

"GILBERT RYLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND"

(UGC under Minor Research Project
No. F. 5-73/2006-07 (MRP/NER)/5291

By

DR. (MRS) MAMANI KALITA

Lecturer, Deptt. of Philosophy
Dispur College, Dispur
Guwahati - 781006

"GILBERT RYLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND"

13899

Minor Research
DISPUR COLLEGE
Guwahati-6

(UGC under Minor Research Project
No. F. 5-73/2006-07 (MRP/NER)/ 5291



By

DR. (MRS) MAMANI KALITA
Lecturer, Deptt. of Philosophy
Dispur College, Dispur
Guwahati - 781006

13899

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Minor Research Project Topic "Gilbert Ryle's Philosophy of Mind" is prepared and I am very much grateful to the University Grants Commission of Gauhati for this Minor Research Work.

As the project was expensive I applied for grant to UGC, NERO, Beltola, Dispur through the U.G.C. Branch, Gauhati University. I was lucky enough to receive a financial grant from UGC/NERO, which considered my case sympathetically. I express my high gratitude to the respected Deputy Secretary and the Education Officer, UGC, NERO without whose help my research work would hardly have been completed. It must be admitted that the establishment of this Regional Office of U.G.C. in Assam has been a boon to us and we can do our works smoothly here.

I convey my sincere thanks to the authors of the books and articles that helped me in preparing the project. I acknowledge with high gratitude to the suggestions of Dr. B.B. Banu, Reader in Philosophy, Gauhati University for her constant advice in completing the project. I thank all the concern staffs to Krishnakanta Hazarika Library of G.U., Lakhminath Bezbaruah Library of Dibrugarh University of Assam, State Library, Dispur College Library, Guwahati, IC PR Library, Luckhnow, and Delhi University Library for their warm co-operation.

13899

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The Minor Research Project Topic "Gilbert Ryle's Philosophy of Mind" is prepared and I am very much grateful to the University Grants Commission of Gauhati for this Minor Research Work.

As the project was expensive I applied for grant to UGC, NERO, Beltoia, Dispur through the U.G.C. Branch, Gauhati University. I was lucky enough to receive a financial grant from UGC/NERO, which considered my case sympathetically. I express my high gratitude to the respected Deputy Secretary and the Education Officer, UGC, NERO without whose help my research work would hardly have been completed. It must be admitted that the establishment of this Regional Office of U.G.C. in Assam has been a boon to us and we can do our works smoothly here.

I convey my sincere thanks to the authors of the books and articles that helped me in preparing the project. I acknowledge with high gratitude to the suggestions of Dr. B.B. Banu, Reader in Philosophy, Gauhati University for her constant advice in completing the project. I thank all the concern staffs to Krishnakanta Ha Library of G.U., Lakhminath Bezbaruah Library of Dibrugarh University of Assam, State Library, Dispur College Library, Guwahati, IC PR Library, Luckhnow, and Delhi University Library for their warm co-operation.

I am highly thankful to Dr. Amar Saikia, Principal, Dispur College, Dr. Reeta Sarma, Vice-Principal, Dispur College for providing me the necessary advice during the period of my project.

However I cannot forget the support and inspiration of my dear husband Mr. Bapan Kalita and affectionate children Mon and Mimi who have helped me in many ways in completing the project.

Minor Research
DISPUR COLLEGE
Guwahati-6

I wish to express gratitude to my mother Mrs. Durga Kalita and my brothers and sisters who always encourage me for further study. At last, I am thankful to Miss Tutumani Kalita, who typed the project with great care.

Dated :



Mamari Kalita
Dr. (Mrs.) Mamani Kalita

CONTENTS



	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION :	1-9
CHAPTER - I : THE NATURE OF MIND AND DIFFERENT THEORIES OF MIND.	10-56
CHAPTER - II : THE NATURE OF DISPOSITIONS & GILBERT RYLE'S ACCOUNT OF MIND.	57-80
CHAPTER - III : THE NATURE OF WILL	81-105
CHAPTER - IV : THE NATURE OF EMOTION.	106-137
CHAPTER - IV : THE NATURE OF SENSATION AND OBSERVATION.	138-170
CHAPTER - VI : THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.	171-203
CHAPTER - VII : AN ANALYSIS OF RYLE'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF MIND.	204-235
CONCLUSION :	236-257
BIBLIOGRAPHY :	258-269

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Mind is the greatest enigma of all times. What is the mind ? - is an important question of the philosophy of mind. Some say that mind is thing, a substance ; others say that it is merely a complex states, attributes and dispositions of living human bodies. Some philosophers again claim that the mind is a form of energy, a kind of force. The philosophers, who say that the mind is substance, say that it is a spiritual or immaterial or non-physical substance. Others say that mind is a material substance made up of organic matter and found inside the skulls of living human beings. Each individual human being has one mind which is inseparably attached to him. Again, sometimes the mind and the soul are treated as one and the same entity. But in other times, the mind is said to be a part of the soul and some thinkers again separate mind and soul entirely. They deny the existence of the soul while maintaining the reality of mind. Thus we see that philosophers are conflicting among themselves about the nature of mind. The concepts of mind and soul are closely linked and overlap but they are not identical.

Philosophy of mind is a philosophical study of mind. Here an attempt is made to analyse and examine those concepts that involve mind including the very concept of mind itself. It constitutes a very important branch of philosophy mainly with the various problems related with mind. In a sense it is defined by a group of problems. The first problem of the philosophy of mind is the problem of clarifying the concept of the nature or structure of the mind or mentality. There are also

problems concerning specific mental properties or kinds of mental states and events and their relationship to one another. The most important problem of the philosophy of mind is the problem concerning the relation between mental and physical properties. They are called "The mind - body problem." It is the central problem of philosophy of mind. This is the problem of clarifying and making intelligible, the relation between our mental and the physical nature of being or more generally, the relationship between mental and physical properties.

The philosophy of mind includes different mental states within its subject matter which can roughly be classified under the following six headings –

- (i) **Sensations :-** Pains, aches, tickles, itches, throbs, tingles, etc.
- (ii) **Cognitions :-** Believing, knowing, understanding, conceiving, thinking, reasoning etc.
- (iii) **Emotions :-** Fear, jealousy, envy, anger, grief, indignation, enjoyment etc.
- (iv) **Perceptions :-** Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching etc.
- (v) **Quasi-perceptual :-** dreaming, imagining, seeing in the minds eye, hallucinating, seeing after images etc.
- (vi) **Conative states :-** acting, trying, wanting, intending, wishing etc.

Among these mental states it can be said that sensations have more or less definite bodily location whereas all the other states do not. Thus the philosophy of mind has different mental phenomena. In this regard, a survey of the full range of views on philosophy of mind have been influential in the history of philosophy. The most important theories of mind have been variants of one basic view like

Platonism, Aristotalism, Conceptualism, Imaginism, Psychological Nonimalism and Behaviourism.

The mind - body dualism is formulated by Descartes over 300 years ago. Descartes argues that the mind or soul is separate from his body. A view like this is called "Substance dualism". According to this theory, a composite being is made up of two distinct substances, an immaterial mind and a material body. The core idea of a substance is that of something than can "exist independently" and have properties and enter into relationships with other substances. By "thinking" Descartes meant a full range of mental states and activities, such as sensing, feeling, perceiving, judging and doubting. Further, minds necessarily lack spatial dimensions and matter necessarily lacks consciousness, which on Descartes' view doesnot prevent them from causally influencing each other. For example, in perception the physical stimulation of our sensory surfaces causes us to perceive objects and events around us and in voluntary action our wants and beliefs cause our limbs to move in appropriate ways. According to Descartes both mind and body interact upon each other on the pineal gland of the brain which is known as interactionism.

Analytical behaviourism challanges and rejects the dualistic theory of Descartes. It maintains that statements about the mind and mental states turn out to be equivalent to statements that describe a person's actual and potential public behaviour. Analytical behaviourism has a number of strengths ----

- (i) Avoidence of mind and body interaction problem :-

Firstly, it makes the nature of the relationship of the mind to the body perspicuous, i.e. The mind just is the behaviour, actual and potential of the body. The mind doesnot cause the behaviour. But it is the behaviour itself.

(ii) The non-mysteriousness of the mental :- There are no mysterious element in mental properties. Internal processes are the cause of the external stimuli and the behaviour. The analytical behaviourist insists that statements describing mental or psychological states can be translated into statements describing possible and actual behaviour.

In the English speaking world, the two prominent trends in philosophy of mind since 1945 are the materialism, which takes various forms and the philosophy of linguistic analysis. Materialist philosophers like to see themselves as sharing the aim of science, which they perceive as a search leading to the discovery of general laws. Thus they seek wide and simple general accounts of the nature of the mind. Materialist theories are 'nothing but' theories. For instance, behavioursim is the theory that the mind is nothing but the body in action and physicalism is the theory that mental events are nothing but brain events. In other words, materialist theories are both scientific and reductive.

Linguistic philosophy takes more than one form. One variety consists of contructing theories about language, as Wittgenstein did in Tractatus - Logico-Philosophicus. Another type takes the form of searching for a logical solution to a particular problem or set of problems. This kind of linguistic philosophy leads to the recognition of previously unnoticed distinctions and may involve inventing new

logical terms. Russell's Theory of Descriptions is an example of this kind. Again, some linguistic philosophy seeks to solve problems by undertaking detailed but non-formal analysis of ordinary language. Linguistic philosophy has roots in logical positivism in so far as the vienna circle and sometimes Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein constructed influential philosophical theories about language.

Gilbert Ryle, published his celebrated book "The Concept of Mind" in 1949 in which he said that behaviourism is a method of research used by experimental psychologists, not a philosophical doctrine. But in spite of this disclaimer Ryle is widely regarded as an exponent of behaviourism. Whether or not Ryle is a behaviourist he is certainly a 'linguistic philosopher' in the sense that he uses logic and facts about language to solve philosophical problems. Ryle's book The Concept of Mind is regarded by some interpreters as making a strong case for philosophical behaviourism. But others see his work as a prime example of linguistic and even Wittgensteinian philosophy. But actually Ryle is essentially interested in solving philosophical problems through language. On the other hand his analysis appears to push him towards behaviouristic conclusions at least in some degree.

In the introduction to his book, Ryle states that his aim is to determine the logical cross-bearing of the mental concepts. Ryle aims to demolish the Cartesian conception of the mind as a ghostly non-physical entity existing over and above the familiar flesh - and - blood living human being, an entity whose states are supposed to be logically private.

Ryle's first aim is to repudiate utterly the Cartesian concept of mind as an

immaterial substance linked in life to a corporeal machine, the body. Ryle characterizes this as "The Dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". Dualism, Ryle says, embodies a category mistake. This concept of a category mistake is a powerful philosophical tool which Ryle explains by means of examples. Ryle argues that mistakes about the mind come from wrongly believing that mind like matter belongs in the category of substances. The Cartesian dualists believe in the existence of two substances material and mental. But Ryle says that a person does not live through two collateral histories, the one consisting the outward public physical doings and the other consisting in ghostly happenings on a private mental stage. Ryle argues that the supposition that there are special non-material mental events and actions which take place in a non-material substance is 'an unfortunate linguistic fashion' which traditionally belongs to the two-worlds story, the story that some things exist or occur "in the physical world", while other things exist or occur not in that world, but in another metaphorical place".

Ryle shows that there are no such things as mental acts by examining 'a whole battery' of psychological concepts, with the aim of proving that none of them fits into our action of an action or an event, but rather each falls into one of the three broad classes -

(a) dispositional concepts (b) adverbial concepts and (c) achievement concepts.

Dispositional concepts include liabilities, tendencies, abilities, capacities, habits etc. The things like inclinations, motives, moods and agitations which are some times called mental states, are not really states at all, but propensities. There

are distinctions between dispositions and actions. Actions take place in time (when) and take time (how long). But dispositions do not occur at specific times and do not take time in the way that actions and events do. According to Ryle, states such as knowing, believing, wishing, hoping, fearing are not deeds but dispositions.

The idea of an adverbial concept is explained by Ryle as follows -

In describing a person's mind we are describing the ways in which parts of his conduct are managed. Thus in saying of someone that he is aware of what he is doing, or is paying heed to what he is doing, we do not refer to a mental act which is being performed by him simultaneously with his physical performance, for example, writing a letter, or driving a car or reciting a poem. But rather to such facts as that he can later say what he was doing. But adverbial concepts do not reduce to dispositional concepts. Thus according to Ryle, the meaning of 'attention' is derived from the meaning of 'attentively', the meaning of 'heed' from the meaning of 'heedfully' and the meaning of 'awareness' from the meanings of such adverbs as 'carefully', 'knowledgeably' and 'deliberately'.

Ryle says that achievements are not actions because they do not take time. They are not doings, but end-points. Ryle also calls them 'success-words'. Verbs, which refer to achievements and end-points include 'win', 'conquer', 'unlock', 'prove', 'deduce', 'solve', 'see' etc.

In his book "The Concept of Mind", Ryle analyses the different mental concepts and upholds the dispositional analysis of mind. In the thesis, my main objective is to analyse the different mental concepts and Gilbert Ryle's analysis of

the dispositional theory of mind. In the thesis, I shall try to make critical analysis of the traditional conception of mind, specially Descartes' dualistic theory of mind. For this purpose, I shall offer Gilbert Ryle's opinion on the various concepts. My main objective is to offer a critical exposition of Ryle's philosophy of mind.

In the chapter I, I will describe the nature and theories of mind given by the different philosophers at different times.

In the chapter II, I shall be concerned with the nature of dispositions. Here I will describe the different views on dispositions and will examine Ryle's dispositional account of mind. In this chapter an analysis will be devoted to the distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' which is an essential part of Ryle's philosophy of mind.

In the chapter III, I shall be concerned on the nature of will. Here, I will describe the nature of will analysed by the traditional philosophers as well as Gilbert Ryle's analysis of will.

In the chapter IV, I shall be mainly concerned with the nature of emotion. In this chapter first I will deal with the definition and theories of emotion given by the traditional philosophers and the last part will be devoted to Gilbert Ryle's account of emotion.

The chapter V deals with the nature of sensation and observation. Here I will describe clearly the traditional account of sensation and observation and ultimately will examine Ryle's account of it.

In the chapter VI, I shall be concerned with the nature of consciousness.

Here I will discuss the different psychological and philosophical account of consciousness and will examine how far Ryle's view of consciousness is tenable.

The chapter VII deals with Ryle and Wittgenstein. Here I will examine the dominant figures of twentieth century philosophy which is known as 'Linguistic Analysis' and will compare the logical behaviourism of Ryle to that of Wittgenstein.

The last chapter will be the concluding chapter. In this chapter a critical exposition on some of the mental concepts of Gilbert Ryle will be analysed. Here I will sum up my findings and will try to show whether Ryle's account of mind is tenable to us.

CHAPTER - I

CHAPTER (I)

Nature of Mind, Different Theories of Mind

One of the most important problems of philosophy is the problem about the nature of mind. There are different explanations regarding the nature of mind but none can explain it clearly. The nature of mind centres round the relation between mind and body. Bruce Aune Says, "The mind-body problem has been called a world knot, where all the problems of philosophy ultimately come together."¹

To explain the nature of mind we have to be clear about the mental words, mind, soul and spirit. Of course, they are not synonyms because the word mind suggests intellectual activities while the soul and psychical are called emotional and vital elements. On the otherhand when we think of the mind as seperable from the body, we use the word spirit and the adjective spiritual suggests moral and religious values. Man is differentiated from other animals because of his possession of mind and different mental capacities, i.e. his capacity for thought, feeling and deliberate actions.

In order to understand the nature of mind clearly we have to analyse the different formulations of mind. According to Oxford Dictionary, mind means a seat of consciousness, thought, volition, feelings, attention and concentrations. According to the Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Psychology 'the mind' is taken to include, everything one is inclined to call 'mental'. Historically the term succeeded and supplimented the Aristotelian notion of psyche, which denotes all the func-

¹ Aune, Bruce : Knowledge, Mind & Matter, P- 225

tions that distinguish the animate from the inanimate. Hence psyche includes metabolism, nutrition, growth and locomotion as well as the mental phenomena thoughts, feelings, perception, sensation, moods ; but intellectual activity has always been most central elements.

According to Dictionary of Philosophy mind is used in two principal senses:-

(i) The individual mind is the self or subject which perceives, remembers, images, feels, conceives, reasons, wills etc. and which is functionally related to an individual bodily organism.

(ii) Mind is generally considered as a metaphysical substance which pervades all individual minds and which is contrasted with matter and material substance.

According to the Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Philosophy, "The mind - body problem is the philosophical problem of how the mind is related to the body, and of what properties, functions, and occurrences, should be regarded as respectively, mental or physical. This problem is central to both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology".

The problem of the relation of body to mind is usually interpreted to mean the relation of matter to mind. These two problems are identical. Primitive men thought of the soul or mind as a kind of shadowy image or replica of the body, perhaps like a vapour or breath, capable of leaving the body during sleep and surviving it after death. Primitive men didnot have any clear idea about self. But he did have certain beliefs about himself and his fellow beings. He thought that the shadowy duplicate of body had a seperate and independent existence and that is

why it was not subject to any limitation as human body. "The belief most widely current among the peoples of lower culture is that each man consists, not only of the body which is constantly present among his fellows, but also of a shadowy vapour-like duplicate of his body; this shadow-like image, the animating principle of the living organism is thought to be capable of leaving the body, of transporting itself rapidly, if not instantaneously, from place to place and of manifesting in those places all or most of the powers that it exerts in the body during waking life."² They explained sleep as a temporary separation of this ghostly duplicate from the body and by death they meant its permanent separation. In this way the primitive man explained himself as mental. This concept was found in ancient Hebrews, one of the earliest tribes. They took the soul to be whatever that resides in a body and which made body alive and which made it living something rather than dead one. This tribe used the word 'Hebrew' for 'breath' which is a sign of life and soul.

Greek philosophy and literature are permeated with the idea of the soul. Greek thinkers did not accept the primitive concept of matter and mind. Mind for them was a sort of subtle matter. They drew no sharp distinction between mind and matter. The Greek word 'psyche' signifies soul and consciousness. The distinction between soul and body was not a distinction between substances one of which was material and the other spiritual. The earliest Greek thinkers believed in a "divine and animate essence, immanent in nature, appearing in man as the soul, the source of life and intelligence. This view is found in the doctrine of Heracleitus, who thought that the soul is a fiery vapour, identical with the rational and vital fire

2. Mc. Dougall, W. Body & Mind, P - 1

soul of the universe. Greek Science, however culminated in Democritus, who believed that all physical things are composed of material atoms in mechanical interaction. According to him, the soul or mind also consists of smooth round atoms permeating the body. Democritus admitted the soul or the mind as a mobile substance pervading the whole body. Permenides explained all psychological phenomena by the mixture of substances in the body and drew no distinction between the mental and the corporeal.

The Sophists draw the philosophical thinking toward knowledge. According to Democritus, knowledge is due to the motion of the atoms, specially impinging on fire atoms. There is only a difference in degree between perception and thought. In perception motion is coarse and rough, and in contrast in thought the motion is fine and gentle. So there is no real distinction between sense and reason or matter and mind. Therefore, Protagoras holds that knowledge is perception. Again Gorgias points out that thought is not identical with being. We can think of things both real and unreal. Since what we think does not necessarily exist and we have no means of distinguishing real things from unreal ones. Thus he concludes against Permenides' identification of thought with its object.

According to Socrates, the fundamental mistake of the Sophists was that they denied the role of reason, which constitutes the knowledge and morality. They did not distinguish between reason and perception. But Permenides and Heraclitus draw the distinction between reason and perception and Socrates accepts this distinction. For Socrates, perception can yield only what is relative with regard to

the realm of becoming. Reason or Thought or Mind can give us what is universal and valid for all persons. Socrates maintained that virtue is knowledge of the good through concepts, and concepts are formed by reason. Socrates believed in the immortality of soul and its pristine knowledge. Concept is formed by a glimpse or intuition of the universals. Socrates maintained that morality or virtue is knowledge of the good through concept and since concepts are formed by reason, so morality issues forth from rational insight into the good. "Socrates speaks of reasoning or thinking, temper and desires as the three parts of the soul. The function of reasoning is wisdom ; wisdom commands, while temper assists in the execution of these commands, and desire furnishes the material basis of action."³ Thus Socrates uses the term reason or thought as the function of soul to control all the activities.

The popular modern ideas about the soul or the mind is largely Platonic. According to Plato the soul is a distinct immaterial essence imprisoned in the body. Its home and destiny is the world of eternal Ideas and its nature has little in common with the earthly things. Plato's teaching clearly shows the personality, individuality and immortality of the soul. The soul has intuitive knowledge of the world of Ideas and it has higher values because it possesses inner divine nature. The soul brings with it a kind of reminiscence of its former exalted home, prior to its life in the body. It is the source of motion in the body as well as the fountain of knowledge and aspiration. Plato attempted to give us a psychological analysis

3. John Burnet J. Greek Philosophy PP - 144-145

about the soul but ultimately he was not successful in doing so and his psychology is largely coloured with metaphysics. The Platonic conception of soul is not systematically worked out. It is scattered through a number of dialogues which are written at a long interval of time. Again his views have undergone considerable changes from time to time.

Plato's explanation of the connection between soul and body is never precise. He expounds it in the form of myth. He believes that it is not possible to give any exact account of the soul but only pictorial one which is something like the actual truth.

In "Republic", Plato gives us a detailed analysis about the soul. Plato distinguished three parts or functions of the soul which correspond with reason, will or feeling. In the fourth book of the Republic, Plato speaks that the parts of the soul differ from one another. Will and feeling are connected with the physical body and evidently they are not immortal. The reason is the 'divine' part of the soul and it is separate and independent from the body. Thus the words separateness, divinity and immortality of the soul, Plato probably had in mind the 'divine' or the 'reason' part of the soul. In this point we find a clear distinction between soul and body. His sharp distinction between the body and the soul was the source of the dualistic theories. In addition to these parts Plato further speaks of a third principle, namely passion of the Soul. Plato's theory of soul enabled him to account for motion. Plato was the first to attempt a scientific justification of the soul. He distinguishes ten kinds of motion. Among them the ninth is the motion that can move other

thing but cannot move itself, and the tenth is that which can move both itself and other things. This tenth kind of motion is never found in earth, fire or water but only to that which lives or which has a soul. He says that by soul he means that motion which of itself can move itself. The other motions all belong to body. Therefore, the soul according to Plato, is prior to body.

Aristotle mentions that the soul is the organization of the body. But Aristotle forbids us to identify the soul with bodily organization. He says that the soul is non-bodily principle within the body. It is the 'form' within the matter. Aristotle mentions three kinds of soul which corresponds to three forms of life - the vegetative, the animal and the human soul. The soul of plants is the vegetative soul which corresponds to the phenomena of nutrition and reproduction. Animal souls are sensitive and appetitive. Sensations and locomotion are the functions of the animal body. Human souls are characterised by reason and intelligence. Thus the soul was regarded not as something independent of the body but an immanent influence without which there couldnot be any unity nor bodily organisation. Aristotle's conception of mind is biological, though it is different from modern biology.

The evolution of mind created by Aristotle made a great contribution in the classical western philosophy and remained a very influential theory throughout many centuries. Pointing out this point Prof. E. Harris writes : "Aristotle is indeed, one of the great figures in the history of philosophy whose thought, though inevitably a product of a period, rises the special view points of the time comes look nearer to grasping the eternal truth which is the goal of the whole historical

development."⁴ In his book "On the Soul", Aristotle shows that there is a distinction between soul and mind. He says that the mind is higher than the soul and soul is bound to the body. Aristotle writes, "The case of mind is different, it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed The mind is the part of us that understands mathematics and philosophy, its objects are timeless, and therefore it is regarded as itself timeless. The Soul is what moves the body and perceives sensible objects: it is characterised by self-nutrition, sensation, feeling and motivity ; but the mind has no relation to the body or to the senses. Hence the mind can be immortal, though the rest of the soul can not." Aristotle maintains that body and soul are related as matter and form. Thus it follows that soul is inseparable from its body. Aristotle regards mind as the higher part of the soul. According to the Encyclopaedic Genius, Aristotle holds that the faculty of thought is the one part of the soul and is separated from the body. In Aristotle's philosophy the word 'Nous' or reason is responsible for thinking and it is related with the soul. When the body dies, its function in the form of the soul disappears and active reason returns to God. The words sensation, perception and memory, all belong to the body. Therefore, with the destruction of the body, all of them are lost. Aristotle believes that man is distinguished from other animals by the possession of reason. Reason is the function of the soul. Human souls resemble the soul of plants and lower animals. Like the soul of plant, the human soul controls the lower vital functions and like the

4. Harris, E. Nature, Mind and Modern Science P- 107

animal soul, it is responsible for the possession of perception, desire, pleasure, pain etc. For the possession of reason, the soul of man has the power of conceptual thought. With the perception the soul can apprehend the sensible object and with the reason the soul apprehends the concepts.

In the seventeenth century dualism as a philosophical method was established by Descartes. Decartes was the most significant dualistic philosopher. His concept of mind and its relation to body is a revolutionary one. 'Substance' according to him, is a thing that exists. It exists by itself and requires nothing for its existence. Descartes believes in the existence of three substances, namely God, mind and body. He defines these three substances thus, "That substances in which thought immediately resides, I call Mind that substance, which is the immediate subject of extension in space and of the accidents and pre-suppose extension, e.g. figure, situation, movement in space, etc. is called Body that substance which we understand to be supremely perfect and in which we conceive absolutely nothing involving defect or limitation of its perfection is called God."⁵ But although Decartes believes in the existence of three substances, he never gives them equal status. He says that mind and body are created by God and as such they are dependent on God for their existence. It is only God who never depends on anything else for his existence. Both mind and body are independent of each other.

In his famous work "Meditation" Descartes establishes a rigid dualism between mind and body. Descartes tried to show that mind and body are two distinct,

5. Quoted from Haldane and Ross : The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Vol. II, P.- 53

separate and independent substances. Matter or body for him, is extensive, inert subject to mechanical laws, having no desire, purpose, or power of spontaneous motion. The soul or mind for him is a substance with no extension, whose essential nature is to think. By 'thinking' Descartes meant all those activities, which we commonly associate with the mental, namely desiring, feeling, judging, willing and so on. Descartes admitted that both mind and body are two antagonistic substances. What is there in the mind is never found in the body and what is present in the body is absent in the mind. Consciousness or thought which is the essence of mind is opposed to extension of bodies. Descartes' view is that like all other bodies, human body is a machine. But he makes a difference between artificial bodies and human bodies only on the ground that the artificial bodies are made by the hand of man whereas the human bodies are fashioned by God, the most perfect being.

In his *Meditations* Descartes thoroughly examines all the categories of knowledge and tries to find out whether any assertion in any one of them is free from doubt. Descartes wanted to doubt whatever was capable of being doubted and reconstructed his philosophy with some self-evident principle. He maintained that the single, certain truth can be systematically sought by deliberate doubt. In order to discover the indubitable intuition, Descartes doubts everything in this world. The things like tables, chairs, desks, benches etc. which we use in our daily life and know through the senses can also be doubted. The senses, can deceive us as illusions and hallucinations. According to Descartes even the truth of science can be doubted.

Thus Descartes started his philosophy by doubting everything in this world. But his doubt could not continue infinitely. He had to stop somewhere and to believe the existence of something. He says that he may doubt any thing but he must believe the fact that he is doubting. His doubting may be a dream or a real consciousness, but he must exist as doubting being. He further says that if he thinks that there is a demon that deceives him then he must believe that he exists as a thinking being to be deceived. Thus from the knowledge that he is thinking, Descartes concludes that he exists. "I doubt or think, therefore I exist" i.e. "Cogito ergo sum". This Cogito ergo sum is the one certain truth and is taken by him as the foundation of his entire philosophy. "To doubt or to think all opinions as false, necessitates the existence of the doubter. If I doubt, I think, if I think then I exist 'Cogito ergo sum.'" Thus in his Cogito ergo sum, Descartes discovers the indubitable existence of I. But this 'I' is not the empirical 'I', instead it is the thinking 'I'. After proving his own existence Descartes did not stop his enquiry. By applying the same method he proved the existence of the external world, God etc.

According to Descartes, the self or mind is not related with the external world directly, but it possesses the peculiar quality of consciousness by virtue of which one can be aware of the external objects. Descartes takes the help of 'ideas' and these 'ideas' are copies or representations of physical objects. Hence he is called the founder of the famous doctrine of representationalism. His representationalism is thus the logical counterpart of the dualists' metaphysics. For Descartes mind is a qualified existent. There are some qualities such as colour, smell, taste

etc. which are changeable, while other qualities, such as extension, figure and motion are unchangeable. Descartes says that the former qualities are ideas of our mind and the later qualities correspond to the physical world. In his earlier view we find that he believes all ideas as innate. But afterwards he draws a qualitative distinction between ideas and extension, figure and motion as understanding or thought and the idea of colour, taste, smell, etc. as sensing. All the objective faculties as feeling, emotion, imagination etc. except thinking or understanding are called by imagination.

But though it appears that Cartesian philosophy is a dualistic one, it is found that this is not the case. His philosophy is really "Trilateralistic" because Cartesians believe in the existence of three substances-mind, body and God. The concurrence of the God is urgently necessary for mind and body. In his *Meditations VI*, Descartes says "God can effect whatever we clearly perceive just as we perceive it. But we clearly perceive the mind, i.e., a thinking substance, apart from the body, i.e., apart from any extended substance, and vice-versa, we can perceive body apart from mind."⁶ Hence, at least through the instrumentality of the Divine power, mind can exist apart from body and body apart from mind. In his *Meditations* Descartes says that the sensation of 'hunger', 'thirst', 'pain' etc are confused modes of self consciousness which arise from the union of mind and body. Cartesianism is blended with the elements of pantheism, materialism and idealism. If it thinks that mind and matter are co-ordinate aspects of God who becomes the indwelling substance of all things, we find it to be like the pantheism

6. Ibid, P - 59

of Spinoza. Again, if we abolish mind as a thinking substance and think that thought is nothing but the function of a bodily machine, then we have the materialism of Hobbes. Again if we abolish matter and absorb it into spirit as a thought in the Divine mind, then we have the idealism of Malebranche and Berkeley. But Descartes forbades us to think in such ways. It is true that he is a typical dualist.

In his Third Meditation Descartes deals with "The Existence of God". According to him, God is free from all kinds of errors. Thus in order to make him free from errors he imposed it on the shoulder of man. This leads him to a second dualism within his dualism of mind and body, viz. intellect and will. In respect of intellect man is less than God, but in respect of will man is God. "The intellect is limited in its perception of truths ; in this respect man is less than God. But the will is unlimited, it is wholly free ; in this respect man is like God".⁷ Descartes believes the ontological proof as the existence of God. The ontological argument consists in inferring the existence of God from the idea of God. According to him the existence of God follows from the idea of a perfect being for perfection implies existence. Descartes advanced another argument to ontological argument i.e., The idea of an Infinite being. The idea of God is the idea of an actually Infinite being. Thus Descartes inferred the existence of God as the cause of the idea of the Infinite being.

Descartes in his sixth Meditation deals with "The Existence of Material Things and the Real Distinction between Mind and Body." Thus he repeatedly declared that mind and body are two independent entities and each have its own character-

7. Quoted from R. M. Eaton's (ed.) : Descartes Selection, P - 3

istics. But it is very difficult to stick on this hard and fast distinction between mind and body. Thus according to Descartes, there is an interaction between mind and body. They interact upon each other in the pineal gland of the brain. He says that sometimes mind causes bodily changes and sometimes body causes mind's changes. It is an experience of daily life that if there be any kind of diseases in the body then it affects man's life and thinking. If there be a blow on the head it may cause our loss of consciousness. It is well known that the uses of drugs, alcohol and coffee cause mental affect. There is a common experience that with the development of brain and nervous system thinking power of mind also increases. These examples prove that physical conditions affect mental condition. Thus though Descartes believes that there is a well-known distinction between mind and body, yet at the same he firmly asserts their intimate union in man's nature. This is known as interactionism or the mind-body relation in Descartes' philosophy. In his sixth Meditation, Descartes says, "I here show that the mind is really distinct from the body, and at the same time that the two are so closely joined together that they form so to speak, a single thing."

In his later work, "The Passions of the Soul" Descartes depicted a thorough going causal account of the relations involved between the mind and body. But Descartes emphatically says that my soul is not in my body as a "pilot in a ship". Descartes concludes that the soul or mind is a permanent substance since we have found its essence called thinking whichever the worst of doubt cannot demolish. Thus Descartes by his first principle, 'Cogito ergo sum' he had proved his

own existence with certainty.

By 'Cogito ergo sum' he does not logically deduce 'sum' from 'Cogito' but rather perceives intuitively the self-evident of 'sum'. Descartes tried to establish not an inference but a simple fact of primitive knowledge or self-evident axiom. If it is an inference, then it would be merely dependent on premises for its certainty and then again these premises on other premises for their certainty. This would lead to infinite regress without reaching the indubitable truth. Moreover, the certainty of the Cogito is clear and distinct and nothing close can be perceived with the same certainty. Cogito ergo sum means that my consciousness is the means of revealing myself as something existing. There is the indubitable truth of the inseparability of thought and thing.

The English philosopher John Locke developed his theory of mind in the later Seventeenth Century. His chief work "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" deals with the nature of mind. He tried to determine the nature, function, origin and limits of knowledge by his theory of mind. The use of the term 'idea' is very important for understanding his philosophy of mind. The 'idea' may mean the mode of individual consciousness or a representation of something other than itself. Locke uses the term in both the senses. If we say that we have an idea or thought of the table then ordinarily we mean that we are conscious of something before us. Again we find that the idea of table consists of some images, sensations and feeling which stand for something independent of the mind. Thus it can be said that each idea is a modification of an individual consciousness pointing out and

13899
2/4/09

representing something in the extramental world. Again, idea as an event in individual's consciousness can be studied from psychological and logical standpoint. The idea in one's consciousness can be analysed in terms of sensation, images and feeling from the psychological standpoint. Moreover from the logical standpoint, an idea involves the fundamental, timeless and logical content in it. It is true that Locke is realist. But he believes in an extramental world to which our ideas refer. Locke understands by innate ideas that ideas which the mind simply finds in itself, as distinguished from those ideas which it receives from outside.

Locke refutes the doctrine of inborn truth or innate ideas. There is not any speculative principles present in the minds of men. They are also acquired in the same way as other truths. In its first state, the mind is a 'tabula rasa', a 'dark chamber', an 'empty cabinet', 'white paper', void of all characters, and without any ideas. The two sources of all our ideas are sensation and reflection. By sensation the mind is furnished with sensible qualities and by reflection the mind operates on perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing and willing. The primary capacity of the human mind is intellect's ability to receive the impressions made on it, either through the senses by outward objects or by its own operations when it reflects on it. By idea, Locke means that ideas which the mind directly apprehends or which is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding. Thus the mind receives the simple ideas and has the power to repeat, compare and combine in endless variety and thus to make new complex ideas. Some simple ideas enter our minds by one sense only. For example the ideas of

colour, sound, taste, heat, cold, solidity etc. Some ideas are conveyed into the mind by more than one sense. For example, the idea of space or extension, figure, rest and motion etc. enter through sight and touch. Again, some ideas are received by reflection. For example, the mind notices its operations of perception, retention and recall in memory, discerning, comparing, compounding, naming and abstracting. Locke distinguished between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are those qualities which belong to the objects themselves and are utterly inseparable from them. Among primary or original qualities are solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number. On the other hand, secondary qualities are those which are nothing in the objects themselves except powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities. For example, qualities such as colours, sounds, tastes etc. are secondary qualities. The primary qualities are constantly found in the bodies. Thus the "primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all". Locke points out that primary qualities are really existent whether there be any person to perceive them or not. But secondary qualities are totally dependent on human subjects and their various sense-organs. Without eyes there are no colours, without ears there are no sounds. Secondary qualities are relative. For example, the same bucket of water may be cold or hot according to the different arrangements.

According to Locke, the self is conscious of its own existence. Locke writes,

"We have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence ; a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of God, of the existence of anything else, we have no other but a sensitive knowledge."⁸ Thus according to Locke, the existence of self is intuitively and immediately known because it accompanies every act of our sensation and perception. In this point Descartes is similar to Locke. But with regard to the nature of mind there is a fundamental difference between Locke and Descartes. Locke disagrees with Descartes on the ground that consciousness or thought is the essence of mind.

Thus from the above analysis we get the knowledge of mind through reflection. The mind has the qualities of perceiving, thinking, memory and witting with the idea of an unknown substratum. Hence the nature of mind is unknown, though its qualities are known. By its own power, the mind can put together the simple ideas and make new complex ideas. The complex ideas are divided into modes, substances and relations. Modes are those complex ideas which contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves but are considered as dependences on substances. For example, the ideas of number, duration, triangle and gratitude. A substance is the substratum or support underlying a number of simple qualities experienced together. A substance is not given in sensation or reflection and it is not experienced by us . Hence it is an unknown substratum of qualities. The mind also gets certain ideas of relation by comparing one thing with another. The idea of cause and effect is the most comprehensive relation subsisting among ideas. It is a relation derived from sensation and reflection.

8. John Locke . An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book - IV, Ch.II P.- 280

Thus in offering his nature of mind Locke vehemently criticised the innate ideas of Descartes. The laws of contradiction and identity and the like are supposed to be innate but no such ideas are found in the mind of the insane, idiots and children. Locke maintains that no ideas are innate as none are universal. But again from the universality of any idea we cannot prove its innateness. Ideas may be universal without being innate. For example, everybody has the idea of the sun, fire and heat and yet no body regards them innate. Locke's method of ideas is primarily psychological for he wants to analyse the process in which we do come to have our actual experience.

Another English empiricist George Berkeley (1685-1753) occupies an important position in the philosophy of mind. The philosophy which Berkeley inherited was mainly that of Locke. Berkeley tried to be a more consistent Locke. According to him, things cannot exist without some mind to perceive them. When there are no human minds, things are sustained by the divine mind. In his view mind is a thinking and active being, "a real thing which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas and wills and reasons about them." Regarding ideas Berkeley says, (a) Ideas actually imprinted on the senses, (b) Ideas perceived by attending to the positions and operations of the mind (c) Ideas formed by help of memory and imagination. He admits that there is some thing which knows or perceives them and exercises diverse operations - as witting, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving active being is what Berkeley calls mind, spirit, soul or myself. Berkeley is confident of the capacity of the human

mind to cope with the problem of knowledge. He believed that though we donot have any idea of the self yet we have a notion of it.

Berkeley rejects the abstract ideas. The mind is incapable of forming abstract ideas. The idea of a world without the mind, is an abstract idea. Our thoughts and passions and the pictures of the imagination donot exist outside the mind. They are all in the mind, their existence consists in their being perceived or known by the mind. Hence to exist means to be perceived, to be in the mind. The famous doctrine of Berkeley's philosophy is "Esse est percipi". By this he means that if anything exists it must be thought or percieved by the mind. Nothing can exist which is not known by the mind. Berkeley's system is idealistic, since it teaches the reality consists of spirits and their ideas only. A body is solid, extended, figured substance having the power of motion, a certain colour, weight, taste, smell, and sound. The primary qualities are inseperably united with the secondary. The so-called primary qualities are also ideas. Ideas are mental. Therefore, even the primary qualities are mental.

According to Berkeley there must be some cause of the sensations or ideas in my mind. This cause must be an active substance. It cannot be a material substance. Hence it must be an incorporeal, active substance or spirit. A spirit is one undivided, active being, which is so far as it perceives ideas is called understanding ; in so far as it operates upon them, it is called will. Berkeley says that he has notions of his own mind and its operations, of other finite kinds and of God's mind. The uniform rules in conformity with which the supreme mind excites in us,

are called the laws of nature. The ideas imprinted on the sense by God are called real things and those excited in the imagination, beingless, regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed as ideas or images of things which they copy or represent. But our sensations are ideas. They exist in the mind. Thus matter does not exist and Berkeley is a founder of immaterialism.

But Berkeley's philosophy is not free from criticism from the leading and recent philosophical point of view. Berkeley's emphasis on the conative aspect of human mind is admitted by modern psychology. Modern psychology no longer recognised conation and cognition as two different faculties of mind. Thus according to Stout, cognition, feeling and conation are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in any concrete psychosis, but they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from each other.

David Hume (1711-76) strongly criticises the mind or self as a spiritual substance. Hume said that we have no experience of any such thing as a soul and there is no evidence for its existence. According to him, experience gives us nothing but a lot of impressions or perceptions and ideas or memory images and we have no way of reason for believing that the mind is anything more than the collection of these impressions and ideas. He maintains that consciousness is nothing but numerous experiences, which he calls "perceptions", of pleasure, pain, sights, sounds, thought, desire and the like. There are some philosophers who imagine that in every moment we feel about some kind of consciousness or self. But Hume says, "..... For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I

always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non entity."⁹

Thus according to Hume there is no entity as self or permanent substance. Consciousness is a constantly changing and shifting flow of experiences. He forbids us to identify these continuous changing experiences with any underlying permanent principle. He says that belief in the existence of a permanent self is a mythological conception. Hume maintains that the fiction of personal identity is the work of imagination. The succession of pleasure, pain, sensations and images are connected together by resemblance, contiguity and causation. For Hume, our notion of personal identity proceeds entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought according to the principles of resemblance, contiguity and causation. This resemblance is sustained by our memory. Again, causation also produces the notion of personal identity. According to Hume, the human mind is "a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect and mutually produce, destroy, influence and modify each other. Our impressions rise to their correspondent ideas ; and these

9. Hume, David : Treatise On Human Nature, Book - I, P - 252

ideas in their turn produce other impressions."

Thus the self or mind for Hume, is just a construct of sensations, feeling and images. The so-called self is nothing but a heap or collection of passing sensations. Hume advances his own theory of mind. In his own words : "The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearances : pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity at different, whatever natural propension we have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind"¹⁰

Thus what is meant by self, according to Hume is simply the totality of experiences and nothing more. He analysed the furniture of the mind in terms of fleeting impressions. Hume, after a careful analysis of the main categories of thought comes to the conclusion that there is no substance, neither matter nor self. We are left with passing impressions only. Hume had a constructive philosophy of empiricism with these four principles : (i) The doctrine of impressions and ideas, (ii) The laws of association, (iii) The imagination and (iv) His theory of relations. By these principles Hume shows that real knowledge is habitual and not cogitative. Thus according to Hume there is no permanent substance like mind or soul or self. Mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations

The German Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attacked the tradi-

¹⁰ Ibid, P - 253

tional theory of Soul. Kant himself maintains that Hume aroused him from his dogmatic slumbers. Kant agrees with Hume in saying that the self is never revealed in experience. Modern philosophy begins with faith in the power of the human mind to attain knowledge. Kant maintains that the senses furnish the materials of our knowledge and the mind arranges them in ways made necessary by its own nature. Hence we have universal and necessary knowledge of the order of ideas, though not of things-in-themselves. The contents of our knowledge are derived from experience (empiricism) but the mind thinks its experiences, conceives them according to its native a priori, that is, rational ways (rationalism). Kant claims that knowledge consists of synthetic a priori judgements. There can be no synthetic judgement without a synthetic mind, no causal judgement without a mind thinking in terms of cause and effect. Here Kant is employing human reason with all its categories. Knowledge presupposes a mind. Moreover, we cannot think without having something to think about, and we can have no object of thought unless it is given through the senses or unless the mind is receptive or has sensibility. Percepts and concepts constitute the elements of our knowledge. Percepts without concepts are blind, concepts without percepts are empty.

Unlike Hume, Kant argues that the traditional view on the soul is self-contradictory. Self, according to Kant, is that which does knowing. It is always the subject of knowledge and as such it can never be made an object of knowledge. "I cannot know I but only me ; myself as subject I cannot know but only myself as

object."¹¹ But the solution to the problem of the nature of mind given by Hume is not accepted by Kant. Kant says that Hume failed to prove the unity of mind. Kant concludes that Hume's view of mind as a collection of experiences bound together by the laws of association does not solve the problem. Kant insists that there is more of unity within mind, than Hume admits. In his 'Critique of Pure Reason', Kant refers to this unifying function as the 'Synthetic unity of Apperception'. By this he means some kind of capacity within the mind to organise different experiences into meaningful wholes either by way of memory and association or by way of inference. Hence according to Kant mind is not a 'bundle' of experiences as Hume said. The mind is rather an 'organization' of experiences, and this organization is made possible by an actually existing principle or agent of organization. Thus Kant insists on the necessity of an organizing principle of experiences which Hume denies. Kant emphasizes the essential unitary spiritual character of the mind, of which nature is hardly more than the phenomenal product. Form is a principle of unity in experience and matter is a principle of manifoldness or multiplicity. Kant says, "That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter ; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations I term the form of appearance."¹² Thus according to Kant knowledge or judgement would be impossible without a synthetic, thinking mind, that is, without understanding or intelligence. Sensibility is receptive, but understanding is active and spontaneous. The forms of sensibility are intuitional

11. Quoted from G.W. Cunningham's, *Problems of Philosophy*, P - 255

12. Quoted from Frank Thilly's *A History of Philosophy*, P - 418

and the understanding is conceptual : it thinks in concepts. Thus knowledge is possible by the union of the two-mind and matter.

Several theories have been advanced to describe the nature of the relation between mind and body. As a result we have different theories of mind such as Interactionism Occasionalism, Pre-established harmony, Parallelism, Epiphenomenalism, Emergent evolution etc. Besides some philosophers again offer different theories of mind under the headings of Dualism, Mentalistic Monism, Materialistic Monism, Neutral Monism etc. But during the last century the foundations of the philosophy of mind were laid on experimental science and in empirical psychology. Thus we have also some principal theories of mind held by philosophers during the nineteenth century. We can distinguish these theories under four classes such as Materialistic theories, Idealistic theories, Double aspect theories. A comparative analysis of these theories are discussed in the following —

The materialistic theories of mind maintains that mentality is merely of many possible attributes of certain more or less complex material bodies. Materialism admits that there is no other reality than matter. Mind is either a form or function of matter. Consciousness arises in the transformation of energy in the highly complex mechanism of the nervous system, but is not itself a distinct form of energy nor a distinct form of being of any kind. In the Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy we find Democritus who admits the materialistic theory of the mind. Democritus considers the soul to be composed of atoms, like the body. The chief exponents of this theory of mind were members of the associationist school like Spencer, Lewes and

Huxley. Some of the German materialists of the eighteenth century speak of thought or consciousness as being a secretion of the brain. Hackel in his "Riddle of the Universe" maintains that the mind is a function of the brain.

Epiphenomenalism is a theory of mind advocated by a group of materialists. This word was first used by Huxley. It indicates that mind is not a factor in natural processes. Mind is a name that we give to certain phenomena that merely accompany types of processes and changes in the nervous system. Mental states are like a kind of aura, hovering about cerebral processes without themselves having any function. They effect no changes and have themselves no significance in the world of movement. The materialists take mind as different from body and believe in a causal relation between body and mind. But this relation holds only in one direction. Mind is an offshoot of brain activity and so is caused by it. But mental processes cannot cause brain processes. Mind is an epiphenomenon i.e. of phenomenon of secondary importance only. Mind is a kind of functionless attendant upon certain forms of cerebral activity- a sort of shadow thrown by the body.

In Russia, Pavlov, admitted the old mechanistic theory under the title of behaviourism. Ryle, in his book "The Concept of Mind" has accepted (with minor reservations) a thorough going behaviouristic stand point and has begged psychologist once and to discard the 'theological notion' of a mind or soul- temporarily lodged in the body like 'a ghost berking in the neurological machine'. Behaviourism continues the mechanistic trend in psychology, reducing psychic

phenomena to the relations of the organism. Behaviourism identifies consciousness and behaviour the main unit of which it considers to be the stimulus reaction correlation. Knowledge, according to behaviourism is entirely a matter of the conditioned reactions of organisms (including man). Thus behaviourism is a science which studies in a wholly objective way the conduct or behavior of living beings and considers human psychology to have just this behaviour to men as its subject matter. Behaviourism commands our highest respect because it is the method of advancing the science of psychology free from doubtful assumptions. But it can make no lawful claim to furnishing a philosophy of mind.

The dualistic or animistic theories of mind is an important theory coming from Plato and Descartes. Dualism as a metaphysical theory taught by Descartes and accepted by Locke and popularized in America through the influence of the Scottish School. According to this theory mind and body are quite distinct and represent the two universal realities. At the close of the nineteenth century William James in America and most of the leading psychologists in Britain such as Ward, Stout, Mc Dougall and their disciples clung to this dualistic theory of mind. Stout held that conscious processes ran parallel to neural processes. The others held that there was a causal interaction between the immaterial mind and the physical brain. Descartes advocated the theory of interaction between mind and body. Mind and body are two separate and independent substances created by God. He maintained that these two substances interact and there is a causal relation between the two. Mind, which is a spiritual substance, has a definite location in the pineal

gland of the brain. It exerts influence upon the body and is affected by the brain process. Thus according to interactionism bodily processes are at times supposed to cause mental experiences and at other times are caused by them. Thus according to Descartes consciousness and extension or mind and body are independent of one another and do not involve each other's existence. As such there are two independent substances called mind and body.

Descartes' doctrine of man is equally dualistic. He contended that a soulless and lifeless bodily mechanism combined in man with rational soul. Body and soul, which are heterogeneous interact by means of a special organ. In contrast to the body, whose essence lies in extension the essence of the soul lies in thought. Descartes considered animals to be no more than elaborate automata devoid of soul and mental capacity. Like F. Bacon, Descartes defined the ultimate end of knowledge as man's mastery of the forces of nature, discovery and invention of technical devices, perception of causes and effects and improvement of the nature of man. In epistemology, Descartes was the founder of rationalism, which sprang from his one-sided understanding of the logical nature of mathematics. Descartes believed that the universal and necessary character of mathematical knowledge derived from the nature of the mind.

However this vague formulation of the mind and body relationship is very inadequate. That mind and body do interact seems to be inconceivable. If two substances are entirely different and heterogeneous, as supposed by Descartes, how can the one act upon the other causally relate? A nervous process can cause

another similar nervous process but not a mental one. If they are essentially different, one could never give rise to the other ; it is simply impossible that a change in brain cells could produce a thought or vice-versa. Causal connection is possible between two things of the same quality.

To avoid the difficulties of the theory of interaction, the followers of Descartes advocate the theory of occasionalism. The two philosophers who advocate the theory are Arnold Geulinx and Nicolas de Malbranche. Mind and body are opposed to each other and hence there can be no interaction between the two. According to occasionalism, this correspondence between mind and body is brought about by God. On the occasion of certain changes in mind or body, God intervenes to bring about corresponding changes in the other. But this explanation is not at all convincing. Explaining the relation between mind and body by a constant intervention of God is an absurd explanation. Closely related to the theory of occasionalism is Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony by which he seeks to explain the relation between mind and body. The theory holds that at the time of creation God pre-adjusted mind and body in such a manner that they always correspond with each other. Like two perfectly adjusted clocks which keep exactly the same time, but there is no connection between them, mind and body also correspond with each other without having any relation of interaction. But the theory of pre-established harmony also is no improvement upon occasionalism. Both occasionalism and pre-established harmony take recourse to divine miracle. The only difference between the two is that while occasionalism supports perpetual

miracle in the form of constant intervention of God. Leibniz admits one miracle only at the time of creation. But how could God establish harmony between two entirely different entities like mind and body was not explained by Leibniz.

William MC Dougall's Psychological Dualism is somewhat similar to Descartes' dualistic theory of mind. Mc Dougall has revived the use of the word Animism as a name for his philosophy of mind, which is nothing other than the usual soul theory. Generally the word 'Animism' has been used in anthropology and religion to signify the tendency among primitive people to endow everything with mind, even inanimate things, such as sticks and stones. Mc Dugall uses the term in its larger sense merely to indicate belief in mind (anima), as a reality. According to Mc Dougall the mind or soul or ego or self is an unitary and distinct psychic being which cannot be identified or confused with the body with which it interacts. The mind possesses certain enduring capacities for psychical activity such as having sensations, relating to them, and guiding the stream of nervous energy in such a way as to neutralize the tendency of physical energy to disseparation and degradation. But according to Mc Dougall this emphatic dualism between mind and body does not involve necessarily any cartesian dualism of the world. It is content to affirm the distinction of mind and body in the human personality. The animistic theory of mind has been represented by some other representatives like the German Philosophers, Lotze, Stumpf, Kulpe, and in America, George T. Ladd, and James while in France Bergson has defended a somewhat closely related theory of mind.

Thus Descartes and his successors has falsely created the dualistic theory of the mind. To think that there is an extreme dualism and separation between mind and body is to make the solution of the problem impossible. The theory of interactionism as advocated by Descartes appears to be dogmatic. But it is the philosopher who raises the dust and then complains that he cannot see. The absolute dualism between mind and body must be avoided if we are to reach any solution of the problem.

There are many idealistic theories of mind such as mentalistic monism, panpsychic, personalistic and mind-stuff theories. These theories are theories of the world rather than of mind. They interpret the universe in terms of consciousness or will or experience. The mentalistic monism represents the Universe as at bottom essentially spiritual. It is the view held by Plato and his followers.

The mentalistic monism theory of mind is supported by idealist philosophers like George Berkeley, Hegel etc. Berkeley formulated the theory of Subjective Idealism. He maintains that mind and their ideas are only real things and independent of them nothing exists. Mind is a thinking and active being "a real thing which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas and wills and reasons about them."¹³ The famous doctrine of Berkeley's philosophy is "Esse est percipii". By this he means that if anything exists it must be thought or perceived by the mind. Nothing can exist which is not known by the mind. But there are many drawbacks in Berkeley's philosophy of mind from the recent

13 Berkeley G - Principles of Human Knowledge. P - 103

philosophical point of view. But in spite of this, his account of the theory of mind resembles with the findings of recent psychology. Berkeley's emphasis on the conative aspect of human mind is admitted by modern psychology. Modern psychology recognised conation and cognition as two different faculties of mind. According to Stout, "Cognition, feeling and conation are abstractly and analytically distinct phases in any concrete psychosis, but they are not separable. They do not occur in isolation from each other."¹⁴

According to the Double-aspect theories of mind, mind and body are simply two aspects of the same underlying reality which is itself possibly unknown. They are not different from each other. They are identical in essence. They are the same realities seen from different sides or the two faces of the same coin. This theory was originated by Spinoza and is held by many modern psychologists. Spinoza maintained that mind and body are not two independent substances but are two parallel manifestations or correlative aspects the inner and the outer - of one and the same reality. Because mind and body are two attributes or manifestations of the same substance, God and they run parallel. This is Spinoza's theory of psychophysical parallelism. According to this theory every mental process has its corresponding bodily or nervous process, every psychosis has its neurosis. But the theory insists that there is no causal connection between bodily and mental series. The relation is one of mere concomitance in time and they are constantly parallel. Causal connection exists only between one mental state and another or

14 Stout G T - Manual of Psychology. P - 117

between one physical state or another. There cannot be any causal relation between two distinct states. Spinoza takes thought and extension as two attributes of one substance that is God. The double aspect theory of mind attempts to solve the mind-body problem by denying that there are two realities at all. Thus this theory affirms that mind and body are two aspects of the same reality, the living organism, like the concave and convex sides of a piece of curved glass. They constitute one single process observable in two different ways. But the difficulties of parallelism cannot be avoided by double aspect theories.

A subtler form of Monism which has attracted several speculative thinkers is one which rejects both materialism and idealism but attempts to retain the merits of both. One of its keenest champions was the Viennese psychist Ernst Mach. According to him, the primary fact is not the conscious ego or mind, but the sensory elements which constitute the conscious ego. Material bodies do not produce sensations. A similar view is found in a contemporary Viennese physicist E. Schrodinger in his book "Mind and Matter" (1958).

In his famous book "The Concept of Mind" Gilbert Ryle has used the most appropriate method of linguistic analysis to show the hollowness of mind-body dualism. Ryle alleges that Descartes initiated the philosophers' myth of mind-body dualism. Descartes had established the dualism of mind and body as two distinct substances having opposite qualities. For example, human bodies are in space and are subject to mechanical laws. Bodily states and processes being public can be observed by others. But minds are not in space, nor are their operations subject

to mechanical laws. The workings of mind are not witnessable by other observers; its carrier is the privileged operation of the individual himself. One cannot know what is going on other's minds. One can only directly recognise of the states and processes of his own mind. Thus one's mental states and processes are wholly and directly perceivable by him who possesses them. Descartes assumes that there is a basic distinction between mind and matter. But Ryle says that this assumption is a 'category mistake' because it attempts to analyse the relation between mind and body as if they were terms of the same logical category. According to Ryle, Descartes' dualistic theory is an attempt to analyse mental processes as if the mind were distinct from the body. He explains that knowing how to perform an act skillfully is not a matter of purely theoretical reasoning. Knowing how to perform an act skillfully is a matter of being able to think logically and practically, and is a matter of being able to put practical reasoning into action. According to Ryle, mental processes are nothing but intelligent acts. There are no mental processes which are distinct from intelligent acts. Thus an act of remembering, dreaming, knowing or willing is not merely a clue to some hidden mental process, it is how that mental process or intellectual operation is defined. Ryle argues that there is no ghostly, invisible entity called the 'mind' inside a mechanical apparatus called the 'body'. The working of the mind are not an independent mechanism which governs the workings of the body. The workings of the mind are not distinct from the actions of the body, but are conceptualized as way of explaining the actions of the body. In Ryle's own language,

"A person lives through two collateral histories, one consisting of what happens in and to his body, the other consisting of what happens in and to his mind. The first is public, the second private. The events in the first history are events in the physical world, those in the second are events in the mental world."¹⁵ This is somewhat as the faces of coins are heads or tails or somewhat as living creatures are either male or female, So it is supposed that some existing is physical existing and other existing is mental existing.

Ryle admits that this official doctrine is initiated by Descartes in the 17th century. Ryle abuses the Cartesian dualism as an absurd doctrine which involves 'The dogma of the ghost - in-the machine'. Ryle says. "It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another."¹⁶ His main aim is to show the logical mistake committed by philosophers in attributing a category or logical type to mental concepts.

Ryle finds that in the dualism of Descartes there is a capital mistake which is termed as "Category Mistake". The nature of category mistake is explained by Ryle with the following illustrations -

(a) If a foreigner visiting the university of Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, and scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks the question, 'But where is the University?' His question is a big category mistake because he misconstrues

15. Ryle, G : The Concept of Mind, P - 13

16. Ibid, P - 17

the University to be a parallel institution like the library or the museum. He does not realize that the University is the way all these institutions function and that it has no separate collateral existence of its own.

(b) A child witnessing the march past of a division commits the same category mistake in expecting to see the 'division' apart from seeing the passing of various battalions, batteries, squadrons etc. His question 'when is the division to arrive' is a big mistake arising out of type confusion in language.

(c) A similar category mistake is committed by a foreigner witnessing for the first time a cricket match. On showing the functions of various batsmen, fielders, bowlers and umpires, the foreigner wants to know as to who will contribute to the 'team spirit'?

In each of these cases a question of the wrong logical type has been asked. Hence all of these have committed a category mistake. In the introduction to "The Concept of Mind", Ryle indicates that the sentence factors belonging to one type cannot belong to another, i.e. one form of expression that can be fitted in logically in one form of fact cannot be fitted in another without involving a logical absurdity. Ryle points out the logical absurdity in the Cartesian concept of mind having a parallel, non-material existence of its own corresponding to the material existence of body. It is intended that if mind or the mental can be explained adequately in terms of observable behaviour, it can conjoined or disjoined logically with body or the physical. Whereas for the philosopher the mind has an immaterial, substantial existence of its own, not having any common characteristics with body, for Ryle

the mind is a disposition or a complex of dispositions belonging to various kinds of observable behaviour. But for the philosopher the mind has a reality of its own. In the exposition of the logical behaviour of various mental epithets, Ryle has actually shown that they are significant in themselves.

Ryle intended to show that just as in cases of assuming the separate existence of the University, the Division and the Team Spirit, the enquirers commit the mistake of asking for entities. Philosophers commit the same category mistake when they assume mind to have a separate entity of its own apart from body or matter.

The mind is the way of the various mental epithets function, just as the British constitution is the way the British Home Office and the Church of England function. In spite of the analogical explanation provided to illustrate the category mistake, it is not clear whether the relation between the mind and its various physiological behaviour is the same as the relation between the British constitution and its various institutions, or the university and its different functional units. It seems that we can speak of people having mental experiences even when we cannot refer to any episodic behaviour for such experiences, although we cannot legitimately speak of the University of Oxford or Cambridge when it has no parallel institutions to function.

The Cartesian mistake has its origin in the Galilean discovery of mechanics in the 17th century, which led to the mechanical explanation of the entire natural phenomena including human bodies. Descartes agreed in essence with the

mechanical concept of the universe. The mental operations of willing, imagining, thinking, knowing etc. become a mystery to all except the individual himself who can know his own states and operations through the privileged access of self-illuminating consciousness and introspection. Ryle observes that some inevitable consequences follow from such a dual-life doctrine. The upholder of the dual-life doctrine, according to Gilbert Ryle, has mistaken the logic of the problem implied in mental-conduct concepts.

It is absurd to conjoin terms belonging to different categories as in the case of 'She came home in a flood of tears and a sedan chair. In the dogma of the ghost - in - the machine, Ryle holds this. It conjoins statements belonging to different categories and involve absurd theories.

Ryle observes that once the argument of 'Category Mistake' is successful, it will dispel the hallowed contrast between mind and matter. The mind is not a faculty, not a container, holding its won operations behind the screen ; it is a disposition or a complex of dispositions whose sole evidence lies in its observed and observable behaviour. Ewing suggests that one need not admit reality of two substances to admit reality of two different species of experience. To say that there are two qualitatively distinct operations, the physical and the mental, is not to say that they are either one or two substances.

So, separate statements like 'Mind exists' and 'Body exists' are valid, though conjunctive or disjunctive statements like 'Mind and Body exist' and 'Mind or Body exists' are invalid. Thus Ryle makes it clear that mind and body both exist, but they

do not exist in the same sense. The Cartesian dualism took them as existing in the same sense. According to it, mind and body were both substances existing together in human body, having their own proper fields of action. Ryle is against this type of dualism, and advocates forcefully that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. This mind is a myth. Throughout his book he has tried to explode this myth. But by exploding the myth, he is not negating the concept of mind. Ryle has his own theory of mind. What he is negating are the idioms in which mind was conceived and described by the dualists. He emphatically asserts in the introduction to his book that his task is only "to rectify the logical geography of knowledge which we already possess." In practical life we all use mind involving concepts correctly, but when an occasion to give an account of those concepts comes, we describe them in a mythical way. Ryle wants to do away with this mythical account of the dualists, particularly of Descartes.

Through his book "The Concept of Mind" Ryle has a stir in the world of philosophy and a new line of discussion about the philosophy of mind. No philosopher before Ryle gives such thorough analysis about the nature of mind. His chief aim is to refute the myth of the "dogma of the ghost in the machine" and to rectify the notions about the nature of mind. By the word 'myth' Ryle does not mean a 'fairy story.' But by this word Ryle means, "It is the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another. To explode a myth

is accordingly not to deny the facts but to re-allocate them."¹⁷ To determine the logical geography of concepts is to reveal the logic of propositions. The main argument of Ryle's book is 'to show why certain sorts of operations with the concepts of mental powers and processes are breaches of logical rules. I try to use *reductio ad absurdum* arguments both to disallow operations implicitly recommended by the Cartesian myth and to indicate to what logical types the concepts under investigation ought to be allocated."¹⁸ Here Ryle Primarily meant for Descartes' theory of mind. The another interpretation of his argument is to re-allocate the philosophy of mind after a thorough investigation. To reach both the purposes he uses the *reductio-ad-absurdum* method or indirect proof. The *reductio-ad-absurdum* method is a way of arguing in which a statement is proved to be true because its falsity leads to absurdity. According to Ryle, philosophy is the replacement of category habits by category disciplines. Thus the main aim of Ryle is to show the falsity of the Cartesian dualistic theory of mind and to reallocate the facts of mental life.

Descartes divides person's life into two parts-one is external and the other is internal. All the physical things including human bodies belong to external world. on the other hand, the states and processes of ones own mind are internal. But Ryle maintains that this antithesis of outer and inner world is nothing but metaphor. Because if the spatial existence of mind is denied then it is not possible to speak of the mind as being spatially 'inside' something. Ryle says,

¹⁷ Ibid, P - 10

¹⁸ Ibid, P - 10

"This antithesis of outer and inner is of course, meant to be constructed as a metaphor, since minds, not being in space, could not be described as being spatially inside anything else or as having things going on spatially inside themselves."¹⁹

Ryle is very much conscious about the theoretical difficulties of the influence of mind and body to each other. It is true that there is some kind of influence of mind on body and body on mind. But it remains mysterious how two opposite existents can influence upon each other. In this point, Ryle vehemently criticises the Descartes' theory of interactionism.

This kind of knowledge cannot be described by one's autobiography of inner life. According to Ryle, "They can be inspected neither by introspection nor by laboratory experiment. They are theoretical shuttlecocks which are forever being bandied from the physiologist back to the psychologist and from the psychologist back to the physiologist."²⁰ Thus the theory of interactionism has some major theoretical difficulties. Descartes says that mind is opposite and independent to body. But sometimes they interact upon each other on the pineal gland of the brain. Regarding the nature of mind, Ryle writes, "The workings of minds had to be described by the mere negatives of the specific descriptions given to bodies; they are not in space, they are not motions, they are not modifications of matter, they are not accessible to public observation. Minds are not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not - clockwork."²¹

19. Ibid. P- 14

20. Ibid. P- 14

21. Ibid. P. - 21

Ryle denies the fact that minds are merely ghosts put into the machines of bodies rather he believes that minds are themselves ghost-machines. He admits to treat the human body as engine but at the same time warns us to treat it as an ordinary engine. Because some of the workings of this body engine is governed by another engine which resides within this body engine and this is a very special kind of engine. This interior govern-engine is not able to be seen or heard. Again, it has neither shape nor weight. This special engine cannot be broken into parts and it is not possible to know the laws which it obeys. Thus how the bodily engine is governed by it is totally unknown. In the words of Ryle, "Though the human body is an engine, it is not quite an ordinary engine, since some of its workings are governed by another engine inside it ---this interior governor - engine being one of a very special sort. It is invisible, inaudible and it has no size or weight. It cannot be taken to bits and the laws it obeys are not those known to ordinary engineers. Nothing is known of how it governs the bodily engine."²²

In his philosophy of mind, Ryle does not deny the occurrences of mental processes. He says that the two phrases, i.e. 'there occurs mental process' do not mean the same kind of thing and thus it is meaningless either to conjoin or to disjoin these two phrases. Ryle says, "It is perfectly proper to say, in one logical tone of voice, that there exist minds, and to say, in another logical tone of voice, that there exist bodies. But these expressions do not indicate two different species of existence, for 'existence' is not a generic word like 'coloured' or 'sexed'. They indicate two different senses of 'exist', somewhat as 'rising' has different sense in

22 Ibid. P - 21

'the tide of rising', 'hopes are rising' and 'the average age of death is rising.'²³

Thus Ryle proves that the cartesian dualism is a futile doctrine and this theory is eliminated by him from the field of the philosophy of mind.

But there are criticism against Ryle's somewhat inappropriate use of the concept of the 'category'. Critics arguing against 'Descartes Myth' have pointed out that the idea of category is vague, slippery and ill-defined. We know more or less where we are with the categories of Aristotle, as well as with the categories of Kant, but not know in the same way the categories of Ryle. The distinction between things, relations and qualities can be described as categorical distinctions, or be the distinctions between facts and events, between elements and constructs, or between dispositions and their actualizations. It is a categorical mistake to confuse a fact and an event or to treat a dispositional property as though it were an occurrent actualization or a persistent manifestation of the disposition. In his article on "Categories" Ryle discusses the difference between Aristotle and Kant's use of categories without intending either to complete or make more comprehensive the list of categories. He uses the term for his own purpose of showing the logical powers of concepts and their misuse in philosophical thinking. When Ryle remarks that philosophers commit a category mistake in imputing a real entity to minds where there are no such entities found to exist, he has in mind more Russell's theory of Types than either Aristotle or Kant's notion of categories. Hence it is felt by critics that he could have avoided using the term 'category' in pointing out the logical mistake committed in the philosophers myth. According to Ryle, "It is one

big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is namely a category mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another. The dogma is therefore a philosopher's myth."²⁴

Ryle uses expressions like the 'same category' and 'different category' without being at all prepared to say which category or categories are in question. In his 'Dilemmas' he has admitted that the word category is used not in its usual, professional sense but in its amateurish, inexact sense. Warnock remarks, "If one is not prepared and indeed is deliberately unwilling to say what a category and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term category?"²⁵

Ryle's observation is that we commit the category mistake if terms belonging to one category are described in idioms appropriate to another. When we try to understand the nature of mind in Ryle's sense, that if the mind is explained as a disposition or a complex of dispositions it cannot be explained as occurrent at the same time without involving the type-confusion. Because in that case again we shall be committing the category mistake of attributing two different categories or logical types in explaining the mind or the mental. If one commits a category mistake in the way described by Ryle, it is clear that some mental concepts are fundamentally dispositional while others are fundamentally occurrent i.e. a concept while being dispositional cannot be occurrent at the same time. The concepts of heeding concentrating thinking one's thought are partly episodic and partly

24 Ibid, P - 17

25 Warnock, G.J Philosophy Since 1900

dispositional. Hence they are described by Ryle as 'mongrel categoricals' or 'semi-hypotheticals'. Does this mean that he commits the same category mistake in another form against himself, as he himself has raised objections? Or does he mean to say that dispositions after all belong to the same category or logical type of as occurrences?

Ryle's objection against Descartes' dualism is that Descartes tried to explain mind or the mental by the same category as body. Body is a mechanical system determined by causal phenomena, mind is a parallel non-mechanical system determined by its own causal laws. If it is true that mind has no existence of its own parallel to the existence of body, it is equally true that mind cannot be explained by the same causal phenomena as body. The mind belongs to the category of dispositions rather than having way mysterious existence of its own. Thus Ryle admits that philosophers commit a category mistake in providing the same explanation for mind as for body. Ryle denies the separate existence for mind. It explains the mind as a disposition or a complex of dispositions.

The whole point of analysis of Ryle's theory of mind is based on the assumption that on observing others to behave in certain ways we can know about the mental states of others as well as of ourselves. To the ordinary man the whole point of knowing the nature of mind is that he knows himself and analogically as well as inferentially he knows others. He constantly infers the beyond but in doing so he never thinks that he indulges in some metaphysical assumption. His reference to 'beyond' is as much an empirical fact as his external behaviour in an

empirical fact. It is absurd to ask for the same kind of verification for all species of meaningful statements regarding human behaviour as it is absurd to assume the existence of a substance beyond the mind or the mental.

Thus by analysing the nature of mind given by Ryle we find that his central aim is to explode the traditional as well as the Cartesian account of mind. Ryle gives the dispositional account of the mind. According to him the mind is only a disposition to behave in certain ways. Ryle's study is not a laboratory study based on observation and experiment. It is a study directed towards the re-arrangement of what we have already known about mind. In his philosophy of mind Ryle tries to establish that there is no private inner life at all and mind is just a name for typical human behaviours. According to him all the statements referring to mind are reports about current bodily behaviour. Ryle accepts behaviourism as the theory of mind. It comes into existence on the rejection of the dualistic theory of mind. Behaviourism admits that there are not two substances, one body and the other mind but there is only one substance i.e. the body and mind is nothing but the behaviour of the body. Ryle's behaviourism is known as philosophical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism or logical behaviourism. Philosophical behaviourism holds that meanings of the mind-predicates must be explained in terms of overt behaviour or that statements about a person's mind can be completely analysed in terms of statements about what others people observe. By his philosophical behaviourism, Ryle tries to analyse all mental predicates in terms of dispositions. Thus the next chapter provides a discussion on the nature of dispositions and Ryle's account of mind.

CHAPTER - II

CHAPTER - II

THE NATURE OF DISPOSITIONS AND GILBERT RYLE'S

ACCOUNT OF MIND

The term 'disposition' is applied to the mind which refers to capacity, ability, tendency and liability to do certain sorts of things. Most of the psychological terms we use stand for dispositions and not actual states of mind. When we speak of a person knowing, desiring, fearing, valuing something, we do not ordinarily mean that he is at the moment we speak in a state of actual desire, fear etc. but that he has a disposition or tendency to be so.

According to Oxford English Dictionary the word, 'disposition' means the person's natural qualities of mind and character. It signifies inclination or tendency.

Gilbert Ryle, in his introduction to "The Concept of Mind" declares that his central aim in the book is not to 'give new information about minds'. It is not to increase what we know about mind, but simply 'to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess'. His main aim is to explode Descartes' dualism and to create the dispositional account of the mind. Ryle says that the mind is not a ghost, it is only a disposition to behave in certain ways. He explains psychological terms as behaviours or dispositions to behaviour. It is not a fact that bodily behaviours are caused by mind. They are occasioned by dispositions or tendencies. Human beings have many dispositions or inclinations in him. He acts

according to those dispositions. But Ryle makes it clear that these dispositions are not stored in an inner private chamber called mind. There is nothing mysterious about dispositions. They are only the ways in which the public behaviour of men are managed. Thus Ryle says that the mental qualities are primarily dispositions in nature.

By his theory of dispositions Ryle gives a new picture of the philosophy of mind. His method is primarily linguistic and not factual. He replaces the Cartesian mind by dispositions and believes that all psychological terms are more or less dispositional in character. Speaking of dispositional properties Ryle writes,

"To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state or to undergo a particular change ; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular condition is realized."²⁶

Ryle denies the traditionalists' account of mind to be a substance over and above the body. Mind is thought to be a disposition, a set, a style or an organic state of readiness 'to do and undergo certain sorts of things' in their appropriate situations. A disposition, however, is not an occult or mysterious inner quality or potentiality present in the person or the object about whom the disposition is said to be true. It is nothing actual. It simply signifies a tendency for certain events to occur if some conditions are realised. For example, when glass is said to be brittle it does not mean that brittleness is a property secretly present in glass. It only means that when a certain situation obtains, e.g. when it is hit with a stone, a

26. Ryle Gilbert The Concept of Mind, P - 43

certain event takes place then the glass breaks into parts. The similar case is true to human vanity or any other disposition. When a man is said to be vain, it does not mean that there is an inner element of vanity in him which he feels or experiences. It simply means that one is prone to behave in certain ways under some specific circumstances. Ryle believes that disposition words are not the names of existing qualities. Dispositional statements are not the categorical reports of some secret phenomena. They have only a hypothetical import. Ryle says that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue. This is of course, too precise.

Thus according to Ryle, a dispositional statement may be categorical in form like 'This sleeper knows French, but it is actually hypothetical in meaning because it is always unpacked in hypothetical statements. For example the above sentence has the following hypothetical statements -

If he is addressed in French, he responds pertinently in French, if he is shown any French newspaper, he acts appropriately or translates it correctly etc. Ryle admits that a dispositional statement cannot be a reporter of existing states and processes. By arguing that mental conduct concepts are dispositional or hypothetical, he seems to think that he can remove the misconception that they refer to a certain existing entity called mind.

Ryle thinks that the meaning of the dispositional statements involves an infinite number of hypothetical statements. He observes, "When an object is described as hard, we donot mean only that it would resist deformation ; we mean also that it would, for example, give out a sharp sound if struck , that it would cause us pain if we cause into sharp contact with it, that resilient objects would bounce off it and so on indefinitely. "²⁷ Similarly when a man is said to be vain we donot mean only that he tends to talk a lot about himself if in the company of others.

Ryle distinguishes between dispositions and occurrences. The distinction lies in his explanation of some of the significant mental conduct concepts like the concept of knowing, believing, thinking, imagining etc. Dispositions are neither actions nor occult or unobservable causes of action. Dispositions behave like open hypothetical statements. The dispositional characteristics whether belonging to inanimate things, animals or human beings behave in the same way. They indicate the ability or propensity of things and persons to act in certain specific ways. Ryle is primarily concerned with the exposition of mental concepts displaying human character and intellect. According to Ryle, human minds are the most complex. Man displays his abilities to think, imagine, know, or believe. Mental epithets are present in us mostly as dispositions which we can know through our various functions of intelligence, cleverness, shrewdness, understanding, imagining etc. Dispositions are inference tickets or the general rules for particular mental activities.

27. Ibid, P - 43

Ryle distinguishes between single-track dispositions, the actualisations of which are 'nearly uniform' and 'many - track' dispositions, the actualisations of which are 'indefinitely heterogenous'. The word 'Cigarette-Smoker' is a single track disposition word because it always means a tendency for only one type of activity, viz. the activity of smoking. But the word 'vain' or 'greedy' is a 'many-track' disposition-word because it signifies not one but diverse activities in different situations. Ryle illustrates it with the concept of 'grocing.' As the term 'grocing' stands for different activities like selling sugar, weighing tea, wrapping up butter, and so on, so the term 'vanity' or 'greedy' stands for a wide range of different activities under various circumstances. According to Ryle, the many-track dispositional words are highly generic or determinable, while the single - track words are highly specific or determinate. The determinable dispositions are indefinitely heterogeneous. So, the description of human beings are given with the help of many track dispositional words. Ryle says - "Some dispositional words are highly generic or determinable, while others are highly specific or detrminate, the verbs with which we report the different exercies of generic tendencies, capacities and liabilities are apt to differ from the verbs with which we name the dispositions, while the episodic verbs corresponding to the highly specific dispositional verbs are apt to be the same." ²⁸

Thus any act which is to be characterised by a mental predicate must be the actualisation of some disposition. There are many dispositions whose track of

actualization is not one. They may actualise in different ways. Intelligence is an example of many track disposition. Intelligent activity is not one unique activity. It may take various forms. Almost all psychological concepts can be explained on the lines of intelligence. They mainly refer to disposition. Dispositions, for Gilbert Ryle, are possibilities of action, whose only evidence are actions themselves. Ryle seems to explain the disposition of man which is highly complex phenomenon. Some indicate the individual's capacities, abilities or efficiencies to act in certain ways, while others indicate his inclinations, propensities or tendencies to act in certain ways. Actually tendencies are different from capacities and liabilities. But Ryle while emphasized the difference between capacities and tendencies, he never mentioned the cardinal point of their difference. On the other hand he makes an effort to point out their essential sameness which lies in the fact that all are dispositional concepts requiring analysis in terms of hypothetical statements regarding overt behaviour.

Ryle distinguishes between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' - knowing how to type write and knowing that the Indian type writer is cheaper than others. Ryle says that knowing in the sense of 'knowing how' is a disposition. The dualist philosophers maintain that knowing is an occurrence in the secret chamber of mind. But Ryle does not find any episodic use of the term 'knowing'. Knowing is the ability to do certain acts or things. Such an ability is called a disposition. There is nothing categorical about dispositions. Dispositional statements are always hypothetical statements. They always involve 'if-then'. That is why they resemble

how statements. Ryle also tried to prove that psychological concepts of 'know', 'believe', 'aspire', 'clever', 'humourous' etc. do not refer to secret activities conducted on secret place called mind. All of them are disposition words. Thus Ryle says that 'knowing' in the sense of knowing how is necessarily a disposition to act outwardly. Ryle does not explicitly discuss the logical status of 'knowing that' though he is particular about discussing the logical status of 'knowing how'. Thus in Ryle's philosophy of mind 'knowing how' is more basic. One does not have to plan his actions first and then act.

Ryle's distinction between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' is based on the criticism of the traditional doctrine. According to him the mental characteristics like intelligence, learning, thinking, imagining, understanding etc. are dispositional in character, in the sense that the disposition to do certain things or to act in certain ways means the individual's doing them rather than meaning his inner capacity to recite rules for them. It is one and the same individual disposed to act and to actually act in a certain way. The mental characteristics like intelligent, clever, shrewd, witty etc. are attributed to human behaviour.

Ryle observes, "Theorists have been so pre-occupied with the task of investigating the nature, the source and the credentials of the theories that we adopt that they have for the most part ignored the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks. In ordinary life, on the contrary, as well as in the special business of teaching, we are much more concerned with people's competences than with their cognitive repertoires, with the operations than with

the truths that they learn."²⁹

In this passage, Ryle has illustrated the value of knowing how much more than that of knowing that. But Ryle's view breaks down when we consider the fact that knowing how requires, the necessary presence of knowing something, which is associated with 'how to do'. Knowing how to drive a car means both to know that there are rules of driving and to be able to drive the car. In this sense knowing how presupposes knowing that. According to Ryle, "There are certain parallelisms between knowing how and knowing that, as well as certain divergences. We speak of learning how to play an instrument as well as of learning something is the case ; of finding out how to prune trees as well as of finding out that the Romans had a camp in a certain place ; of forgetting how to tie a reef-knot as well as of forgetting that the German for 'Knife' is 'Messer'. we can wonder how as well as wonder whether." ³⁰

'Knowing how' is not a physical counterpart of the inner or theorizing behaviour of 'knowing that. One is neither the consequence nor the concurrent effect of another. We can see the intelligibility or competence of 'knowing how' activities without referring to their antecedent 'knowing that' causes. Ryle thinks that philosophers supposed wrongly that all actions requiring mental capacities, tendencies, proficiencies or skills can be explained by a double life doctrine i.e. the purely physical being guided and governed by the purely mental. What is physical cannot, at the time be mental, and what is mental cannot at the time, be

29. Ibid, P - 28

30. Ibid, P - 29

physical. Ryle opposes the distinction between the physical and the mental.

According to Ryle 'know' is a dispositional or a capacity verb. It is noted that some dispositional words are highly generic determinable while others are highly specific or determinate. 'Know' is thus, a determinable dispositional word. It is not used for reporting episodes. It does not stand for a mental act. Perception verbs like 'see', 'hear', 'taste' 'smell' etc. are not dispositional but episodic. They stand for the fact that certain acts have certain results.

Ryle explains clearly the logical powers of 'knowing how' when we say that someone knows how to play chess or swim or cook. We more often refer to the individual's ability or skill to perform these activities than indicate his competence to recite rules or formulas for these activities. He emphasises the difference between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that'. When we say that the individual knows how to play chess or how to cook, we are claiming no more than that the individual on demand will display his ability to play chess competently or cook well. The individual knowing how to play chess is not performing two synchronous activities, one private, and another public rather he is performing one activity and performing it well. In the words of Ryle,

"Part of what is meant is that, when they perform these operations they tend to perform them well, i.e. correctly or efficiently or successfully. Their performance comes up to certain standards or satisfies certain criteria. But this is not enough. The well regulated clock keeps good time and the well - drilled circus seal

performs its tricks flowlessly, yet we donot call them intelligent." ³¹ It is not sufficient to observe an individual's various behaviour in ascertaing his cleverness. Standards or criteria arenot neither acts nor possible acts, they are the rules which make actions intelligent and clever.

Some champions of intellectualist legend are apt to try to reassimilate 'knowing how' to 'knowing that' by arguing that, intelligent performance involves the observance of rules or the application of criteria. But Ryle argues that the intellectualist legend is false and that when we describe a performance as intelligent, this does not entail the double operation of considering and executing. We donot only reflect before we act but reflect in order to act properly. Some intelligent performances arenot controlled by any interior acknowledgments of the principles applied in them. 'Knowing how' to apply maxims cannot be reduced to, or derived from, the acceptance of those or any other maxims. Thus 'knowing how' cannot be the internal criteria of human being.

There is the difference between knowing how to cycle and knowing mathematics. One is concerned mainly with competence, another with competence as well as knowledge of rules of mathematics. But both would require competent delivery for others to witness that A knows how to cycle and B knows mathematics. 'Knowing how' maynot be accompanied by any theoretical instruction in one's mind. According to Ryle, our capacity to understand is equally dispositional in nature. The logical function of understanding is the same as the logical function of

intelligent ; it is a 'know-how' activity indicating the individual's disposition to understand certain problems or implications of certain actions. Understanding, according to Ryle, is a part of 'knowing how'. Understanding is dispositional in the sense of being observable in nature.

In the section on "Intellect", 'knowing how' is indicated primarily as a dispositional capacity required in all intellectual operations of the human mind. It seems that whereas 'knowing how' is primarily concerned with the skilled abilities of intelligent beings, 'knowing that' comprising the theoretical or the intellectual performance which is regarded as essentially inner and private. Ryle emphasizes the point of difference to indicate mainly the observable character of most of the mental conduct concepts. Ryle does not deny the mind. He denies that mind is a different sort of entities, governed by some inscrutable para mechanical laws. He says that there are not two worlds, but only one world which can understand the mental epithets or certain species of human behaviour without involving the dogma of the ghost in the machine.

There are some significant differences between reciting rules of an intelligent action, and acting intelligently. But one cannot give a sufficient account of another nor can it be substituted for another. Ryle says, "Intelligent' cannot be defined in terms of the 'intellectual' or 'knowing how' in terms of 'knowing that'; thinking what I am doing does not connote 'both thinking what to do and doing it. When I do some thing intelligently, i.e. thinking what I am doing, I am doing one thing and not

two. My performance has a special procedure or manner, not special antecedents."³²

Knowing how is a disposition, but not a single track disposition like a reflex or a habit. Its exercises are observances of rules or canons or the applications of criteria.

But we are struck by the intimate and invariable relationship between 'knowing how' and 'knowing that.' One is a disposition to certain types of action, such as cycling, playing chess, swimming, cooking etc. Another is also a disposition to certain other types of action such as knowing the rules of grammar, knowing French, knowing that the earth is round and so on. If 'know that' is inner and private, know how is equally so. For in both a unique recognition is needed by the individual himself for knowing how to cycle and knowing the rules of grammar. It is unique because, no one knows exactly how he knows them. Ryle had drawn a non-parallelism between the two kinds of knowing with the observation that knowing that is more an intellectual activity concerned with knowing subjects like mathematics and logic. In the same way 'knowing how' activities cannot be explained adequately without reference to rules or formulae of these actions.

A similar analysis of 'knowing that' is given by John Hartland Swann in his "An Analysis of Knowing" where he shows that all cases of 'knowing that' are ultimately reducible to cases of 'knowing how'. So, 'knowing that' is as much a disposition to recite rules and 'knowing how' is a disposition to perform certain other kinds of activities. Swann points out that there is no significant non-parallelism between the two uses of knowing, although people may find it difficult to accept

32. Ibid, P- 32

that 'knowing that' the earth is round is ultimately on a par with 'knowing how' to swim. He further observes, "Of course, it is not on a par but only because a different kind of capacity is involved, namely the capacity to state correctly what is the case."³³ 'Knowing how' is not on a par with 'Knowing that' because a different kind of capacity is involved in them. But both of them involve capacities. They are essentially identical in the sense that sentences relating to 'Knowing that' statements can be relevantly stated into sentences relating to 'Knowing how' statements. There is no basic difference which indicates their non-parallelism. Taking Ryle's example of knowing French, which is cited as a case of 'knowing how', Hartland Swann points out that it is equally an instance of knowing the correct rules of translating the French words into their equivalent English words. He shows how 'knowing that' statements are ultimately reducible to 'knowing how' statements.

But there is no basic non-parallelism between the two and that 'knowing that' is as much a disposition to recite rules of grammar or give correct mathematical answers as 'knowing how' is a disposition to swim, to cook or to cycle.

Ryle makes an attempt to reduce the dispositional concepts to their corresponding hypothetical statements, so that no metaphysical statements can explain the mental characteristics of human behaviour.

Ryle's theory of disposition raises a number of questions. First of all we can ask questions why should Ryle think that a disposition is primarily a tendency to behave overtly? why should knowing French mean only such overt acts as replaying

33. Swann, H : Analysis of Knowing, P - 60

in French, translating in mother tongue and so on? why should 'Vanity' almost mean the overt acts of boasting alone. Ryle's account of disposition lays an over emphasis on overt acts for disposition may be a disposition to act outwardly as well as to feel inwardly. Thus in this regard A.C. Ewing remarks that a disposition may not be primarily "a disposition to behave in a certain way, but a disposition to have private experience of a certain kind."³⁴

D.M. Armstrong says Ryle's theory of disposition as the phenomenalist or operationalist account of disposition. He advocates the Realist account of dispositions. According to him, "To speak of an object's having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property (there exists a categorical basis) which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behaviour in certain circumstances, manifestations whose nature makes the dispositional property the particular dispositional property it is. It is true that we may not know anything of the nature of the non-dispositional state."³⁵

The Realist view gains some support from ordinary language, where we often seem to identify a disposition and its 'categorical basis'. Armstrong presents an a priori argument which purports to prove the truth of the Realist account of dispositions. On a number of occasions, a certain rubber band has the same force, F, applied to it, and that on each occasion it stretches one inch. We can then attribute a disposition to the band. It is disposed to stretch one inch under force F.

34. Ewing, A.C. : "Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism", P.- 318

35. Armstrong, D.M. : A Materialist Theory of Mind, P- 86

Thus one essential thing about dispositions is that we can attribute to objects even at times when the circumstances in which the object manifests its dispositions do not obtain.

For the phenomenalist, like Ryle, a disposition does not entail the existence of a categorical state. The only reason he can give for saying that the band would have stretched one inch under force F at T_1 is that numerically the same band behaved in this way on other occasions. Armstrong raises questions against the phenomenalist 'what is the magic in numerical identity?' A thing can change its properties over a period of time. Why should it not change its dispositional properties? How does the phenomenalist know what the band's dispositional properties are at T_1 ?

Thus Armstrong remarks that the phenomenalist about dispositions will be reduced to utter scepticism about dispositions, except on occasions that they are actually manifested. He relates disposition to categorical basis. Thus, if belief is a disposition in a Realist account of mind, then it is entailed that while I believe P my mind is in a certain non-dispositional state, a state which in suitable circumstances gives rise to manifestations of belief that p .

The Realist view of dispositions are causes or causal factors. On the phenomenalist view, dispositions cannot be causes. To say the glass breaks because it is brittle is only to say that it breaks because it is the sort of thing that does break easily in the circumstances which it is in. But if brittleness can be identified with an actual state of the glass, then we can think of it as a cause, in the

process that brings about breaking. Dispositions are seen to be states that actually stand behind their manifestations. It is simply that the states are identified in terms of their manifestations in suitable conditions, rather than in terms of their intrinsic nature.

But Realist account of dispositions can equally be applied to capacities and powers. Armstrong says, "To admit dispositions as states lying behind, and in suitable circumstances giving rise to, behaviour is to contradict the whole programme."³⁶

Ryle's account of intelligence again is somewhat inappropriate in its usage. Ryle thinks that intelligence is a disposition of doing things in certain ways. He equates intelligence with a certain manner or procedure, so that if somebody is intelligent, he will do in that manner and if he does in that manner, he is intelligent. But there are cases in which this equation breaks down. For example, somebody's inner communings might, be intelligent but public performances dull because of his shyness. An intelligent student might do worse at the examination. Conversely somebody might do well at times but he maynot be intelligent. His so-called intelligent action may be only a chance performance. This shows that intelligence cannot be identified with the manner of doing things, though, it is intimately connected with such a manner or procedure. In his book "The Concept of Mind" Ryle makes a basic confusion between the essence and the evidence of mental concepts. Many of the logical problems that Ryle's analysis of mental concepts has raised are due to his failure to distinguish the essence with evidence. Thus

36. Ibid, P - 88

Ryle's attempt to unfold the meaning or significance of a mental concept in terms of behaviour has its own limitation.

Ryle's phenomenalism with regard to mind (Phenomenalism because he holds that mind is not over and above certain sorts of behaviour just as the phenomenalist has said that an object is not over and above certain sorts of sensations) will suffer from the usual charge that no phenomenalist analysis can ever be completed. The original statement, in Ryle's account of disposition will always mean more than the hypothetical observation statements and a complete analysis will remain logically impossible. Again Ryle's assertion that a mentalistic sentence instead of reporting some actual episodes of mind, reports an infinite series of possible behavioural episodes, has the effect of making simple things look rather complicated. To this complexity Peter Geach comments, "It is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of the phenomenalist with regard to physical object statements and of new-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements."³⁷

Thus Ryle's attempt to describe a dispositional concept in terms of behaviour and to reduce a dispositional sentence into a series of hypothetical statements is faced with many difficulties. His notion of many or multi track dispositions is also faced with fresh difficulty. Ryle conceives of a 'many track' dispositional word. Such a word according to him, is 'highly generic' i.e. It serves as a genus having heterogeneous episodes as its species. In this connection R.J. Spilsbury remarks,

37. Geach, Peter: *Mental Acts*, P - 7

"I donot understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context. In any ordinary use it would be absurd to say that hardness was a genus, of which the properties of causing pain, resisting deformation, and giving out a sharp sound were species."³⁸

We may also say that Ryle's example of grocing doesnot establish his point satisfactory. Whereas any overt performance of selling, weighing, or wrapping is grocing, any overt performance isnot the working of mind or in Ryle's terminology the actualisation of a disposition.

Spilsbury points out that in Ryle's analysis of dispositional concepts, acts and possible acts fill a similar place to that filled by *sensa* and *sensibilia* in the phenomenalist theories of perception. The phenomenalist analysis of perception carried out in the 20th century is a paradigm case of the empiricist tradition initiated by Hume in the 18th century. The empiricist philosophers in general, and the logical empiricist in particular, thought of reducing philosophical knowledge to a species of scientific knowledge. Physical objects must be capable of being translated into a series of sensible experience, actual and possible taken together. The same phenomanalist method is applied to our knowledge of the human mind. The mind and the mental must be capable of being known through behaviour. Thus Spilsbury criticises the notion of generic dispositions. Ryle denies that there is any episodic use for many words as Spilsbury maintains. Spilsbury's observation is that the logical problems raised by Ryle's analysis are mainly due to the failure to understand the difference between the meaning of a statement and the evidence for its truth or falsity.

38. Spilsbury, R. J. "Dispositions and Phenomenalism", *Mind*, July 1953, PP - 342-43

There is another difficulty of the phenomenalist analysis of dispositions, i.e. the difficulty arising out of offering a hypothetical analysis of statements which do not appear to have anything hypothetical about them. Another important question is whether dispositions are only hypothetical and not actual. Ryle's thesis is that to expect of a disposition word to denote some specifically existing property is to expect of the term 'average rainfall' to denote some particular pod of water. 'Average rainfall' does not mean something over and above the particular instances of rain. Disposition words similarly do not mean anything over and above the particular episodes of one's life and work. To say that dispositions are not actual is to say that there is no actual difference between person and person. Ryle believes that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do so not by virtue of a property or character, present in the one and absent in the other. We can do so only with the help of certain hypotheticals. A hypothetical which will be true of the one will be untrue of the other. If the hypothetical 'it will dissolve, if submerged in water' will be true of a soluble thing, it will not be true of an insoluble thing.

Further, the rejection of dispositions as something actual leads to queer consequences. It has led Ryle to believe that vain behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent. It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger. Ryle's account of dispositions thus in a way relieves us of our responsibility for our own actions.

Ryle thinks that a disposition only means a regular sequence of behaviour

under appropriate conditions. Dispositional words according to him, do not stand for drives, forces or powers, existing within the agent. The conception of an occult force has been given up by physical sciences. Habit is our disposition.

Aaron, while explaining the nature of dispositions observes that a disposition does not signify only a regular behaviour-sequence. On the other hand, "When ordinary men and some scientists and philosophers speak of dispositions they clearly mean more ; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces or powers."³⁹

Ryle's theory is concerned with common people and common usage. He has tried to understand a dispositional statement only in terms of hypothetical statement. He has argued that both categorical and hypothetical statements are not true of dispositional concepts. Dispositional concepts are not suggestive of inner or hidden qualities. Even when mental concepts stand for dispositions, our inner life is not to be denied.

Ryle's theory of dispositions is helpful chiefly in deciding about the 'character of mind', not about the 'working of mind.' Let us explain it with the help of one or two of Ryle's own illustrations. While giving us a criterion of intelligent activity, he holds that an intelligent activity is one which is the outcome of a skill or disposition. The shooting of a bull's eye by a marks man is an example of an intelligent activity because the marks man has the ability or the skill or the disposition to do it under various circumstances 'even if the wind strengthens, the range alters and the target moves.'⁴⁰ The corollary of this view is that the same act of successful shooting

39. Aaron, Dispositions, The Theory of Universals, Clarendon Press, P - 174

40. Ryle, G The Concept of Mind, P - 45

by a novice is not an intelligent activity because he is not able or disposed to do it again and again. But here what the ability or the disposition help us to decide is that the mind of the marks man is superior to the mind of the novice. The fact that the marks man was disposed to shoot again and again while the novice was not. Both of them might have consciously tried to shoot the target. The mind of both of them might have moved into action. The only difference being that the mind of the marks man was superior in being able or disposed to achieve the success under diverse circumstances, which the novice's mind was unable to do. It is an account of the superiority of mind of the marks man that his action is called intelligent.

It is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human and non human disposition. Merely to say that mind is a disposition to behave in certain ways will not do. Inanimate objects also have their dispositions to behave in their own ways what is it, then which makes us classify some dispositions as physical and others as mental? Ryle does not provide a suitable answer to this question. He also does not think it necessary to explain the criteria that will distinguish the two sorts of dispositions. In this regard Russell remarks "A plain man should say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of bodies and intelligent denotes a disposition of minds - in fact, that the two objectives apply to different kinds of 'Stuff'. But it is not open to Professor Ryle to say this and I do not quite know what he would say." ⁴¹

He does not distinguish human dispositions from the dispositions of other beings and objects, but he makes certain distinctions amongst mental dispositions. Of the dispositions 'know' and 'belief' one renders to capacity and the other to

41. Russell, Bertrand : My Philosophical Development, P.- 247

tendency. 'To know' means to be able to get things right ; to believe means to tend to act or react in certain ways. So, according to Ryle, neither the capacity verb 'know', nor the tendency verb 'believe' refers to any act or process conducted on the private stage of mind. These verbs, Ryle believes, cannot report secret acts or processes, because there are no such acts or processes. His main objection against cognitive acts is that certain questions which ought to be answered about them, because they are acts, cannot be answered.

Ryle has himself seen that a concept of heed, e.g. noticing, concentrating, carrying, attending etc. is not fully explicable on dispositional lines. In the case of these concepts, grouped under the common heading of 'minding', Ryle has to take recourse to the language of 'mongrel categorical' or 'semi dispositional'. Such concepts, he believes are half-dispositional and half-episodic. The proposition 'X is reading carefully' containing the heed concept 'carefully' is therefore neither fully dispositional nor fully episodic. It is in the language of Ryle, mongrel categorical or semi dispositional.

By introducing the concept of 'mongrel-categorical' for elucidating the meaning of heed concepts, Ryle is gradually modifying his original position to an extent that it hardly appears to survive. He holds that the traditionalists had misunderstood the logic of mental concepts. Mental concepts, according to him, do not report any happening or episode for there are no such happenings ; there are no occurrences taking place in a second states world. "To talk of a person's mind is to talk of his abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary

world." ⁴² Ryle appears to maintain firmly that mental concepts are dispositional and not episodic. The logic of disposition words is different from the logic of episode words.

Minding, attending, noticing or caring is known directly through the deliverances of consciousness. Ryle will argue that if minding is known from consciousness, the consciousness of minding must be known by another consciousness and so on forever. Ryle uses the argument of infinite regress against the traditionalists concept of heed. Further, Ryle seems to identify heed with intention or purpose. His discussion of the heed concepts and the inclusion of the word 'trying' in the list of such concepts give the reader an impression that according to Ryle, doing with heed means doing with purpose and vice-versa. Somebody's action may be intentional but unheedful or unintentional but heedful. Lighting a Cigar for the purpose of smoking is intentional but it might be unheedful because the man concerned might be absorbed in some other activity. Similarly, we may begin to pay attention to somebody's conversation accidentally, without any plan or purpose or intention to do so.

Ryle while explaining an attentive or heedful activity thinks that it is an activity done in a certain frame of mind. To do with heed is, according to Ryle, to do something in the present and to be disposed to do a lot of associated things in future if required. The question of heed is not, therefore, to be decided with reference to the outward activity. It is to be decided with reference to the frame of mind, the readiness or the preparedness or the disposition of the agent to do some other possible but connected things. In short, minding, according to Ryle, is the frame

42. Ryle, G : The Concept of Mind, P- 161

'mind' in which one is found to work at the moment. It is a disposition which may actualise in several ways and one of whose actualisations is the activity in which the agent may be engaged at the moment.

Thus heed according to Ryle, is a frame of mind or disposition. But a pertinent question arises whether 'the frame of mind' is not something actual. Ryle will say that a frame of mind is a disposition and it cannot as such be actual.

Mind or consciousness cannot as such be so easily replaced by dispositions or semidispositions. Hugh R. King referring to Ryle's concept of disposition says, "We cannot, reduce 'my mind' to simply 'my ability' or proneness to do certain sorts of things. Indeed, ability and proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed, to dismiss my mind."⁴³

Thus Ryle offers the dispositional theory of mind, according to which the mind is a disposition of the body. According to him, mental acts are mythical. But for all of them, the word knowledge is not descriptive of any inner occurrence. This view is quite consistent with the statement that 'know' is a capacity verb or that it is a performative rather than descriptive use. But the dispositional account of knowledge is misleading. Here the word 'disposition' is used in an extra-ordinary sense. Dispositions as patterns of tendencies are only a few. By calling knowledge a disposition, we obscure the limitless variety in knowledge. Relation to particular acts is necessary for manifestation of knowledge, but not for manifestation of disposition. Thus the dispositional account of knowledge is not free from controversies.

Hugh R. King, "Prof. Ryle and The Concept of Mind", *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLVIII P.- 98

CHAPTER - III

CHAPTER - III

THE NATURE OF WILL

The concept of will is an important concept of philosophy and psychology. It almost includes all the criteria of mental life. Will or volition includes the activities like motives, desires, deliberations, decisions, choices, doing, striving and trying actions etc. Motive literally means what moves us to act in a particular way. A motive may mean an efficient cause of action or a final cause of action. Motive instructs us to move, incite and to act in a particular way. It is a spring of action or a feeling of want and it may be said to be a feeling of pleasure, pain, emotion of anger, fear or hatred. Thus motive is intimately related with will. The act of willing is known as volition.

Like motive, desire is a factor in the act of volition or will. First, there is a feeling of want. It is converted into a desire by the self. When a desire is chosen by the self after deliberation there is choice. Thus there can be no volitions without desires. An inefficient desire is simply a desire. A dominant desire is called a wish. But the universe of desire is called the will.

Will is a person's conscious determination to carry out a given action or actions. It is the natural desire for something or the tendency regarding an intellectually known object. Volition or will activity can be of many different kinds. Volition is desire if it regards an object absent and not possessed ; it is called enjoyment if it regards the goal or end ; it is called resolution if it regards means

and interest. It is choice if it involves selection between various motives. Thus we see that the concept of will includes motives, desire, deliberation etc. Will therefore, indicates not only the chosen desire that is consistent with our universe of desire but also the one we intend to attain at any cost. A wish is a single dominant desire, while will depends on the dominance of a universe of desire.

Generally it is believed that the mind or soul has three parts, namely thoughts, feeling and will and the mind function in three different modes such as the cognitive mode, the emotive mode and the conative mode. Without will, mind cannot function properly. Again some philosophers think of a movement as being really two things causally connected. (i) a mental activity and (ii) Its effect, i.e. a bodily movement. Instances of the mental activity can be called as acts of willing. Volition or will is believed as a special act of mind. It is through this volitions that mind actualises its ideas and plans. It is believed that there exists two separate entities like mental and physical and there is no identity in their occurrences. The mental acts of volition are taken as cause and bodily act as effects.

Thus volition puts one's muscles into action. It assumes that there are mental states and processes enjoying one sort of existence and bodily states and processes enjoying another. An occurrence on the one stage is never numerically identical with an occurrence in the other.

Traditionally it is believed that there is a causal relation between will and action. Any action is always related with a will. First, there is the will to do certain action i.e. there is the mental activity called willing and then the action follows.

Action is described as voluntary or involuntary, intentional or unintentional, successful or unsuccessful, moral or immoral as well as intelligent or stupid. But these distinctions apply only to that action as opposed to mechanical movement. By a voluntary or intentional action is meant an action performed by a rational agent not through any blind impulse, but knowingly and intelligently with prevision and free choice of the means and end. Voluntary actions are actions of moral Judgement. On the otherhand, actions like inanimate, spontaneous, reflex, instinctive, ideo-motor, imitative, accidental, actions of children, insane persons and idiots are involuntary actions. They are non-moral actions. The three voluntary actions are attention, deliberation and fixed purpose or resolution. Every man knows that he can turn his attention for a longer or a shorter time, and with more or less intenseness, as he pleases. It is a voluntary act, and depends upon his will. But involuntary actions donot depend on will. They are spontaneous.

The problem of freedom of will has raised controversy among the philosophers. Some philosophers advocate the doctrine that there is no freedom of will which is known as determinism or necessarianism. Others advocate that there is freedom of will. According to determinism a volition which isnot determined by antecedent circumstances or the so-called free volition would be an event without a cause i.e. a miracle, which is impossible. Life and mind being more complex forms of matter and mechanism are subject to the rigid laws of nature. Man cannot take initiative in any action. My muscles contract because of the inflow of nervous energy.

Thus the determinists deny any freedom of will. They hold the human will is bound by the iron grip of eternal and immutable laws. There is no freedom anywhere, only an unbending necessity. The psychology of voluntary action implies determinism. Our volitions are determined by our motives and desires. Volition is determined by the strength of motive. The strength of motive again, is determined by the physical and social environment and partly by the character of the individual. Character of the individual is again, determined partly by heredity and partly by the structure of the individual's nervous system. Thus our volitions are rigidly determined. But the arguments advanced by determinism against freedom of will are not adequate. While we act, we are also conscious that we are doing it deliberately and intentionally. Freedom of will is a necessary postulate of our moral life. The terms 'duty' 'obligation' etc. would be meaningless without any reference to freedom of will. Freedom of will either means indeterminism or self-determinism. Indeterminism holds that the self can determine its own volition without any motive or reason. But freedom doesnot mean indeterminism. The self is free in the sense that it determines its own volition and course of action. We ourselves determine our volitions in the light of moral ideal. The self determines its own volitions according to the ideal of highest good. Therefore freedom means self-determinism. The concept of self- determinism reconciles a golden mean between extreme determinism and total indeterminism.

Thomas Reid offers the following definition of will :

"Every man is conscious of a power to determine, in things which he

conceives to depend upon his determination. To this power we give the name of will"⁴⁴.

According to Reid the term will is often put to signify the act of determining, which is more properly called volition. Volition signifies the act of willing and determining, and will is put indifferently to signify either the power of willing or the act. But in the writings of some philosophers the term will has a more extensive meaning. In the general division of our faculties into understanding and will, passions, appetites and affections are comprehended under the will ; and so it is made to signify not only our determination to act or not to act, but every motive and incitement to action. Thus, desire, aversion, hope, fear, joy, sorrow, all our appetites, passions and affections etc. are modifications of the will. But the motives to action, and the determination to act or not to act, are things that have no common nature.

Reid, makes some observations on the nature of will which are as follows

The first observation is that every act of will must have an object. Anyone that wills must will something and that which he wills is called the object of volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of some thing, nor remember without remembering of something so neither can he wills without willing something. Therefore, every act of will must have an object and the person who wills must have some conception, of what he wills. Thus things done voluntarily are distinguished from things done merely from instinct or merely from habit. For example, a healthy child, some hours after its birth, feels the sensation of hunger,

44. Thomas, Reid : Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind., P.- 57, 1969.

and if applied to the breast, sucks and swallows its food very perfectly. But we cannot say any reason that the child has any conception of that complex operation. Thus one cannot say that the child wills to suck. We find numberless instances done by animals without any precious conception of what they are to do or without the intention of doing it. They act by some inward blind impulse. Other things are done by habit, which cannot properly be called voluntary.

The second observation of will that the immediate object of will must be some action of our own. Here will is distinguished from two acts of the mind i.e. desire and command. But many later writers have represented desire as a modification of will. Both desire and command must have an object and therefore both must be accompanied with some degree of understanding. But they differ in several things.

The object of desire may be anything which appetite, passion or affection leads us to pursue; it may be any event which we think good for us or for those to whom we are well affected. For example, I may desire meat or drink or ease from pain ; but to say that I will meat or will drink or will ease from pain, is not correct english. Therefore, there is a distinction of common language between desire and will. The distinction between them is that what we will must be an action and it is our own action. But what we desire may not be our own action, it may be no action at all. Desire is only an incitement to will, but it is not volition. The determination of the mind may be, not to do what we desire to do. But as desire is often accompanied by will, we are apt to overlook the distinction between them. The command of a

person is sometimes called his will, sometimes his desire. But when these words are used properly, they signify three different acts of the mind. The immediate object of will is some action of our own ; the object of a command is some action of another person, over whom we claim authority ; the object of desire may be no action at all. A command being a voluntary action, there must be a will to give command. Some desire is commonly the motive to that act or will, and the command is the effect of it. A command is the social act of the mind.

The third observation is that the object of our volition must be something which we believe to be in our power, and to depend upon desire to make a visit to the moon or to the planet Jupiter, but he cannot will or determine to do it because he knows it is not in his power. Therefore, it is evident that what we will must be believed to be in our power and to depend upon our will.

The fourth observation of will is that when we will to do a thing immediately, the volition is accompanied with an effort to execute that which we willed. For example, if a man wills to raise a great weight from the ground by strength of his arm, he makes an effort for that purpose. He determines to raise that weight. But we should remember the fact that a great weight requires a great effort and a small weight requires a less effort.

The last observation of Reid is that in all determinations of the mind, there must be something in the preeding state of the mind that disposes or inclines us to that determination. If the mind were always in a state of perfect indifference without any incitement, motive or reason, to act or not to act then our active power would

withholding it from any particular action." Volition may more briefly be defined, the determination of the mind to do, or not to do something which we concrete to be in our power. Locke mainly held two propositions regarding the concept to will - (i) We get the idea of active power through reflection (introspection) when we perform some voluntary movement. (ii) We cannot comprehend "how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought."

D.M. Armstrong's book "A Materialist Theory of the Mind" is an attempt to give an account of all mental states as states of the person apt for the bringing about of certain sorts of physical behaviour. Classical theories of mind saw it as an inner arena. Behaviourism saw the mind as outward act.

Regarding the concept of will, Armstrong says -

"It is convenient to begin the account of the mental concepts with a discussion of the will. When I speak of 'the will' I intend the phrase to be taken in the broadest possible sense. It is intended to cover every sort of mental process that is of the conative sort, as opposed to the cognitive sort, or any other sort there may be. It is a label for a whole great department of mental activities."⁴⁵

Armstrong discusses the words 'to act purposively'. Purposive activity is behaviour with a mental cause. But not all behaviour brought about by a mental state is purposive activity. Anxiety may produce a rapid heart - beat, but the beating of the heart is not a purposive activity. What makes off purposive activities. The beating of the heart is merely a bodily happening, while striking somebody on purpose is an action. But this is no more than the verbal satisfaction if we want to

be gone in vain. We should either be altogether in active and never will to do any thing, or our volitions would be perfectly unmeaning and futile. But God has given everybody any degree of active power. God has given some principles of action suited to our state and situation. Thus the concept of will occupies an important place in Reid's observation.

In the western philosophy Rene Descartes is the most prominent philosopher to determine the nature of will. He says that we have two activities. (i) a mental activity and (ii) its effect, i.e. a bodily activity. The acts of willing or acts of volition can be called as mental activity. Descartes' theory of will lies in the fact that a person comprises two distinct substances, i.e. soul and body. Gilbert Ryle calls this theory as "the dogma of the ghost in the machine".

According to Descartes, the workings of the body are motions of matter in space. The causes of these motions must be either other motions of matter or in the privileged case of human beings. But the mental activities are not movements of matter in space. Mental activities can cause muscles to contract. For example, to describe a man as intentionally pulling the trigger is to state that such a mental thrust or activity did cause the contraction of the muscles of his finger. Descartes, in his treatise on "The Passions of the Soul", deals with the feelings like fear, anger, joy, love, admiration, respect, scorn, pride, humility, bravery, pity, sadness, etc. which signify will as mental phenomena.

Locke defines volition to be, "An act of the mind, knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man by employing in it, or

uphold a 'causal' theory of purposive activity. For we cannot say what the difference is between mere bodily happenings and actions proper. But we can say that actions are physical events that are caused in a certain way. If somebody raises his arm with the intention of striking another, then he raises his arm with a purpose. But if he raises his arm without any mental action, but simply because it comes into his head to do so, we may not always wish to say that he has any purpose in raising his arm. But here the phrase 'acting purposefully' is intended to cover both these cases. It is a mistake to think that all purposive acting is a matter of physical as opposed to mental happenings. Working out a long division sum in one's head is as much a case of purposive activity as deliberately striking somebody. Modern philosophy has shown a tendency to ignore the cases where the purposive train of events is purely mental. Thus will covers every sort of mental process that is conative, cognitive, emotive etc. It is a level for a whole great department of mental activities. The philosophy of the will has received a good deal of attention in recent years also. Will is an inner cause.

Wittgenstein has given us a classical formulation of the problem of purposive activity. To say that I raise my arm entails that my arm rises. But my arm can rise without my having raised it. What must be added to the rising of my arm to give the raising of my arm? The answer is the mere physical behaviour to give 'behaviour proper'. This problem was first introduced by Wittgenstein and following him it was raised by the modern analytic philosopher Gilbert Ryle. But before Wittgenstein it was unchallenged orthodoxy. Armstrong, further admits that having of purposes

and intentions are not events or processes, but are states of our mind. They are states with causal powers. They are the powers to initiate and sustain trains of physical or mental activity.

Thus some argument of recent philosophy designed to show that purposive activity cannot possibly be the effect of mental cause. Here we see the quite special power of an analysis of mental occurrences in terms of "states of the person apt for the bringing about of certain behaviour."

The logically central cases of 'behaviour proper' involve purpose. If there was no purposive behaviour there could be no 'behaviour proper'. An account of purposive behaviour will be discussed here. There are some arguments against the view that purposive activity is the effect of a mental cause. There seems to be some logical bond between intention and the occurrence of the thing. But there cannot be any bond between ordinary cause and effect.

Thus purposive activity is behaviour with a mental cause. But not all behaviour brought about by a mental state is purposive activity. Anxiety may produce a rapid heart-beat, but the beating of the heart is not a purposive activity. It may be said that the beating of the heart is merely a bodily happening, while striking somebody on purpose is an action. But this seems to give no more than verbal satisfaction if we want to uphold a causal theory of purposive activity.

The essential role of information in purposive action that enables us to understand a phenomenon very clearly brought out by Miss Anscombe.⁴⁶ She maintains the fact that behaviour can be intentional behaviour under one description

46. Anscombe : *Intention* (Blackwell, 1958)

and yet not be intentional behaviour under another description. Suppose that I am pumping water to a house and that the motion of my arm is throwing peculiar shadows on the ground. It may be true description of my action or physical event, that I am pumping water, and also that I am throwing peculiar shadows on the ground. But there my action is intentional under the first description and not intentional under the second description. Thus the notion of purposive activity involves operating with concepts. There must be something in the mental cause which is fit for the operation of information upon it so that the cause is then modified in some appropriate manner. But the statements that concepts are essentially involved in the operation of those mental causes which steer our purposive activities may lead to misunderstanding.

Regarding the immediate acts of will Armstrong says, "Since we have accepted the classical view that purposive action is action initiated and sustained by a mental cause, we are also committed to the view that the causal chain involved begins in the mind (whether or not this is identified with the brain), that impulses and travels along the nerve-paths, changes occur in the muscles, then in other parts of the body and finally in objects outside the body."⁴⁷

Ryle discusses the traditional notion of 'Volition' or the 'Will'. He says that there is nothing like 'volition' or the 'will'. According to Ryle, volition is an artificial or technical term. Common people donot use it in everyday conversation. Volitions as thrusts, coming to physical body from the inner world of mind is a myth. Ryle

47. Armstrong, D.M. : A Materialist Theory of the Mind. PP- 144-45

analyses the concept of freewill in the ordinary language. But he rejects its metaphysical reality in the sense of willed activities. Volitions or will do not have an entity of their own. These processes are not experienced in our everyday life. The traditional philosophers admit three classes of mental processes i.e. thought, feeling and will and it has three modes- the cognitive mode, the emotive mode and the conative mode. But Ryle says, "This traditional dogma is not only not self-evident, it is such a welter of confusions and false inferences that it is best to give up any attempt to re-fashion it. It should be treated as one of the curios of theory."⁴⁸

Ryle cannot be considered either for or against the freedom of will. On the other hand, he admits that there are actions for which men are completely accountable or totally responsible. Ryle maintains that there are strong-willed persons and weak willed persons. But he admits that there are no inner processes or occult going on at a time when a man decides to act in a particular way. Thus Ryle does not deny the willed actions, but he denies the process implied in the action. That means the individual's choice to act in a certain way rather than another, amounts to his acting that way. Of course, this is observable by others. Regarding the nature of will, Ryle says,

"The concept of volition is in a different case. We do not know in daily life how to use it, for we do not use it in daily life and do not consequently, learn by practice how to apply it, and how not to misapply it. It is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. It does not, of course, follow from its being a technical concept that it

is an illegitimate or useless concept. ⁴⁹

Although we have some attribute of voluntariness or intelligence to actions, we cannot for that reason suppose that there exists some inner, inscrutable process to cause the observable voluntary actions. Ryle says, "Volitions have been postulated as special acts, or operations, 'in the mind' by means of which a mind gets its ideas translated into facts".⁵⁰ Ryle admits that we perform a volition which put our muscles into action. Thus volition signifies an action, not any mental entity. We can say a volition as praise or blame, good or bad only when a bodily movement takes place from such a volition. Ryle rejects the will as an inevitable extension of the myth of the ghost in the machine. It assumes that there are mental states and processes enjoying one sort of existence and bodily states and processes enjoying another. An occurrence on the one stage is never numerically identical with an occurrence on the other.

It is said that when an action is done on purpose, two conjunction activities have taken place. One is the action itself and another is the purposing of the action. But according to Ryle, this kind of assumption is an extension of the myth of the ghost in the machine. Ryle explodes the para-mechanical hypothesis involved in the notion of volition by the following objections.

The first objection is to the doctrine that overt actions, to which we ascribe intelligence predicates, are results of counterpart hidden things that at 10.am he was occupied in willing this or that, or that he performed five quick and easy volitions

49. Ibid, P - 61

50. Ibid, P - 62

and two slow and difficult volitions between midday and lunch-time. Novelists describe the actions, remarks, gestures and grimaces, the day dreams, deliberations qualms and embarrassments of their characters. But they never mention about their volitions. Some philosophers may say that the enactment of volitions is asserted by implication, and an overt act is described as intentional, voluntary, culpable or meritorious. They define volitions as a species of conscious process. But ordinary people fail to mention their volitions in their descriptions of their own behaviour.

The second objection follows that no judge, school master, or parent ever knows that the actions which he judges merit praise or blame, for he cannot do better than guess that the action was willed. The connection between volitions and movements is mysterious. Thus the pulling of the trigger may have had some other event for its cause.

Ryle says that if we cannot help willing to pull the trigger then it would be absurd to describe my pulling it as voluntary. But if my volition to pull the trigger is voluntary then it must issue from a prior volition and that from another *ad infinitum*. Thus volitions cannot be described as voluntary or involuntary. Volition is a term of the wrong type to accept either predicate.

In short the doctrine of volitions is a causal hypothesis adopted because it was wrongly supposed that the question, what makes a bodily movement voluntary? was a causal question. This supposition is only a special twist of the general supposition that the question, how are mental conduct concepts applicable to human

behaviour ? is a question about the causation of that behaviour.

Thus Ryle's first objection shows that "If there are such mental processes occurring in the inner process of the human mind, by what predicates should they be described?" His second objection shows that no individual can witness the volitions of another. Since an individual can never be sure about the volitions of another, he cannot really know where a particular action has followed the act of volition or not. Thus the absence of causal connection between the action and the willing of the action signifies the concept of willing as mysterious.

The traditionalists maintain that if the phenomenon of volition doesnot occur, the body cannot move to act. A bare decision to do something doesnot issue in action. To perform the actual action, a prior act of will has to be performed in the secret world of mind. According to the traditional theory, the physical act of doing something is the effect of the mental act of willing. But Ryle doesnot admit any similarity in the common talk of the people. Ryle opposes on the statement that volitions supply aid to make actions meritorious or wicked. As mental operations are themselves generally meitorious or wicked, the question of volition arises with regard to them. Discussing the nature of will, Ryle asks the questions what about volitions? Are they voluntary or involuntary? If voluntary(i.e. issuing from a prior volition), we cannot avoid infinite regress. If involuntary (i.e. not issuing from a prior volition), they cannot make the issuing act voluntary. So, if volitions are accepted ridiculus consequences follow from the same. Volitions are wrongly identified with certain quite familiar and authentic processes. People are frequently

in doubt what to do, having more attentive courses of action. This process of apting for one of the alternatives is sometimes said to be what is signified by 'volition'. But this identification will not do. It is notorious that a person may choose to do something but fail to do it for weakness of will. But the theory could not allow that volitions ever fail to result in action. The process of deliberating between alternatives and opting for one of them is itself subject to appraisal - predicates. The same objections forbid the identification with volitions of such other familiar process as that of making up our minds to do something.

Ryle does not refute the concepts, 'voluntary and involuntary'. He admits the difference between voluntary and involuntary acts but rejects free will as the philosophers' myth. Ryle says that the mental conduct concepts such as the concepts of trying, concentrating or making an effort of will cannot be explained wholly in terms of publicly observed behaviour. These mental occurrences can occur but their occurrences are to be explained partly in terms of propensities or inclinations as well. Ryle says philosophers use the word 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' with a few minor elasticities, as adjectives applying to actions which ought not to be done. We discuss whether someone's action was voluntary or not only when the action seems to have been his fault. He is accused of making a noise if the action was voluntary like laughing. He has excused himself, if he satisfies us that it was involuntary, like a sneeze. In the same way in ordinary life we raise questions of responsibility only when someone is charged, with an offence. It makes sense to ask whether a boy was responsible for breaking a window, but not whether he

was responsible for finishing his homework in good time. Thus in this ordinary use, it is absurd to discuss whether correct or admirable performances are voluntary or involuntary.

Ryle says that the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are used in day-to-day life. They are not related to the mysterious phenomenon called 'volition'. These terms are not taken with reference to a private act of will. It is taken with reference to 'could have avoided' or 'could not have avoided'. If somebody could have avoided doing something, the action is called voluntary and if he could not have avoided it, the action is called involuntary. The question of guilt is related with these terms. For example, if somebody breaks a glass, the question at once arises whether he breaks it intentionally, that is, whether he could have avoided breaking it or not. If it is proved that he intentionally breaks the glass, he is condemned; if otherwise he is not condemned. Thus the terms 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are used with reference to our faults. In the case of voluntary action a person knows the right thing but does not do that. For example, if somebody performs a praiseworthy act, his action will be called voluntary only if he could have avoided it. That is he knew the wrong thing but did not do that. Ryle holds that it is not proper to level both right and wrong actions as voluntary. Only that is voluntary which is our guilt or fault. In the ordinary use, to say that a sneeze is involuntary is to say that the agent could not help doing it and to say that a laugh is voluntary is to say that the agent could have helped doing it. But Ryle says that this is not to say that the laugh is intentional. We do not laugh on purpose. The boy could have got the sum right

which he actually got wrong ; but he misbehaved ; he was competent to tie a reef-knot, though what he unintentionally produced was a granny - knot. His failure or lapse was his fault. When we say that someone could have avoided committing a lapse or error, we mean that he knew how to do the right things or was competent to do so, but didnot exercise his knowledge or competence. But when a person has done the right thing, we cannot then say that he knew how to do the wrong thing, or that he was competent to make mistakes. For making mistakes isnot an exercise of competence. The problem of the Freedom of the will is derived from this unconsciously stretched use of voluntary and consequential misapplications of different senses of 'could' and 'could have helped'.

If a boy has tied a granny knot instead of a reef knot, we satisfy ourselves that it was his fault by first establishing that he knew how to tie a reef-knot, and then by establishing that his hand wasnot forced by external coercion and that there were no other agencies at work preventing him from tying the correct knot.

The two important points of voluntariness are -

First, we oppose things done voluntarily to things suffered under compulsion. Some soldiers are volunteers, others are conscripts ; some yachtsman go out to see voluntarily, others are carried out to sea by the wind and tide. What is involuntary isnot describable as an act. Being carried out to sea is something that happens to a person, not something which he does. This antithesis between voluntary and involuntary differs from the antithesis when we ask whether someone's tying of a granny knot.

Secondly, when a person does something voluntarily, in the sense that he does it on purpose, his action certainly reflects some quality or qualities of mind, since he is in some degree minding what he is doing. To frown intentionally is not to do one thing on one's forehead and another thing a second metaphorical place ; nor is it to do one thing with one's brow-muscles and another thing with non-bodily organ. Thus Ryle says, "He frowned intentionally' does not report the occurrence of two episodes. It reports the occurrence of one episode, but one of a very different character from that reported by 'he frowned involuntarily,' though he frowns might he photographically as similar as you please."⁵¹

Ryle discusses some idioms of every day life which may refer to the mysterious element of volition. For example 'behaving resolutely,' 'strength of will', 'effort of will' etc. But these elements have no mysterious qualities. Behaving resolutely means not getting slack in efforts. Strength of will means sticking to a task. Effort of will means acting in face of other stronger temptations. There is, therefore, no room for bringing in the ghostly concept of volition in order to explain these concepts.

Ryle also discusses the philosopher's concept of the 'freedom of will'. It was believed that the physical sciences had established the things and events of the external world are rigidly governed by discoverable laws, not appraisal-words. All external happenings are confined within the iron grooves of mechanical causation. There are purposeless forces in the world. Volition and voluntariness being internal forces makes occurrences spiritual. Freedom of will was invented out of the fear

51. Ibid, P - 72

of mechanism. According to mechanism, the physical world is governed by rigid laws. The whole course of nature is strictly determined. There is no scope for freedom. Thus the question of morality could not raise with regard to actions done in such a world. Moralists and religious thinkers were shocked to hear it. The philosophers, in order to defend morality and religion, invented a peculiar world, called it mind and described its volitional part as the source of these ideas. According to the traditional philosophers, we have a mind whose one phase is volition or will and which by its nature is free. But Ryle argues that this concept of the freedom of will is totally imaginary. There is no truth in it.

Ryle's another significant analysis of the concept of will is the section on "the Bogy of Mechanism". The terms like 'explanation', 'why', 'because', 'cause', 'law', 'rule', 'principle', 'reason', 'govern', 'necessitate' etc. have a range of typically different senses. Mechanism seemed to be a menace because it was assumed that the use of these terms in mechanical theories is their sole use ; that all 'why' questions are answerable in terms of laws of motion. Grammar tells the reader that the verb must be a plural verb, but not which verb it will be. Mechanism therefore, is a mere bogy and it elucidated in the special concepts of biology, anthropology, sociology, ethics, logic, aesthetics, politics, economics, history, geography etc. Thus Ryle says, "Man are not machines, not even ghost - ridden machines. They are men-a tautology which is sometimes worth remembering".⁵²

But in spite of this rejection of freedom of will, Ryle does not believe that mechanism is wholly true. In some respect he also believes in freedom. Ryle only

52. Ibid. P - 79

prevents us to seek freedom in a ghostly world. For the sake of freedom, we neednot go to any mysterious world of mind. Our physical world provides us with freedom. The physical world is full of necessity and freedom. In this regard, Ryle illustrates the following example,

In a game of chess, the bishops must move on the squares of the same colour, but on which particular square it will move at a certain juncture depends on us, the player. While writing, one has to obey the rules of grammar, but in what style one would write is not forced by the grammar. Therefore, we have freedom in our physical world. Physical laws govern everything but we have freedom to maintain it. Ryle asserts, "Not all questions are physical questions". Questions of morality are valid questions. So, even without the mysterious concept of mind and its will, moral concepts can be understood and explained. Ryle denies volition or will. But he doesnot deny morality because his theory is not incompatible with the concepts of freedom and morality.

Human beings are called responsible as much for the reason that they have acted well in the past as for the reason that they would make the right decision at the appointed time. Thus responsible means 'accountable'. But 'accountable' doesnot mean determination by the predisposed states alone. It means determination equally by what we have been and what we intend to be. The permanent disposition, known as character is constantly being supplemented by personal decisions of individuals by our pre-disposed states, since pre-disposed states are those that are never complete without the constant effort of the individual

himself. In conclusion, it is perhaps worth while giving a warning against a very popular fallacy. But in fact there are very few machines in nature. The only machines that we find are the machines that human beings make such as clocks, windmills and turbines. There are a very few natural systems which somewhat resemble such machines, namely, such things as solar systems. The movements of the heavenly bodies provided one kind of 'clock'. It was the human pulse that provided the next. The games of billiards are subject to mechanical laws but it is not at all like the workings of machines.

Thus after careful philosophical analysis Ryle discovered that our mental terms such as mind, thought, will etc. are not words which describe an inner private world of faculties. Instead they are mostly to be analysed as dispositional terms whose attribution depends on the ordinary observation of ordinary human behaviour. For dispositions are nothing but an ability, propensity, liability or capacity to do things of a certain type in certain specifiable circumstances. To be intelligent is to be disposed to accomplish successfully such tasks as doing mathematical problems. It is not to provoke an inner Cartesian faculty, called the 'intellect' into producing its private and proprietary mental acts. Thus according to Ryle, volitions or will do not have an entity of their own.

Armstrong criticises Ryle's account of volition. He says that volition is the causal antecedent of our mind. Armstrong analyses the importance of purposive activity. He writes,

"It is simple and natural view that my raising my arm is distinguished from

the mere rising of my arm by the fact that, in the former case, my arm rises as a causal result of a certain sort of antecedent in my mind. When my arm merely rises this sort of causal antecedent is lacking."⁵³ But Ryle rejects this kind of causal antecedent in case of will. Moreover, Armstrong admits that having of purposes and intentions are not events or processes, but are states of our mind. They are states with causal powers. They are the powers to initiate and sustain trains of physical or mental activity. Thomas Reid also admits will or volition as mental power. But Ryle rejects this kind of analysis regarding volition.

Ryle holds the infinite regress argument for rejecting the theory of purposive activity. Like all infinite regress arguments it has the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*. Let us suppose that purposive activity is activity caused by an act of the will. Now the question arises- Is an act of will itself a piece of purposive activity? If it is, the act requires to be caused by a further act of will and so *ad infinitum*. But this is absurd. The alternative is to say that the act of will is not itself a piece of purposive activity. This is equally absurd. Ryle uses an exactly parallel argument to prove that intelligent action is not action that is caused by intelligent mental activity.

But there is something that Ryle's argument proves incontestably. It proves that not all purposive activity can be the effect of such things as deliberating. Deliberating what to do is itself purposive activity. Purposive mental activity that has as its object the forming of a purpose to undertake some further action. So, if deliberation is required for purposive action, prior deliberation will be required for deliberation, and so *ad infinitum*. But does the argument prove that purposive

53. Armstrong, D.M. *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*. P- 132

activity is not activity with a mental cause? A causal theory of purposive activity can take the second horn of Ryle's dilemma. We must in the first place distinguish between acts of will and mere operations or motions of the will. An act is something that we do as opposed to something that merely happens. An act springs from our will. An act of the will is therefore, something that is itself brought into existence by the will. An intention formed as a result of deliberation would be an example. It follows that not all our acts can spring from acts of will, but that we must in the end come to acts that spring from mere operations of the will. Operations of the will are mere happenings. They have causes but these causes do not lie in the will.

Thus Armstrong remarks, "Actions are purposive in the sense that they are caused by the will. Operations of the will are purposive in the sense that they cause actions. Only acts of will are purposive in both senses. So, there is no regress involved in saying that actions are caused by the operations of the will."⁵⁴

Thus volition or will cannot be rejected as a technical or mysterious term as Ryle does. As a conscious human being we must have to admit at least the presence of volition or will.

54. Ibid, P.- 137

CHAPTER - IV

CHAPTER – IV

THE NATURE OF EMOTION

The nature of emotion plays a significant role in guiding and directing our behaviour. Philosophers and psychologists discuss the nature of emotion. Etymologically, the word emotion is derived from the Latin word 'emovere' which means 'to stir up' or 'to excite'. Thus emotion can be understood as an agitated or excited state of our mind and body. According to the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Psychology, "Emotion is a total state of consciousness considered as involving a distinctive feeling-tone and a characteristic trend of activity aroused by a certain situation which is either perceived or ideally represented".⁵⁵ Emotions play a key role in providing a particular direction to our behaviour and thus shaping our personality according to their development.

Philosophers and psychologists debated the nature of emotions. Different philosophers at different times give the different conceptions of the nature of emotion. Plato and Aristotle argued about the nature of emotion. Aristotle discussed emotion in the Rhetoric, in De Anima, and in his Nicomachean Ethics in which correct emotion is regarded as equivalent to a large part of virtue. In De 'Anima' Aristotle characterized the human 'Soul' or 'Psyche' which is best translated as "Life Principle." Thus according to him, plants have souls because they grow and reproduce and animals have also souls because they can feel move and desire. Like Plato, Aristotle divides the human soul into a rational and an irrational part.

55. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy and Psychology, edited by James Mark Baldwin, vol -II

But unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn't make a sharp division between the two parts. He argues that they necessarily form an unity. Emotion involves a cognitive element including beliefs and expectations about one's situation as well as physical sensations.

Aristotle recognizes that emotions can be used in varying degrees of complexity. In "Nicomachean Ethics", Aristotle argues that virtue (e.g. courage and generosity) is largely a matter of feeling the right thing. Thus the courageous individual is neither fearless nor over whelmed by fear in a dangerous situation. Aristotle admits that we can mold our emotions through education and habit. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that many emotions is strong moral belief about how others should behave. Aristotle mentioned 'On the Soul' that most of the soul's conditions anger, courage, desire and any sensation - neither act nor are activated without the body. The act of thinking perhaps belongs to the soul alone, but if even this thinking happens to be some sort of imagination or connected with imagination then it too, can belong to the body as well as the soul. Apparently all the conditions of the soul are connected with the body including anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, hating etc. In the 'Nicomachean Ethics' Aristotle said that the analysing states connected with anger, mildness is a mean between the extremes. The middle emotion has actually no name, as is almost true for the extremes. Aristotle in his Ethics, insists that the 'good man' should feel the right emotions at the right times and not feel the wrong ones.

Rene Descartes advanced a theory of 'passions' as part of his overall theory

of mind and body, with the emotions occupying an awkward middle position. The key to Descartes' theory of emotion is his metaphysical distinction between two kinds of substance- mental and physical. He said that the mind is 'unextended substance', defined by its properties of thought and free-will. On the other hand, bodies are extended in space and subject to the mechanical laws of physics.

Descartes was a follower of the feeling theory of emotions. Descartes' account of the emotions or passions is contained in his work the passions of the soul, parts I and II. Passion is the reflective awareness of the commotions going on in the body. For Descartes, emotions are passive or passions. For him, distinguishing the emotions become a matter of distinguishing the different external objects or different internal temperaments of the body. Emotion is like an epiphenomenon to the basic causal nexus from perception to bodily reaction and purposive action. The dualistic view of mind and body raises special problems in emotions. Descartes thinks of emotions as feelings of physical agitation and excitement. He thinks of emotions as sensations. His theory of emotion sets the stage for many later theories such as Hume's (part-I) and James' (part-II), which treat emotions as nothing but sensations of agitation. But Descartes doesn't confine himself to this physiological analysis of emotion. He also describes emotions in straight forward mentalistic language, speaking of the perceptions, desires and beliefs associated with different emotions. In recognizing the conceptual dimension of emotions, Descartes appears to be struggling toward a more cognitive picture of emotions, a picture characteristic of many contemporary theories of emotion.

Descartes listed six basic emotions such as wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. He said that all other emotions are composed of these six basic emotions.

The Scottish philosopher David Hume gave a particularly sophisticated, account of emotions in his theory of human nature. In his book 'A Treatise of Human Nature', Hume defended a radically skeptical view of human knowledge. Hume is best known for his work on moral sentiments. But his theory of moral sentiments fits within a general theory and classification of emotions. His work "Of the Passions" is devoted to his theory of emotion.

Following Descartes' footsteps Hume defines emotion as varying degrees of physical and mental agitation. For Hume, passions are impressions and reflection, unique kinds of experience which arise as a result of sense perceptions (including sensations of pleasure and pain) and thoughts. Hume tells us that the emotions or passions are 'secondary or reflective impressions' or imprints on the soul which proceed from some of these original ones. Emotions or passions are second-order impressions. They can be divided into two kinds 'the calm and the violent.' Calm emotions are the aesthetic ones, the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition and external objects. But the violent emotions are the passions proper and include 'love and hatred', grief and joy pride and humility, though he warns us that these so-called emotions 'may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become in a manner imperceptions'.⁵⁶

Direct passions, such as desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security result from the direct association of pleasure and pain, good and evil

56. Hume, David- Of Passions, P. - 276

with some aspect or quality of some object. Indirect passions, such as pride, humility, ambition, vanity love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity arise in a more complicated matter. They result from associating in a special way some pleasure or pain, which results from some particular quality of some object with some quality of some other object. It is in connection with these indirect passions or emotions that Hume is able to point out that the object of the passions often differs from its cause.

Thus Hume's theory of emotions (part-I) clearly illustrates a pure sensation theory. Unlike physiological theorists Hume ignores the physiological attendants of emotion. In his view, emotions differ from physical pains and pleasures because emotions neednot be accompanied by definite, localizable physical sensations. Emotions have a characteristic feel. They are sensations and we may distinguish one emotion from another in part by determining how it feels. Hume introduced the phenomenon of intentionality into modern discussions and pointed out the awkward relationship between an emotion and its intentional object, and the difference between the object and the psychological cause of the emotion. Hume insisted that emotion, not reason was the heart of ethics.

Thus according to the traditional philosophers emotions are internal or private experiences. They are the internal processes taking place in ones secret mental world. As opposed to this traditional view of emotion, Ryle holds a dispositional account of emotion, according to which emotions cannot be the feelings of the internal mental world, but they are the reasons of predicting the overt behaviour.

Anthony Kenny in his book "Action, Emotion and Will" gives a philosophical account of emotion. He criticises the traditional view of emotion that emotions are purely private mental events. On the other hand he holds that emotions are not internal impressions or purely private mental events. According to him, sensations, feelings and experiences are not internal impressions or purely private mental events. He holds that emotions are feelings or at least are sometimes feelings.

The difference between sensations and emotions is that emotions are not localised whereas sensations are localised. Any pattern is accidental to a sensation, while some pattern is essential to an emotion. Kenny says that an emotion has a characteristic history behind it. But it is not essential for a sensation or feeling to have a characteristic history. Moreover, emotions unlike sensations are essentially directed towards objects. There must be an object for an emotion. It is not that the object of emotion has to be a physical object only. It can even be non physical. However there is a difference between object and causes of emotion.

In his book, by the object of emotion Kenny means "The sense of 'object' which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss is one which derives from the grammatical notion of the object of a transitive verb. The object of love is what is loved, the object of cutting is what is cut, the object of heating is what is heated. In discussing the nature of objects we are simply discussing the logical role of the object - expressions which complete the sense of intentional and non-intentional verbs."⁵⁷

57. Kenny, Anthony - Action, Emotion and Will, PP.- 187-88

However, I think that having of an object is not an isolated fact about emotion. That is emotions do not differ from sensations or feeling only in the sense that emotions have objects whereas sensations or feelings do not.

Kenny criticises Hume's view that the relation between an emotion and an object is a causal one. Hume wants to say that the connection between pride and the object of pride is contingent and not a priori. He makes a distinction between the object and the cause of an emotion and then holds that the relation between an emotion and an object is a contingent one.

Now let us discuss the psychological conception of emotions. The nature of emotion will be incomplete without Sigmund Freud's analysis of emotion. Actually Freud did not develop a theory of emotion. But his psycho-analytical theories radically changed the whole idea of emotions and sorts of phenomena that theories of emotion are supposed to explain. With his concept of "The unconscious", Freud re-orient our entire "topography" of the mind. According to him mental events, including emotions were no longer assumed to be "in consciousness" they could also undergo a variety of dynamically caused "vicissitudes", which sometimes prevented us from being aware of them. In all of Freud's theories of the mind, there were the same assumptions : the ultimate cause of the emotion is "psychic energy". There are unconscious processes of which a person may not or cannot be aware ; the mind is separated into different parts or "agencies" which came into conflict ; and infantile experiences, especially those of a sexual nature, profoundly influence adult behaviour and psychology. In the first part of his career, Freud divided the

mind into three components, which he sometimes described as "chambers". There is the conscious, a pre-conscious, which can emerge into consciousness at any time, and the unconscious which cannot become conscious because of repression. After 1923, Freud developed his view of the mind, dividing it into the Id (the source of instincts), the Ego (the rational self) and the Superego (the internalization of the rules and restrictions learned from one's parents and other authorities). But in both theories, the notion of unconscious emotions played an important but ambiguous role.

In fact Freud never develops an adequate or consistent view of emotions and the unconscious. He often referred to emotions as "affects" by which he usually meant a sensation, a "felt feeling" or "the conscious subjective aspect of an emotion"; as such he denied that an emotion can be unconscious. But through out his career, he referred without hesitation to such emotions as "repressed hostility". Thus Freud ambiguously describes an emotion as just a "feeling tone" or as a complex that includes not only a feeling (an affect), but also an instinct that motivates it and an idea that directs it towards an object. From Freud's analysis of emotion the following nature of emotion can be derived-

- I. An emotion is itself an instinct or an innate drive which is essentially unconscious.
- II. An emotion is an instinct plus an idea - a drive from within the unconscious, but aimed at a conscious object. In this analysis, an emotion becomes unconscious when the idea is separated from its instinct, so that one might experience it without

knowing how and why.

III. An emotion is just an effect or feeling or what William James called an 'epiphenomenon', a by-product of the processes of the mind. In this analysis, an emotion cannot be unconscious, although its causes may be.

Thus the nature of emotions play a large role in human experience and behaviour. There are certain emotion terms such as fear, anger, indignation, remorse, embarrassment, grief, distress, joy, craving, disgust etc. Emotions are what are designated by such terms in some of their use. We must distinguish an emotion as a kind of temporary state of a person from more or less long-term dispositions to various states, including emotional states, and activities. Such dispositions include :-

- I. Attitudes toward particular objects admiration, contempt, gratitude, resentment, jealousy, hate, sympathy.
- II. Dispositions to act and feel in certain ways toward objects of certain kinds under certain kinds of circumstances, generosity, friendliness, benevolence, humility etc.
- III. Dispositions include liabilities to emotional states irritability, excitableness, fearlessness, etc.

The psychological factors of all these three sorts can be mentioned under the heading of 'emotion' or 'passion'. Many emotion-terms can be used to designate dispositions as well as temporary emotional states. Emotional attitudes like hate and gratitude constitute an important and complicated problem of analysis.

According to many thinkers, the following factors are essential for emotion –

- I. A cognition of something as in some way desirable or undesirable.
- II. Feelings of certain kinds
- III. Marked bodily sensations of certain kinds.
- IV. Involuntary bodily processes and overt expressions of certain kinds.
- V. Tendencies to act in certain ways.
- VI. An upset or disturbed condition of mind or body.

Thus emotion is not a simple or primary state of consciousness, but is a compound state of mind. It is generally said that emotion is made up by the interaction of two aspects of the self - desire and intellect. The play of intellect on desire gives birth to emotion, and shows some of the characteristics of its father, Intellect, as well as of its mother, Desire. A continuing desire for union which the same object becomes an emotion. Emotions do not form a mere jungle, but that all spring from one root, dividing into two main stems, each of these again sub-dividing into branches. This fruitful idea, is due to an Indian author, Bhagawan Das, who has for the first time introduced order into this confused region of consciousness. Students of psychology will find in his science of the emotions a lucid treatise setting forth this scheme which reduces the chaos of the emotions into a cosmos and shapes therein an ordered morality. Thus the nature of emotion is important for both philosophy and psychology.

William James offers the physiological theory of emotion. His account of emotion is contained in his classic "Principles of Psychology" vol. II chapter XXV.

James argues that the feel of emotion which equals the emotion itself is, in fact nothing but the perception of these physiological disturbances. James asks us to imagine what an emotion would be like if we remove from it all feeling of agitation, clamminess, trembling, flushing etc. Physiological disturbances donot seem to be necessary to what philosophers call "dispositional" emotions. That is, we sometimes ascribe emotions to ourselves without implying that at each moment we are actually feeling or experiencing the emotion. James also said that emotions must be clearly distinguished from instincts to behave in certain ways. The core of his theory of emotion is that 'bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion. For James, emotions are really just internal bodily sensations that is the feelings or subjective sensible aspects of physiological occurrences caused by perceptions. Ordinarily, says James, Sensation is 'an object simply apprehended, emotion is an object emotionally felt.' (James 1890, p. 474). With James, Gilbert Ryle is prone to believe that feeling refers to bodily sensations. There is nothing secret or mysterious about it.

Anthony Kenny in his book "Action, Emotion and Will" holds that William James identified the emotions not with bodily processes themselves but with the perceptions of these processes. For James the emotions are states so private that the conclusive verificatiion of his theory can come only from introspection. In order to account for the great variety of emotional states, James insisted that there was hardly any limit to the permutation and combinations of possible minute

bodily changes. Moreover, he had to claim, "The every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is felt, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs." Here a question arises - What is the criterion for the occurrence of such a feeling minute bodily change? If it is the non-verbal behaviour of the subject, then it must be his display of emotion. But if so, then James is merely renaming the emotions "perceptions of bodily changes" and his theory has no explanatory force. If the criterion is the verbal behaviour of the subject then the theory of James is obviously false. One of the bodily changes in fear is the increases secretion of the adrenal glands. On James theory, fear consists partly in the perception and of secretion. But people felt fear long before the adrenals and if now-a-days we can sometimes infer the state of our adrenals from the state of our feelings, we infer the secretion from the fear, not the fear from the secretion. In fact, James suggests no criterion. The feeling of a bodily change is clearly for him an internal impression, which carries its specification on its face. In support of his theory James suggests that it is impossible to have any strong emotion without having the appropriate bodily sensations. But if this is true, no one proves that an emotion is identical with bodily sensations.

J.B. Watson , the founder of "Behaviourist Psychology" was one of the notable exponent of the theory of emotion. In his book "Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist " he writes the following : "Psychology is that division of natural science which takes human activity and conduct as its subject matter. It attempts to formulate through systematic observation and experimentation the

laws and principles which underlie man's reactions." ⁵⁸ Watson placed the emotions among those behaviour patterns which he believed were inherited rather than acquired and he desired to establish this by conducting experiments on newly born babies. According to Watson, "An emotion is an hereditary 'pattern - reaction' involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems". ⁵⁹

Here by pattern reaction we mean that the separate details of response appear with some constancy, with some regularity and in approximately the same sequential order each time the exciting stimulus is presented. Thus an emotion differs from an instinctive reaction in that 'when the adjustments called out by the stimulus are internal and confined to the subjects body, we have emotion, e.g. blushing ; on the other hand when the stimulus leads to adjustment of the organism as a whole to objects, we have instinct, for example, defense responses, grasping etc.

But Watson's behaviourist account becomes self-refuting. Watson has told us that an emotion is 'pattern - reaction', chiefly of physiological changes, which is found in its unadulterated form only in the new - born child, but it is difficult to get clear evidence of this emotions.

There are two difficulties about accepting Watson's account of emotions. The first concerns the description of the response itself. There are many adult expressions of fear and love which correspond in no detail to the behaviour

58. Watson - Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviourist, 1919, P.I.

59. Ibid, 195

described by Watson. An executive who drops into a pillar-box a cheque to a blackmailer and a love-letter to his mistress is performing at the same time two actions, one out of fear and one out of love ; yet he neednot be crying, starting, smiling, holding his breath, cooling, gurgling or suffering visceral commotions and indeed he can hardly be doing all these things at the same time. The adult behaviour is not merely 'an addition and modification to the infant pattern described. It is considered just as a piece of behaviour, a totally different response. Watson admits that the stimuli in the adult case may be very dissimilar to the unconditioned stimuli. But where stimulus and response are both totally different, what grounds have we for talking of the same behaviour pattern at all? Watson does indeed feel misgivings.

B.F. Skinner, another psychologist also offers the behavioural analysis of emotion. In his most theoretical book 'About Behaviourism', Skinner tells us, "The environment performs the functions previously assigned to feelings and introspectively observed inner states of the organism", and 'what an organism does will eventually be seen to be due to what it is, at the moment it behaves, and the physiologist will some day give us all the details.'⁶⁰ In other words the explanation of behaviours is to be found in terms of two factors alone, physiology and the environment or external stimulus. But Skinner's behaviourism in the area of emotions differs from Watson's account. Skinner looks not to physiological changes and reflex behaviour for the pattern reactions which are the emotions. But he operates behaviour.

60. Skinner : About Behaviourism, 1974, PP-248-9

But it should be maintained here that both the psychological behaviourists like John Watson and B.F. Skinner as well as philosophical behaviourists like Gilbert Ryle flee from the idea that behaviour merely expresses or signals some inner private emotional phenomenon. They argued that instead that behaviour and the disposition to behave actually constitute the emotion itself. In "The Concept of Mind" Ryle argues that all mental terms (e.g. 'feels angry,' 'believes', 'suspects') can be defined solely in terms of behaviour and that all ascriptions of mental states or events to ourselves and other can be fully justified by appeal to a person's behaviour or disposition to behave in characteristic ways. This means that because mental terms refer to behaviour and dispositions to behave, mental states and events, including emotions, are no more private than physical states. Thus Ryle admits emotions as physical states.

Thus emotions typically involve a 'perturbation', 'disturbance' or 'agitation' of person. Physiological studies have revealed certain disturbances in normal bodily functioning as regular features of emotional states. These include increased adrenaline secretion, increased heartbeat, alternation of the distribution of blood to various parts of the body, changes in the pattern of respiration, suspension of digestive activities and increases in red corpuscles in the blood. These changes are manifested in the involuntary overt expressions of emotion. Ryle takes it as a criterion of what he calls 'agitations'. A person can be too grief - stricken to think about what he is doing, too overjoyed to concentrate on his work, or too frightened to notice what is happening around him. Psychologists seeking an objective criterion

for the term emotion have tended to identify emotion with bodily states which are disturbances in this double sense. Thus "Emotion is activity and reactivity of the tissues and organs innervated by the automatic nervous systems." ⁶¹

Thus we find different conceptions of emotions given by different philosophers and psychologists. From these definitions of emotion we can derive that emotion, is an experience of turbulences going on in the private stream of consciousness. Due to certain situations in the environment the normally of the internal stream of consciousness is disturbed. The feeling or experiencing of this disturbance is called emotion. So, according to the traditional philosophers emotion is necessarily connected with a ghostly world of mind where turbulences are said to occur. But Gilbert Ryle rejects this explanation of emotion.

Now let us explain Ryle's analysis of emotion from his book "The Concept of Mind". People are said to be in emotional states when they are inclined to act in certain ways as well as when they act in particular disturbed states of mind. Gilbert Ryle offers a dispositional account of emotion. He says that the word 'emotion' is used in two quite different senses in which we experience people's behaviour by reference to emotions. In the first sense we are referring to the motives or inclinations from which intelligent actions are done. In the second sense we are referring to moods, including the agitations of which some aimless movements are signs. In neither of these senses we are asserting that the overt behaviour is the effect of a felt turbulence in the agents stream of consciousness. In the third

61. Morion A. Wenger, as quoted in Robert Plutchik, *The Emotions : Fact, Theories and a New Model*, P. 175)

sense of emotion, pangs and twinges are feelings or emotions, but they are not things by reference to which we explain behaviour. In this regard Ryle says, "Inclinations and moods, including agitations aren't occurrences and don't therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts or states. They are, however, propensities of different kinds and their differences are important. Feelings, on the other hand, are occurrences, but the place that mention of them should take in descriptions of human behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories accord to it".⁶²

Ryle makes a list of senses in which the term emotion is used. He explains these words one by one and shows that none of them has any reference to a ghostly world. The words thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms, hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings, shocks etc. are feeling words. People ordinarily report the occurrence of a feeling by the phrase, 'a throb of compassion', 'a shock of surprise', 'a thrill of anticipation' and so on. Ryle says that it is an important linguistic fact that the names for specific feelings such as 'itch', 'qualm' and 'pang' are also used as names of specific bodily sensations. If someone says that he has just felt a twinge, it is proper to ask whether it was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism, though the word 'twinge' is not used in the same sense in both of the contexts. Similarly, qualms of apprehension are analogous to qualms of sea-sickness. The various feelings are located in the whole body. The feeling of despair can be located in the pit of the stomach. The feeling of anger may be located in muscles of the jaw and the fist.

62. Ryle, Gilbert: *The Concept of Mind*. P.-81.

Those which cannot be so located pervade the whole body. So, like William James, Ryle also believes that feeling refers to bodily sensations. There cannot be any secret or mysterious about it. Thus according to Ryle emotion cannot be any mental phenomenon. It is a physiological or bodily phenomenon of our life. Emotions refer to bodily sensations.

The theorists confuse that motive terms are names of internal experience as emotion. By emotion they explain people's higher level behaviour. Here we may take the term 'vanity' for example. The theorists believe that there is a feeling of vanity in us. When a man is described as vain, considerate, avaricious, patriotic, or indolent, an explanation is necessary of why he conducts his actions daydreams and thoughts in the way he does and these words act as species of emotions or feelings. The specific feeling of vanity causes the outward behaviour of boasting, day dreaming etc. Thus the theorists admit emotion as internal feeling and it directs our outward behaviour. But Ryle rejects this idea of emotion given by the theorists. According to him, here vanity means nothing more than a muddle and confusion. 'Vanity' means tendencies or propensities to act in certain ways in certain circumstances. It is a motive word. All motive words are again names of propensities or dispositions. Ryle holds, "Motive words used in this way signify tendencies or propensities and therefore cannot signify the occurrence of feelings. They are elliptical expressions of general hypothetical propositions of a certain sort, and cannot be construed as expressing categorical narratives of episodes".⁶³ Thus

63. Ibid, P. - 83.

'Vanity' signifies a 'disposition'. The tendency of vanity actualises in the various acts of boasting. It is not the registering of a feeling. We don't feel the thrills or twinges of a vanity. The vain man would have been first to know how vain he was. Moreover, it becomes almost a habit with the vain man to boast. But habit is not an internal event or process. Therefore, vanity is a disposition and as disposition it cannot be an occurrence because no disposition is an occurrence. So, vanity cannot be felt as occurring internally. Similarly, patriotism is not a feeling. It is a disposition to behave in certain ways. Thus Ryle believes that motive words don't refer to internal feeling and it cannot be emotion in the traditional sense which refers emotion as only internal experience of mankind. Thus while talking about emotion, Ryle is always talking about bodily habits or behaviour.

But there are distinctions between feelings and bodily sensations. All feelings cannot be explained by reference to bodily sensations. Bodily sensations aren't equations for feelings. A man giving an account of his feeling cannot give a parallel account of bodily sensations. James identifies feelings with bodily sensations, but it is enough to show that we talk of feelings very much as we talk of bodily sensations. Ryle says that there is a tinge of metaphor in case of feelings. But the metaphor is absent in case of the bodily sensations. To the ordinary man outside the laboratory the equations of bodily sensations with emotions is simply outrageous. Ryle himself acknowledges the difference between feelings and bodily sensations when he remarks, "I hope to show that though it is quite proper to describe someone as feeling a throb of compassion, his compassion is not to be

equated with a throb or a series of throbs, any more than his fatigue is his gasps ; so no disillusioning consequences would follow from acknowledging that throbs, twinges and other feelings are bodily sensation".

Ryle also distinguishes between cause and reason. He maintains that the cause of an action is different from the reason of an action. The theorists object that an act of boasting is one of the direct exercises of vanity. But Ryle says that when we explain why a man boasts by saying that it is because he is vain, we are forgetting the point that a disposition is not an event and so cannot be a cause. The cause of his boasting must be an event. He must be moved to boast by some actual 'impulse' namely an impulse of vanity. So the direct actualizations of vanity are particular vanity impulses, and these are feelings. The vain man is a man who tends to register particular feelings of vanity which impel him to boast. To explain an act as done from a certain motive, in the case from vanity, is to give a causal explanation. This means that in this case the boasters' mind is full of special causes. That is why a vanity feeling has been called to be the inner cause of the overt boasting. Ryle says, "I shall shortly argue that to explain an act as done from a certain motive is not analogous to saying that the glass broke because a stone hit it, but to the quite different type of statement that the glass broke when the stone hit it, because the glass was brittle."⁶⁴ Thus motives are dispositions they cannot be the cause of actions. Vanity as such cannot be the cause of boasting. It is the reason of the acts of boasting. The cause is some such event as meeting the stranger. So, in order to explain the acts of boasting, we needn't confuse their

reasons with cause. We needn't take vanity as a cause. Thus emotion is not something ghostly or occult.

Ryle holds that to explain an action which is done from a certain motive cannot be a causal explanation. He says that motives are emotions no doubt, but they are not emotions in which agitations are emotions. He establishes the point that to do something from a motive is compatible with being free from any particular feelings while doing it. To call a feeling or sensation 'acute' is to say that it and to attend to a feeling is not the same thing as to attend to a problem in symbolic logic. Thus Ryle rejects the conclusion that motive words are the names of feelings or else of tendencies to have feelings. He says that we discover the motives of other people. The process of discovering them is an inductive process which results in the establishment of law like propositions and the applications of them as the 'reasons' for particular actions. Here we establish a general hypothetical proposition of certain sort. The way in which a person discovers his own long-term motives is the same as the way in which he discovers those of others.

In Ryle's explanation of motive, for the every action it is natural to ask "From what motive was it done?" The possible answer is that it was not done from a motive but from force of habit. The performance of an action from a motive is different from its performance out of habit. But the sorts of things which belong to the one class also belong to the other. But to say of an action that it is done from force of habit is to say that a specific disposition explains the action. No one thinks that 'habit' is the name of a peculiar internal event. Therefore to ask whether an

action was done from force of habit or from kindliness of heart is to ask which of two specified dispositions is the explanation of the action. Ryle does not make any difference between motive and trait. Thus he holds,

"To say, then, that a certain motive is a trait in someone's character is to say that he is inclined to do certain sorts of things, make certain sorts of plans, indulge in certain sorts of day dreams, and also, of course, in certain situations to feel certain sorts of feelings. To say that he did something from that motive is to say that this action, done in its particular circumstances, was just the sort of thing that was an inclination to do. It is to say, he would do that".⁶⁵

Thus Ryle says that motive is the trait in a person. Again sometimes a particular motive is so strong that it always dominates every other motives. The words 'emotion', 'emotional', 'moved' etc. are used to describe agitations or other moods in which people are liable. By a 'highly emotional person' is meant a person who is frequently and violently distraught, thrilled or flustered. But if the proper sense of emotion is agitations then motives or inclinations are not emotions. In this regard, vanity cannot be an emotion, though chagrin can or being interested in symbolic logic cannot be an emotion, though being bored by other topics can. But these are the ambiguities of 'emotion'. So, Ryle holds that it is better to say that motives are emotions but not in the sense in which agitations are emotions.

The emotional words like 'worried' 'excited' 'embarrassed' etc. are used in different ways. Sometimes they are used to signify temporary moods as when we say that someone was embarrassed for some minutes, or worried for an hour.

Sometimes we use them for susceptibilities to moods as when we say that someone is embarrassed by praise. Similarly 'rheumatic' sometimes means 'having a bout of rheumatism', sometimes 'prone to have bouts of rheumatism'. Ryle holds, 'Susceptibilities to specific agitations are on the general footing with inclinations, namely that both are general propensities and not occurrences.'⁶⁶ From the fact that a person has been having indigestion for an hour it does not follow that he had one long pain or a series of short pains during that hour, perhaps he had no pains at all. Nor does it follow that he has been feeling sick. 'Indigestion' does not stand for any unique episode. Similarly a sulky or hilarious person may or may not say certain things, talk in certain tone of voice, grimace in certain ways, have certain day dreams, or register certain feelings. To be sulky is to be in the mood to act or react in some ways. This shows that mood words like 'tranquil' and 'jovial' and words for agitations, like 'harassed' or 'homestick' stand for liabilities. But though agitations, like other moods, are liability conditions, they are not propensities to act intentionally in certain ways.

Thus Ryle holds that motives are not agitations, not even mild agitations. On the other hand, agitations are not motives. But agitations pre-suppose motives or they presuppose behaviour trends. Thus motives are the most interesting sort for us. Conflicts of habits with habits, or habits with unkind fact, or habits with motives are commotion conditions. There are some words which signify both inclinations and agitations, some which never signify anything but agitations, and others which never signify anything but inclinations. Words like 'uneasy', 'anxious',

66. Ibid, P. - 92

'distressed' 'excited', always signify agitations. Phrases like 'fond of fishing', 'keen on gardening', 'bent on becoming a bishop' never signify agitations. But words like 'love', 'want', 'desire', 'proud', 'eager', and many others stand sometimes for simple inclination and sometimes for agitations which are resultant upon those inclinations.

But we can say that Ryle doesnot make any attempt to relate motives to emotions, though Ryle says that motives are emotions and they are emotions in a sense quite different from agitations. He holds that motives or inclinations donot signify agitations. Motives cannot be causes. The explanation of motive is the reason explanation. Motive cannot be occurrence or episodic. Thus Ryle's explanation of emotion in terms of motive cannot be accepted.

Now let us discuss moods in relation to emotion. A person's momentary mood is a different sort of thing from the motives which actuate him. Moods monopolize. To say that he is in one mood is to say that he isnot in any other. Mood words are different from motive words. Depression, happiness, restlessness and joliness etc. are some of the mood words. Both moods and motives are disposition. But Ryle holds that moods are liabilities but they arenot propensities to act intentinally. This feature of intentionality or purposiveness distinguishes motives from moods. Like moods, motives arenot monopolised. Again motives cannot be said as the names for feelings. Feelings in the strict sense, are things that come and go. We feel them all over us or in a particular part. Energy isnot a feeling. Ryle holds that names of moods arenot the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in

certain sorts of situations. He says, moods differ from motive words, not in the term of their application but in their use in characterising the total 'set' of a person during the short term.

Ryle also admits that some times mood words are also confused as the names of feelings. But Ryle argues that moods cannot be taken as feelings. They even cannot designate emotions. Mood words refer to certain frames of mind. Moods unlike motives monopolize. They cannot be called feelings. Feelings come and go, appear and disappear in quick successions. But moods don't do so. Nobody says that his pleasant mood is fast appearing and disappearing. So, not referring to feelings, they refer to the short term tendencies of the individual. They cannot be understood as pointing to the episodes of feeling occurring within the individual. The theory of the traditionalists is therefore wrong.

There are many people who identify emotions with commotions. By a highly emotional person, they mean a person who is often agitated. But Ryle rejects this explanation of agitation. According to him, it is mistake. Words standing for agitation, e.g. 'worried', 'excited', 'embarrassed' etc. are names of moods or states of mind. Ryle admits agitations as liability conditions because when one gets into the agitated frame of mind, one is liable or bound to behave in typical ways.

But we can say that moods cannot be equated with behaviour only. In this regard Ryle holds, "So a person's mood during a given period colours all or most of his actions and reactions during that period. His work and his play, his talk and his grimaces, his appetite and his daydreams, all reflect his touchness, his joviality,

or his depression. Any one of them may serve as a barometer for all the others."⁶⁷

Thus Ryle says that to be in a particular mood is to do certain sorts of things and not others. If a person is in a depressed mood, all his actions will reflect his depression. So, I think that mood cannot be equivalent to action. Actions are the reflection of moods, but they are not the whole of moods. Reflection is always reflection of something. There cannot be any actualization in reflection. Thus emotion cannot be explained clearly in terms of moods.

Ryle explains about the notion of agitations. He argues that feelings are intrinsically connected with agitations and are not connected with inclinations so far as inclinations are factors in agitations. Ryle holds that to be 'anxious', 'shocked' 'irritated', 'harassed' etc. are words of agitations. Agitations differ from inclinations in the sense that inclinations are not disturbances. Ryle says that feelings are intrinsically connected with agitations. Thus he writes, "It is part of the logic of our descriptions of feeling that they are signs of agitations and are not exercises of inclinations."⁶⁸ Therefore, the feelings that are causally related are agitations. They are sign of agitations in the same sort of way as stomach-aches are signs of indigestion. An inclination is a certain sort of proneness or readiness to do certain sorts of things on purpose. Ryle says that agitations like moods are only liabilities but are not propensities like motives. For example, to be panic is liable to do certain sorts of things such as stiffen or shrick, or to be unable to finish one's sentence. He says that agitations are not propensities because the things we do when we

67. Ibid, P.- 96

68. Ibid, p. 101.

are agitated are not done on purpose. Therefore, motives are not happenings and are not of the right type to be causes. The expansion of a motive expression is a law like sentence and not a report of an event.

Ryle, by explaining the different senses of the term 'emotion', comes to the conclusion that it has no reference to the ghostly process of internal turbulences felt in the stream of consciousness. Ryle shows that as motive, emotion is a disposition, as mood it is a frame of mind, as agitation, it is a liability condition and as feeling it is nothing more than bodily sensations. Emotions are feelings when they indicate particular excitements or disturbed states of mind. Emotion is used in different senses when it is meant to designate motive words, or words which explain people's higher level operations. When a man is described as vain, considerate, avaricious, patriotic, or indolent, no palpable excitement is supposed to be disposed. A vain man does not have any peculiar feeling of vanity or pride occasionally in between his several acts of vanity. Ryle said "To put it quite dogmatically, the vain man never feels vain. Certainly when thwarted, he feels acute dudgeon and when unexpectedly successful, he feels buoyant. But there is no special thrill or pang which we call a feeling of vanity"⁶⁹. Emotions when related as motive words, act more as dispositions leading to various kinds of activities. The motive words of vanity, considerateness, avariciousness constitute the generic dispositions or designate higher order states of human beings. For Ryle, the concept of I and myself, though implied in thinking, visualizing images or knowing what one is doing, are the terms of the same nature. They belong to the higher

69. Ibid, P. 84

order dispositional states of the human mind. Ryle denies the individual's experience of feeling vain in his vanity behaviour.

Now we discuss Ryle's radical explanation of emotions. The logical behaviour of emotions where emotions are supposed to act as dispositions is different from the explanation accorded to them by causal antecedents. Ryle uses the routine explanations to overrule the privileged access of the individual to know his own emotional states. The word emotion can be used in different senses like inclinations, moods and agitations. The identification of emotion with motives finds the greatest emphasis in the book, "The Concept of Mind". Emotions are regarded as motive words or words indicating the individual's moods and inclinations can be explained as dispositions to act in certain ways. Emotion in these senses does not mean the individual's active mental state or operation. Our ways to know the motives of other individuals are the same as our way to know our own motives. But Ryle says that the process of discovering them is not free from error. In this regard he holds, "It is or is like an inductive process, which results in the establishment of law like propositions and the applications of them as the 'reasons' for particular actions. What is established in each case is or includes a general hypothetical proposition of a certain sort."⁷⁰

Ryle observes that one need not take much heed of the actual feelings accompanying particular motivated actions. He says, "There is a special reason for not paying much heed to the feelings had by a person whose motives are

70. Ibid, P-87

under investigation, namely that we know that lively and frequent feelings are felt by sentimentalists whose positive actions show quite clearly that their patriotism, e.g. is self indulgent make believe"⁷¹ Ryle also believes that the people's heart go on sink when they hear that their country's plight is desperate. But their appetites are unaffected and the routines of their lives are unmodified. It is said that persons having feelings while acting under some motivation, are rather like theatregoers and novel readers, who also feel genuine pangs, glows, flutters and twinges of despair with the difference that they realise that they are making believing.

Ryle observes that agitations imply particular feelings of individuals. Thus they are essentially episodic. He says, "When people are said to be speechless with amazement or paralysed by horror, the specific agitation is, in effect being described as extremely violent."⁷² These agitations or feelings indicate a disturbed state of mind, an occurrence which cannot be identified either with inclination or with mood words. When emotion is present as a motive, the individual's actions neednot have any corresponding feeling to them. But when emotion is expressed as agitation it is necessary that the individual actually feels and is conscious that he feels. Ryle's point is that even in such cases there willnot be much difference between emotions as excitements and emotions as motives or inclinations. Ryle observes that it would be absurd to say that a person's interest on Symbolic Logic or that some one was too patriotic to work for his country. Ryle holds, "Inclinations arenot disturbances and so cannot be violent or mild disturbances. A man whose

71. Ibid, P-89

72. Ibid, P.-90

dominant motive is philanthropy or vanity ; for he is not distracted or upset at all. He is entirely single - minded. Philanthropy and vanity are not gusts or storms"⁷³. Although agitation implies occurrence of particular feelings, when analysed in everyday language turns out to be similar to mood words like being hilarious or sulky. To be sulky is to be in the mood to act or react in some or other of certain vaguely describable, though easily recognizable, ways, whenever junctures of certain sorts arise. Thus Ryle says, "This shows that mood words like 'tranquil' and 'jovial' including words for agitations, like 'harassed' and 'homesick' stand for liabilities. Even to be for a brief moment scandalized or in a panic is, for that moment, to be liable to do some such thing as stiffen or shrick, or to be unable to finish one's sentence, or to remember where the fire escape is to be found."⁷⁴

To this Stuart Hampshire replied that the physiological reactions take place, although not necessarily and always. Thus physiological reactions by themselves will not give a sufficient evidence for the occurrence of feelings. Agitations while implying liability conditions function like categorical happenings, with hypothetical pre-supposition of motives or moods. Thus they are episodic whose explanation is possible in terms of law-like liability propositions with particular occurrences at particular times under particular provocations.

A.C. Ewing observes that Ryle seems to take a too episodic view of pleasure and interest involved in activities. Ryle thinks that apart from analysis in terms of overt behaviour these feelings can consist of a very 'short-lived exciting thrills' and

73. Ibid. P. - 90

74. Ibid. PP. - 93-94

argues that a person may still be interested in or enjoy his pursuit in between thrills. Pleasure is generally believed as one of the most popular words used in everyday talk and is an internal feeling or experience appearing on a ghostly plane. But according to Ryle, pleasure cannot be so conceived. He asks us to look to the different uses of the word 'pleasure'. In one use this term is commonly substituted by the verbs 'enjoy' and 'like'; in another it is replaced by such nouns as 'delight', 'transport', 'joy', 'rapture' etc. In the sense of the verb, e.g. when we say 'this man is enjoying digging' the word enjoying doesnot refer to a seperate experience of pleasure besides digging. Ryle says that 'enjoying digging isnot both digging and having a (pleasant) feeling,' but surely as A.C. Ewing observes, "It is both physically digging and having a pleasent experience of the physical process. This experience isnot just a feeling of pleasure you cannot have pleasure without having pleasure is in something but a cognitive and conative experience pleasantly toned throughout or so toned with only slight interruptions"⁷⁵

Thus enjoying digging isnot the physical act of digging and the mental act of experiencing pleasure. It is a act of making digging in itself a pleasure. Thus enjoyment cannot be reduced to physical behaviour plus a few sensations. Emotional states is explained as dispositions to behave in certain ways. Feelings of pleasure, pain, embarranssement etc. continue to be unique experiences of our personal life. Physical digging in certain mood or frame of mind is pleasure, not a vehicle or means of pleasure. Thus there is nothing private about pleasure.

75. A. C. Ewing, Prof. Ryles' Attack on Dualism in Clarity Is not Enough., P. 337.

Again, when pleasure is used in sense of a noun, it signifies moods including agitations. We use the idioms as 'too delighted to speak coherently' or 'crazy with joy'. 'Too delighted to speak' means to be so much delighted that one cannot speak coherently. But we know that there is nothing ghostly about agitations. Likewise there is nothing ghostly about emotions. Thus Ryle tries hard to establish by referring to common usage that the introspective psychology which views mind as essentially private to the agent is defective and false. Ryle's idea of mind as well as emotion is inherently open or public. There is no private inner life at all. Mind is just a name for typical human behaviours. All statements of mind are reports about current bodily behaviour or predicated bodily behaviour. But we cannot accept Ryle's conception of emotion. As a conscious human being we must have feeling about something.

CHAPTER - V

CHAPTER - V

THE NATURE OF SENSATION AND OBSERVATION :

The concept of sensation is an important concept of philosophy as well as psychology. The Oxford English Dictionary describes 'Sensation' as an operation of any of the senses, a psychical affection or state of consciousness consequent on and related to a particular impression received by one of the bodily organs or a particular impression required by one of the organs of sense. Based on this description we can draw a distinction between two types of sensations.

- I. Those which are connected with special organs of sense, namely eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin.
- II. Those which are connected with other sensitive but non-sensory parts of the body.

Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and feeling come under the first category.

They are the sensations connected with special organs of sense. The later are generally called organic sensations. Pains, aches, tickles, pricking, fatigue and giddiness, fall under this later category. But both are used interchangeably. For example, when our eyes are dazzled or we have a fish-bone in the throat, or we are pricked in the skin, we readily say that we have pain. Conversely, whenever we have an organic sensation, for example, pain in the throat or stomach or we are fatigued, we are apt to say that we feel the fish bone in the throat or suet pudding in the stomach, or the resistance of a log. However, the main point of

distinction is that while it is proper to ask for the cause of organic sensations, there is no sense in asking for the cause of the sensations connected with our special organs of sense. Generally, the cause of an organic sensation can be a sensation connected with our special sense organs.

The Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Philosophy describes the two meanings of the term sensation.

- I. Ordinarily, sensation means having such feeling as cold, pressure, thirst, itches, or pains.
- II. Technically, it means mental entities of a kind private to their owner.

Thus in ordinary language one may speak of having sensations of thirst, cold or pleasure and may refer to itches or pains as sensations. Here sensation is used synonymously with feeling. But the technical use of the word sensations involves a meaning. One may speak of visual or auditory sensations (i.e. - colours or sounds) while such form of speaking have no place in ordinary speech. Sounds and smells seem public and external. For example, two or more people may hear the same sound or smell the same smell and agree on its source. But the feelings of pressure or warmth are partly sensations and partly seem to be awareness of heavy or warm objects. In the technical sense, sensation is used in a semi-physiological and semi-psychological sense. Here sensation includes colour patches, hearing sounds, getting smells, tasting, touching and so on.

Sensation is primarily said to be a mental phenomena. Psychologists define sensation as a primary consciousness originating from sense object contact.

According to them, due to the stimulation of the senses, an initial consciousness emerges in the private realm of mind, which goes by the name sensation.

Some supporters of the theory of sensations are influenced by discoveries concerning the atomic structure of matter. The basic sensations are atomic. They are sensory point-elements each corresponding to a different nerve cells. Thus a patch of red colour would be made up of many sensations of red. The awareness of sensations or percepts is a circular explanation and can lead to an infinite regress—seeing sensations must require further sensations and so on. Thus it is necessary to maintain that the awareness of sensations or percepts is a special kind of direct awareness different from perceiving, an amendment explicitly adopted by the sense-datum theory. Sensationalists like James Mill, J.S. Mill, Hume and others claimed that perceiving is the association of various sensations. 'Association' is a vague term and was explained as the customary linking of ideas or sensations that are similar, contiguous in space and time and so on.

Sensationalism or sensationism holds that all knowledge has its origin in sensation. It is a doctrine of epistemology which considers sensations as the sole source of knowledge. As a psychological theory sensationalism stresses the origins of knowledge and the processes by which it is acquired. It reduces all mental contents to unitary sensations and has close relationships with associationism. It is sometimes regarded as a form of empiricism and adopted with antimetaphysical intentions. There is always a tendency to associate sensationalism with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries empiricism. The development of sensationalism

leads us to the distinction between sensation and perception. The distinction between them is important because perception involves interpretation and thus there is the possibility of error. But sensation does not involve it. Thus sensationalism is an empiricist's quest for certainty and a sure foundation for knowledge.

During the last fifty years philosophers use the word *sense-data* or *sense contents* instead of sensations. Perception whether direct or indirect is a process of acquiring knowledge in which we know what is given to our senses. This given entity is the *sense datum*. The datum present in sensation is the *sense-datum*. It is different from memory data or introspection. Thus the problem of illusion or error in perception leads the philosophers to introduce *sense data* in philosophy specially with regard to epistemology. The concept of *sense-data* is not a new one. Some ancient philosophers called them *sensible species*.

In Locke and Berkeley we find them as the ideas of sensation. The same concept was found in Hume as impression. In the nineteenth century philosophy they were known as sensations. C.D. Broad and some others called them *sensa*. Ayer called them *sensibilia* and at the same time the term '*sense-data*' has been introduced by the contemporary philosophers. The introduction of *sense data* has occupied a new dimension in the problem of knowledge and perception. Through the justification of *sense-data* perception has been made free from error or illusion.

G.E. Moore introduced the term '*sense-data*' to denote those objects of sense-experience that are immediately given. According to the analytical philosophers also what is immediately given in sense experience is called '*sense*

datum'. We can have sensory experience of things which do not exist. But what is immediately given to our sense organs must exist i.e. sense data. And what is lying behind the sensation is a physical object. Moore, regarding the nature and status of sense-data, takes a peculiar position which starts with the objectivity of sense data and marches towards subjectivity. Maintaining a difference between sense-data and the act of sensing he upholds that sense data can exist independently, without being perceived.

Some general nature of sense data are as follows -

- I. Sense data are private. Each sensed only one percipient.
- II. Sense data are transitory existents. They are lasting only while they are usually claimed to be events rather than things or properties.
- III. Sense-data are distinct from the percipient and seem to be external.
- IV. Sense-data are causal properties, for sounds cannot act on other things nor can colours or tastes, though the sensing of them may affect a person.
- V. Sense-data cannot be other than they appear to be.

Thus the introduction of sense -data in philosophy are very important for understanding the nature of sensation. What we directly get in sensation is nothing but the sense-data and what is lying behind the sensation is a physical objects.

Another important concept that is related with sensation, is observation. The relation between sensation and observation can be maintained as a relation of elements to a complete whole. Observation consists of noticing or having of

sensations, images, relations and other elements of experience. Observation is a purposive perception of the objective reality that provides us with the primary data for various claims to knowledge. Observation may be simple or complex, or direct or indirect. It is regarded as one of the postulates of scientific investigation. It provides the primary data for scientific research. Observing some thing entails not only housing a sensation but also paying heed to it. In the form of a formula we can say :

Observation = Having a sensation + paying heed to it.

Thus sensation and observation are closely related to each other.

The traditional philosophers more or less deal with the nature of sensation and observation. The Greeks had no linguistic means of distinction between sensation and perception. The word 'aesthesia' is used by Plato and Aristotle to mean 'sensation' or 'perception'. Plato says that the senses make judgements and indicate the results to the soul. Plato speaks of the senses anthropomorphically. The important point that emerges is the connection of perception with judgement. In some cases that judgement is straight forward ; in other cases it has to be made relative to other standards. Plato made the distinction between absolute and relative properties. According to him, absolute properties are those which the senses are competent to judge for themselves. Plato accepted the view of Heraclitus that the whole of the sensible world is in a flux. Thus Plato thinks that the senses never judge adequately about any sensible properties that the whole sensible world is imperfect, a mere imitation of the world of Forms. This view is put forward in the

Timaeus. Plato's view of perception are also found in the first part of the Theatetus. This part of the Theatetus is concerned with the question whether aesthesis is knowledge. This is clearly not perception in the ordinary sense of the word. Thus ordinary empirical judgments are vindicated, and being not merely becoming, is attributed to objects of perception. This constitutes a revolution in Platonic thought and it is connected with other developments which may be discovered in the later dialogues.

In the Theatetus, Plato has used the term aesthesis. To have aesthesis is to have an acquaintance with sensible object ; and the last is an impression or what modern philosophers have called a sense-datum. Therefore, Plato has not been concerned with perception in the ordinary sense of the word. In the notion of an impression the notions of sensation and perception are blended and there is no conception on Plato's part to separate them. Impressions are like sensations in so far as they are caused by things outside us. They are perceptual in so far as they afford us knowledge of things outside us.

Aristotle's conception of sense perception is found in De Anima. Aristotle is not concerned with the question where perception brings with it knowledge or can act as the basis of knowledge. He makes statements about the infallibility of the senses. But he was not concerned with the reliability of the senses as a source of knowledge. In the De Anima he says that before perceiving the senses are nothing actual at all, and that the same is true of the relation between the intellect and thought. Moreover, he says that the soul never thinks without an image, while

images depend for their existence upon previous sense-perception.

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle says that each sense is more reliable concerning its own proper object than it is about the objects of another sense. Aristotle wishes to distinguish between the physical object and the affections which it produces. But this passage of the *metaphysics* contains the germs of two notions which present difficulties for Aristotle in his discussion of perception in *De Anima*. Firstly, perception is said to involve a pathos. Since this word is etymologically connected with the verb to suffer or be affected, perception may in this respect be viewed as passive. Secondly, it is said that the senses make declarations about their objects. Hence, there are two grounds for subsuming perception under two of the Aristotelean categories- those of passivity and activity. To assert that something falls under some category when it really falls under another is to make a category mistake. In the *'Posterior Analytics'*, Aristotle says that all animals possess a 'congenital discrimination capacity which is called sense perception. He says the persistence of sense-impressions leads to memory and this is in turn to what he calls experience- the basis of empirical knowledge but as yet unsystematized.

Aristotle uses two formula in order to explain sense perception. The first formula is that in sense perception the sense organ receives the sensible form without matter. In this formula Aristotle uses technical vocabulary which he evolved to deal with philosophical problems. The second formula is that in perception the sense, the faculty or the sense organ is potentiality what the sense-object is actuality. In this case Aristotle again employs the technical distinction between actuality and

potentiality.

In stressing the role of passivity in perception, Aristotle emphasized the fact that, if perception is to occur, our senses require to be stimulated. The affection of our sense-organs is a necessary condition of perception. Thus Aristotle was really concerned with the conditions under which we have sensations.

The philosophy of the 17th century were much concerned with problems of perception. The rationalists attempted to show that knowledge could be based on indubitable truths of reason, independent of sense experience. The empiricists believe in sense experience upon which all knowledge could be based. Descartes believed in the method of Geometry. He makes no distinction between sensation and he thinks of sensation as caused in the mind by the stimulation of our sense-organs. The words perception and perceptio are used to cover any form of cognition, whether intellectual or sensory.

Another word that is related with sensation is 'idea'. In Meditation III, Descartes defines ideas as thoughts which are as it were images of things, and he opposes them to volitions, affections and judgments. He says that ideas, when considered only in themselves and not as representative of another thing cannot strictly speaking be false. Falsity arises from the will, i.e. from the use of judgement. God guarantees our ideas, but not the use to which we put them. We have ideas both in perceiving and understanding our soul is confronted with an idea. In perception we have a spontaneous impulse to believe that our ideas are veridical, but that they are so can be demonstrated only by reference to God. Descartes

thinks of sense perception as something akin to sensation in the strict sense, although he adds to this our use of judgment. But we see that in so imposing judgment upon an initial passive sensation, Descartes follows the mediaeval tradition. But Descartes' concept of sensation is ambiguous between sensation and perception.

Like Descartes, Malebranche thinks that we can have clear and distinct ideas of extension, figure and movement, because these qualities are intelligible. His reasons for this view are the same as those of Descartes, namely that they are rationally conceivable in mathematical terms. God puts into our minds sensations corresponding to the effects in the sense organs which are caused by objects. The sensation which we have in any given case corresponds to the 'image' on the sense organ ; and the sense organs themselves are designed for the conservation of life. The relativity plays a large part in Malebranche's account of sense perception. He tries to show that our estimates of size, figure, movement and distance are all partially relative. Malebranche thinks that the essence of perception consists in the having of sensations. He thus follows the Cartesian tradition in thinking of sensations as representative. In referring to complex sensations, Malebranche points out that the impressions on the retina must be considered as a whole and not in isolation. Malebranche admits that since sensations are representative we are given information in each perception.

Spinoza's views of sensations can be understood by the following definition-

"By idea I understand a conception of the mind, which the mind forms

because it is thinking thing. I say conception rather than perception, since the word 'perception' seems to indicate that the mind is affected by an object ; whereas conception seems to express an activity of mind. Because God is both a thinking the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.^{*76}

Thus in spinoza's philosophy the relation between ideas and bodies and their objects and so the order of events in the human mind and in the body must necessarily be parallel. But an idea has been defined as a conception not a perception. Spinoza maintains that the human mind has therefore no adequate knowledge of the body or of the things which are perceived by its means. Sense experience is the lowest of the three grades of knowledge distinguished in the Ethics. It covers not only the direct receipt of sensations but also any knowledge derived ultimately from the senses and hence dependent on the body. Spinoza calls it also 'opinion' and imagination'. Knowledge derived from reason or intuitive is necessarily true, while experience is the only cause of falsity. Spinoza recognizes the existence of images or 'imaginings' of mind and he says that they in themselves contain no error.

Leibniz makes a distinction between perception and apperception. To have a perception is to have an idea which corresponds in some way to an object. 'Perception' is merely a general term for the representation of other things in a monad. To have a perception of an object is to have an idea of it, an idea is not a certain act of thinking but a power or faculty. When we are so aware we have

76. Spinoza - Ethics II, P.- 7

apperception, and this entails that our perceptions must be distinct. That is to say that in order to have apperception we must be conscious of what is involved in our perceptions and this necessarily requires that those perceptions should be distinct. In Leibniz's philosophy the highest monad of all is God and under him there is a hierarchy of monads *ad infinitum*. The dominance of one monad which constitutes its body is determined by its power of activity and hence by the clarity of its perceptions. In human beings the monad which constitutes the soul has clearer perceptions than those which constitute the body. Monads not only have perceptions, they also have appetitions. Appetition is the tendency to pass from one perception to another and is due to the intrinsic activity of the monad. Appetition is an intrinsic property of a monad, not something that determines its relations to other monads. According to Leibniz, it is appetition which ensures the passage of a monad from one perception to another but the correspondence of those perceptions with their objects is due to the pre-established harmony. Leibniz and Spinoza are supreme rationalists in the sense that they make everything that has to do with the mind a function of the mind alone. They give no account of our ordinary conception of perception. Thus we see that the rationalists equate sensations with the ideas of our mind.

The empiricists occupy an important position regarding the nature of sensation. Locke held that ideas are produced in our minds by things outside us ; Berkeley held that they are caused by spirits, while Hume denied the existence of things which could be the causes of our ideas, he suggests impressions. Locke

claims that there are three degrees of knowledge - (i) intuitive (ii) demonstrative and (iii) sensitive. He claims that we have intuitive knowledge of our own existence, demonstrative knowledge of God's existence and sensitive knowledge of the existence of particular finite things. Ideas may be either of sensation or reflection and they may be simple or complex. Locke uses the term sensation in many ways-

- (i) Of the process by which we come to have ideas of sense.
- (ii) As an equivalent of sense perception.
- (iii) Of the physiological effect which objects have on the sense-organs and brain.
- (iv) Of the consequent ideas.

Locke also uses the term 'impression' in an ambiguous way. He uses it to account for the effects on our sense organs and also to account for the effects on the mind. Locke follows the Cartesian line of making perception as a mode of thought. He classifies different kinds of perception -

- (i) The perception of ideas in our minds
- (ii) The perception of the significance of signs.
- (iii) The perception of the agreement or disagreement between any of our ideas and he calls perception as an act of the understanding.

Locke supports the view that the mind must attend to the bodily impressions if there is to be perception. To feel a pain is to have a sensation. Locke distinguished between primary and secondary qualities. The primary qualities are solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number. As opposed to these there are such

qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities - as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. 'These are secondary qualities. Our perception of secondary qualities varies with the circumstances. Locke calls the ideas of secondary qualities as sensations.

Berkeley gives us a new picture of the conception of sensation. He might be called as 'Purified Locke'. Berkeley substitutes for the Lockean view that matter can cause the ideas which are to be found in our minds. But our perceptions are caused by God. Berkeley assimilates all qualities to sensations. Berkeley follows Locke, but he goes further than him in that he extends the arguments to primary qualities, indicating that size, shape etc. are also perceived differently under different conditions. He draws the conclusion that all perceived qualities are really sensible things i.e. sensations in the mind.

Berkeley's view of sensation is that each sense is responsible for separate and distinct sensations and these are connected only by experience. To perceive an object is merely to have a bundle of ideas or sensations. Berkeley's view provides an almost perfect example of an attempt to assimilate perception to sensation. The notion of a sensation is such that it could rightly be said to be proper to a sense, and Berkeley relies on that fact. When the assimilation of perception to sensation is rejected, Berkeley's conclusions, including his somewhat paradoxical metaphysical views, no longer seem surviving.

Hume uses the term perception for any content of the mind, and all the actions of seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating and thinking, fall under this

denomination. (Treatise, III, P. 456). Hume seems to make the distinction between impressions and ideas both one of kind and one of degree. In some places, he uses the term 'perception' instead of 'impression' speaking of it as passive in contrast with the active exercise of thought and he occasionally uses the term 'sensation' as another equivalent of impression. Hume maintains that there are three different kinds of impression conveyed by the senses, i.e. those of primary qualities, those of secondary qualities and pains and pleasures.

After Hume, Reid offers an important conception on the nature of sensation. In the "Essays On The Intellectual Powers of Man", Reid says, "Sensation is a name given by philosophers to act of mind which may be distinguished from all others by this, that it hath no object, distinct from the act itself". Again, he says that there is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it. A pain and the feeling of pain are one and the same thing. Reid takes pains and similar feelings as the paradigm cases of sensations, and he shows some acuteness in his remarks about the status of these senses. He thinks that we have sensations whenever we use any of our senses. Reid thinks that perception is an act of mind which involves a conception of the object. Reid maintains that sensations are natural signs of perceptible qualities, not only the effects of those qualities.

Kant took over the representative theory of perception and maintained that all knowledge is founded on subjective experiences produced by entities outside the mind. The essential part of Kant's philosophy is that experience in the proper sense cannot arise without both intuitions and concepts. Thus he says 'thoughts

without content (intuition) are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind". In Kant's theory sensations are like perceptions to the extent that they have an object and thus have an epistemological function.

In the nineteenth century Hartley defined sensations as 'those internal feelings of the mind which arise from the impressions made by external objects upon the several parts of our bodies.' He thus equated sensations with feelings, a move which was typical of the sensationalists. All our other internal feelings may be called ideas. Hartley makes it clear that sensations may be distinguished from ideas only by their intensity. So, he agrees with Hume.

Thus we see that most of the traditional philosophers admit sensation as a mental phenomenon and observation as object of sensation. The traditional philosophers equate sensations with perception and say that sensations are the ideas of our mind.

Gilbert Ryle tries to give a dispositional analysis of sensation and observation. He believes in the phenomena of sensations without believing in a mind to house them and as such he thinks that there is nothing other worldly or mysterious about sensations. The word 'Sensation' is used ordinarily for a special family of perceptions, that is, tactual and kinaesthetic perceptions, perceptions of temperatures, pains, discomforts etc. Seeing, hearing, tasting and smelling do not involve sensations any more than seeing involves hearing or than feeling a cold draught involves tasting anything. In the sophisticated sense sensation is semi-physiological, semi psychological term, the employment of which is related with

certain pseudo, scientific, cartesian theories. When we feel things as hot or cold, soft or hard, sweet or sour with hands we are said to have the sensations of the thing concerned. So, sensation is a species of perception. It is not an ingredient in perception. It is wrong to believe that seeing, hearing and smelling are comprised of sensations. Nobody says that he has first visual sensations and then seeing or he has first auditory sensations and then hearing. The case of seeing, hearing or smelling are comprised of sensations. So, according to Ryle, sensation means bodily feeling.

Ryle holds, "To say that something tastes peppery is to say that it tastes to me now as any peppered viands would taste to anybody with a normal palate".⁷⁷ In this sense we cannot describe haystacks in terms of this or that set of sensations. We describe our sensations by certain sorts of references to observer and things like haystacks. For describing the organic sensations Ryle follows the same practice. When a sufferer describes a pain as stabbing, a grinding, or a burning pain, though he doesnot necessarily think that his pain is given to him by a stiletto, a drill, or an ember, still he says what sort of a pain it was by likening it to the sort of pain that would be given to anyone by such instruments. Thus Ryle says that sensations cannot be internal. It is something like the external bodily feeling which may be obtained by other instruments. We donot employ a 'neat' sensation vocabulary. We describe particular sensations by referring to how common objects regularly look, sound and feel to any normal person. Epistemologists use words like 'pains',

77. Ryle, Gilbert : *The Concept of Mind*, - P. 193

'itches', 'stabs' 'glows', 'dazzles' as neat sensations. But Ryle says that this is misleading.

Ryle says that to be observing something the observer must be trying to find something out. Thus his scrutiny is described as careful or careless, cursory or sustained, methodical or haphazard, accurate or inaccurate, expert or amateurish. Observing is a task. But one's powers of observation is different from having of visual, auditory or gustatory sensations. One can listen carefully, but not have a singing in one's ears carefully ; one can look systematically, but one cannot have dazzle-sensation systematically ; one can try to discriminate flavours, but one cannot try to have sensations of taste. Again we observe on purpose, but we do not have sensations on purpose, though we can induce them on purpose. We can make mistakes of observation. But in case of sensation, it is nonsense to speak of either making or avoiding mistakes. Sensations can be neither correct or incorrect, veridical nor non-veridical. They are neither apprehensions nor misapprehensions. Thus Ryle holds,

"Observing is finding out or trying to find out, something but having a sensation is neither finding out, nor trying to find out, nor failing to find out, anything".⁷⁸

Ryle advances a number of arguments to show that the theorists or traditionalists conception of sensation is false and fabricated. First, the theorists cannot explain what their sensations actually are. Sensations cannot described in

78. Ibid : P. - 195

unambiguous language. The theorists always describe sensation with the help of some object e.g. it looks as such and such or it sounds like such and such. So, whenever a sensation is described, it is described with the aid of the vocabulary of common objects. This falsifies the theory of the traditionalist, who explain things with the help of sensation. Ryle denies sensations as private events or processes because we have no neat sensation vocabulary i.e. there is no pure sense-datum language. This argument of Ryle consists of the following -

- (a) The concept of sensation as understood by the theorists does not occur in the accounts of the novelists, the biographers, the diarists etc.
- (b) Common people talk of seeing, hearing or smelling objects quite unconsciously for occurring anything they need sensation.
- (c) We speak of objects and not of sensations. If we want to talk of a glimpse (which is a sensation word according to the theorists), we talk of the glimpse of some such object as a robin. So, instead of the robin being described in terms of its glimpses or sensations, as the theorists had supposed, we describe the glimpses or the sensations in terms of the robin.
- (d) There are some words e.g. 'pains', 'itches', 'stabs', 'glows' 'dazzles' etc. which are taken to be pure sensation by the Cartesians. But Ryle says that it is not true.

Thus the theorists' account of sensation is not covered by the ordinary language and Ryle admits it as meaningless.

The second argument of Ryle is the argument from the impossibility of observing sensations. The points of this argument can be summarised as follows-

(a) Mental predicates are not applicable to sensations. We cannot speak of having sensations carefully, systematically, purposefully etc. Each predicate is only applicable to perceptions. We can listen carefully, look systematically or observe purposefully. As there is nothing mental about sensations, so we speak of reptiles having sensations.

(b) Objects of observation have size, shape, temperature, position, colour etc, but sensations cannot be the objects of observation.

(c) We require aids for observing objects e.g. telescope, stethoscope, torch light etc. But we do not require them for observing sensations. So, sensations cannot be affirmed as the objects of observation.

(d) If sensations would ex-hypothese require the sensations of a sensation. But this is ridiculous.

Thus Ryle's arguments suggest that in order that a concept may be called mental, it has to be qualified by some such mental predicate as 'carefully,' 'systematically' etc. If it is proper to say that the concept of awareness is mental, even when 'carefully,' 'purposefully' 'systematically' are inapplicable to it. Similarly, it is no less proper to say that the concept of sensation is mental even when such terms are not applicable to it. After all a mental does not require a mental to prove as a mental. Sensations are mental. They do not need anything else to be established as mental. Ryle's contention is that sensations are non mental, because reptiles do observe. These creatures observe and therefore act. Ryle, therefore as he does that whereas sensations are not mental, observations or perceptions are so.

Ryle's second objection that the objects of observation have size, shape, colour etc. which are not at all to be found in sensation, strengthens dualism instead of weakening it. This only proves that the objects of observation are different in nature when compared to sensations. So, this argument though seeming to support Ryle may also go against him.

Ryle's third argument to use observational aids like telescope, stethoscope etc. in the case of sensations is also not very helpful because it may mean that the methods of knowing sensations and the external world are different. This again supports dualism for sensations and external objects being different in nature.

Ryle's last argument that the observation of sensation would require the sensation of sensation is unsatisfactory for the same reasons. Ryle maintains that as the observation of a robin would require the sensation of a robin, the observation of sensation would require the sensation of a sensation. But this argument presumes that the method of knowing sensations must be the same as the method of knowing robins. Generally sensation is the medium of knowing physical objects. A sensation therefore, which is very much unlike the physical object does not need a prior sensation in order to be known. The argument that a sensation must be known by another sensation is similar to the argument that a light must be known by another light. But Ryle maintains that sensation cannot be observed by pointing out the absurdity of such expressions as 'sensation of a sensation', 'the glimpse of a glimpse' or the 'whiff of a pain' etc. Here Ryle takes the words 'glimpse' and 'whiff' as sensation words. But Ryle himself says that these words are not sensation

words. They are observation words. So, taking them as observation words but arguing as if they are sensation words will itself lead to nothing but absurdity and confusion. Thus Ryle's conception of sensation is ambiguous.

Ryle's argument is against the traditionalists' conception that a sensation is private phenomenon which can only be internally observed. His objection is against the use of the verb 'observe' with regard to sensation. Ryle says that planets, microbes, nerves and eardrums are publicly observable things in the outside worlds. On the other hand, sensations, feelings and images are privately observable constituents of our several mental worlds. We need observational aids like telescopes, stethoscopes and torches for the observation of planets, hearts and moths, but we cannot think to apply such instruments to our sensations. Similarly, though we know well what sorts of handicaps prevent our observation of common objects, namely handicaps like fogs, tingling fingers, and singing in the ears, we cannot think of analogous impediments getting between us and such sensations as tingles and singings in the ears. Regarding the nature of sensation, Ryle holds,

"In saying that sensations are not the sorts of things that can be observed, I do not mean that they are unobservable in the way in which infra-microscopic bacteria, flying bullets, or the mountains on the other side of the moon, are unobservable in the way in which the planets are unobservable to the blind. I mean something like this. Every word that can be written down, except words of one letter, has a spelling; some words are more difficult to spell than others and some words have several different spellings. Yet if we asked how the letters of the

alphabet are spelled, we have to answer that they cannot be spelled at all. But this 'cannot' does not mean that the task is one of insuperable difficulty, but only that the question, 'of what letters arranged in what order does a given letter consists?' is an improper question. As letters are neither easy to spell, nor insuperably hard to spell, so I argue, sensations are neither observable nor unobservable" ⁷⁹

The theorists again believe that perception requires to be preceded by having at least one sensation. We do not observe it. Ryle says strongly that sensations are never the objects of observation. We do not observe sensations as such. What is observed is an object, not its sensations. Sensations can only be noticed but not observed just as alphabets may only be written but not spelled. If sensation would have been observed, we would require the sensation of a sensation and the series would go on forever. It is said that observing entails having sensations. In this sense a man could not be described as watching a robin who had not got a single glimpse of it or as smelling a cheese who had not caught a whiff. Thus an object of observation like a robin, or a cheese must be the sort of thing by which the observers are able to catch glimpses or whiffs. If sensations are proper objects of observation then observing them must carry with it the having of sensations of those sensations analogous to the glimpses of the robin without which I could not be watching the robin. But this kind of sensation is absurd. There is no answer to the phrases like 'a glimpse of a glimpse' or a 'whiff of a pain' or 'the sound of a tweak' or 'the tingle of a tingle' and if there was anything to correspond, the series would go on forever. Thus Ryle holds that sensations cannot be the object of observation. Ryle has,

79. Ibid : P. -196

however, no objection to the use of the verb 'notice' in connection with sensations since according to him, it is quite proper to speak of 'noticed headache' or 'felt twinges'.

Ryle, of course, makes a distinction between observing and noticing. He says that whereas observing involves noticing, noticing does not involve observing. But this simply means that observing is a complex process consisting of the noticing of various sensations. On the other hand, observations are characterised as good or bad, careful or careless etc. But the sensations cannot be characterised like this. Observations have the qualities of size, shape, position, temperature, colour, or smell etc. but these qualities are not found in the sensations. Thus sensations cannot be the objects of observation. There are objects and there are sensations to be noticed but there is no mind to house them or observe them. All those who believe that sensations are the objects of private or internal perception are wrong because the question of their perception cannot be meaningful. Thus sensations need not refer to a ghostly habitat called mind to exist in. Ryle holds that the word 'observe' is generally used to cover the processes like watching, listening, savouring, describing, detecting etc. It is also sometimes used that 'pay heed to' is synonym of 'notice'. Ryle says, "Watching and describing do involve paying heed, but paying heed does not involve watching".⁸⁰ But Ryle himself does not appear to be confident about the nature of sensation and observation. In his chapter on 'Sensation and Observation' he categorically asserts that observation is a complex process,

80. Ibid P-198

comprising of the noticing of sensations. His two statements that is, 'observing entails having sensations' and 'watching and descreying do involve paying heed, but paying heed doesnot involve watching', establish that observation is a complex process and is more than having sensations. But in another article 'On Sensation' Ryle doesnot admit this point. There he observes : "The concept of perception is on a more elementary or less technical level than that of sense-impression".⁸¹ Thus the whole idea of Ryle seems to be confused.

If we critically analyse Ryle's conception of sensation we see that Ryle himself takes sensations to be private. He observes, "It is, of course true and important that I am the only person who can give a first hand account of the tweaks given me by my ill-filling shoe, and an oculist who cannot speak my language is without his best source of information about my visual sensations. But the fact that I alone can give first hand accounts of my sensations doesnot entail that I have what others lack, the opportunity of observing those sensations."⁸² The main burden of Ryle's argument is to disapprove that sensations are private on the ground that they are unobservable. His objection is to use of the verb "observe". But though he rejects the privacy of sensations on the ground of the impropriety of the use of 'observing sensation', he does not fail to secure its privacy on other grounds. What is thrown out from the front door is received back through the back door. This time Ryle secures its privacy on logical grounds. He observes, "Just as you cannot, in logic, held my catches, win my races, eat my meals, frown my

81. Article Published in Contemporary British Philosophy, 3rd series, George Allen and Unwin, P. - 428

82. Ryle, Gilbert : The Concept of Mind, P- 199

frowns, or dream my dreams, so you cannot have my twinges, or my after images."⁸³ So, my having of sensations is, according to Ryle analogous to my eating the meal. But there is one great difference between my having of sensations and my eating the meal. Whereas others can see eating the meal, others cannot see experiencing the twinges. The experience of what the twinge is, can only be known by me. A.C. Ewing has made a similar objection. He remarks "I cannot held somebody elses' catches, but I can be aware of his catches in a way in which I cannot be aware of his pain."⁸⁴ Ryle refutes the traditionalists, view of sensations as something private realm of mind.

In his conception of sensation and observation Ryle attacks the traditionalists' theory of sense-data. But we know that the theory of sense-data serves a good hypothesis for explaining errors in perception. That which is given to the sense is a sense datum. Different sense impressions are sense data e.g. Looks, appearances, sounds, whiffs, flavours and tastes are sense data. The sense-datum theory is an attempt to elucidate the concepts of sense perception or the notions of sensations of sight, touch, hearing, smelling and tasting. Those who believe in the theory of sense-data believe in the three factor theory of knowledge. Any knowledge situation involves three things viz. The act of knowing, the sense impression or datum and the object. We donot know the objects directly. What we know directly is the datum and through such datum, we infer the object. Thus when we know a horse, we actually see or sense some colour patches and through

83. Ibid : P.- 199

84. A.C. Ewing,- Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism. P. - 314

the impressions. We know a horse by inference. Similarly, we donot taste a lemon, what we taste is the flavour and know lemon by inference.

The upholders of the theory of sense-data would say that the elliptical appearance of a round plate is sense-datum. Ryle strongly objects to this way of explaining the knowledge of objects. According to him the whole theory of sense-data is a 'logical howler'. Ryle says, "The whole theory of sense data rests upon a logical howler, the howler, namely of assimilation the concept of sensation to the concept of observation."⁸⁵

Ryle tries to show that this assimilation makes nonsense simultaneously of the concept of sensation and of the concept of observaton. The sense-datum theory says that when a person has a visual sensation of getting a glimpse of a horse-race, his having this sensation consists in his finding a *sensum*, that is a patchwork of colours. This means that having a glimpse of a horse-race is explained in terms of his having a glimpse of something else, the patchwork of colours. But if having glimpse of a horse-race entails having at least one sensation, then having a glimpse of colour patches must again involve having at least one appropriate sensation, which in its turn must be analysed into the sensing of an earlier *sensum* and so on forever. Regarding sensations Ryle holds,

"Sensations then, arenot perceivings, observings or findings ; they arenot detectings, scannings or inspectings ; they arenot apprehendings, cognizings, intuitings, or knowing. To have a sensation is not to be in a cognitive relation to a sensible object. There are no such objects. Nor is there any such relation. Not

85. Ryle, Gilbert : *The Concept of Mind*, P.- 203

only is it false, as was argued earlier, that sensations can be objects of observation; it is also false that they are themselves observings of objects."⁸⁶ Thus we see that Ryle negatively asserts the nature of sensations.

The theory of sense datum asserts absurd facts. Further, the so-called sense-datum is nothing else than the object. Ryle says "Now a person without a theory feels no qualms in saying that the round plate might look elliptical. Nor would he feel any qualms in saying that the round plate looks as if it were elliptical. But he would feel qualms in following the recommendation to say that he is seeing an elliptical look of a round plate."⁸⁷

This assertion would mean that it is meaningful to say that a round thing might look elliptical though it is not meaningful to say that its elliptical appearance is seen. If Ryle, by maintaining this assertion means something deep and extra-ordinary, then it is difficult to see what he actually means. It is a difficulty of this kind which makes Russell comment. "I cannot understand what exactly he is maintaining."⁸⁸ With the collapse of the sense datum theory, Ryle claims to prove that sensations or sense-impressions are not the Rules of the observation of objects. Sensations are neither the objects of observation, nor the observing of objects. For perception we do not require the via media of sense-datum. we can directly perceive an object. Thus the datum which refutes mind, is also refuted. Thus the sense datum theory had unnecessarily established two worlds - the public world

86. Ibid : P.- 204

87. Ibid : P.-206

88. Russell, B. : "What is Mind" My Philosophical Development, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1959, P. - 251

to house objects and the public world to house sense data. According to Ryle, an error in perception is due to our own failure in the application of the proper technique of perception. It is our own misuse of the perception recipe. Ryle also does not distinguish between illusion and hallucination. He observes, "Only a person who can balance can lose his balance ; only a person who can reason can commit fallacies ; only a person who can discriminate huntsmen from pillar boxes can mistake a pillar box for a huntsman ; and only a person who knows what snakes look like can fancy he sees a snake without realising that he is only fancying." ⁸⁹

Ryle's basic criticism against the sense-datum theory is that sensations are not a species of observation. Hence observation cannot be equated with having or noticing of a series of sensations. Observation implies having sensations. But it is certainly more than of having sensations. It involves an active element of finding out something. Ryle objects to perceiving anything that is not real, or that which cannot be witnessed by more than one individual at the same time. He has pointed out repeatedly that to have an elliptical look of a plate is not to see anything. Ryle draws an important distinction between sensation and observation with the remark that sensations while noticed are not equivalent to observation. Sensations are ingredients of observation but observation is obviously more than sensations.

Ryle denies the theory of phenomenalism with the denial of sense data. First, phenomenalism asserts that a thing is nothing more than the family of different sense impressions. It denies the 'thing in itself' and reduces a thing to the experience of different sense data. According to this theory a thing is what it looks, sounds,

89. Ryle, Gilbert : The Concept of Mind, P-222

feels etc. Phenomenalism asserts that talking of a thing is talking about sense-data. Ryle finds this theory unacceptable. Secondly, according to Phenomenalism, observing an object means observing sensations, which again cannot be true. We have already seen that Ryle proves that sensation cannot be observed. Thirdly, language does not permit the propositions about objects to be translated into propositions about sensible objects. Fourthly sense-impressions or data are temporary but things or objects are more or less permanent. Ryle says that phenomenalism is therefore wrong. What is observed is not the family of sense impressions or sense data or sensations. It is the object itself. We observe the common or public objects.

Ryle also objects the traditionalists' account of perception. Traditionalists maintain that perception or observation is sensation plus meaning. When we experience of sensible quality (or sensation), we on the basis of past experience, impose all other qualities on the sensible quality which were found associated with it and thereby perceive an object. So, according to this theory, perception is more than sensation. This theory maintains that there is private world of mind from where the meaning is applied to sensation. It suggests that what we directly observe are the sensations and what we indirectly know are the objects. We do not observe robin; we observe its sensations and know the robin thereafter. Ryle finds no truth in this account. He asserts that, "It is robins and games that we observe and it is sensation that we never could observe". Here Ryle's position is that of naive realism. Knowledge, according to him, involves only two factors; the knower and the object.

Thus there is no need of sensation to explain perception. Ryle holds that we learn perception recipes as we learn bicycling i.e. we learn by practice. To illustrate Ryle's standpoint : We perceive a tune when on noticing the auditory sensation we recognise it, i.e. when we utilise our past knowledge of the tune, we are said to perceive it. Recognition consists in the utilization of the previous knowledge of the tune. Thus perceiving or recognising a tune means hearing a tune in a special frame of mind. When we learn a tune, we acquire certain auditory expectation propensities. Similar is the case with visual and other perceptions. When we catch the glimpse of a thimble, we at once recognise it to be a thimble. When we know a thimble, we acquire certain expectation propensities, i.e. we expect to see it in a particular shape, size, colour etc. and also expect to do with it in a certain way. When at the occurrence of the visual sensation, these expectation propensities are fulfilled, we are said to recognise or perceive the thimble. Ryle again holds, "A sensation is not something which its owner observes or witnesses. It is not a clue. Listening to a conversation entails having auditory sensations, for listening is heedful hearing, and hearing entails getting auditory sensations. But having sensations is not discovering clues. We discover clues by listening to conversations and looking at fingerprints. If we could not observe some things, we should not have clues for other things and conversations are just the sorts of things to which we do listen, as finger prints and gate-posts are just the sorts of things at which we do look."⁹⁰ Thus listening and looking are not merely having sensations nor they are joint

90. Ibid : P-220

processes of observing sensations and inferring to common objects. Observing is using one's ears and eyes. But using one's ears and eyes doesnot entail using one's visual and auditory sensations as clues. It makes no sense of 'using sensations'. Thus Ryle admits that observing entails having at least one sensation, though having sensations doesnot entail sensation. And perceiving, according to Ryle, is nothing ghostly. It is only recognition which recognised the object.

There is another example for the description of sensations. As flour, sugar, milk, eggs etc. are among the raw materials out of which cakes are made or as bricks and timber are among the raw materials of the builder, so sensations are often spoken of as the raw materials out of which we construct the world we know. But Ryle holds that the notions of collecting, storing, sorting, unpacking, treating, assembling and arranging which apply to the ingredients of cakes and the materials of houses, cannot apply to sensation. We can ask what a cake is made of, but not what knowledge is made of ; similarly we cannot ask about the ingrediants of visual and auditory sensations. Thus Ryle says that sensation cannot be the raw materials of observation.

Thus Ryle concludes that there is nothing mysterious or ghostly or other worldly about sensation. He denies sensations as private processes for two main reasons (i) we have no neat sensation vocabulary i.e. there is no pure sense-datum language and (ii) It makes no sense to speak of observing sensations. So, because sensations cannot be said to be observed and there are no pure sensation word in our every day language. In his "After Thoughts" he categorically maintains

that there is no sensation but perception. What we call sensations are tactual or kinaesthetic feelings. With the view that peception entails sensations, he expresses his deep dissatisfaction. In his forward to the chapter on 'Sensation and Observation' he maintains "For reasons developed in its last section, I amnot satisfied with this chapter. I have fallen in with the official story that perceiving involves having sensations. But this is a sophisticated use of sensation "⁹¹ Ryle again and again finds helpless with the concept of sensations. In his separate article 'On Sensation' he confesses his helplessness when he says ; "One of the things that worry me most is the notion of sensations or sense impressions." ⁹²

91. Ibid : P. - 191

92. Published in Contemporary British Philosophy, 3rd Series, P.-427.

CHAPTER - VI

CHAPTER - VI

THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The nature of consciousness occupies a very significant place in the philosophy of mind. Usually it is believed that the essence of mind is consciousness. It is said to be a constant element of all mental processes. Both consciousness and introspection enable us to know and ascertain the facts of the internal world. They are taken as the unfailing facts of mental life.

In Psychology, consciousness is regarded as a mental state or process. The word "Consciousness" is derived from the Latin word "Conscire" which means "to know things together." We are aware of our mental and motor activities. This definition was made popular by Vives, the Spanish psychologist. Thus consciousness is the distinctive character of mental life. But it is very difficult to define consciousness. According to Baldwin, "Consciousness is the point of division between mind and not-mind." Wherever there is not total unconsciousness, in the sense in which we attribute unconsciousness to a table or a log of wood, the existence of some form of mind we denote by the word consciousness. Another psychologist Mc. Dougall says that the word consciousness should be used to mean the act of knowing or thinking of thing. But consciousness has a more wider sense than this. The nineteenth century psychologist G.T. Ladd gives this meaning of consciousness : "Whatever we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that it is to be

conscious. What we are less and less, as we sink gradually down into dreamless sleep, or as we swoon slowly away and what we are more and more, as the noise of the crowd outside tardily arouses us from our after-dinner nap, or as we come out of the midnight of the typhoid fever crisis,' that is consciousness."⁹³

The International Dictionary of Psychology gives the following interpretations on consciousness :

"Consciousness : The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings ; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of confusing consciousness with self-consciousness - to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon : it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it". (Sutherland 1989).

Thus consciousness is the most vivid phenomenon. It is very difficult to pin down the subject-matter of consciousness. It cannot be directly defined. But it is clear that from the psychological point of view consciousness is a mental phenomena i.e. awareness, feeling etc. The conscious experience is the central element of consciousness.

In philosophy, Rene Descartes was the first philosopher to discover consciousness as the essence of mind. All mental states and processes are conscious states and processes. Descartes held that every event in the mind is a

93. Ladd, G.T. : Psychology, Description and Explanatory (1894), P. 30.

cogitatio, or a content of experience. To this class he assimilated volitions, intentions and every type of thought. To Descartes, the notion of an unconscious mental state was a contradiction. In search of certainty in philosophical knowledge, Descartes found that "Cogito -ergo-sum" is the single certain truth. After having made it clear that he exists (Cogito-ergo-sum), Descartes tried to find out what he is. He found that he is nothing but a thinking thing. Thinking or consciousness is his essence. The essence of a thing contains only what is necessary for the existence of the thing. Here we can mention the example given by Norman Malcolm :

"..... if there is an existing thing O, and if there is something E, such that if one perceives E necessarily one perceives O, and if one perceives O, necessarily one perceives E, then E is the essence of O."⁹⁴

Descartes found that his essence is thinking or consciousness. He held that the subject of consciousness is the mind and that the mind is a thing or entity separate and distinct from the body. The body is thing or entity whose essence is occupying space, i.e. having shape, size and location in space ; and it is not conscious. The mind, on the other hand, is completely different in its nature. It is utterly nonspatial, having neither shape, size, nor location. Its essence is having consciousness, that is, thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions, desires, emotions etc. Thus Descartes is aware of himself when and only when he is aware of thinking. Descartes says, thinking is nothing other than "Consciousness". In his Meditation II, Descartes maintained that a thinking thing is that which is having

94. "Descartes proof that His Essence is Thinking : Modern Studies in Philosophy",
edited by Willis Doney, P. 315

conscious activities like doubting, understanding, willing sensing etc. that is consciousness. Descartes writes,

"What then is it that I am ? A thinking thing, what is a thinking thing ? It is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, sustains from willing, that also can be aware of images and sensations."⁹⁵

By the principle 'Cogito -ergo-sum,' Descartes wants to rebuild the edifice of knowledge about self - consciousness. The 'I' (or self-consciousness) that has been proved to exist and it has been inferred from the fact that "I think, therefore I exist." If 'I' ceased to think, there would be no evidence of my existence. I am a thing that thinks, a substance of which the whole nature or essence consists in thinking and which needs no place for its existence. The soul is therefore distinct and separate from the body. Descartes says that the mind is essentially active and its activity is to 'think'. Descartes holds that there is no thinking apart from something which thinks. He admits that there is a permanent self or ego, since there is its unchangeable attributes of thinking. Descartes concludes that the soul or mind is a permanent substance, since we have found its essence called thinking or consciousness which even the worst of doubt cannot demolish. He recognises two kinds of substances - finite and infinite. God is the only perfect and infinite substance. Mind and body are finite substances. Thus according to Descartes the essential nature of soul or self is thinking, since to be aware of thinking is to be aware of myself and to be aware of oneself is to be thinking or consciousness.

Some philosophers argue that Fruedian concept of mind goes against
 95. Philosophical Writings, translated by N.K. Smith, P. 186.

Descartes' claim that consciousness is the essence of mind. Freud's concept of mind shows that mind has three mental states, such as conscious, subconscious and unconscious. If so how consciousness can be regarded as the essence of mind? But it should be mentioned here that Freudian unconscious state has two grades, namely preconscious and unconscious proper. According to Freud, unconscious has no access to consciousness except through the pre-conscious. Pre-conscious is the unconscious states which are easily accessible to memory. The unconscious must be accepted as the general basis of the psychic life. Here Freud analyses what Descartes has pointed out. Everyone would agree that an unconscious state cannot prove its existence. Mind can be proved to be having existence only through consciousness. Moreover, if unconscious is accessible to consciousness through preconscious states then unconscious does not remain opposite to consciousness.

David Hume assumed that we know nothing of an immaterial, indivisible, imperishable soul-substance. The idea of substance is meaningless whether applied to matter or to mind. The doctrine of simplicity and indivisibility of thinking substance can neither be affirmed nor refuted by empirical evidence. Hume's denial of soul - substance as well as consciousness can be understood by his following writings -

"The mind is a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. The mind is a kind of theater where several perceptions successively make

their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different (times)"⁹⁶

Hume again admitted that he did not find self by his introspection. But Hume's claim seems to be untenable because as a subject of consciousness something must exist whether it is mind or physical body. In this regard Mc. Taggart says that our knowledge of our own identity implies that self is not a mere bundle of impressions as Hume contended. It implies that there is in fact an unanalysable ego of which we have direct knowledge of introspection.

There are some philosophers and psychologists who more recently have denied the very existence of consciousness. Some psychologists raised the following objections regarding the statement consciousness is the essence of mind.

(i) There are a number of activities of which we are conscious in the beginning and which on being performed for a number of times become automatic. As they become automatic, they do not need attention. This is the nature of our habitual actions. Thus in habitual actions, there is no need of consciousness.

(ii) Recently the unconscious is regarded as an important part of the mind and its study is very much within the province of psychology. The 'unconscious' as established by Freud, has an important impact on our conscious behaviour.

(iii) Consciousness can be studied only with the help of 'introspection'. Every individual's consciousness being his own, introspection is a private affair; its study can only be subjective or speculative. We have immediate knowledge of our

96. Hume, David : A Treatise of Human Nature, B.K. 1 Sec. 6

own consciousness only. Consciousness of others can only be inferred. But this is the method of analogy and it is unscientific.

(iv) Again, the use of introspection can obtain a complete description of the consciousness of an individual. But it does not explain why any particular consciousness takes the form it does, and how it can be controlled or utilised to the best advantage of human beings.

For all these difficulties the definition of psychology as the science of consciousness was discarded.

William James in his famous paper 'Does "Consciousness" exist?' denies the existence of consciousness. But we should notice the first point that William James puts the word consciousness in inverted commas. This should warn us that he is not referring to consciousness as ordinarily understood, but to a specific philosophical doctrine of "Consciousness." The following passage makes clear about William James' denial of consciousness "To deny plumply that "Consciousness" exists seems so absurd on the face of it - for undeniably "thoughts" do exist - that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is knowing."⁹⁷

97. James, William : *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (London, 1912), Chap. 1, P.3.

Thus what James is denying is not in fact the existence of consciousness but the correctness of certain types of description of consciousness : viz. those that entail its being an 'entity' or 'aboriginal stuff.' That is to say that James is disputing the truth of certain philosophers descriptions of consciousness. This is a far less radical challenge than the unqualified statement consciousness does not exist. Thus James believed that consciousness is the name of a non-entity, and has no right to place among first principles. He denies that the word "Consciousness" stands for an entity, but insists that it stands for a function. For him it is the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. While regarding consciousness as the stream of thought James seems to be very close to Descartes' interpretation of consciousness.

But Hamilton gives a sort of objection to James' claim that consciousness is not an 'entity' or 'aboriginal stuff'. According to Hamilton, "Consciousness may be compared to an internal light, by means of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible. Consciousness is simple - is not composed of parts, either similar or dissimilar. It always resemble itself, differing only in the degree of its intensity ; Thus, there are not various kinds of consciousness, although there are various kinds of mental modes or states of which we are conscious."⁹⁸

Ludwig Wittgenstein tried to dissolve the problem of mind and body and attempted to show that this problem arises out of conceptual confusions, and that proper attention to the way in which we use mental and physical terms in ordinary

98. Bowen : The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, P. 120

language will relieve us of the vexatious problem. For him, there is nothing inside who has mental processes and beetle in the box has nothing to do with the language game because the box may be empty. Wittgenstein liberates the concept of mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world and puts it back in the outer world of the linguistic and other activities. So, according to Wittgenstein, mind is a part of the world where language games take place. The world is not a set of dead material objects and the objects are various sorts, such as plants, animals, humans etc. But we see that the question of consciousness arises only in the case of human beings who speak language. It is because of this, that mind, thought and other mental states are ascribed to the human beings. It is the human beings who have the capacity to relate themselves to the world by virtue of their cognitive and other interests in the world. But human mind cannot rest idly without speculation about the philosophical problems as suggested by Wittgenstein. A philosopher has to enquire the mental concepts until the mystery of the mind is disclosed. Wittgenstein maintains that language serves as the best medium of relating our mind to the world and mind does not stand apart as a transcendent entity but directly enters the world as a function of the linguistic activities that are about the world. Thinking and representing the world are the same and the activity of representing the world means we have already thought about the world. Thus Wittgenstein's mind represents the universe with language which represents rational mental activity and consciousness.

Bertrand Russell in his book "Analysis of Matter" denies consciousness as

the essence of mind. According to him, consciousness is a complex and far from universal characteristic of mental phenomena. As he says, "Consciousness is too narrow to characterize mental phenomena. Many things which seem essentially mental are really neural. Perhaps it is the nerves that acquire experience rather than the mind."⁹⁹ Russell maintains that mind and matter are logical constructions, the particulars out of which they are constructed have various relations, some of which are studied by physics, others by psychology. But who makes this logical construction of mind and matter? who thinks, or infers them from particulars? There must be a thinker whose essence is thinking or consciousness which is proved by Descartes.

C.O. Evans defines consciousness as follows, "To conscious is, *inter alia*, to perceive, to feel emotions and sensations, to have images and recollections, and to have desires, intentions and thoughts."¹⁰⁰ By this definition he does not want to limit consciousness to persons such that only persons can be conscious and since he is staying within the self-approach no question arises of having to correlate consciousness with behaviour. The mental concepts in terms of which Evan has defined consciousness must be understood in a non dispositional, or episodic sense.

Gilbert Ryle declares that the general theory of consciousness and introspection is a logical muddle. It is a product of misconceived notions and confused convictions. Ryle remarks that the myth of consciousness is a piece of para-

99. Russell, B : *The Analysis of Mind*, P. 292.

100. Evans, C.O. : *The Subject of Consciousness*, P. 48

optics. Both Ryle and William James attack G.E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism" in which he offers his analysis of sensation which provides the most notable instance of the doctrine of 'consciousness'. According to Moore, "We have then in every sensation two distinct elements, one which I call consciousness and another which I call the object of consciousness. This must be so if the sensation of blue and the sensation of green, though different in one respect, are alike in another ; blue is one object of sensation and green is another and consciousness, which both sensations have in common, is different from either".¹⁰¹ Moore again writes, "For the element 'Consciousness' being common to all sensations may be and certainly is regarded as in some sense their "Substance" and by the "Content" of each is only meant that in respect of which one differs from another."¹⁰²

Thus when philosophers such as James and Ryle deny the existence of 'Consciousness', they are not denying that we are conscious in the ordinary sense of the word. They are denying rather the views of Hamilton and Moore. Who admit that all our experiences contain an element in common which they confusedly name 'consciousness.' They deny consciousness as an entity.

Ryle discusses consciousness in the sixth chapter of "The Concept of Mind" which is entitled as "Self - Knowledge." Here Ryle's primary concern is two fold. The first is to dismiss the traditional notion of consciousness and introspection and the second is to establish the identical nature of knowledge of one's own self and the knowledge of others. Ryle maintains that our knowledge of our own

101. Moore, G.E. : Philosophical Studies, (London, 1960) P. 17

102. Ibid. P. 23.

selves cannot be based on the doubtful means. He believes that the traditionalist' theory of 'privileged access' to our own mental states and processes rests on an imaginary assumption that there is an internal faculty of reflection or intuition or introspection or consciousness which supplies the data about our internal life. Ryle has sought a number of arguments to dismiss the age-long notions of consciousness and introspection.

Actually 'consciousness' is not to be conceived of as something over and above the occurrence of thoughts and feelings. We are therefore, free to determine the meaning of consciousness without fear. Any attempt to discover the meaning of consciousness as it is ordinarily used would meet with the immediate objection of Ryle. Ryle argues that the word is ordinarily used in a number of different contexts for a variety of purposes. First of all, he draws our attention to a number of senses in which the words 'conscious' and 'consciousness' are used in our daily life. But Ryle holds that in none of these, the philosophers' sense of the word 'conscious' find a place. Ordinarily, the word 'conscious' or 'self-conscious' is used in the following senses-

(a) First, it is used when we want to convey our vague or indistinct apprehension of some object or situation, e.g. when we say, 'I am conscious that some wrongly had occurred some where', or 'I am conscious that the furniture had been rearranged' or 'I am conscious that he was less friendly than usual'. In such contexts the word 'conscious' is used instead of words like 'found out' 'realized' and 'discovered' to indicate certain noteworthy nebulousness and consequent inar-

ticulateness of the apprehension. The furniture looked different somehow, but the observer could not say what the differences were ; or the man's attitude was unaccommodating in a number of ways, but the speaker could not enumerate or specify them.

(b) Secondly, it is used when we want to speak of the embarrassment shown by other people, especially by youthful persons. We often say, he is conscious of the sorry figure that he cut on the occasion. The youthful persons anxious about the opinions held by others by their qualities of character or intellect. Shyness and affection are ways in which self consciousness, is commonly exhibited.

(c) Thirdly we also use the word 'conscious' or 'self-conscious' when we want to talk of the heed that we pay to our own qualities of character or intellect. e.g. When we say 'I am conscious of my homesickness'. Self-consciousness in this sense is of primary importance for the conduct of life and of Ethics. The Freudian concepts of the 'unconscious' and the 'subconscious' are closely connected with this use of 'conscious'.

(d) Fourthly, 'conscious' is also used for 'sensitiveness' e.g. when we say, 'consciousness in returning to my numbed or anaesthetized leg. In this use 'conscious' means 'sensitive' or sentient' and 'unconscious' means anaesthetized or insensitive. We say that a person has lost consciousness when he has ceased to be sensitive to any slaps, noises, pricks or smells.

(e) Fifthly, it is used for the heed that we pay to our bodily sensations. It is in this sense that we say, 'I wasnot conscious of the pinching of the shoe because

I was deeply engrossed in talk. ' It makes sense to say that a sensation is hardly noticed even when the sensation is moderately acute, namely when the victim's attention is fixed very strongly on some thing else. Conversely, a person may pay sharp heed to very faint sensations. For e.g. when he is scared of appendicitis, he will be acutely conscious of stomachic twinges which are not at all acute. In this sense, also a person may be keenly conscious, hardly conscious, or quite unconscious of feelings like twinges of anxiety or qualms of doubt. Thus 'heeding' does not denote a peculiar conduct of cognitive certainties.

Ryle says that philosophers' concept of consciousness is not covered by any one of them. The philosophers' notion of consciousness, he says, invariably use consciousness in the sense of an essence of the mental as apposed to the physical. Mental, for the philosophers, is by nature conscious or self-intimating. Anything appearing on the mental state makes itself felt or known by the person concerned. 'Conscious' in the sense of 'sensitive' of a particular part of the body means awareness of that part of the body. Of course, Ryle's description of this sense of consciousness is not sufficiently drawn. A person is 'sensitive' or 'sensitive' while he is fast asleep and yet no one can be conscious in any of the other senses while in a dreamless sleep.

John Wisdom¹⁰³ tried to determine the fundamental sense of consciousness by the following points -

- (i) Conscious implies either feels or awareness.

103. Wisdom, J : Problems of Mind and Matter, PP-12-15

(ii) Consider the change which comes over a man as he comes round from chloroform or from dreamless sleep. That kind of change he calls '

becoming conscious'.

(iii) Conscious doesnot mean alive. A tree is alive but not conscious. An amoeba is certainly alive yet quite likely not conscious.

(iv) Conscious doesnot mean living and sensitive. A man in a dreamless sleep is a living and sensitive being. But he is not at that time conscious in the sense of course such a man is conscious compared with a tree or a dead man.

(v) S is conscious implies neither (a) that S is conscious of his environment nor (b) that S is conscious of himself.

(vi) Conscious is the fundamental sense of 'conscious' - that is the sense in terms of which all other senses are defined.

Wisdom's analysis of consciousness brings into open all the ambiguities latent in Ryle's description of consciousness in the sense of 'sensitiveness'. There are two major points of disagreement between Ryle and Wisdom. Firstly, Wisdom believes that a fundamental sense of conscious may be distinguished. But Ryle fails to determine the relations of dependency which hold between the various senses of consciousness. He distinguishes and he denies by omission that there is a basic sense of consciousness. Secondly, Wisdom asserts that the other senses of consciousness can be defined in terms of the fundamental sense.

Ryle's list of different senses of 'conscious' is a different type of list from that of Wisdom. Ryle's list is a list of possible usages of the word 'conscious' in

ordinary language, whereas Wisdom's list reveals a number of possible philosophical distinctions that may be made by taking conscious in various senses. Thus while it is true that Wisdom's basic sense of 'conscious' is a defining sense for his list, it is doubtful whether it could be a defining sense for Ryle's list. As C.O. Evans writes, "Since my entailment relation between the basic sense of 'conscious' and its other senses applies to Ryle's list as well as to Wisdom's it is more flexible than Wisdom's defining relation." ¹⁰⁴

Ryle argues that if consciousness is the constant and unfailing source of obtaining facts about mental life will speak of 'knowing through consciousness' or getting some truth as 'a direct deliverance of consciousness'. Had it really been so important a source of acquainting oneself with the private life, such idioms, would have surely entered into the common parlance of people. But nobody speaks in such idioms. Secondly, if consciousness is the constant and unfailing source of obtaining information about mental life it will remain hidden or obscure from the agent.

Ryle does not believe that awareness or consciousness exists. He substitutes awareness by disposition, which is no more than behaviour, actual or possible. But consciousness or awareness cannot be identified with behaviour. For example, a paralysed man may be completely incapable of any behaviour, but he is still conscious. Conversely a robot may behave as perfectly as a human being, but it is not conscious. The mistake of identifying consciousness with behaviour is in one's failure to see that there is only a correlation between consciousness

4. Evans, C.O. : The Subject of Consciousness. P. 45.

and behaviour. But a correlation or a bond does not mean identity. By denying consciousness, Ryle has only strengthened the belief that disputation about the traditional philosophical problems. Therefore, the phenomenon of consciousness is so fundamental that it cannot be either defined or properly described. Arguments and reasonings, therefore, cannot prove to be effective either for its affirmation or denial. According to Ryle, the philosopher's popular notion of consciousness is an extended version of the protestants' belief that there is a God-given light of conscience within us. As the protestants thought that there is an internal light of conscience to discern moral qualities, so the traditional philosophers think that there is a general light of consciousness to reveal the mental episodes.

Ryle gives one important argument against the idea of consciousness. That is the argument of infinite regress or *reductio ad absurdum*. There would be an infinite number of consciousness. The theorists had maintained that consciousness is self-luminous. It reveals itself as well as its objects. When I am conscious of something, I am also conscious of that thing. Consciousness of an object and the consciousness are simultaneous. However, Ryle argues that the theorist's notion of consciousness cannot escape the conclusion that there is an infinite series of consciousness in us. Ryle believes that if this absurd notion of a series of consciousness is to be avoided, the theorists' notion of consciousness must be discarded. So, the general theory of consciousness is unacceptable to Ryle. By analysing the meaning of the words 'conscious', 'consciousness' and 'self-consciousness' as used in day-to-day life, Ryle shows that none of them has any

affinity with the philosopher's use of the term. Ryle writes, "Philosophers chiefly since Descartes, have in their theories of knowledge and conduct operated with a concept of consciousness which has relatively little affinity with any of the concepts described above" ¹⁰⁵

Ryle's radical objection to the philosophers' theory of consciousness is that there are no ghostly objects to be illumined by consciousness. As he writes,

"The radical objection to the theory that minds must know what they are about, because mental happenings are by definite conscious, or metaphysically self-luminous, is that there are no such happenings, there are no occurrences taking place in a second status world, since there is no such status and no such world and consequently no need for special modes of acquainting ourselves with the denizens of such world." ¹⁰⁶

Ryle has one more objection against consciousness on linguistic ground. He argues that if consciousness is to be conceived on the analogy of light, the theorists ought not to say that consciousness enables us to know the mental states and processes. His objection is to the use of the word 'know'. Ryle argues that we speak of only seeing things, say a table, in light. We donot speak of knowing it. Light enables us to talk of seeing not of knowing for "knowing isnot the same sort of thing as looking at, and what is known isnot the same sort of thing as what is illumined" ¹⁰⁷ Ryle argues that as if seeing and knowing are opposite concepts so that if we could speak of seeing in the context of light, we couldnot speak of

¹⁰⁵. Ryle, G : *The Concept of Mind*, P. 152.

¹⁰⁶. *Ibid*, P. 154.

¹⁰⁷. *Ibid*, P. 162.

knowing in the same context.

Ryle's basic objection to the theorists' notion of consciousness is that there is no mental happening to be consciousness which can be known or felt. Ryle uses the word 'ghostly' for whatever is said to occur in the 'private theatre'. Ryle thinks that the philosophers have committed a category mistake by conceiving of mind in the idioms which are suitable only for the body. But here question may be arised-Does he not himself commit a category mistake by likening the mind to a ghost ? A ghost is a nebulous body. It appears. But consciousness or mind is not a body. It doesnot appear as an object. For his own purpose Ryle has sought to replace consciousness by disposition. Because of such replacement we find an altogether new picture of man. In this sense man is a typically behaving body. Though unconscious, he is considered to do everything that is called intelligent. One may wonder whether Ryle himself believes that he is unconscious. Therefore, man's conscious nature is very dear to him and he may feel completely shocked and disappointed to hear that he is in fact unconscious being As D.S. Miller writes :

"If you learned today that your own life from tomorrow morning on would be of this sort, the life of perfectly behaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, you would suddenly cease to be concerned about it, you would not in the least cling to life on these terms. Why ? Because you cannot for a moment identify yourself with a body without consciousness".¹⁰⁸

108. Miller, D.S. : "Descartes' Myth and Prof. Ryle's Fallacy" *Journal of philosophy*. Vol. XVIII, April - 26, 1951, P. 272

A conscious mind is the creator of all human values. It is the source of art, literature and religion. The task of creating and maintaining such human values cannot be ignored by our body. Thus as a perfect organism, we should conceive the concept of consciousness.

'Introspection' is a term of art. It is ordinarily used to signify about one's own character, abilities, deficiencies and oddities. The technical term 'introspection' is supposed as the species of perception. Ryle finds fault with the philosophers' theory of introspection. He denies introspection almost on the same lines on which he has denied consciousness. Ryle admits that the traditionalists theory of introspection is as little intelligible as their theory of general consciousness. The theories of consciousness and introspection suffer from severe defects and as such they cannot be made infallible and unfailing sources of letting us into the secrets of mind. The word 'introspection' is hardly used by the common people. It is a technical term used in the language of art. The common man is little familiar with this concept and it is only a highflown utterance of theoretical philosophers. Ryle also rejects the idea of introspection on some other grounds. According to him, if introspection be the mental act of scrutinizing the private experience of ones own, it would mean that we can attend to two things at once. But how can one attend to the act and the object of scrutiny simultaneously? Because of this usual difficulty, we can say that in introspection the act and the object remain distinguishable. It is certainly difficult to attend to two disconnected things at once. In introspection, however, the act and the object may fuse together to become one whole. There-

fore the charge of double attention in introspection prove it to be inappropriate. Ryle puts another familiar charge against introspection which is known as the infinite regress. The charge is like this - if the mental is known by introspection, it being mental must be known by another introspection and so on indefinitely. The act of introspection and the mental state scrutinized may form one whole and we may be conscious of the whole without being distinctly conscious of parts.

In this regard A. C. Ewing holds, "So if I introspect or am in some way conscious of myself as resolving, both introspection and resolving will be part of my total felt state, but they need not both be objects of distinct consciousness." ¹⁰⁹

But if we analyse the charge of infinite regress against introspection then we have to admit that the question of infinite regress cannot arise with introspection because it makes no sense to say that one knowledge requires another knowledge to be known. It is an obvious matter. Consciousness has been conceived on the analogy of light. One light doesnot require another light to manifest itself.

Ryle's another attack for introspection is that it isnot what it is said to be. The theorists believe that introspection is the deliberate act of internally perceiving mental episodes. It is said to be the media in informing us about our internal life. Ryle argues that if it is so why do several disputes exist relating to the nature of our internal life? Of course this criticism of Ryle against introspection has some ground. It is true that the claim of infallibility is an extravagant claim on the part of the introspectionists. Introspection means scrutiny and scrutiny involves judge-

109. Ewing, A.C. : 'Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism', Reprinted in *Clarity Isnot Enough*, P.320.

ments. One may error in his judgement. But error in judgement does not establish that there is no judgement. The introspectionists may be wrong in their concept of infallibility.

By following Hume, Ryle points out the worthlessness of the introspection on the ground that they do not enable us to have a true picture of our emotional states or experiences. The language of introspection clearly points out to retrospection. Ryle says, "There is nothing intrinsically ghostly about the objects of retrospection".¹¹⁰ When I catch myself getting into panic, I do such and such or He caught himself wondering how to do so and so' is usually the language of introspection. The word 'catch' here clearly suggests that by introspection we actually mean retrospection for we can catch only that which is running away from us and which is being pursued and overtaken. Thus what we name as introspection is in truth retrospection and there is nothing mysterious about it. In this regard Ryle asserts, "In the same way that I can catch myself daydreaming. I can catch myself scratching ; in the same way that I can catch myself engaged in a piece of silent soliloquy, I can catch myself saying something aloud."¹¹¹

Therefore, primarily there is no difference between 'catching oneself scratching' which is a public act, and 'catching oneself day - dreaming' which is a private act. Here Ryle tried to establish that in principle there is no difference between the physical or public and the mental or private aspects of a man. What is ordinarily private in a man is the subject matter of retrospection. Retrospection supplies

110. Ryle, G : The Concept of Mind, P. 160

111. Ibid, P. - 160

data about the qualities of the agent. It is just like a diary. Thus as the diary and its contents are not ghostly, retrospection and its date are not likewise ghostly. Ryle says, "The fact that retrospection is autobiographical does not imply that it gives us a privileged Access to facts of a special status. But of course, it does not give us a mass of data contributory to our appreciations of our own conduct and qualities of mind. A diary is not a chronicle of ghostly episodes, but it is a valuable source of information about the diarists' character, wits and career."¹¹² Introspection, therefore, is nothing but the authentic process of retrospection. By substituting retrospection for introspection, Ryle thinks that he can eliminate the ghost. But it is not at all clear how this substitution can help one to escape the ghost-for if we do not introspect, how can we retrospect? Retrospection generally means scrutiny of the recent past. We know that retrospection involves memory and memory involves our consciousness or awareness of some situation. Thus though retrospection is the scrutiny of something not present at the moment, still what is scrutinised is the experience of one's own. Thus Price writes -

"Introspection may always be retrospection ; it may always be form of short - range memory. But even if it is always 'retro-', the point that it is always 'intro-' "¹¹³.

Thus it is difficult to do away with introspection. The reason is that if we do not introspect, how do we know that an attempt to introspect cools down the emotional experience ? Moreover, if I am asked to introspect the feeling of pain

112. Ibid, P. - 160

113. Price : Some Objections to Behaviourism, Dimensions of Mind, P. - 81

that I will have when the injection needle goes deep into my skin, shall I ever fail to introspect? All these facts go to support the case for introspection and consciousness. Therefore, Ryle's attempt to deny both consciousness and introspection is debatable.

Now, we discuss Ryle's account of self-knowledge. In this connection he makes a bold statement which dominates his thoughts and ideas throughout "The Concept of Mind." Ryle writes,

"The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same."¹¹⁴ Of course, it is not difficult to see that Ryle's identification of the method of knowing others is due to his oversimplified notion of mind and the mental. He admits that mind is just a name for a certain class of behaviour, typical to human beings. Thus Ryle believes that by marking the behaviour of others we can know other minds and by noticing our own behaviour, we can know our own. It is true that behaviour is the only source of our information about the mind of others. One has certainly to see how the other talks, acts, and moves. He can know what the other wants to do. Other person's minds can be known only through behaviour because it is none of our privilege to have direct access to other minds. Behaviour in general is a pointer to the workings of other minds. It is so because it is more or less like a 'proprium' of mental phenomena. A proprium follows from an essential property without being itself an essential prop-

114. Ryle, G. : The Concept of Mind. P.- 149.

erty. Behaviour follows from mental phenomena without being itself a mental phenomena. Ryle's real difficulty is that if we donot identify mind with behaviour, we can never in that case known that there are other minds because we can never observe the thoughts and feelings of others.

But a question may be raised here - How do we know that there is a mind ?

In this regard Ryle writes,

"The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propencies is an inductive process, an induction to law-like propositions from observed actions and reactions." 115

Ryle substitutes mind by person and believes that a person is not the combination of mind and body. According to Ryle, the conjunctive phrase, 'mind and body' is as ridiculous as the conjunction 'in tears and sedan chair'. To say that 'a man is mind and body' is as absurd to say, 'she came home in tears and sedan chair.' Throughout "The Concept of Mind", Ryle argues to establish that the theorists' notion of mind and body have a series of breaches of logical rules. Ryle admits,

"Where logical candour is required from us, we ought to follow the example set by novelists, biographers and diarists." 116

But Ryle has frequently identified the Cartesian mind with behaviour of certain sorts. Thus it is difficult to decide what he actually wants to say whether mind is the behaviour of certain sorts or person is the behaviour of certain sorts.

115. Ibid. P. - 164.

116. Ibid. P.- 168

Ryle agrees with Freud that in believing that a man may be a stranger to himself in certain respects. Ryle concludes that though there is no primary difference between self knowledge and knowledge about others, there are some circumstances which provide reasons making self-knowledge more open than the knowledge of others. So, whereas the dualists had based self-knowledge on consciousness and introspection, Ryle bases it on induction. Secondly whereas the dualists had based the knowledge of others mind on feeble inference (feeble, because no body has perceived the connection between somebody's behaviour and his so-called accompanying mental experience), Ryle bases it again on induction. Thus Ryle makes it clear that there is nothing secret or ghostly about man. but a question may arise, what about the notion of 'I' stand for ? Generally it has been said that 'I' is the name of soul or spirit which is the basis of identity in us and which survives death. It is the subject or known as apposed to the body or material substance. But according to Ryle, this isnot the true meaning of the word 'I'. This way of interpreting the word 'I' is to rob it of its true meaning. Ryle asserts that 'I' doesnot mean a soul substance. It only means an index word. Just as 'now' refers to the time when the word is uttered, just as 'that' refers to the person or thing which is pointed out by the speaker's figure, So 'I' refers to the person by whom the word 'I' is uttered or written. Similarly, the word 'you' refers to the person who hears one say 'you' or who reads the word 'you'. Therefore, 'I' and 'you' cannot be the names of ghostly substances in me or in you. Thus Ryle writes,

* 'I' isnot an extra name for an extra being ; it indicates, when I say or write

it, the same individual who can also be addressed by the proper name Gilbert Ryle'. 'I' is not an alias for 'Gilbert Ryle', it indicates the person whom 'Gilbert Ryle' names when Gilbert Ryle uses 'I'¹¹⁷

To determine the meaning of 'I' clearly Ryle again asks the question . Is the self known or unknown ? According to him, if it is known it is an object like other objects ; if it is unknown, it is a mystery, leading to nothing. So, there is no question of the self and no question of 'I' as naming the self. 'I' and myself is used in different senses in different contexts. For example, 'I am warning myself before the fire'. Here the word 'myself' refers to the body. 'I caught myself just beginning to dream', here 'myself' does not refer to the body. 'I was not scorched, only my hair was', here 'I' is not used even for a part of the body. 'I collided with police car', here 'I' is used for the mechanical auxiliary, viz. the car, which is far more inferior than the human body.

But we may object that these different usages do not deny the self. On the other hand, they suggest the various types of selves within the human body. For example, when one says the statement, 'I should not have done that', one's good self appears to be passing a remark on one's bad self. Ryle answers that 'I' or 'myself' always refers to the same person, though used in different contexts. Thus there is no mysterious ghost in the statement 'I found myself guilty' in Ryle's sense.

Thus in the context of above explanations, Ryle explains the notions of 'self-consciousness' and 'self-control' which is related with the concept of consciousness. Self-consciousness is the act of reporting on our own selves. Just as

we report about others so we report about ourselves. The same is true of self-control. As we control others, so we control ourselves. Therefore self-consciousness and self-control have no reference to soul in the body. Many philosophers describe the soul as the pure knower, the pure ego or the ultimate consciousness. But Ryle denies the fact. He argues that the systematic elusiveness does not presuppose the fact of soul, mysteriously existing in human body. According to Ryle, this elusiveness has no reference to an extraordinary being in man. Of course, this may be true of many observable facts in the world. But for that matter this elusiveness does not become extraordinary or mysterious. Ryle argues that all the acts of a diarist cannot be recorded in the diary for the last act of making entry still remains to be recorded. Thus Ryle maintains that there is no question of pure ego or pure consciousness as opposed to body. In this way, Ryle attempts to demolish the whole structure of Cartesian psychology. For him, Descartes' concept of consciousness has little similarity with any of the concepts used in ordinary life. The concept of consciousness as described by Descartes and his followers is a myth and mental processes are, in some cases unconscious. But there are no occurrences taking place in a second status world, since there is no such world. Thus according to Ryle, consciousness is not the part of the mental or it is not the essence of the mind. Ryle says that mental processes do not refer to mind or consciousness but they refer to the disposition of human behaviour. Ryle by attacking the science of behaviourism criticises Descartes' metaphysical theory of consciousness. But it is not the way to attack him on this ground.

One of the basic confusions that Ryle has made in his book "The Concept of Mind" is between mental qualities and their tests. Ryle fails to distinguish between the essence and the evidence of mental qualities, between the meaning of a statement and the method of its verification. This has led Ryle to say that mind is just a summary of the different behaviours peculiar to a human being. Ryle's writings prove that he has not decided whether mental concepts stand for some behaviour or they are only tested by some behaviour. Critics have invariably found this fault with his theory of mind. Stuart Hampshire in his review of "The Concept of Mind" remarks :

"Professor Ryle is not really arguing that all or most statements, involving mental concepts are (or are expressible as) hypothetical statements about overt behaviour, but (and it is very different) that to give reasons for accepting or rejecting such statements must always involve making some hypothetical statement about overt behaviour."¹¹⁸

Hampshire points out that Ryle tries to prove too much as a general logical thesis for the concept of mind when he says that the sorts of things I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out others, and the methods are the same. This Hampshire observes as an open paradox, for the reason that people can notoriously occult in at least one very important sense - namely that in comparison with animals and inanimate things, it is difficult to establish truth about human beings. Again Hampshire maintains that the Privileged

Access view of the traditional philosophers may not be wholly true, it is equally the

118. Hampshire, S : 'Review The Concept of Mind', Mind, April 1950. 245

case for precisely the same reasons that the Open Access view of Gilbert Ryle is equally unacceptable. Of course, Ryle says that it is not his purpose to distinguish between the meaning of a mental concept and the method of its verification. On the other hand it is his theory to identify the two.

Thus Ryle's attempt to confine a man's mentality in his behaviour is primarily motivated by his belief that there is one world which is open to everybody. Ryle believes that self-consciousness or self-awareness is just our higher order action which are directed on our own previous actions. A higher order action is one which is somehow concerned with other action or actions. Ryle thinks that just as one directs his higher order action on the actions of others, so he directs his higher order action on his own. In his extreme behaviouristic and realistic view Ryle has sought to merge the subject with the object. According to Ryle himself, the self of the moment doesnot allow itself to be objectified. J.N. Findlay thinks that man is necessarily a "two - sided person having an outward and an inward history."¹¹⁹

To escape from rigorous criticism Ryle might be trying the law of parsimony in abandoning dualism or he might be only playing a linguistic game. But we cannot consistently think of a man as a mere lump of flesh and bone exhibiting certain typical behaviours. A man is more than these and there lies than these and there lies the ghost. As C. A. Mace says,

"The ghost in the machine is, we may say, the machine itself as it appears

119. Findlay, J.N. "Linguistic Approach to Psycho-Physics", Reprinted in *Language, Mind and Value*, P. 142.

to itself, and it can appear to itself as an extremely spiritual sort of thing - even as a 'disembodied mind'.¹²⁰ Every thing is what it is, and not another thing.

From the above explanation it is clear that the concept of consciousness is an undeniable fact. No one can deny the fact that the discovery of consciousness is the most valuable incident in the history of philosophy which is successfully done by Descartes. Consciousness is the essence of the philosophy of mind. It occupies a very important place in neurology as a neuro physiological phenomena and trying to identify it with high level brain activity. But neuro physiology is yet to develop itself to prove mental phenomena to be neuronal phenomena. In this regard David J. Chalmers, in his essay "On the Search for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness" rightly concludes -

"And I hope to have made a case that philosophy and neuroscience can come together to help clarify some of the deep problems involved in the study of consciousness."¹²¹

Thus the concept of consciousness occupies a very important place in science. Hence Descartes seems to be fruitful in the light of the recent development of neurophysiology. The attempt to study the concept of consciousness in this area will surely reveal new facts about the concept of consciousness.

John R. Searle¹²² in his essay on "Free Will as a Problem in Neurobiology" writes about the importance of consciousness which can move our bodies.

120. Mace C.A. "Some Trends in the Philosophy of Mind", British philosophy in the Mid-centuries P.P.- 119-10.

121. Chalmers, D. J. : Towards a Science of Consciousness, P. 227.

122. Searle R : " Philosophy : The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 76 No. 298 Oct. 2001, P. 497.

According to him, because the problem of free will is a problem about the causal facts concerning certain sorts of consciousness, we need to explain how consciousness in general can function causally to move our bodies. How can a state of human consciousness cause a bodily movement? One of the most common experiences in our lives is that of moving our bodies by our conscious efforts. For example, I now intentionally raise my arm, a conscious effort on my part. Searle admits that consciousness is a higher - level biological feature of the brain. The consciousness of the brain can have effects at the neuronal level even though there is nothing in the brain except neurons (with glial cells, neuro-transmitters, blood flow, and all the rest). Just as the behaviour of the molecules is causally constitutive of solidity, so the behaviour of the neurons is causally constitutive of consciousness. When we say that consciousness can move my body then we mean that the neuronal structures move our body. But they move our body because of the conscious state of the mind. Consciousness is a feature of the brain in a way that solidity is a feature of the wheel. Thus the nature of consciousness cannot be denied. Searle asserts the following conditions regarding the relation of the consciousness and the body.

- (i) Consciousness, as caused by neuronal processes and realised in neuronal systems functions causally in moving the body.
- (ii) The brain causes and sustains the existence of a conscious self that is able to make rational decisions and carry them out in actions.
- (iii) The brain is such that the conscious self is able to make and carry out

decisions.

Thus consciousness is a generic concept that may be defined in terms of its several instances. The concept of consciousness, though Ryle denies it, occupies a very important place in philosophy and in the recent past in neurobiology. Ryle's view on consciousness and introspection is very hard to accept.

-0--0-

CHAPTER - VII

CHAPTER-VII

AN ANALYSIS OF RYLE'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S

ACCOUNT OF MIND

Both Ryle (1900-1976) and Wittgenstein (1889-1951) are the dominant figures of the twentieth century philosophy which is known as "Linguistic Analysis". Ryle's Major work "The Concept of Mind" (1947), because of its style and content in the field of philosophy of mind has become one of the modern classics of philosophy. In this work Ryle attacked what he calls, Cartesian dualism or the myth of the ghost in the machine, arguing that philosophical troubles over the nature of mind and its relation with the body arose from a 'category mistake' which led erroneously for treating statements about mental phenomena in the same way as those about physical phenomena. Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigation" (1953) occupies a very important place in the philosophy of mind. In "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein talks about different mental concepts specially about the concept of 'pain'. According to Wittgenstein meaning and understanding is neither to name nor to describe mental occurrences. In his book Wittgenstein was mainly motivated by the relationship between language and the mind. Both Ryle and Wittgenstein criticised Descartes' theory of mind. They liberate the mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world and put more importance to linguistic activities.

Both Ryle and Wittgenstein believe firmly that linguistic analysis is the

sole aim of philosophical enterprise. It is so because philosophy cannot profitably engage itself with the task of considering facts. The study of facts is exclusively the concern of science. So, the world of facts remains outside the scope of philosophical enquiry and philosophy should concentrate on the analysis and examination of language. The followers of the logical positivism saw that the business of philosophy was clarification, not discovery ; its concern was with meaning not with truth, its subject matter was language, not facts. Ryle is a leading member of the present day analysts. He admitted this notion of the positivists. Wittgenstein asserted that all philosophy is the critique of language. He also admitted the fact that "Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language".¹²³ Ryle was also so much convinced of the muddle created by the philosopher's mishandling of language that he believes that "The proper business of philosophy is the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconceptions and absurd theories."¹²⁴ Both Ryle and Wittgenstein felt the need of analysis to the use of faulty language. They began to examine the language with the aims of halting improper use, exposing absurd theories, dispelling confusions, overthrowing idols and securing clarity. They wanted to replace the defective language and established a non-defective language and as a result we find their conception regarding the philosophy of mind.

Both Ryle and Wittgenstein supported the behaviourism. Their view on

123. Wittgenstein : *Philosophical Investigations*, Sec. - 109, (P. 47)
 124. Ryle , 'Systematically Misleading Expressions', *Essays on Logic and Language*
 First Series, P.- 36.

behaviourism is known as philosophical behaviourism or logical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism. According to this behaviourism we can give an account of all mental processes in terms of the physical behaviour and tendencies to behave. Ryle's book 'The Concept of Mind' is a defence of analytical behaviourism. He identifies mental states not with actual behaviour but with the dispositions to behave. Logical behaviourism or analytical behaviourism holds that the psychological statements whether they are about other minds or about one's own are translatable into statements about physical occurrences or physical states. Here the viewpoint is one not of science but of logical or conceptual analysis. It says that the meaning of mental statements is analysable about behaviour and about the observable circumstances in which such behaviour occurred. Thus we can say that Ryle is an exponent of logical behaviourism. Some readers of Wittgenstein allege that he advocates an extreme form of philosophical behaviourism in his *Philosophical Investigations*. For example, J. J. C. Smart in 'Materialism' says, "In spite of his own disclaimer Wittgenstein is in fact a sort of behaviourist". Of course, here the term 'behaviour' is used to refer to not only the present behaviour but also the future and past behaviour. Wittgenstein's concept of mind leads inevitably to philosophical behaviourism which reduces mental states to behavioural activities. However, Wittgenstein does not reduce mental phenomena to behaviour in the sense behaviourists do. He only holds, "An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria."¹²⁵ When Wittgenstein speaks of 'outward criteria' he means that

125. Wittgenstein : *Philosophical Investigations*, Sec. - 580, (P. 153)

mental processes need outer criteria in order to be identified as such. The phrase in saying that inner processes stand in need of outward criteria, Wittgenstein seems to be saying that there is a logically necessary connection between inner and the outer. What Wittgenstein meant by 'criteria' is much debated. But his remark certainly emphasizes the necessity for a public context if the idea of an inner process is to be intelligible. This statement of Wittgenstein is in contrast to Cartesian tradition in which one has to start, in one's account of the world from one's own case i.e. one's own inner processes. Ryle says that mind is only the disposition of the body and there cannot be anything private about mind.

But there is one difficulty in interpreting Wittgenstein and Ryle as behaviourists. They took behaviourism to be the doctrine and hold that there are no such things as minds. They did not want to deny the existence of minds, but simply wanted to give an account of the mind in terms of behaviour. Both of them denied that they were behaviourists. But D.M. Armstrong remarks, "I think, these philosophers wrongly persuaded themselves that they were not Behaviourists. However, where this piece of interpretation is right or not does not really matter. The accounts of mental processes given by these philosophers were certainly very close to Behaviourism, and it is useful to consider them as Behaviourists. If they are not Behaviourists, we may challenge them or their followers to tell us in what way their view differs from Behaviourism."¹²⁶

Wittgenstein had not positively spoken much on the concept of mind. While

126. Ibid, Sec. 305 (P.-102)

discoursing on the philosophy of mind, Wittgenstein is concerned with the language that is used when one talks about mental acts and states. The linguistic philosopher deals with what it is to say that someone is thinking, understanding, willing, feeling, remembering etc. Here we may quote the definition of a private language. Wittgenstein defines 'private language' as follows, "Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word, that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his 'thinking he understands, attaching some meaning to the word, criteria for his understanding the word right. In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a private language."¹²⁷

According to Wittgenstein, the language in which we have words like 'thinking', willing etc. has a logic of its own which is different from the logic connected with words like walking, sneezing, running etc. The statement "I am in pain" is not a descriptive statement i.e. it does not describe a mental state. It is an expression of a mental state. It does not describe what is happening in mind. Mind does not contain mental states which can be described in the way we can describe the contents of a room.

According to Wittgenstein, though mind does not refer to an entity yet it is real. Mind is real in the sense that we play language game involving mind. Our language game are rich with mental words and statements.

Wittgenstein was interested in the analysis of language and through that

127. Ibid, Sec. 306 (P-102)

he explained away the mind. He tried to dissolve the issue instead of solving it. But the issue was insoluble although not insolvable. It can hardly be said that Wittgenstein really brought about a dissolution.

Wittgenstein clearly saw that the reason behind philosophical difficulties lay in the violation of ordinary language. He suggested us for bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. His objection was that the metaphysicians operated with ordinary words but deprived them of their ordinary functions. He complained that the metaphysicians had distorted the ordinary language. Wittgenstein as well as his successors believed that it was philosophers' misconception and misdescription of ordinary language that led them go astray. They argued that if philosophy was to succeed, it must determine how our language is in fact used - what we mean when a word or a sentence is used in everyday discourse. Therefore, the analysts said that clarification based on common use can solve or dissolve a philosophical dispute. The followers of Wittgenstein took common or ordinary use to be the only proper use and what they wanted to clarify was not the knowledge of facts but the meaning of statements. Their clarificatory philosophy aimed at clarifying puzzling sentence. By doing so, they hoped to remove the darkness of perplexity and cure philosophy of its muddles or headaches. Thus the linguistic conception of philosophy and the notion of ordinary language are the philosophical touchstones in Wittgensteinian philosophy.

Ryle is one of the most influential proponents of this new concept of philosophy. His book "The Concept of Mind" is a fine example of the ordinary

language philosophy, where he points to analyse the psychological concepts in order to show the hollowness of mind body dualism. Ryle contends that the cartesian concept of the mind is essentially private. Ryle strongly rejected the notion that there exists two kinds of stuff. Viz, the physical and the mental. According to Ryle, "To talk of a person's mind is not to talk of a repository which is permitted to house objects that something called 'the physical world' is forbidden to house, it is to talk of the person's abilities, liabilities, and inclinations to do and undergo certain sorts of things, and of the doing and undergoing of these things in the ordinary world." *128

According to Wittgenstein, "The mind world certainty logically available is metaphysical certainty which involves the certainty about our language game." Wittgenstein wants to emphasize on the certainty of the existence of the world as its existence is a part of the framework of our thinking and using language and so there could be no place for the universal doubt about the existence of the world. Language itself presupposes that the world exists and that the world being exist it makes language use possible. By this Wittgenstein admits the metaphysical certainty to the existence of the world and the mind. In this sense thought and language are part of the world. He also argues for the mind in the world rather than for the mind that is outside the world.

Thus philosophical activity is linguistic. He maintains that the problems of philosophy arise because the logic of our language is misunderstood. He says in the "Philosophical Investigations" that we are misled by grammar, by the apparent

form of language. Philosophical problems are products of the linguistic illusion. Hence, the philosophical activity consists in clarification. Philosophical problems can be solved by a careful study of language. All philosophy is a critique of language. Wittgenstein maintains that an important business of philosophy consists in diagnosis. Philosophical methods are like 'different therapies'. It is the job of philosophy to cure the conceptual diseases. Wittgenstein writes, "When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it".¹²⁹

Thus Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is entirely related with his conception of psychology. In his book "Philosophical Investigations" Wittgenstein connects his conception of mind with language. Mind is not something inner or private as held by Descartes. According to Wittgenstein, the mental words such as 'thinking' and 'meaning' do not designate any inner process. It is essentially a public phenomenon as observable by others as by the subject himself. But we have to engage ourselves in searching on which ground Wittgenstein maintains that mental phenomena or mind is not an inner process, but a public phenomenon. It is not an inner process because various mental concepts are meaningful only in the light of forms of life, and thus all mental concepts are connected with language. Thus language is intimately related with mind. We can express our feelings, thinkings etc. through language. Ryle in his article "Ordinary language"¹³⁰ says

129. Philosophical Investigation, Sec. 194, P-79

130. Ryle - Ordinary Language ; PP - 178-180.

that we do not speak of the 'use' of sentences. Only words are used. But there is nothing absurd to talk of the 'use' of sentences. We certainly use them. In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein says that the tendency to sublime the logic of language leads us to essentialism. But essentialism cannot be completely eliminated from language. What Wittgenstein is rejecting is the claim that all name-words function in the same way, or that all descriptive sentences describe in one fixed way. These are only one kind of language game. They cannot be models for others. Wittgenstein's main purpose is to make us realize that language has no fixed use.

Introducing the term 'Language game', Wittgenstein wanted to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity or of a form of life. Therefore, with the analysis of Wittgenstein's concept of mind the analysis of language and analysis of forms of life go side by side. In his later work Wittgenstein replaces the picture theory of meaning by the tool theory of language. He holds, "The Philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours."¹³¹ Language is an instrument and its concepts are also instruments. He asks to think of the tools in a tool box. There is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. "The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. And in both cases there are similarities. Wittgenstein says that we find only similarities among the games, such as board games, card-games, ball games, olympic games and so on. We

131. Wittgenstein : Philosophical Investigation, Sec. 2, P.-3

see a complicated net work of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing : Sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.' ¹³² In his opinion, although things have no common essence, they have "family resemblances". Games form a family. We use a term for a number of things not because they have some essence in common, but because they have certain similarities. Wittgenstein thus exposes the traditional theories about things and destroys them completely. Philosophers have disagreement regarding the essence of mind. Some philosophers have concluded that the essential feature of mind is rationality. Some others maintain that it lies in the contemplative awareness and according to some it lies in its ability to symbolize, form, abstractions and use language. All these explanations of the essences of mind imply that mind has somekind of power and through this power various successive experiences are organised into a systematic whole of experiences. But Wittgenstein takes a completely different position regarding the explanation of mental phenomena or mind. According to him mental phenomena arenot characterized by the hidden essence or hidden power. It is characterized by discrete and manifold forms of life.

Wittgenstein believes that language is almost inseperably connected with life and mind. A language game is an use of language for some purpose. Language isnot something artificially constructed for the use of philosophers. Language is rather an instrument. That is to say speaking a language and understanding is a matter of being able to do a variety of things, to act or behave in certain ways and to do so under the appropriate conditions. Thus speaking a language is engaging

132. Ibid, sec. 66, P-31

in certain modes of behaviour. It is to engage in forms of life and to "imagine a language means to imagine a form of life"¹³³. We express our feelings and emotions through words and words are pieces used in various language games. The meaning of a word is determined by its roles in the various language-games in which it occurs, the kind of behaviour in which its use is embedded. It gets its meaning from these modes of behaviour. Wittgenstein said, "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life". It should be maintained here that under the notion of language game, Wittgenstein includes both linguistic and non-linguistic activities. G. Pitcher calls the linguistic activities as pure and non linguistic activities as impure. According to Pitcher, Linguistic behaviour is not entirely independent of the other modes of behaviour. On the contrary, Wittgenstein believes that in a certain sense, impure language games are basic and holds that "Pure language games are parasitic upon them in a crucial way"¹³⁴. Thus both purely linguistic behaviour and non-linguistic behaviour are essential to Wittgenstein's conception of language-game. But it seems that for him impure language games "i.e in the background". But we have to assert that whatever may be the case, Wittgenstein admits emphatically that words derive their meanings from the language-game which are their 'original homes'.

Thus in Wittgenstein's philosophy, mental phenomena are related with language. When Wittgenstein says that language is related to human behaviour and to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life, he uses the term

133. Ibid, Sec. 19, P.- 8

134. Pitcher G., The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, P. 240

behaviour in a very wide sense. He writes, "Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing".¹³⁵

Wittgenstein describes the tendency to search the life of meaning in the mental activity as a disease. This disease is based on a generally correct premise from which a wrong conclusion is made to follow. As words are lifeless in themselves there must be something to give them meaning. But it is wrong to assume that it is a mental activity or process that gives meaning to a word. It is rather the use of a word in language which makes it meaningful. In other words it is the stream of life, not a mental activity or process that makes an expression significant. According to Wittgenstein, following a rule is as much dependent on "Practice" as playing a game is. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. He writes, "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)"¹³⁶. That means rules are not enough for understanding language. To understand the language one should clearly look at the actual cases. Wittgenstein writes, "And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it."¹³⁷ Whether a rule is obeyed or not is decided by reference to what Wittgenstein describes in the "Blue Book" as "conventions" and in the "Philosophical Investigations" as "forms of life"

135. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation* Sec. 25, P-12

136. Ibid, Sec. 199, P-81

137. Ibid, Sec. 202, P-81

which is related to our mind. Thus conventions or forms of life are for Wittgenstein the highest court of appeal, not rules. Even an unknown language is interpreted by reference to our common behaviour.

Regarding meaning, Wittgenstein says, "And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private. It is the intangible something, only comparable to consciousness itself."¹³⁸ Meaning and understanding are not determined by what goes on in the 'speakers' and hearers' minds. They are rather matters of how they are used. What gives life and significance to words is their use, i.e. the way they are used in various language games. Wittgenstein maintains that the mental words such as 'thinking' and 'meaning' do not designate any inner process. If there were inner processes running along concurrently with the physical processes of speaking, we should be able to recognise and identify these alleged processes by introspection. But we fail to trace out anything like that. Certainly it is possible to say something and to mean something else, but generally it is gestures, tone of voice, facial expressions and a variety of actions and experiences of different kinds before and after, which distinguish meaning what we say from not meaning it.¹³⁹ Thus according to Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding are not mental activities. Their function is neither to name nor to describe mental occurrences. Wittgenstein has tried to show with extra-ordinary brilliance that generally there is no mental content designated by mental words and that even in the situations where a mental content seems to be present, the meaning of a word is not

138. Ibid, Sec. 358, P-113

139. Wittgenstein - Blue and Brown Books, PP. 35, 148, 144-45.

determined by its occurrence. What gives meaning and life to words and sentences is their use in language and life.

Wittgenstein takes an opposite position of Descartes regarding the nature of mind. Descartes maintains that we may doubt the existence of everything as illusory, but we cannot doubt the very fact of doubting and this implies the mind that doubts. But according to Wittgenstein, Cartesian dualism concerning mental concepts is untenable. It is simply irrational to doubt if there is no positive ground for it. Doubting is a form of life, apart from which it has no significance. Doubting cannot just consist in saying "I doubt". There must be something in the situation itself which justifies our doubting. To imagine a doubt is not to be in doubt. Doubting has an end. The expression of doubt has no place in language game. Without arranging in situations or forms of life 'Doubting' is an abstraction. Wittgenstein says that there is nothing that the Cartesian mind can do in the linguistic picture of the world. Mind is a thinking substance and it merges itself in the language centred activities, which called the language games, and the mental activities involved in the language games. Mind and the mental activities become one. On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein mental representations merge with the linguistic representations which themselves are nothing but language games. Therefore, Wittgenstein says that the mind is not the central concepts. It is the activities of playing language games that make the central idea. It makes mind as transparent as the world in language itself. Wittgenstein liberates the concept of mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world and puts it back in the outer world of the

linguistic and other activities.

Both Wittgenstein and Descartes admit that mind is a central feature of the world because the human language and actions are intimately related to each other. Descartes posits the mind as the metaphysical centre of the world. Wittgenstein also takes it a metaphysical truth about the human being. Descartes says that mind is completely independent of the world and body requires for the manifestation of the mind. On the other hand, Wittgenstein rejects Descartes' dualism and makes it clear that though mind is irreducible, yet mind is co-partner of the body.

Like Wittgenstein, Ryle also rejects Descartes' dualism. According to Ryle mind is simply the disposition of the body, and mental predicate does not refer to anything private. Ryle while building a theory of mind goes to see the logical character of certain model sentences containing imaginations, perception, thought, emotion and so on. Therefore we can define Ryle's philosophy of mind as a theory of logical character of certain sentences. Thus Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind shows that mental concepts can be constructed as essentially behavioural. According to Ryle mind does not refer to any entity or substance. Ryle is against the Cartesian dualism and advocates that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. The mind is a myth. Throughout "The Concept of Mind", Ryle tried to explode the myth. But he is not negating the concept of mind. What he is negating are the idioms in which mind was conceived and

described by the dualists. Ryle has his own theory of mind. So in practical life we all use mind-involving concepts correctly. But Ryle wants to avoid the mystical account of the mind as given by the dualists, particularly by Descartes. Wittgenstein indicates that mind does not refer to any separate substance or entity. Thus there are outward criteria connected with mental processes. He says that if people only inwardly feel pain and shows no sign of them then the word pain would not be there in language.

Wittgenstein proceeds to examine those words of language which are generally supposed to refer to essentially 'private experiences'. Words like 'pain', 'itch', 'ache', 'anger', 'mood' and others are used to signify private experiences. It is believed that only I know my pain, others can only guess. Similarly I can never know certainly that somebody is in pain. Thus sensation and feeling words name and describe private experiences. G.E. Moore¹⁴⁰ reports that in the early 1930's Wittgenstein accepted the popular view that sensation words describe 'primary experience'. He also maintained that both first person and third person words describe the same sensation. For example, The propositions "I have toothache" and "He has toothache" mean the same. But Wittgenstein realised soon that these propositions have different meanings. Wittgenstein gives another strong point is that : If 'pain' is the name of a sensation which I experience only in the privacy of my own consciousness, then I cannot even understand what it mean to say that another person has a pain. If the word "pain" only denotes for me, an item in my

140. Moore, G.E. "Wittgensteins' Lectures in 1930-33" reprinted in *Philosophical Paper* PP. 307-308.

consciousness, then 'pain' can exist only when I am aware of it. Wittgenstein believes that mind is real and mental states are logically connected with the behaviour of the human beings and what is true of "pain" is true of all mental predicates. Wittgenstein has neither denied the existence of sensations, feelings etc. nor has he formulated any theory about language. His claim is very modest, namely to describe the logical grammar of sensation - expressions. Wittgenstein introduces a powerful attack on the view that sensation words stand for private sensations by examining the possibility of a private language. The meaning of 'pain' and other sensation words is necessarily tied up with our private sensations. Consequently, the meaning of 'pain' is determined independently of pain behaviour and other publicly observable characteristics of the situation in which 'pain' is used. But a private language is an impossibility. Wittgenstein makes two observations in this connection. First, a man could not make himself understood when he used these words and secondly we cannot say that these words are names of sensations.

Like Wittgenstein, Ryle is also a constant supporter of ordinary language. Bertrand Russell while commenting on Ryle's "Concept of Mind" has criticised him for preferring the language of the 'uneducated people' and condemning the 'sophisticated language of the learned'. But Ryle in his book "The Concept of Mind" analyses mental concepts in order to show that ordinary language does not permit an existential conjunction between mind and body. According to him 'mind' and 'matter' are terms of different orders or categories. They cannot as such be legitimately conjoined or disjoined. For him, the conjunctive phrase 'body and

mind' is a meaningless phrase. Ryle asserts that the psychologists have committed a category mistake by describing mind in terms which are suitable only to the body. But it should be maintained here that though Ryle does not believe in the dualism between mind and body, yet he wants to make a categorical distinction between the mental and the physical. He strongly holds that there is a syntactical difference between the mental and the physical. According to Ryle, mental adjectives are terms of higher order or category. Therefore they cannot sensibly fit with the physical. Here he is talking about the logical category. But subsequently Ryle himself preferred not to take the term 'category' so seriously. In his "Dilemmas" Ryle says that he recommends it "not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which like a skeleton key, it will turn all our locks for us ; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us."¹⁴¹

According to Ryle, 'mind' and 'matter' when conjoined or disjoined make no sense. Mental and physical concepts are freely used together and they convey significant information to us. Ordinary language combines mental and physical terms in its descriptions and explanations of human behaviour. For Ryle, mental concepts always mean some externally recognisable behaviour. Ryle analyses the meaning of mental concepts in order to show that in actual use they do not refer to any ghostly entity called mind. His behaviouristic appraisal of such concepts enables him to say that they primarily mean some bodily behaviour, actual or

141. Ryle, *Dilemmas*, P. 9

possible. For example, 'Intelligence' for Ryle, is only a manner of doing things in certain ways. Similarly, 'anger', 'fear', 'joy' and the like mean only characteristic behaviour patterns. 'Thinking' means silent speech or soliloquy. It is simply saying in a certain frame of mind. Ryle identifies meaning with the method of verification. In his book "The Concept of Mind" we find a lot of examples in support of this thesis. For example, he explicates the meaning of 'vanity' (emptiness) in terms of certain behaviours, "namely to talk a lot about himself, to cleave to the society of the eminent, to reject criticisms, to seek the foot-lights and to disengage himself from conversations about the merits of others. We expect him also to indulge in reseat daydreams about his own successes, to avoid recalling past failures and to plan for his own advancement. To be vain is to tend to act in these and innumerable other kindred ways."¹⁴² Thus Ryle is certainly identifying the meaning of mental concepts with the method of their verification.

Ryle refutes the Cartesian theory of mind because he admits the 'mind' as a descriptive concept. Cartesians, explain the mind as an explanatory or causal concept. Whereas according to Ryle the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent behaviour lies in their description, according to the Cartesians, it lies in their causation. The Cartesians do not introduce their theory of mind in order to show how intelligent behaviours differ from non intelligent ones. They introduce mind to explain for such a difference. The Cartesian have advanced a theory of mind of their own. Ryle has attacked 'mind' as a cause theory. Following Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy can only describe linguistic usage, Ryle has

142. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, P.- 83-84

felt satisfied with descriptions alone. But descriptions cannot be a substitute for cause. Description and explanation are two different things concerning mind. Thus Ryle's and Wittgenstein's theories of mind cannot completely refute the cartesian theory of mind.

Wittgenstein's "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" arose logical positivism or logical empiricism and his "Philosophical Investigations" gave birth to a trend which is called 'ordinary language school'. Russell also said something very similar with Wittgenstein, "A logically perfect language would be very likely private to one speaker. That is to say, all names that it would use would be private to that speaker and could not enter into the language of another speaker."¹⁴³

Descartes' conception of Pure Ego is a mental substance capable of performing actions. Wittgenstein's self is more like Hume's bundle of perceptions which is not inside but outside the world of "objects" and is incapable of transforming the 'world of experience'.

In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein rejected the solipsist position because he realised that the problems posed by contemporary natural sciences cannot be coped with by a solipsist doctrine. But both in the "Tractatus" and in the "Philosophical Investigations" he advocated that philosophy is confined to language. Wittgenstein's philosophy is not concerned with reality as a whole or the relation of man and nature or with ethical or aesthetic values, etc., but it simply describes the uses of words. He holds, "We may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away

143. Russell, Our knowledge of the External World, P. - 198

with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its power of illumination - i.e. its purpose from the philosophical problems.¹⁴⁴ But how does language create problems in philosophy? In this context Wittgenstein says, "Language (or thought) is something unique" - this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems".¹⁴⁵ For Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical Investigations" the job of philosophy is not even to interpret or analyse language but "leave everything as it is". In fact, according to him, there is nothing to explain: "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain."¹⁴⁶ Thus in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein held that philosophy does not propound any doctrine nor does it offer any fresh information. It has nothing new to say-philosophising is an activity which follows a technique of describing functions of words with a view to dissolve philosophical problems. Here his position is that the method of philosophy is not analysis but only description of various uses of expressions of our day-to-day ordinary language. Criticising analysis as a method, here he held that in our ordinary day-to-day language there is nothing which can be regarded as simple or complex. What is simple from one point of view may be complex from another point of view.

Wittgenstein also rejected his earlier view of the "Tractatus" that ordinary language hides the real form of the propositions and that this real form is revealed

144. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Section 109., P-47
 145. *Ibid* Sec-110, P-47
 146. *Ibid*, Sec. 126, P-50

through analysis. In the "Philosophical Investigations" he denied the form itself. He said "We see that what we call 'sentence' and 'language' have not the formal unity that I imagined, but are families of structures more or less related to one another."¹⁴⁷ Here Wittgenstein did not deny the hidden in the domain of existents. But he denied the concept of essence or the universal common something in the domain of language. In the "Tractatus" he had maintained that the essence of language is the analysed perfect language where there is one-to-one relationship between the form of the perfect language and the form of the fact. It is the essence of language which Wittgenstein rejected in the "Philosophical Investigations". Here he rejected that language has only one functions, i.e. describing "atomic facts", and advocated that there are multiple ways in which language functions. Wittgenstein realised that knowledge must include a content and goes beyond the use of symbols which stand for "immediate objects of experience." To achieve this he formulated another method of interpreting the concept of meaning. This is known as the "use theory of meaning". Wittgenstein writes, "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice."¹⁴⁸ Thus the use theory of meaning has a significant role in his philosophy of mind. He held that the meaning of an expression is determined by the way in which an expression is actually used in a specific context.

In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein maintained that language

147. Ibid, Sec. 108, P-46
 148. Ibid, Sec. 340, P-109

cannot be private. According to him, just as the playing of a game is a "public affair" because rules cannot be learnt and obeyed "privately", so also language cannot be learned and used "privately." "Private language" as a "technical" philosophical concept, means a language which cannot be understood by anyone except the person who makes use of it. In the "Philosophical Investigations", he rejected the possibility of "private language". We also find that the subjectivity of the "Tractatus" is replaced by a complete denial of subjectivity in the "Philosophical Investigations" because here he presented an objective criterion of meanings. Wittgenstein said, "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique".¹⁴⁹ The technique is to know how to use a word in its proper context. But a question may arise, what is the proper context? The proper context, according to the "Philosophical Investigations", is not any inner mental experience (the position in the Tractatus) but the social behaviour of mankind. This criterion applies both to the known and inner experience. Wittgenstein held that on the basis of behaviour the unknown language is interpreted. In this reference, he wrote, "The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language"¹⁵⁰

In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein advocated behaviourism. There he says that understanding and learning the "meaning" of a word is not a mental act, but consists of understanding a pattern of behaviour. And Wittgenstein interpreted in behavioural terms not only the concept of meaning but even mental

149. Ibid, Sec. 199, P-81

150. Ibid, Sec. 206, P-82

concepts like "pain". Within the framework of behaviourism, he argued that our mental concepts do not refer to the conscious, subjective status. Therefore, all mental concepts are reducible to a collection of behavioural patterns. A mental concept like 'pain' is not a "name" of an inner phenomenon but refers to "publicly" observable situation. This is so because rules cannot be "privately obeyed because obeying a rule, implied that one is doing the thing correctly. Logically, doing things right implies the possibility of doing them wrong as well. Therefore, one can know whether one is right or wrong only through a public check - when one goes wrong others correct him. And if there is no public check one would not know whether one has obeyed the rules or not. Moreover, since there cannot be any language without rules, therefore logically there cannot be a language denoting inner experiences. Therefore according to Wittgenstein the mental concept like mind cannot be private. But it is a public affair.

Wittgenstein used his arguments against the possibility of a "private language" to prove that mental concepts are equivalent to a collection of behavioural pattern. In this regard Wittgenstein writes, "If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula', it is particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on -- when the formula occurs to me. Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all. For, that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself : in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, 'Now I know how to go on' In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental

process."¹⁵¹

Regarding the assumption that body and mind are two absolutely separate entities, Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical Investigations" denied the existence of mind and accepted the existence of body only which is known as behaviourism. But this position of Wittgenstein is one-sided, and, consequently, they are metaphysical. By metaphysics here is meant taking an aspect of reality and absolutizing it. Wittgenstein, due to his metaphysical approach, failed to grasp the dialectical relation of body (matter) and mind. It should be mentioned here that Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy in the "Philosophical Investigations", actually propounded vulgar materialism. Moreover, Wittgenstein erroneously deduced that all mental concepts are reducible to patterns of behaviour. But he failed to comprehend the fact that being human implies conscious being. And it is consciousness which precisely distinguishes man from nature. Consciousness evolves out of the interaction of man and nature and man and man. Therefore, consciousness which is the subjective side of man cannot be identified with bodily behaviour. Language itself belongs to the conscious activity of man.

Here we may ask the question What is mind ? Wittgenstein argued that because of a certain "Picture" of language we had formed, we wrongly apply the rules of one language game to another. He said, "Where our language suggests a body and there is none : there, we should like to say, is a spirit."¹⁵² According to Wittgenstein, in this instance we use the model of the "nameing" of objects by

151. Ibid, Sec, 154, P-60-61

152. Ibid, Sec. 36, P-18

pointing out to the language of mental phenomena. Thus, he argued, when we cannot perceive anything outside ourselves in the world we assume that these mental activities exist inwardly. In this way, in Wittgenstein's view, the problem of mind arises because of regarding the mental activities to be analogous to physical phenomena. Gilbert Ryle in his book "The Concept of Mind" called the above misuse of language as "category-mistake". Ryle admits that the dualists confuse the category of mind with the category of body. The dualist forgets that 'mind' and 'body' are terms of different categories. Mind is just the way of the human body and its brain function. Thus, according to Ryle, a dualist makes a big category mistake by confusing the terms of different types to be terms of the same type. Ryle admits that mind and body are terms of two distinct types or categories. He makes it clear that mind and body both exist. But they donot exist in the same sense. The Cartesian dualism took them as existing in the same sense. According to it, mind and body were both substances existing together in a human body, having their own functions. Ryle is against this type of dualism, and advocates forcefully that such a co-existing substance as mind has no reality at all. Such a mind he calls a ghost, and he is totally against the conception of a ghost in the body-machine. This mind is a myth. Throughout his book "The Concept of Mind" Ryle has tried to explode this myth. According to him, mind is nothing but behaviour of certain sorts. He explains psychological terms as behaviours or dispositions to behaviour. It is not a fact that bodily behaviours are caused by mind. They are occasioned by dispositions or tendencies. Thus Ryle admits that mind is a

dispositional behaviour. Mind-involving concepts mean tendencies leading to behaviour in appropriate circumstances. As behaviour it is nothing secret. It is open and public. By observing our own behaviour, we can have a look into our own minds. By observing the behaviour of others, we can have a look into their minds. There is an open access into the minds of others as well as of our own selves. Ryle, throughout his book on mind wants to establish the fact that mind as behaviour is public, not private.

Thus both Ryle and Wittgenstein advocate behaviourism. Behaviourism is the doctrine which holds that the mind and all mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to some observable or recordable physiological reactions. Ryle's dispositional behaviourism is also called as analytical behaviourism because the analyst here does not deny the nature of mind, but denies the status given to it by the traditional philosophers. It does not say that there is no mind. It only says that whatever one can say about mind or the mental, one can legitimately say in terms of the actually observed and observable behaviour. Analytical behaviourism is an attempt to explain mind and the mental in terms of dispositions, where dispositions would mean to behave and to be capable of behaving in a particular way and not dispositions to reflect on one's behaviour. C. A. Mace points out that analytical behaviourism gives an extended meaning of the term 'behaviour' in such a way as to include mental epithets which otherwise would embarrass him. Thus the analytical behaviourist while maintaining the reality of mental experiences, denies the causal explanation accorded to them by Descartes' mind-body dualism.

Thus the philosophical behaviourism of Ryle and Wittgenstein hold that the cartesian conception of mind errs in a fundamental way. Minds are not entities and mental episodes are not private goings on inside such entities. We are attracted to the Cartesian picture only because we are misled by what Wittgenstein calls the grammar of our language. Both Ryle and Wittgenstein were linguistic philosophers. Wittgenstein says that philosophical problems arise "When language goes on holiday." Ryle supports this point of Wittgenstein. He says that minds are kinds of entity amounts to a "Category mistake", "It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category ... when they actually belong to another."¹⁵³ Ryle says that minds are not entities at all, ghostly or otherwise. But he says that an analogous mistake encourages Cartesian dualism. We begin with the idea that minds are entities, distinct from, but similar to brains or bodies. When we have trouble locating such entities in the material world, we assume that they must be non-material. In this regard Ryle says, "The theoretically interesting category mistakes are those made by people who are perfectly competent to apply concepts, at least in the situations with which they are familiar, but are still liable in their abstract thinking to allocate those concepts to logical types to which they do not belong."¹⁵⁴

An example of Wittgenstein, regarding this analogous mistake, makes us clear. Wittgenstein says that suppose you look into the cab of a locomotive (or the cockpit of a Jetliner). You see levers, knobs, buttons and switches. Each of these operates in a particular way and each has a particular function in the locomotive's

153. Ryle - The Concept of Mind, P. 17

154. Ibid, P.- 19

operation. We should be misled if we assumed that levers or knobs with similar shapes had similar functions. In the same way, the fact that "mind" is a substantive noun or that we speak of "states of mind" should not lead us to assume that "mind" functions to designate a particular entity and that states of mind are states of this entity. Thus Ryle's contention is that it is a mistake to regard our possessing a mind as a matter of our body's standing in a particular relation to a distinct entity. And Wittgenstein's suggestion is that terms used to ascribe states of mind are not used to designate objects of some definite sort. Both of these ideas are independent of the behaviourist's analytical project, and both survive in accounts of the mind that are self-consciously anti-behaviourist. Thus one might suppose that to have a mind is just to possess a particular sort of organization. And one might imagine that to possess a given state of mind is just to be in some state or other that contributes in a characteristic way to the operation of this organized system. But one point should be maintained here that both Ryle and Wittgenstein were anti-dualistic philosophers and they admit no room for inherent privacy in the life of an individual. According to them, mind is inherently open or public and mental phenomena are public affairs. Ryle thinks that pleasure and pain are not anything beyond physical behaviour. Enjoying digging is not digging plus enjoying. Certain ways of digging are themselves enjoying. Similarly pain in some such visible behaviour as groaning, screaming, shouting and the rest. By logically analysing the meaning of mind involving sentences. Ryle comes to maintain that mind is only a manner or a style or a way of behaviour. He classifies mind-sentences into

three distinct logical types. They are the categorical, the hypothetical and the semi-hypothetical or mongrel-categorical. According to Ryle, none of these types meaningfully refers to any ghostly entity.

But whether or not Ryle and Wittgenstein are behaviourists, they are certainly 'linguistic philosophers'. They use logic and facts about language to solve philosophical problems. Linguistic analysis and Rylean behaviourism were the dominant trends in English and American philosophy. Wittgenstein often says that language creates philosophical problems. He says that philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. Some commentators take this dictum as embodying the whole of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. But in fact Wittgenstein's later books do not appear to be based on the dictum that language as such is the only cause of philosophical problems. Rather, it is the interplay between language and life. Philosophical understanding must include an understanding of 'forms' or 'patterns' of life. Words and sentences are to be distinguished from each other by their use. Wittgenstein also examines common notions such as understanding, knowing, believing, pretending, dreaming, hating, anger, expectation, remembering, hoping, meaning, perceiving. He also investigates less common notions such as 'the feeling that everything is unreal'. He discusses the experience of seeing a picture or diagram first as representing one thing then as representing another, to which experience he gives the level 'seeing as'. Wittgenstein often asks the question: How do we as children learn what anger is?, what hope is?, what dreaming is? etc. The overall answer of these questions

is that by having our spontaneous non verbal reactions gradually fitted into a linguistic schema by adults, who do this without thinking ; and also by our spontaneously imitating the behaviour of adults. But he says, by behaviour he means behaviour in context. 'For words have meaning only in the stream of life'. Some interpreters admit that Ryle's well-known book "The Concept of Mind" is a prime example of linguistic and even Wittgensteinian philosophy. Ryle is interested in solving philosophical problems through an analysis of language. Ryle argues that the supposition that there are special non-material mental events and actions which take place in a non-material substance is 'an unfortunate linguistic fashion' which traditionally belongs to the two - worlds story, the story that some things exist or occur "in the physical world", while other things exist and occur in another metaphorical place. He goes to analyse a large number of psychological notions with the aim of showing that mental items are neither substances nor events. The analyses are intended to show that psychological concepts really fall into one or other of three entirely different categories. These are : dispositions, adverbial concepts, and achievements. Dispositions include tendencies, abilities, capacities and habits. Several features distinguish dispositions from actions. According to Ryle, states such as knowing, believing, wishing, hoping, fearing, are not deeds but dispositions. Any dispositional account of the mind will be incompatible with Cartesian dualism, because according to Descartes the mind is not a disposition; it is known directly and not via manifestations. But we should maintain here that many objections have been raised against Ryle's account of mental notions. Some of these objections misfire. It is commonly said of him that he tried to analyse all

mental concepts in terms of dispositions, which is plainly not true. But what is the relationship between statements about behaviour and statements about mental states ? This is a question which Ryle never really answers. He often appears to be analysing the latter in terms of the former, yet he also speaks of feelings and consciousness as if they can exist independently of bodily behaviour.

Wittgenstein further argues that human consciousness cannot be separated from its embodied appearance and, that human consciousness is inconceivable apart from a predominantly human form. In his view, the relationship between mental and bodily states is not contingent but conceptual, the attribution of mental state is logically related to the behaviour of a certain sort of corporeal being. He hereby means to say that mental processes cannot be identified until there are outward criteria connected with them. Wittgenstein says that if people only inwardly feel pain and show no sign of them, the word pain would not be there in language. He wants to show that the idea of the inner arises for a "grammatical mistake" and these are elaborate of the misunderstanding of the language in which we talk about the mental activities. Ryle calls this mistake as "category mistake". But we must admit the point that both Ryle and Wittgenstein want to demystify the Cartesian concept of mind. They advocate the analytical behaviourism. They prefer to deal with the ordinary language. The mental phenomena, according to both of them are public and not private and there is not any ghostly entity. Again Wittgenstein's dictum that an inner process stands in need of outward criteria could be taken as the guiding principle of Ryle's attack upon 'the ghost in the machine'.

CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I shall try to see how far Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind is teneable to us by making a critical exposition on some of the most important mental concepts.

We see that Ryle's philosophy of mind is anti-cartesian and anti-dualistic. It leaves no room for inherent privacy in the life of an individual. But it can be said that there are some statements in his book to support the inner life theory. We may take an example in support of our contention. Ryle says :

"Much of our ordinary thinking is conducted in internal monologue or silent soliloquy, usually accompanied by an internal cinematograph-show of visual imagery".¹⁵⁵

In this statement Ryle accepts that there are silent thoughts and imaginings which support inner life. Ryle accepts that if the agent is unwilling to reveal them they may not be known. Now the point is - are not these confessions sufficient to establish that Ryle is also subscribing to the view of dualism, knowingly or unknowingly? Some of the statements of Ryle speak of his acceptance of silent deliberation and calculation, silent imagining and recollecting in one's head. Thus we may ask : when Ryle accepts such silent deliberations, is he not talking of mind which he obhors? such statement of Ryle's philosophy of mind is inconsistent and paves the way for the revival of dualism. Thus while remarking on dualism, Prof.

A.C. Ewing writes,

155. Ibid, P.-28

"That Ryle is trying the tactics of the woman who excused herself for an illegitimate baby by saying that it was a very little one."¹⁵⁶

There are also criticisms against Ryle's somewhat inappropriate use of the concept of 'category'. With regard to his thesis that the ghost is born of the illegitimate mingling up of the different categories, we may point out that Ryle does not give us any criterion to distinguish such categories. The rejection of the ghost on the basis of category mistake should have been preceded by a precise definition of category. One ought to be equipped with an adequate criterion to determine the category difference. Ryle uses expressions like the 'same category' and 'different category' without being at all prepared to say which category or categories are in question. In his "Dilemmas", Ryle has admitted that the word category is used not in its usual, professional sense, but in its amateurish, inexact sense. Thus G. J. Warnock has rightly objected:

"If one is not prepared, and indeed is deliberately unwilling, to say just what a category is, and what categories there are, can one really be entitled to employ the term 'category'?"¹⁵⁷

Ryle rejects the Cartesian dualism on the ground that it commits category mistake. As against Descartes, Ryle holds that although body has extension and it is a physical entity, mind is not an entity but it is simply a disposition of a person. Therefore, when we make a conjunctive statement like - There exists body and

156. Ewing, A.C. : "Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism, Reprinted in Clarity Is Not Enough, P.- 338

157. Warnock, G.J. English Philosophy Since 1900, P. 96

there exists mind, according to Ryle by this conjunctive statement we make a mistake by putting 'mind' in the same category with the 'body'. For Ryle statements about body are statements about an entity called body but statements about mind are definitely not statements about an entity called mind, because mind is not an entity. When two things belong to the same category it is possible to make conjunctive or disjunctive statements out of them. Therefore, for Ryle by the conjunctive statement "there exists body and there exists mind" we are placing both of them in the same category and thereby commit a mistake. However, though Ryle has talked about category mistake, he was not at all interested to define a "category."

Moreover, as against Ryle one can always ask a question - Did Descartes really commit a category mistake? Descartes' theory of mind is an ontological theory. He is concerned with the actual existence of mind. Whereas Ryle being an ordinary language philosopher, was interested in the logic of ordinary language. Therefore, one can always raise a question like - how far Ryle is justified in attacking Descartes' ontological or metaphysical theory of mind from quite different standpoint?

Karl Popper, the Austrian philosopher in his book "Conjectures and Refutations" disagrees with Ryle's view against Descartes. Popper tried to show that the theory of category-mistakes is untenable. According to him, ordinary English very often treats mental states and physical states on a par with each other, not only where it speaks of a 'mental disease' of a 'hospital for the mentally sick' of a man who is both physically and mentally well balanced' etc. These cases might

be dismissed as driving from a philosophical dualism. But Popper says, "Thinking of sheep always helps me to fall asleep' or 'Reading Mr. Smith's novels always helps me to fall asleep.' There are countless similar examples. They certainly do not establish that ordinary English words describing mental states and physical states always belong to the same 'Category.' "158

Thus in many places Popper criticises Ryle's concept of category mistake. Popper says that the example of the colleges and the university is precisely analogous ; the foreigner who wants to see the university asks, of course, for a university building and this building would be of the same category as the college buildings. Is it not therefore a category mistake to suggest that he has made a category mistake?

According to Ryle, psychology deals with mental incompetences and proves into man's unconscious in order to find out the hidden cause. But here we may ask: Is not Ryle equating psychology with psycho-analysis? Now-a-days the two cannot be so easily equated because psycho-analysis differentiates itself from psychology and claims to be an independent science. Psycho-analysis as we know concentrates more on the sub-conscious than on the conscious.

Again, Ryle has attacked 'mind as a cause' theory. Following Wittgenstein's dictum that philosophy can only describe linguistic usage, he has felt satisfied with descriptions alone. But descriptions cannot be a substitute for cause. Description and explanation are two different things concerning an event and both have their

158. Popper, Karl : Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. P-408

own functions. The Cartesian theory of mind cannot therefore be thrown completely.

When we try to understand the nature of mind in Ryle's sense, that if the mind is explained as a disposition or a complex of dispositions it cannot be explained as occurrent at the same time without involving the type-confusion. Because in that case again we shall be committing the category mistake of attributing two different categories or logical types in explaining the mind or the mental. If one commits a category mistake in the way described by Ryle, it is clear that some mental concepts are fundamentally dispositional while others are fundamentally occurrent i.e. a concept while being dispositional cannot be occurrent at the same time. The concepts of heeding, concentrating, thinking one's thought are partly episodic and partly dispositional which is described by Ryle as 'mongrel categoricals' or 'seme-hypotheticals'. Does it mean that he committed the same category mistake in another form against which he himself has raised objections? Or did he mean to say that dispositions after all belong to the same category or logical type as occurrences.

According to Ryle, mind is inherently open or public. It is only by training or 'special artifice' that we keep it secret. Ryle seems to admit that unless mind is basically public, we cannot know about the mental qualities of others. But the critic may argue that unless mind is private, how is that we are deprived of sharing one another's experience? Whatever kind of privacy Ryle ascribes to mental phenomena, he does not seem to be consistent about it. Ryle thinks that mental privacy is analogous to the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key. A natural

corollary of this comparison is that mental privacy is a matter of physical or physiological accident. But there are also lines in Ryle's book which state that mental privacy is only a verbal matter.

Mind - body dualism reflects itself in the speech habit of the people. When we speak of 'mental disease' or of a 'hospital meant for mentally sick', or of a man who is both 'physically healthy and mentally healthy', we are certainly contrasting mind from body. It is difficult to overcome the psychic phenomena of dreams, images, pleasure, unpleasure etc. from the mind. We have seen how Ryle has almost avoided discussing dreams. we donot know how to disbelieve the inherent privacy of dream experiences. We donot also know how Ryle's one-world theory is competent to account for the fantasy worlds that dreams create. Dreams arenot public events Of course, when we communicate or make statements about them, they are, in that way, made public. But to say that dreams are made public isnot to say that dream are dreamt publicly .

According to Ryle pleasure and pain arenot anything beyond physical behaviour. Enjoying digging isnot digging plus enoying. Certain ways of digging are themselves enjoying. Similarly, pain is some such visible behaviour as groaning, screaming, shouting and the rest. But here also Ryle's conception of pleasure and pain is in conflict. Pleasure and pain cannot be understood in terms of physical categories alone as Ryle says. We must distinguish physical pains and the pains of the heart. For example, the pains of tooth-ache arenot of the same kind as the pains of disappointment.

Ryle has attempted to dispense with the ghost. This has clearly led to the revival of behaviourism in a new form. The one general remark made against *The Concept of Mind* is that it is a book on behaviourism or even a thinly disguised form of Materialism. C.A. Campbell, referring to the last section of the book remarked that "The Concept of Mind" is, at bottom, a thinly disguised form of materialism comes out most clearly in the final chapter, where Ryle devotes a short section to the relation of his view to behaviourism. It is surely materialism, though not mechanistic materialism. As Ryle himself has observed, it may be said to be 'Polymorphic Materialism'. Polymorphic materialism would still be materialism having varied characteristics or manifestations.

However, Ryle's behaviourism is not naive or psychological behaviourism. It is logical or analytical. By logically analysing the meaning of mind-involving sentences, he comes to maintain that mind is only a manner or a style or way of behaviour. Ryle's analytical behaviourism is based on the consideration of linguistic data.

But Ryle's behaviourism, though dressed in logical role, lacks the charm of appeal. This is primarily so because he has failed to distinguish the essence of mental qualities from those that are only their evidences. Behaviours are the criteria or the evidences that enable one to determine mental qualities in others.

Ryle agrees and equates mind with behaviour, a doubt arises whether he is not also guided by the problem of other minds than by the problem of mind as such. This doubt is strengthened if we look into the beginning of his introduction to

"The Concept of Mind". Here he explicitly seems to be concerned about other minds. Ryle observes.

"Teachers and examiners, magistrates and critics, historians and novelists, confessors and non commissioned officers, employers, employer and partners, parents, lovers, friends and enemies all know well enough how to settle their daily questions about the qualities of character and intellect of the individual with whom they have to do."

Thus critics point out that Ryle is only concerned with the problem of other minds, not with the philosophy of mind.

Ryle's behaviourism makes him look like a materialist, though Ryle declares that both Idealism and Materialism are answers to an improper question. Still, Ryle's emphasis on bodily behaviour as not merely manifesting but being the working of mind together with his attempt to dispense with all specifically mental happenings can be taken a materialist view. G.J. Warnock very aptly sums up his theory when he says:

"This is the thesis that there really exist only bodies and other physical objects, that there really occur only physical events or processes, and all statements ostensibly referring to minds are really categorical statements about current bodily behaviour, or more commonly hypothetical statements about predicated bodily behaviour; that hence there is really no such thing as private, inner life at all, and that in principle everything about every individual could be known by sufficiently protracted observation of his bodily doings."¹⁵⁹

159. Warnock, G.J. *English Philosophy Since 1900*-PP.- 100-101

Thus when Ryle reduces mind ultimately by bodily behaviour, it is manifesting an absorption of mind by matter and there we find materialism. Of course, his materialism is not mechanistic. But Ryle's attempt to get rid of 'the ghost in the machine' paves the way to a mechanistic theory of nature.

Ryle seems to hold that while his analysis would clarify the mental concepts of their metaphysical lumbars, it will not increase man's knowledge of human mind and its various functions. Man will continue to know what he knows as well as is capable of knowing through his everyday experience in life. He will give a more consistent account in the sense that what he understands by the epithet 'mind' is not radically different from what he experiences about it in behaviour both in himself and in others. If Ryle were to aim at analysing mental concepts in such a way as to render them more easily understandable by others, he would have maintained the moderate dualism in the two species of experience and contend that all mental epithets cannot be significantly explained in terms of physical behaviour.

Ryle in the form of linguistic analysis tries to emphasize a theory of mind which at many points seems to go quite against the ordinary view of the nature of mind. He resorts to ordinary language to show the philosopher's myth and yet propounds a theory which is as much opposed to traditional philosophy as it is to the view of the ordinary man.

Bertrand Russell while commenting on Ryle's *Concept of Mind* has criticised him for preferring 'the language of the uneducated people and condemning the

sophisticated language of the learned."¹⁶⁰

In this regard H.J. Paton remarks : "It is a mistake to suppose that any language, whether home baked or dehydrated, can be used as a standard to which philosophical thinking must conform."¹⁶¹

Frederick Copleston denies that there is anything as 'fixed ordinary language' and "if there were, it is not at all self - evident that it would constitute a court of appeal in philosophical disputes."¹⁶²

In his "Concept of Mind", Ryle advocates the dispositional theory of mind. The dispositional theory of mind doesnot deny the nature of mind, but denies the status given to it by the traditional philosophers. It doesnot say that there is no mind ; it only says that whatever one can say about mind or the mental one can legitimately say in terms of the actually observed and observable behaviour. Analytical behaviourism is an attempt to explain mind in terms of dispositions, where dispositions would mean to behave and to be capable of behaving in a particular way and not dispositions to reflect on one's behaviour. It means that while man would act he wouldnot reflect on his acts. And even if he reflects he can not know that he does so. For admitting self-reflection on some of our mental actions would mean admitting more than what could be permitted by Ryle's open hypothetical statement regarding behaviour. C.A. Mace points out that analytical behaviourism gives an extended meaning of the term 'behaviour' in such a way as to include mental epithets which otherwise would embarrass him. It seem that the

160. Russell, B : What is Mind, My philosophical Development, P.-250

161. Paton, H.J. : Fifty years of Contemporary British Philosophy.

162. Copleston, Frederick : Contemporary British Philosophy 1900, P. 14.

analytical behaviourist while maintaining the reality of mental experiences, denies the causal explanation accorded to them by Descartes' mind-body dualism.

Ryle's subsequent chapters seem to be concerned with a different kind of dualism, the dualism of two species of experience, the mental and the physical, which he thinks cannot be conjoined or disjoined together without involving logical absurdity in them. For example, Ryle's account of dualism as dealt with in the chapter on Descartes' Myth and as dealt with in subsequent chapters is concerned more with the fact that the individual engaged in a particular mental operation cannot be said to be aware simultaneously of his inner reflection on mental operation - a fact which does not seem to follow from the rejection of the dogma of the 'ghost-in-the machine.' In fact, to reflect upon our various mental operations we need not presuppose any Cartesian self-illuminating consciousness.

Our knowledge of ourselves is never identical with our knowledge of others. In some cases we depend upon others more to know our own states or processes than we depend upon our self - illuminating consciousness or introspection, just as other individuals depend upon us to know about themselves. But that dependence is not based on the fact that there is no difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, but because of the essentially mysterious nature of life itself we depend on more information from self observation as well as on observation by others to know what we are.

Ryle assuming a more reconciling position with regard to some difficult mental epithets, particularly the epithets of heeding, attending, concentrating or

thinking one's thought. The episodic concepts is prevalent in his chapters on Dispositions and Occurrences, Self-knowledge etc. Ryle's assertion that a mentalistic sentence instead of reporting some actual episodes of mind, reports an infinite series of possible behavioural episodes, has the effect of making simple things look rather complicated. In this regard Peter Geach comments, "It is really a scandal that people should count it a philosophical advance to adopt a programme of analysing ostensible categoricals into unfulfilled conditionals, like the programmes of the phenomenologists with regard to 'physical object' statements and of neo-behaviourists with regard to psychological statements".¹⁶³

Again Ryle conceives of 'many track' dispositional word. Such a word, according to him is 'highly generic' i.e. it serves as a genus having heterogeneous episodes as its species. But here an important question is raised against Ryle's conception. The question is, according to which principle can a series of episodes, being so heterogeneous in character can subsume under a common genus? According to which rule of construction can the diverse hypothetical propositions be grouped together? Such questions may disturb a reader's mind. In this connection Spilbury remarks:

"I donot understand Ryle's use of the term 'generic' in this context. In any ordinary use it would be absurd to say that hardness was a genus, of which properties of causing pain, resisting deformation, and giving out a sharp sound were species."¹⁶⁴

163. Geach, Peter - *Mental Acts*, P. 7

164. Spilbury, R.J. - *Dispositions and Phenomenalism*, *Mind*, July 1953. PP.- 342-43.

Against Ryle some philosophers have argued that dispositions on the one hand, and existing states on the other are not mutually exclusive alternatives. They argue that dispositions are necessarily connected to existing states. D.M. Armstrong¹⁶⁵ for example says that the assertion that x has such-and such a disposition actually entails either the proposition x has a certain structure, or the proposition that x is in a particular state. That some psychological concepts are dispositional is consequently not incompatible with the thesis that there are such things as mental states but rather constitutes a proof of this thesis. As Armstrong is a materialist, the mental state, for him, is a brain state.

Some physicalist philosophers argued that the states and structures of physical objects must be the ultimate realities of the universe. Dispositions and tendencies are derivative and non-ultimate and therefore cannot be fully true. The reason is that the existence of a disposition requires the prior existence of an underlying state of affairs. According to physicalism, the states which underlie the dispositions which Ryle identifies with thoughts, beliefs and so on are brain states. The beliefs themselves are simply states of the brain. Thus it does not follow that the state and structure is identical with the disposition.

In the chapter II of the "Concept of Mind" Ryle says.

"When we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects. We are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves."¹⁶⁶

165. Armstrong, D.M. : A Materialist Theory of Mind, 1968, P. 85

166. Ryle, G. - The Concept of Mind. P.- 26

That is psychological dispositions are dispositions to perform physical actions including utterances. If this were true it would, no doubt, remove the need to posit an incorporeal substance, the soul. But surely Ryle exaggerates here. The possibility of future physical acts and utterances does not exhaust the content of dispositional mental notions. A disposition may be partly a disposition to think certain thoughts, feel certain emotions, have certain sensations. Its manifestations might themselves be hidden things about which only the subject can tell us. An anti-Rylean dualist might say in favour of the soul, conceived as an immaterial and separate substance. He could argue that at least some tendencies and capacities belong to the incorporeal substance just as certain acts and states are its acts and states. A dispositional account of the mind is not incompatible with dualism unless it can be shown of each and every psychological disposition that it is ultimately to be fully cashed in physical terms.

Further to say that dispositions are not actual is to say that there is no actual difference between person and person. It is only to say that a difference would arise when they would act in their own ways. But to say so is to say something very unusual. Ryle believes that if we want to distinguish a soluble thing from an insoluble one, we can do so not by virtue of a property or character, present in the one and absent in the other. We can do so only with the help of certain hypotheticals. But Ryle's conception of hypotheticals in this regard is somewhat unusual. The denial of the actuality of dispositions also appears to be incompatible with the learning of skills. We know that skills are learnt gradually by practice. But unless

every practice leaves some thing positive to be carried forward in the next, how can we improve and acquire skills?

Again, the rejection of dispositions as something actual leads to queer consequences. It has led Ryle to believe that vain behaviour is not due to an element of vanity present in the agent. It is due to some such thing as meeting the stranger. Thus Ryle's account of dispositions in a way relieves us of our responsibility for our own actions. But this is not the appropriate method.

It also becomes difficult to believe with Ryle that a disposition is not existing drive or force. Aaron, while explaining the nature of dispositions observes that a disposition does not signify only a regular behaviour - sequence. Aaron says,

"When ordinary men and some scientists and philosophers speak of dispositions they clearly mean more ; rightly or wrongly they mean drives, forces or powers."¹⁶⁷

It is, therefore debatable if a dispositional statement is not categorical in significance, but hypothetical statements. Of course, the categorical statement is generally made when the hypothetical statements are found to be true. If a sugar-like thing does not dissolve in water, we cannot ordinarily say that it has solubility as its quality. But that is only to make the truth of the categorical statement depend on the truth of hypothetical statements. That is not to deny the categorical significance altogether. Therefore dispositional concepts are not unsuggestive of inner or hidden qualities. Even when mental concepts stand for dispositions, our

167. Aaron : Dispositions, The Theory of Universals, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1969, P.174.

inner life is not to be denied.

Though dispositions may seem to be a good substitute for mind, it is necessary for Ryle to distinguish between human and non-human dispositions. Merely to say that mind is a disposition to behave in certain ways will not do. Inanimate objects have their dispositions to behave in their own ways. What is it, then, which makes us classify some dispositions as physical and others as mental? Ryle does not provide a suitable answer to this question. Nor does he seem to think it necessary to explain the criteria that will distinguish the two sorts of dispositions. In this regard Bertrand Russell remarks:

"A plain man would say that 'brittle' denotes a disposition of bodies and 'intelligent' denotes a disposition of minds - in fact, that the two adjectives apply to different kinds of 'stuff'. But it is not open to professor Ryle to say this, and I do not quite know what he would say."¹⁶⁸

Of the dispositions 'know' and 'belief', one refers to capacity and the other to tendency. 'To know' means to be able to get things right; 'to believe' means to tend to act or react in certain ways. So, neither the capacity verb 'know', nor the tendency verb 'believe' refers, according to Ryle to any acts or processes conducted on the private stage of mind. These verbs, Ryle believes, cannot report secret acts or processes because there are no such acts or processes. His main objection against cognitive acts is that certain questions which ought to be answered about them, because they are acts, cannot be answered. Nobody can answer such

168. Russell, B.: *My Philosophical Development*, 1959, P. - 247.

questions as : How many cognitive acts did he perform before breakfast, and what did it feel like to do them ? Did he enjoy his passage from his premises to his conclusion, and did he make it continuously or recklessly ? Did the breakfast make him stop short halfway between his premises and his conclusion ? Is conceiving a quick or a gradual process, an easy or difficult one?

Now we can say that the answers of these questions cannot be easily given not because there are no cognitive acts but because the question themselves are more or less illegitimate. Such questions can be validly asked about physical or bodily acts. But if someone makes their answer a condition for the acceptance of cognitive acts, we may say that we can answer some of them. We do enjoy drawing certain conclusions. We do at times infer continuously or recklessly. Conceiving is sometimes quick, sometimes gradual, sometime easy and sometimes difficult. We generally speak of something (say the breakfast bell) interrupting our thought etc. So, we cannot reasonably deny cognitive acts. Thus mind also cannot be easily replaced by dispositions or semi-dispositions. In this regard Huge R. King remarks:

"We cannot reduce 'my mind to simply 'my ability or pronenes to do certain sorts of things'. Indeed, ability and proneness may be just those dispositions which allow me to do a thing unconsciously and without heed, to dismiss my 'mind.'"¹⁶⁹

It can be said that for his own purpose Ryle has sought to replace consciousness by disposition. The effect of such a replacement has been to present

169. King, Huge R. : Prof. Ryle and the Concept of Mind', Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XLVII, P.-298

an altogether new picture of man. Man is now a typically behaving body. Though unconscious, he is thought to do everything that is called intelligent. One may wonder whether Ryle himself believes that he is unconscious. As a matter of fact, man's conscious nature is so dear to him that he may feel completely shocked and disappointed to hear that he is in fact unconscious. As D.S. Miller puts it :

"It you learned today that your own life from tomorrow morning on would be to this sort, the life of a perfectly behaving body but a perfectly unconscious one, you would suddenly cease to be concerned about it, you would not in the least cling to life on these terms. Why? Because you cannot for a moment identify yourself with a body without consciousness."¹⁷⁰

Ryle has also denied introspection almost on the same lines on which he has denied consciousness. We have seen how unsatisfactory his denial of consciousness is. If introspection be the mental act of scrutinizing the private experiences of one's own, it would mean that we can attend to two things at once.

But can one attend to the act and the object of scrutiny simultaneously? Ryle's attempt to deny both consciousness and introspection, is therefore, debatable. Ryle substitutes mind by person and believes that a person is not the combination of mind and body. According to Ryle, the conjunctive phrase 'mind and body' is as ridiculous as the conjunction 'in tears and sedan-chair.' To say that 'a man is mind and body' is as absurd as to say 'She came home in tears and sedan-chair'. we can say that Ryle's substitution of mind by person really takes us

170. Miller, D.S., "Descartes' Myth and Prof. Ryle's Fallacy" *Journal of Philosophy* Vol. XL, April 26, 1951, P-272.

nowhere. We may ask, What does Ryle mean by 'person'? 'Person' is an ambiguous term. So, unless Ryle defines his concept of person and explains how it can take the place of mind, a mere verbal substitution is not enough. Moreover, Ryle has frequently identified the Cartesian mind with behaviour of certain sorts. In view of this it is difficult to decide what he actually wants to say whether mind is the behaviour of certain sorts or person is the behaviour of certain sorts. We may also ask - Is the conjunction 'mind and body' as ridiculous as the conjunction 'in tears and sedan chair'? It is the unusual nature of objection to the expression 'mind and body' that leads Frank Sibley to comment:

"To say that the phrase 'Mind and matter is to be avoided seem to be pushing the objection too far."¹⁷¹

Further, Ryle's version that the question of relation between mind and body is as non-sense as the question of relation between university and its Registrar's office on the other. But doctors talk of mind affecting the body or body affecting the mind. A doctor conveys a significant information when he says, 'A fracture in the skull bone has affected the patient's mind' or 'The cause of his disease is mental rather than physical'. Does such of kind observation of the doctor not imply some kind of mind-body interaction?

Moreover, Ryle's idea is that the mental is private in the same way in which the entries of a diary kept under lock and key are private. Ryle asserts, "I cannot overhear your silent colloquies with yourself, nor can I read your diary, if you write

171. Sibley, Frank : 'A Theory of Mind' Review of Metaphysics, December, 1950. P.-268.

it in cipher, or keep it under lock and key."¹⁷² This observation of Ryle makes it clear that the mental is private not in the sense of its being absolutely private. It is private only in the sense that it is restricted to one and could be made public - not that it is necessarily confined to one and cannot be made public. Thus Ryle believes that the mental is not made or meant to be private. One only manages to keep it private. The mind is open or public in principle, though one can maintain its secrecy if he prefers to do that. But now a question may arise whether the mental privacy can at all be likened with the privacy of a diary kept under lock and key? It is not impossible to break open the lock and go through the contents of one's diary. But is it in any way possible to enter into another's mind to get a first hand report of its deliberations?

One of the basic confusions that Ryle has made in the "Concept of Mind" is between mental qualities and their tests. It is his failure to distinguish between the essence and the evidence of mental qualities, between the meaning of a statement and the method of its verification, that has led him to say that mind is just a summary of the different behaviours peculiar to human being. Again, Ryle's writings give the impression that he has not decided whether mental concepts stand for some behaviour or they are only tested by some behaviour. Critics have invariably found this fault with his theory of mind. Hampshire in his review of *The Concept of Mind* remarks: "Professor Ryle is not really arguing that all or not statements, involving mental concepts are (or are expressible as) hypothetical statements about overt

172. Ryle, G- *The Concept of Mind*, P. - 184.

behaviour, but (and it is very different) that to give reasons for accepting or rejecting such statements must always involve making some hypothetical statement about overt behaviour."¹⁷³ Of course, Ryle comments that it is not in his scheme of things to distinguish between the meaning of mental concept and the method on its verification. On the other hand, it is his theory to identify the two.

However, though Ryle's dispositional analysis of mind underwent severe criticism from different quarters, yet his presentation of dispositional analysis of almost all concepts (minus some occurrences) made him one of the most prominent of those analysts who regarded the use of ordinary language as a philosophical tool. While criticising Cartesian dualism Ryle, contends that intelligent behaviour is a matter of knowing how to do something and once this fact is acknowledge, there is no temptation to explain the behaviour by looking for a private internal knowledge of facts. H.D. Lewis observes "When I write these words there seems to be clearly more going on at the time, than the movement of my fingers and pencils. In my actual writing more is involved than the physical movement and this 'more' is not merely of a dispositional kind. It is a part of what goes on as I have put it. It is my sustained understanding of what I am doing and my continuous proposing to do it. This can not be dissolved into dispositional attitudes".¹⁷⁴

Thus a study of Ryle shows that he has taken help of extra-linguistic consideration in order to uphold his theory of mind. But the way in which Ryle has taken help of logic, language and fact, he has not succeeded in eliminating the

173. Mind, April, 1950, P. - 245.

174. Lewis, H.D. : The Elusive Mind P- 51

bugaboo of the ghost in the machine. A rumour about the ghost is still left in the air of Ryle's anti-ghost philosophy of mind and this gives strength to much-maligned Cartesianism. Cartesian dualism still seems to serve at least as a good hypothesis.

-0-0-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamson, R. : 'The Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I & II,
London, William Blackwood & Sons, 1903.
- Ameriks, Karl : Kant's Theory of Mind. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.
- Ammerman, R.R. : Classics of Analytic Philosophy. Tata Mc. Graw-Hill
Publishing Co. Ltd. New Delhi.
- Anscombe, G. E.M. : Philosophical Investigation, Oxford, 1953.
(Trans.)
- Armstrong, D.M. : A Materialist Theory of the Mind. Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1968.
- Armstrong, A.H. : An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy. University Paper
backs, Methuen & Company Ltd., London, Reprint 1968.
- Ayer, A.J. : The Problem of Knowledge, Penguin Books (London)
1982.
- Ayer, A.J. : Wittgenstein, Weiden field and Nicolson, London 1985.
- Ayer, A.J. : Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books (London)
(Reprinted in 1983)
- Aune, B. : Knowledge, Mind and Nature, Kalifornia, 1967.
- Baier : Postures of the Mind, Essays on Mind and Morals
Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1985.
- Bali, D.R. : Introduction to Philosophy, Sterling Publishers Private
Ltd., New Delhi, 1989.
- Balz, Albert G.A. : Cartesian Studies, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1951.
- Balz, Albert G.A. : Descartes and Modern Mind. New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1952.
- Barlinggay, S.S. : A Critical Survey of Western Philosophy, Macmillan India
Ltd. 1980.
- Barnes, J. : An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis ; Allied publishers
Pvt. Ltd. Bombay 1971.
- Beck, L.J. : The Method of Descartes, Oxford, 1952.
- Beck, L.J. : Metaphysics of Descartes ; A Study of the Meditation Oxford,

- Clarendon Press, 1965.
- Besant : A Study in Consciousness. The Theosophical Publishing House. Adyar, 1938.
- Bhatia, H.R. : General Psychology. Oxford & I.B.H. Publishing Company, New Delhi, Reprint 1971.
- Bhattacharyya, H.M. : The Principles of Philosophy, Calcutta, 1969.
- Bhattacharya, S. : Doubt, Believe and Knowledge, New Delhi ICPR & Allied Publisher, 1987.
- Borst, C.V.(ed) : The Mind Brain Identify Theory (A Collection of Papers) Macmillan and Co.Ltd. Little Essex Street 1970 ; London ; Wez.
- Bricke, John : Hume's Philosophy of Mind. Edinburgh at the University Press, 1980.
- Broad, C.D. : The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London 1962.
- Brown, W. : Mind, Medicine and Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, London, 1938.
- Budd, Malcolm : Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge, 1989.
- Butler, R.J. (ed) : Cartesian Studies, New York, Barnes & Noble 1972.
- Calhoun C. & : What is an Emotion-Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology, Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Chakraborti, S. : An Introduction to Philosophy, 1979 J.N. Ghose & Sons, Calcutta.
- Chakravarty, D.K. : Fundamental Question of Epistemology and Metaphysics, Manthan Prakash, Guwahati.
- Chennakesavan, S. : Concept of Mind in Indian Philosophy, Matilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Delhi 1991.
- Chauhan, S.S. : Advanced Educational Psychology, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. 576, Masjid Road, Jangpura, New Delhi 1978.
- Chapell, V. (ed) : Rene Descartes' (Collection of Essays) Hamden CT Garland Publishing, INC, 1995.
- Chalmers, D. J. : The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press New York, Oxford 1996, 1997.
- Church, R.W. : Hume's Theory of the Uderstanding. London, George Allen

- and Unwin, 1935, Reprint 1968.
- Collins, J.D. : Descartes Philosophy of Nature, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1971.
- Copleston, S.J.F. : A History of Philosophy. The Image Edition, Vol. I, II, III, in one book 1985.
- Confield, J.V (ed) : The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, vol. 12, Garland publishing, 1986, London.
- Corbalhis : The Descent of Mind, Oxford University Press.
- Cunningham, G.V. : Problems of Philosophy, Calcutta, 1956.
- Curley, E.M. : Descartes Against Skeptics. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 1978.
- Danto, A.C. : What Philosophy Is. New York, Harper and Row, 1968.
- Dennett, D.C. : Content and Consciousness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, New York, 1969.
- Descartes, Rene : Meditation and other Metaphysical Writings, Penguin Books.
- Descartes Rene : Discourse on Method, Earlyman, 1912, Dulton, New York.
- Doney, W (ed) : A Collection of Critical Essays of Descartes, Macmillan, London 1967. (Reprinted in 1970)
- Dutta, S.C. : "Psychology" Bharati Printing works, Calcutta, 1923.
- Dunlop Francis : The Education of Feeling & Emotion. George Allen and Unwin 1984.
- Dutta, D.M. : Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy, University of Calcutta, 1970.
- Dwivedi, D.M. : A Study of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Alahabad, 1977.
- Eaton, R.M(ed) : Descartes Selection. New York, 1927.
- Evans, C.O. : The Subject of Consciousness, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. London, New York, 1970.
- Ewing, A.C. : The Fundamental Questions of Philosophy. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1951.
- Ewing, A.C. : "Are the Mental the Attributes of the Body" Article. PAS, 1944-46.
- Ewing, A.C. : "Prof. Ryle's Attack on Dualism", Article PAS, 1952.
- Falckenberg, R. : "History of Modern Philosophy", Progressive Publishers,

- Calcutta, 1962.
- Feldman, F. : A Cartesian Introduction to Philosophy, New York, M.C. Graw Hill, 1986.
- Fink, E. : Sixth Cartesian Meditation (Trans. by Ronald Bruzina) Bloomington, Indianapolis University Press, 1994.
- Flistad, G. : Mind and Body in Spinoza's Ethics, Synthese Vol. 37, 1978.
- Flew, A. : An Introduction to Western Philosophy. The Bobbes-Merrill Company New York, First Edition, 1971.
- Fox, C. : The Mind and its Body, London, 1931.
- Frawley, David : Beyond the Mind, Sri Satguru Publications, India, 1984.
- Gibson, A.B. : The Philosophy of Descartes, London, Methuen and co.- Ltd. 1932.
- Glover, Jonathan : The Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, Walton Street, 1976.
- Greenspan Patricia S. : Emotions & Reasons, Routledge 1988.
- Grayling, A.C. : 'Wittgenstein', Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Grosholz, E. : Cartesian Method & the Problem of Reduction, Oxford, 1991.
- Gregory, Richard L. : The Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press.
- Gupta, S. : A Critique of Wittgenstein, Intellectual Publishing house 23 Darganj ; Ansari Road, New Delhi.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. : The Greek Philosophers - From Thales to Aristotile, London, Methuen, 1950, Reprint, 1956.
- Gustafson, D. : Essays in Philosophical Psychology, Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Company, 1964.
- Gustafson D.F. : Body, Mind and Method, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979. & Tapscott B. L.
- Hamlyn, D.W. : Sensation and Perception, Rountledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.
- Haldane, E.S. & : The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Cambridge , Vol. I & II, 1967
- Ross, G.R.T. (Trans) : Substance, Body & Soul (Aristotelian Investigation)
- Hartman, E. : Princeton University Press 1977.

- Hassija, B.K. : "Do You Know Your Real Self", Brahma Kumaris world Spiritual University. Mount Abu, India, Om Shanti Press 1995.
- Harris, E.E. : Nature, Mind and Modern Science, London 1954.
- Heil, John : Philosophy of Mind. A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge, London, New York.
- Heil, John : The Nature of True Mind, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hill, Charistopher. S : Sensations, A Defence of Type Materialism, Combridge University Press, 1991.
- Hosper, J. : An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Allied Publishing, Bombay, 1977.
- Hoffding, H. : History of Modern Philosophy. Translation B.E. Dover Publication, New York 1955.
- Hobbes, Thomas : Leviathan, Body, Man and Citizen, a Selection of Hobbe's Writings, edited by Richard S. Peters, New York, 1962.
- Hudson, W.D. (ed) : Wittgenstein and Religious belief. The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1975, London.
- Hutchings, R. M.(ed) : Great Books of the Western World Vol. 31 (Descartes & Spinoza) William Benton, Publisher, Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- Jackendoff, Ray : Consciousness and the Computational Mind 1987.
- James, W. : Principles of Psychology, Vol.-I & II, New York, Henry Hott and Co.1890, Dover Publicaton-1950.
- Jha, Ganga Datta : A Study of Ryle's Theory of Mind, Expository and Critical, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, May 1967.
- Joachim, Harold H. : 'Descartes' Rules for Direction of the Mind. London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1957.
- Kenny, Anthony : Action, Emotion and Will, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.
- Keeling, S.V. : 'Descartes' Second Edition, Oxford University Press 1968.
- Kim, Jaegwon : Philosophy of Mind, West-view Press, 1996.
- Klausmeir, H.J. : Learning and Abilities, Education Psychology, (3rd Ed.) New York 1971 & Ripple Richard, E.

- Lewes, G.H. : The Physical Basis of Mind (London, 1877).
- Lewis, H.D. : The Elusive Mind, London, 1969.
- Leibniz, G.H. : Discourse on Metaphysics, Translated by P.G. Lucas and L. Grint, (Manchester, 1953).
- Lowe : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge Publisher.
- Locke, John : An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London 1690, Book II, Chapters - 21, 23, Sec.28.
- Lyons, William : Emotion, Gregg Revivals, Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Maslin K.T. : An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Polity Press, 2001.
- Masih, Y. : A Critical History of Western Philosophy Motilal Banarsidass. New Delhi, Fifth-Revised & Enlarged Edition 1994.
- Mathur, S.S. : Educational Psychology. Vinod Pustak Mandir Agra-2, Reprint-1990.
- Malcolm, N. : Problems of Mind. Descartes to Wittgenstein, New York, 1971.
- MC Ginn, Colin. : The Character of Mind, Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Mc. Daugall, W. : Body and Mind, History and Defence of Animism. London 1911.
- Mc Ghee : Transformations of Mind, Cambridge Publisher.
- Moyal, Georges : 'Rene Descartes' Critical Assessments, (in Four vols.) New York, I.D. (ed) Routledge, 1991
- Moss, Edward : The Grammar of Consciousness, An Exploration of Tacit Knowing. St. Martin's Press.
- Namboodiri V.M.D. : Perspectives on Mind, Gyan Publishing House, 2001.
- Neel, A. : 'Theories of Psychology' A Handbook Schenkma Publishing Company John Wiley & Sons New York, London.
- Needham, P. : Descartes, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Stockholm, 1981.
- O'Hear, Anthony : Minds and Persons, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press.
- Ornstein, Jack H. : The Mind and the Brain, A Multi-Aspect Interpretation,

- Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972.
- Panda, N.C. : Mind and Supermind, Vol. II, D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd. 1929.
- Passmore J. : A Hundred Years of Philosophy, C. Nicholls & Company Ltd. Great Britain, 1957.
- Patrick, G.I.W. : Introduction to Philosophy, Surajeet Publications, 1978, 7-K. Kolhapeer Road, Kamal Nagar, New Delhi.
- Pears, David : Wittgenstein, Frontana Press, 1971.
- Pitcher, G. : The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Prentice Hall of India, New Delhi, 1972.
- Pojman Louis P. : Classics of Philosophy. The Arch of Constantine, Rome, 1835.
- Popper, Karl : Conjectures and Refutations, The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, Routledge Classics, London & New York, 1963, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1989.
- Reid, Thomas : Active Powers of the Human Mind. The M.I.T. Press, 1969.
- Reith, Herman R. : 'Rene Descartes' - The Story of a Soul, Lanham University Press of America- 1986.
- Roy, Archana : A Short Commentary on The Concept of Mind, Naya Prokash, 206 Bidhan Sarani, Calcutta - 6, 1973.
- Roy, Sumita : Consciousness and Creativity, Sterling publishers Private Ltd., 1991.
- Ross, W.D. : 'The Works of Aristotle' Vol. I, Translated into English Oxford (edited) University Press, 1952.
- Roth, L. : Descartes' Discourse on Method, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1937.
- Robinson, Daniel : 'The Mind' Oxford, New York Clarendon Press, 1937.
- Rubinstein, David : Marx and Wittgenstein, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1981.
- Russell, Bertrand : History of Western Philosophy, Routledge, London, 1999.
- Russell, Bertrand : The Analysis of Mind, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. The Macmillan Co. 1956.
- Ryle, Gilbert : The Concept of Mind, Penguin Books, London, New York, 1949.
- Ryle, Gilbert : Dilemmas, 1953, The Tamer Lectures, Cambridge University

- Press.
- Ryle, Gilbert : Introduction to D.F. Pears' edited *Revolution in Philosophy*, 1956.
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Sensation in H.D. Lewis' edited 'Contemporary British Philosophy' Third Series, 1957.
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'The Theory of Meaning in C.A. Mace' edited, 'British Philosophy in the Midcentury', 1957.
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Systematically Misleading Expression' PAS, Vol. 32 (1931-32).
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Categories', PAS, vol. 38 (1937-38)
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Pleasure', PAS, Supplementary Volume 28 (1954).
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Thinking and Language', PAS, Supp. Vol. 25 (1951)
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Ordinary Language', *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 62 (1953).
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Feelings', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. I. 1951.
- Ryle, Gilbert : 'Collected Papers', *Critical Essays*, Hutchinson of London.
- Ryle, Gilbert : Vol. II
- (i) Negation (1929) (ii) Are There Propositions (1933 a)
- (iii) Imaginary Objects (1933 b) (iv) About (v) Internal Relations.
- Ryle, Gilbert : *Plato's Progress* (1966) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Ryle, Gilbert : *Aspects of Mind* (1993) edited by R. Meyor.
- Sasaki, C. : 'Descartes Mathematical Thought', *Ann Arbor, Mich* 1989.
- Shear, Jonathan : *Explaining Consciousness - The Hard Problem*, The MIT Press by the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 1996.
- Shanmugam, : *The Concept of Mind* (A symposium) Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1972.T.E. (ed)
- Shaffer, J.A. : *Philosophy of Mind*, prentice - Hall of India Private Ltd. New Delhi-1997.
- Singh, Dr. Santokh : *Consciousness as Ultimate Principle*, Mushiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi, 1985.
- Sinari, Ramakant : *Concept of Man in Philosophy*, Indian Institute of Advanced

- Study Shimla in association with B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi.
- Sivananda, Swami : Mind-Its Mysteries and Control. The Divine life Society, V.P. Himalayas, India.
- Skinner, C.E. (ed) : Educational psychology, Fourth edition Prentice Hall of India Private Ltd. New Delhi.- 1970.
- Smith, N.K. : New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes. London, Macmillan, 1963.
- Spencer, W.W. : Our Knowledge of Other Minds, Yale - 1930.
- Stout G.F. : Mind and Matter, Cambridge University Press, 1931.
- Strawson, P.F. : Individuals Methuen, 1959.
- Sukla F.P. : The Nature of Mind, Jabalpur (M.P) 1966.
- Taylor, C. : Sources of the Self Cambridge, 1989.
- Taylor, R. : Metaphysics, Fourth edition, Prentice - Hall of India Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi. 1994.
- Teichman, Jenny : The Mind and the Soul, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.
- Teichman, Jenny : Philosophy and the Mind, Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Thilly, Frank : A History of Philosophy, Central Publishing House, Allahabad, 1993.
- Thomson, R. : The Psychology of Thinking (a readable summary account of experimental approach to thinking 1959.
- Vohra, Ashok : Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind, Croom Helm Ltd. 1986.
- Whiteley, C.H. : Mind in Action, An Essay in Philosophical Psychology. Oxford University press, 1973.
- Wittgenstein, L. : The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1958.
- Wittgenstein, L. : Philosophical Investigation, Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953.
- Wittgenstein, L. : Notes Books 1914-1916, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1961.
- Wittgenstein, L. : Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I and 2, (ed) G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. Von Wright, translated G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell.

- Williams, B. : Descartes, The Project of Pure Inquiry, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978.
- Windelband, W. : A History of Philosophy Vols. I and II T.H. Tufts (trans), New York, Harper & Row, 1958.
- Wisdom, J. : Problems of Mind and Matter, London, 1963.
- Woolhouse R.S. : Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz. The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics, New York Routledge, 1993.
- Woodworth, R.S. : Experimental Psychology, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. New Delhi 1971.
- Wright, George Henrik : Wittgenstein Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Dictionary and Encyclopaedia

- Cowie, A.P. (ed) : Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (Indian Edition), 1991, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Craig, Edward : Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8. Routledge.
- Edward, P. (ed) : The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, The Macmillan Company & Free press, New York, London, 1967.
- Goswami, S.C. (ed) : Asamiya paribhasa, Vol-I, Philosophy and Logic, 1971, Gauhati University Press, Guwahati-14.
- Frolov, I (ed) : Dictionary of Philosophy, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1967.
- K. Kanika : Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Philosophy, Lakshay Publication 2003.
- Mautner, Thomas (ed) : Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy Penguin Books, Ltd. 27 Wrights Lane, London W 8 5 T Z, England, 1996, 1997.
- Singha, S.C. (ed) : Dictionary of Philosophy. Anmol Publication, New Delhi.
- Vesey, G. & Foulkes, P : Collins Dictionary of Philosophy Harper Collians Publishers, P.O. Box, Glasgrow G 4-ONB.
- The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 28, 15th Edition 1991, by Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.

Journals

1. Asian Philosophy- An international Journal of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist, Parsian and Islamic Philosophical Traditions. Vol. 12, No. 2. July-2002.
2. Mind, A. Quarterly Review of Philosophy Vol. 104, No. 413. January 1995. Published for the Mind Association by Oxford University Press.
3. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. 102, No. 405, January 1993.
4. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy Vol. XC VIII, 1989.
5. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy Vol. 107, No. 425, Jan'1998.
6. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy Vol. 106, No. 421, Jan'1997.
7. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. XCVI, 1987.
8. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. 105, No. 417 Jan, 1996.
9. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. 112, No. 447, July 2003.
10. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. XCIX, 1990.
11. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. XCVII, 1988.
12. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XL, No.3.
13. Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXX No. 4, October 2003, Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona.
14. Teaching Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2002.
15. Indian Philosophy, For Indian Universities, Jnanada Prakashan, New Delhi, 2001.
16. Indian Philosophical Quarterly Vol. XXX, No. 3. July 2003. Journal of the Department of Philosophy University of Poona.
17. Philosophy : The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 296, April - 2001.
18. The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53. No. 213, October 2003. By Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, U.K. USA.
19. The Philosophical Review, July, 2001.
20. Philosophy : The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 298, Oct. 2001.
21. Philosophy : The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy. Vol. 79, No. - 308, April-2004, November - 2002.
22. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, November - 2002.
23. Mind, A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, Vol. XC IV-No. 373. January-1985.

24. International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XL, No.1, March-2000, For Dham University, New York.
25. Gauhati University Journal of Philosophy (G.U.J.P.) Vol. 4. March 1996.
26. 'Cagito Ergo Sum' edited by A.J. Ayer, in Analysis XIV 1953, PP-27-31.
27. 'Cagito Ergo Sum' by Hintikka J. as an Inference or Performance' in Philosophical Review, LXXII-1963.
28. 'Descartes' Proof That His Existence Is Thinking', The Philosophical Review, Vol 74, No.3, July 1965 PP 315-338.
29. 'Wittgensteinian Technique and the Cartesian Doubt' by Chandra, S. Philosophical Quarterly (Amalner : India) Vol-33, 1961, pp-181-189.
30. 'The Concept of Mind in Modern Indian Thought with special reference to Sri Aurobindo, Rabindranath Tagore, and K.C. Bhattacharya' by R. Ghosh Darshana International Vol. XXXVI April 1996, No. 3.
31. 'Do We Know Other Minds Mediatly or Immediately?' by J. Gregory, Mind Vol. 29, 1920.
32. 'On Wittgenstein's Way of Doing Philosophy' by N.N. Gupta, Darshana International, Vol. - XXXII, No.- 4, October 1992.
33. 'Descartes on Mind Body Interaction by D. Holbrook, Southwest Philosophical Studies.
34. Bradley and Wittgenstein on Language, Thought and Experience by I.P.Q. Vol. XXI, No.- I, January - 1994 by N. Malla.
35. 'Wittgenstein's Critique of Language Game'. A Loytardoan Diabetic by P.L. Sasidharan, I.P.Q. Vol. XXV, No.- 3 July 1998.
36. 'Religion, Ethics and Science'. A Dialogue between Wittgenstein and Gandhi' JIPR by A. Shah Vol. X, No. 2 January to April 1993.
37. 'Gilbert Ryle's Concept of Philosophy' by - G. Singha I.P.Q. Vol. XV, No.-2, April 1988.

-0-0-0- Dr. Mamane Kalita.