

TITLE OF THE THESIS

**INTRINSIC VALUES IN NATURE:
SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
BENGAL FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
PHILOSOPHY**

**BY
SASHI MOHAN DAS
OCTOBER, 2020**

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF

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CONTENTS

	PAGE NOS.
Plagiarism Certificate	i
Preface	ii-v
Acknowledgement	vi
Declaration	vii
Certificate by the Supervisor	viii
Synopsis	ix-xviii
Chapter-I	
1.1: What is Environmental Ethics	1-2
1.2: Value centric terminology	2-3
1.3: Aspects of ascribing intrinsic value in nature	3-4
1.4: Different approaches to assign value	4-6
1.5: Background of the study	6-11
1.6: Objectives and research gap	11-12
1.7: Methodology	12
1.8: First Assumption	13
1.9: Second Assumption	13
Chapter-II	
The Concept and Debates in Intrinsic Value	
2.1: Introduction	14
2.2: Plato, Aristotle and Kant	14-15
2.3: G. E. Moore on intrinsic value	15-20
2.4: Instrumental Value	20-21
2.5: Debates concerning Intrinsic Value in Normative Ethics	21-28
2.6: Debates concerning Intrinsic Value in Environmental Ethics and its implications	28-48
2.7: Conclusive remark	48-50

Chapter-III**Intrinsic Value in Nature: Debates and Dimensions**

3.1: Introduction	51
3.2: Debates on Intrinsic Value in Nature	52-54
3.2.1: Homes Rolston's approach	54-56
3.2.2: Edwin P. Pister's approach	56-57
3.2.3: Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor's approach	57-58
3.2.5: Peter Singer's approach	58-59
3.2.6: J. B. Callicott's approach	59-60
3.2.7: Arne Neass's approach	60-62
3.2.8: Robert Elliot's approach	62
3.2.9: Bryan Norton's approach	62-65
3.3: Criterion for Acknowledging Intrinsic Value in Nature	65-68
3.4: Dimensions of the Debates	69-70

Chapter-IV**Intrinsic Value in Nature: An Analysis from Indian Perspective**

4.1: Introduction	71-75
4.2: Distinctiveness of Value	75-76
4.3: Intrinsic Value as a Guide to Action towards Nature	76-78
4.4: Hindu Ethics, Intrinsic Value and Nature/Environment	78-86
4.5: Concept of intrinsic value from Indian perspective	86-91
4.6: Scriptural importance of Hindu Environmental Ethics	91-96
4.7: <i>Ahimsā</i> and Environmental Ethics	96-98
4.8: <i>Vedas</i> and <i>Upaniṣads</i> on environment	98-101
4.9: Nature in the <i>Brahmanas</i> and <i>Aranyakas</i>	101-102
4.10: The Concept of Nature in <i>Ramayana</i>	102-104
4.11: Conclusive Remarks	104-106

Chapter-V

Conclusion	107-120
-------------------	---------

Bibliography	121-131
---------------------	---------

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Preface

Preparing this thesis entitled **INTRINSIC VALUES IN NATURE: SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS** has made me realized that how far the discussion of ethical issues related to non-human species, and examines the discrepancy in applied ethics and between treatment of human life and treatment of all other life forms. In the process, this thesis offers both explanations and some critical observations of basic moral theories such as deontological and teleological ethics approaching environmental issues.

Long back, philosophers simply did not discuss our treatment on intrinsic value in nature. Actually, it was not widely considered to be a topic of anyone's interest at all till 1949 when Aldo Leopold entered in the field of environmental ethics with his *Sand County Almanac*. But the time has change today. Our earlier thinkers had been well aware of the need to justify the concept of intrinsic value. We have gone through Genesis and some well-known thinkers like G. E. Moore, Roderick M. Chisholm, Noah M. Lemos, Homes Rolston III, Arne Naess, Robert Elliot, J. B. Callicott, Edwin P. Pister, Albert Schweitzer, Paul Taylor, Peter Singer etc. Actually there are strong philosophical debates among many western philosophers about the moral status of nature/environment. Moore proposes a theory related to the concept of intrinsic value which is later examined and elaborated with specification its dimensions. Other thinkers offer discussions concerning anthropocentric/non-anthropocentric dichotomy related to the moral status of nature. There are also discussions whether intrinsic value is subjective or objective. In the domain of these theories, philosophers designed to maximize the satisfaction of preferences defending intrinsic value in nature and that perhaps aims at for a desired outcome that maximizes the preferences in the concerned area of discussion. Leopold, Naess, Rolston III and many other defend a theory of environmental ethics designed to ascribe intrinsic value in nature, based on the inherent worth of teleological entities.

In the chapter one that has been undertaken in the thesis, attempts will be made to give an overview of the statement of the problem, objectives of the research and the research gap that attracts the interest toward the debates and dimensions of intrinsic value in nature. This chapter investigates whether ascribing intrinsic value to nature is crucial to environmental ethics. Furthermore, a good regulatory regime- as found in some traditional normative theories- helps to augment to suffice a sound logical argument that produces a healthy and continued debate on intrinsic value in nature in research.

In chapter two attempts will be made to explore the very concept and warrant of intrinsic value right from Moorean trend to John O'Neill's implicit examination about the concept. However, the ideas inherited from these analyses offer a clear picture that in most of the ethical theories, even though they are different terminologically, seems to be agreed in one point and common to them to mean intrinsic value as *an end in itself*. In Moorean group, regarding the concept and warrant of intrinsic value, Noah M Lemos, Roderick M Chisholm, Franz Brentano, A. C. Wing have almost forwarded similar view. However John O'Neill has a different interpretation. There are also discussions about the counterpart of intrinsic value which is commonly understood as instrumental value- considered as a derivative value.

In chapter three we explore Contemporary environmental ethics begins with 'moral extensionism.' There are some debates in this regard. To what extent of the nature/environment, is to be accorded intrinsic value, and consequently, moral worth? What is the criterion of according moral value? Some like Peter Singer, favour sentience criterion, while conservationists speak of biospheric egalitarianism. The latter hold that trees and plants have non-felt goals of their own. Even in an eco-system, species are to be accorded moral value. Whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality. Can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance? The welfarists say, 'no'. Conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system. Some thinkers like Warwick Fox, do not find any necessary connection between value ascription and

conservation. They think deep self-realisation is needed. Some other thinks that only sentient beings have intrinsic value. Some feel that environmental values are not universal. They support relativist environmentalism. On the other hand third world environmentalism is different. As we have seen that philosophical discussion of moral status of nature has a long history. So, the discussion of moral status of nature and the normative elements of the human-animal relationship long existed in the margins of philosophy.

In chapter four we have examined the eco-aesthetic concern of ancient literature in Sanskrit. The pantheism of the Vedas reflects the intimate relation between men and deified natural forces. *Agni, Indra, Varuna* and other Vedic deities clearly shows that they are personified natural forces. They were most powerful. In the *Brahmanas* there is a desire to subjugate nature by magical powers. During this time the external nature were studied extensively and the ancient science like Ayurveda began to flourish. After the Vedic period the *yajna* cult became weak and the worship of personal Gods became popular. In *Valmiki's Ramayana* the description of nature is given importance. Nature is presented as a coherent and harmonious system of existence. *Ramayana* is always supplied with the energy of nature and Sita is the true daughter of nature. When compare to *Mahabharata*, *Ramayana* is friendlier towards forests. The two epics together draw an ecological map of India from Himalayas to Srilanka. Kalidasa has followed the style of Valmiki in describing nature and human life. We must note one clear difference between Hindu ethics and Environmentalism. Hindu ethics upholds the freedom from samsara but on the other hand environmentalism upholds the preservation of samsara. However Hindu ethics and Environmentalism do not neglect the need of universal harmony, which we can confirm from the above mentioned findings. Environmentalism once more disagrees with Hindu ethics in the self-realization methodology. In Hindu ethics, particularly in *Advaita*, self-realization stands for the negation of plurality between beings while environmentalism defines self-realization as realization of the non-difference of oneself and the processes of the natural world without sacrificing plurality.

Therefore, this thesis exposes the ongoing necessity for philosophical work in the field of ethics with regard to the treatment of living beings and the urgent need for an ethic that is less partial and more consistent for both human and nonhumans.

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Last but not certainly least; I would like to acknowledge the most important person in my life- my parents. My mother is a constant source of love, compassion and inspiration. I would be happier if my father could have seen this thesis when alive. My better half Indrani, has been a constant source of strength and always forwarded her helping hand in pursuing this research work. I would be failing in my duty if I do not thank my God.

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
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4.11: Conclusive Remarks	104-106

Chapter-V

Conclusion	107-120
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Bibliography	121-131
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DECLARATION

I declare that the thesis entitled “**INTRINSIC VALUES IN NATURE: SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS**” has been prepared by me under the guidance of Dr. Laxmikanta Padhi, Head and Associate Professor in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal. No part of this thesis has formed the basis or the award of any degree or fellowship previously.

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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that the Doctoral thesis entitled **INTRINSIC VALUES IN NATURE: SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS** prepared by Sashi Mohan Das, Ph.D. Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal is the result of his academic work. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is not submitted for the award of any degree of this University or any other University.

It is further certified that the candidate has complied with all the formalities as per the requirements of the University of North Bengal.

As the thesis bears the evidence of his originality, I consider it fit and recommend its submission for evaluation for the partial fulfillment of Doctorate degree in Philosophy of the University of North Bengal.

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SYNOPSIS

Introduction

Value-theoretic terminology is diverse. Philosophers often speak of “intrinsic value”, extrinsic value”, “instrumental value”, “non-instrumental value”, “value as an end”, “final value”, etc. Thus, some terminological explication is in order. Traditionally, “intrinsic value” is understood as synonymous with the idea of being “valuable as an end”. Thus, philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.

With this terminology in mind, the first point to make is that intrinsic value can take at least two forms. Intrinsic value can be relational as well as non-relational. An object is relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good for something or someone. Claims about the nature of well-being or prudential value are claims about relational intrinsic value. My experience of pleasure at a specific time is intrinsically good for me. An object is non-relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good period, or full stop. Indeed, particular objects can be relationally intrinsically valuable but not non-relationally intrinsically valuable, and vice versa. That something is good for me relationally does not guarantee that that thing is intrinsically good tout court non-relationally. My experience of pleasure might be intrinsically good for me, but might nevertheless lack non-relational intrinsic value. For instance, if I am a cold-blooded murderer, my experience of pleasure might be relationally intrinsically valuable, but it might, nevertheless, fail to be non-relationally intrinsically valuable. It might be intrinsically better; some have claimed that cold-blooded murderers feel pain than pleasure, though such pain is certainly intrinsically worse for them than pleasure.

Ascribing intrinsic values to nature

There are two aspects of ascribing intrinsic values to nature. One is epistemological which is in a direction that to ascribe anything valuable there must be an evaluator to value it. “Value is never found in objects in itself as property. It

consists in a relation to an appreciating mind”. There is another aspect of ascribing intrinsic value to the nature which states that nature has its value of its own without any consideration of an evaluator. Despite the language of value conferral, if we try to take the term *intrinsic* seriously, this cannot refer to anything the object gains, to something *within* the present tree or the past trilobite, for the human subject does not really place anything on or in the natural object. We have only a 'truncated sense' of *intrinsic*. The *attributes* under consideration are objectively there before humans come, but the *attribution* of value is subjective. The object causally affects the subject, who is excited by the incoming data and translates this as value, after which the object, the tree, appears as having value, rather like it appears to have green colour. But nothing is really added *intrinsically*; everything in the object remains what it was before. Despite the language that humans are the *source* of value which they *locate* in the natural object, no value is really located there at all. The term *intrinsic*, even when reduced, is misleading. Here lies the great importance of debate to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature.

Statement of the Problem

From Aristotle, we can find that there is a gap between ethical judgment and ethical behavior which is explained in terms of the *akrasia* or impotence of people to act in accordance with reason. According to Aristotle, such a state is due to emotions or feelings which prevent rational choice, for instance our appetite for pleasure. Can we blame people's irresponsiveness or indifference with regard to the ecological crisis on their irrationality or hedonism? As a consequence, we could explore interventions with the aim of making more reasonable choices in environmental affairs, ranging from education for sustainable development in order to increase environmental consciousness, to all kinds of policies for the restriction of industrial pollution, the preservation of natural resources or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

The two basic directions of ascribing intrinsic value to nature, i.e. there must be an appreciating mind to value something and hence value is subjective in one hand and intrinsic value is objective, independent of any subject on the other

hand gives rise to several questions for which we found different approaches to assign value to the nature. Only human beings have intrinsic value (only anthropocentric value) itself gives rise to several questions i.e. is anthropocentric approach in the direction of not ascribing intrinsic value to the nature? Does anthropocentrism talk about sustainable development? Is anthropocentrism only a human centric approach towards nature? Does this approach have no appreciation of intrinsic value of nature? Again only sentient things have intrinsic value (Only sentience-centered value) may have several questions to answer i.e.; How can it be possible to limit the provenance of intrinsic value only to sentient things? Was this value present before it was valued by an evaluator? Another important approach towards nature says that only humans can generate intrinsic values, and ascribe it to some non-sentient things (Only anthropogenic values). Is it really true that only humans can generate intrinsic value? Does intrinsic value have independent status of existence? How humans generate intrinsic value if it is already exist in nature independently? Intrinsic values can arise independent of humans (Anthropogenic values in nature). Is intrinsic value ontologically possible? Does it, in fact, independently exist?

These four approaches have raised several vital questions which need to be met. Hence, there arises a necessity of in-depth research analysis for a new direction to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature and this becomes the basic statement of this domain of research. The statement of this research problem may be formed in between the lines of epistemological and ontological or may give a road map for the better explanation of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.

Significance of the proposed study

Human being evaluates the things and events only when they take an interest. That is why a value relationship comes to the picture where it did not exist before. This evaluation is anthropogenic, which is generated by humans, but not center on humans (anthropocentric). Such process of evaluation requires some “properties” or “potentialities” in nature which are objective properties. For instance a plant can defend its own life, synthesize glucose by using

photosynthesis. Animals have their own life, can be the subject, and can have their preferences.

Interaction with the nature is an important issue in the present day context not only for philosophers but also for the all others so far as well-beings of all living beings is concerned. In Indian we have a great respect to the nature; we call the earth as eternal mother, *Vasundharā*. In religion, there are beliefs and practices to respect trees, animals. But the present day concern is difficult because of the everyday scientific inventions, industrializations, discovering atom bombs, constructing mega dams etc. which have destroyed all age old ecology for which living and non-living beings have been suffering. The vital question is how do we interact with nature is a major concern of all. As Mckibben says, “we are living in a post natural world”. Nature has been used and destroyed as much as we want without considering the nature centered moral framework. But as the days passed and sufferings mount to peak nature has been looked into from a different angle. Philosophers try to add moral values to the nature. But again, a question may arise, how moral value can be assigned to nature? This leads to a debate and it generates an idea of ascribing instrumental value to the nature. Some philosophers say that it has an intrinsic value. This debate becomes more significant from different point of view including preservation of nature even if it is within the human centered framework.

Literature Review

If we have a historical look, we find over thousands of years man has regarded himself at the center of this planet. The *Great Chain of Being* (God at the apex of the universe, with humanity second, and the natural world below humanity) and *The Pyramid of Being* testify it. This tradition continues from Plato-Aristotle through Aquinas to contemporary times. Bible story of creation goes too far to put the entire earth on human control. The main theme of the story is that God has created the nature and men have *dominion* over the entire nature. This story shows two different human attitudes towards the nature. (Bible, 18) The word *dominion* justifies it. 1. as a license to do as we will. 2. as a directive to look after them.

In the present context, we are more concerned for human survival rather than the nature. Mckibben in his *The End of Nature* says, 'We are living in a post natural world.' Contemporary ethicist, Steven Schwarzschild holds that the commands in the *Bible* ultimately teach us to despise, dislike and conquer the nonhuman world. The Copenhagen and the France conferences on climate change are also human centered. These certify that the moral duties are derived from our direct duties to human inhabitants only.

Among environmental ethicists in the West, at least, there is widespread agreement that the forester and ecologist Aldo Leopold provided a benchmark against which subsequent environmental ethics can be measured. His short essay "The Land Ethic" in *A Sand County Almanac* provided an evocative and profound effort to articulate ethical guidelines for human interactions with nature. In it Leopold defined ethics as guidelines for social or ecological situations, based on individual membership in "a community of interdependent parts." Applying this definition to the environment, a "land ethic," he claimed, "simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land". This enlargement of humans' moral community transformed their place in relation to the nature, relation to the natural environment, "from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it". Leopold's land ethic provided a model of and foundation for a type of environmental ethics now known as "ecocentrism" or alternatively "biocentrism".

Arne Naess in his "The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement" stated that ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.

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In The Hymns of the *Rig Veda* stated about *Agni*, *Vāyu*, *Indra* etc. are considered as the sacred Gods for worship. Desire is the primary cause of unhappiness and suffering (*duḥkha*), especially when we desire what we cannot have. Consequently, happiness is achieved through renunciation and by restricting ourselves to our immediate needs. Humans do not try to obtain the grace of the gods but, through compassion and constant individual effort, by following the Noble Eightfold Path and observing *Dharma*, they seek to ultimately reach the perfect world of *Nirvāṇa*. Buddhists encourage non-violence and therefore this is one of the most compatible religions with the idea of preserving nature in its untamed state. Buddhism and Hinduism do not grant humans the status of “Master of nature”. These faiths exalt non-attachment to material goods and consider ignorance to be a sin which has major ecological ramifications.

R. Renugadevi, in her *Environmental ethics in the Hindu Vedas and Purāṇas in India* holds the *Vedas* are ancient Indian compilations of the Aryan period ranging between 2500 to 1500 B.C. *Rig Veda* especially mentions about environment on several occasions. A verse from the *Rig-Veda* states that “the sky

is like father, the earth like mother and the space as their son. The universe consisting of the three is like a family and any kind of damage done to any one of the three throws the universe out of balance”. Vedic culture and Vedic scriptures reveal a clear concept about the earth’s ecosystems and the necessity for maintaining their balance. Another verse from *Rig Veda* says “Thousands and Hundreds of years if you want to enjoy the fruits and happiness of life then take up systematic planting of trees”. These verses carry a message to desist from inflicting any injury to the earth and embark upon constant a forestation for survival or else the ecological balance of the earth would be jeopardized. *Rig Veda* has dwelt upon various components of the ecosystem and their importance. “Rivers occasion widespread destruction if their coasts are damaged or destroyed and therefore trees standing on the coasts should not be cut off or uprooted”. Modern civilization is experiencing the wrath of flood due to erosion of river embankments everywhere and only tree plantations along river banks cannot prevent erosion.

The *Upaniṣadas* were the final stage in the development of Vedic literatures consisting of answers to some philosophical questions. The practice of *Vanmahotsava* is over 1500 years old in India. The *Matsyapurāṇa* tells about it. *Agnipurāṇa* says that the plantation of trees and creations of gardens leads to eradication of sin. In *Padmapurāṇa* the cutting of a green tree is an offence punishable in hell.

Objectives

The problem we face today is that there is a huge gap between our ethical judgments about the ecological crisis on the one hand and our ethical behavior according to these judgments on the other. Many philosophers consider intrinsic value to be crucial to a variety of moral judgments. For example, according to a fundamental form of consequentialism, whether an action is *morally right or wrong* has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances. Many other theories also hold that what it is right or wrong to do have at least in part to

do with the intrinsic value of the consequences of the actions one can perform. Moreover, if, as is commonly believed, what one is *morally responsible* for doing is some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does, then intrinsic value would seem relevant to judgments about responsibility, too. Intrinsic value is also often taken to be pertinent to judgments about *moral justice* insofar as it is good that justice is done and bad that justice is denied, in ways that appear intimately tied to intrinsic value. Finally, it is typically thought that judgments about *moral virtue and vice* also turn on questions of intrinsic value, inasmuch as virtues are good, and vices bad, again in ways that appear closely connected to such value.

Kant himself does not use the language of intrinsic value. It is Tom Regan in ‘Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake’ represents Kant’s position on the maxim i.e. “certain individuals exist as ends-in-themselves” and “those individuals who have this status, because they have value in themselves apart from their value as a means relative to someone’s else’s end, can be said to have intrinsic value and called it ends-in-itself theory of intrinsic value”. Some philosophers deny that intrinsic value can be relational. For instance, according to Noah Lemos, when one says that something is intrinsically good, in the sense with which we are concerned, he means that, that it is intrinsically good period.” However, Lemos does attempt to capture something like an account of relational intrinsic value.

The questions whether, nature has intrinsic value, and whether all value require an evaluator is raised in the traditional environmental ethics. These questions are raised between nature objectivists and value subjectivists. The former presupposes that nature is intrinsically valuable, while the later holds that it takes an evaluator to ascribe value. In this proposal, an attempt will be made to find out a collaborative and discursive process to account for those dual ways of proving intrinsic value in nature keeping in mind the followings.

- To highlight the state of intrinsic value as discussed by Moore, Brentano, Kant and Holmes Rolston.
- To examine whether intrinsic value is ascribed to nature.

- To study the ontological and epistemological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.
- To find out the debates which are more appropriate and have impact parameter.
- To study and to find out amicable ways of ascribing intrinsic value to the nature from the dual aspects of ascriptions.

Research Gap

Morality requires that our sentiments must be balanced with relevant facts and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual philosophizes with more than just reason - we use our will, feelings, and our soul. We have an inclination that moral philosophy needs to be distinguished, predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral dilemmas, but nothing is beyond from the truth.

In the history of Western thought, nature has been primarily appreciated as instrumentally valuable. In *Genesis*, it is said that God gives humankind ‘dominion over the earth,’ that is that natural things were created for the use and employment of man’s happiness. In Platonic philosophy, from Plato to Plotinus, the created world is seen as instrumentally valuable for approaching an understanding of the formal good, and ultimately the Good, or the Neoplatonic One. One might tend to think that nature was regarded as instrumentally good, but intrinsically bad by Platonic philosophers.

However, there is a tendency in Platonism and Neoplatonism, one which has a profound influence on subsequent Western philosophy, to regard nature as intrinsically good. Of course we understand such an idea under the rubric of providence. We can see the clues of these ideas in Plato’s *Timaeus*, and explicit expressions of it in Plotinus’ *Enneads*. This concept of providence holds a powerful influence over the thinking of all subsequent Western philosophy up to Enlightenment. To hold a belief in providence is to believe that the world is fundamentally good, that, being created by a good and benevolent deity, it could not possibly be bad. We can find in Leibniz, in 17th Century maintaining that this is “the best of all possible worlds.” Despite the discontent caused by Leibniz’s

impersonal God, his belief in a providential world order is characteristic of that period of intellectual development that which we refer to as Enlightenment.

In Indian context, nature has been worshiped and respected as God and deity who have given a wide range of scope for considering nature having a sort of value in it. Compiling all these aspects a trend of conflicts still resisting so far as ascribing value in nature is concern.

Methodology

The methodology selected for this proposed research is introduced in its entirety and justified as similarities and differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The specific methods or activities like proportional and logical method will be appropriate and feasible to accomplish the objectives. These methods need to be both qualitative and quantitative in temperament. Whenever possible, these methods will identify the linkage between intrinsic value in nature from Western perspective and Indian Philosophy.

Also the proposal deployed the exploratory research design based on literature survey involving review of qualitative information published either in records/reports or journals/magazines/books. Top scholarly articles in which there are epistemological and ontological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature and which have an impact parameter will be considered as the universe of the study. The sampling is non-probability and purposive since the universe is purposively selected for the proposed study.

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13/10/2020

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Chapter-1

Introduction

1.1: What is environmental ethics?

To talk about environmental ethics, as the topic of the thesis falls under this category, brings three things to our mind, i.e. environment, environmental ethics and environmental philosophy. Environment is everything around humans which is not strictly man made like, wild nature, fields, ditches etc. Environmental ethics, on the other hand, dwells on our treatment towards natural entities, our relationship with them and moral standing of those entities. Again, environmental philosophy deals with the knowledge about natural entities. It also enquires whether natural entities can know themselves as humans do, or are they rational like humans? What is the mode of existence of ecosystem?

Traditional ethics concerns about intra-human duties, specially duties among contemporaries. Environmental ethics extends the scope of ethical concerns beyond one's community and nation to include not only all people everywhere but also animals and whole of nature, the biosphere both present and future generation. Environmental ethics takes the consensus from environmental politics, environmental economics, environmental sciences and environmental literature. The distinctive perspectives and methodologies of these disciplines provide important inspiration for environmental ethics, the environmental ethics offers value foundation for these discipline. They reinforce, influence and support each other. The plurality of environmental ethics which is interpreted in terms of anthropocentrism, animal liberation, rights theory, biocentrism and ecocentrism provide unique and reasonable justification for environmental protection. However, their approaches are different, but by and large the share the common goals.

Let us quote of Claire Palmer from the introduction to the *Blackwell Anthology on Environmental Ethics* at least to grasp the basic concept of what environmental ethics is.

“A wide spectrum of ethical positions is covered by the umbrella term ‘environmental ethics.’ These positions draw on a variety of ethical traditions, from Plato and Aristotle to Mill and Moore. As one might expect, a vigorous debate is being conducted between those advocating such diverse approaches. Certain key questions lie at its heart. One central area of debate concerns value theory in environmental ethics. What is considered valuable, and from where does such value come?”¹

Besides what is in Palmer’s quotation, there are more fundamental questions in environmental ethics such as, “What is the nature of the value that nonhumans have?” “Is the value in question objective or subjective?” “Is it intrinsic or extrinsic?” “Is value instrumental or non-instrumental?” These questions are primarily focused on the nature of the value of nonhumans and the environment and can be summed up by the basic question, “What kind of value do these things have?” Thus, we could perhaps rephrase Palmer’s key question in environmental ethics as three separate questions: “What are the things that have value? What is the nature of value do these things have? And, what is the source of such value?”

1.2: Value centric terminology

There is, of course, the question of what exactly the term “value” itself means as there are many ways to use this terminology. We often see that the term value has being coined as “intrinsic value”, “inherent value”, “extrinsic value”, “instrumental value”, “non-instrumental value”, “value as an end”, “final value”, etc. Thus, some terminological explication is in order. Traditionally, “intrinsic value” is understood as synonymous with the idea of being “valuable as an end”. In this way, it can be understood that there are number of references to the term value. Thus intrinsic value of something is a value that referred to the terms like “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is opposite to intrinsic.² I will assume that value is the same thing as what G.E. Moore calls “goodness” or “good” terms which he believes are indefinable notions that are “simple”. Moore writes, “What, then, is good? How is good to be defined? What I

¹Palmer, Clare (2003). “An Overview of Environmental Ethics.” in *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell publishing, p.16.

²Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value; Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, first published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about this I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement... But if we understand the question in this sense, my answer to it may seem a very disappointing one. If I am asked, 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I have to say about it...My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is."³

With this terminology in mind, the first point to make is that intrinsic value can take at least two forms. Intrinsic value can be relational as well as non- relational. An object is relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good for something or someone. Claims about the nature of well-being or prudential value are claims about relational intrinsic value. My experience of pleasure at a specific time is intrinsically good for me. An object is non-relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good period, or full stop. Indeed, particular objects can be relationally intrinsically valuable but not non-relationally intrinsically valuable, and vice versa. We, therefore, may say that something is good for me, or relationally, does not guarantee that that thing is intrinsically good tout court, or non-relationally. My experience of pleasure might be intrinsically good for me, but might nevertheless lack non-relational intrinsic value. For instance, if I am a cold-blooded murderer, my experience of pleasure might be relationally intrinsically valuable, but it might, nevertheless, fail to be non-relationally intrinsically valuable. It might be intrinsically better; some have claimed that cold-blooded murderers feel pain than pleasure, though such pain is certainly intrinsically worse for them than pleasure.

1.3: Aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature

There are two aspects of ascribing intrinsic values to nature. One is epistemological which is in a direction that to ascribe anything valuable there must be an evaluator to value it. "Value is never found in objects in itself as property. It consists in a relation to an appreciating mind". There is another aspect of ascribing

³ Moore, G.E. (1948) *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 6-7

intrinsic value to the nature which states that nature has its value of its own without any consideration of an evaluator. Despite the language of value conferral, if we try to take the term *intrinsic* seriously, this cannot refer to anything the object gains, to something *within* the present tree or the past trilobite, for the human subject does not really place anything on or in the natural object. We have only a ‘truncated sense’ of *intrinsic*. The *attributes* under consideration are objectively there before humans come, but the *attribution* of value is subjective. The object causally affects the subject, who is excited by the incoming data and translates this as value, after which the object, the tree, appears as having value, rather like it appears to have green colour. But nothing is really added *intrinsically*; everything in the object remains what it was before. Despite the language that humans are the *source* of value which they *locate* in the natural object, no value is really located there at all. The term *intrinsic*, even when reduced, is misleading. Here lies the great importance of debate to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature.

From Aristotle, we found that there is a gap between ethical judgment and ethical behavior which is explained in terms of the *akrasia* or impotence of people to act in accordance with reason. According to Aristotle, such a state is due to emotions or feelings which prevent rational choice, for instance our appetite for pleasure. Can we blame people’s irresponsiveness or indifference with regard to the ecological crisis on their irrationality or hedonism? As a consequence, we could explore interventions with the aim of making more reasonable choices in environmental affairs, ranging from education for sustainable development in order to increase environmental consciousness, to all kinds of policies for the restriction of industrial pollution, the preservation of natural resources or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

1.4: Different approaches to assign value

The two basic directions of ascribing intrinsic value to nature, i.e. there must be an appreciating mind to value something and hence value is subjective in one hand and intrinsic value is objective, independent of any subject on the other hand gives rise to several questions for which we found different approaches to assign value to the nature. Only human beings have intrinsic value (only anthropocentric value) itself

gives rise to several questions i.e. is anthropocentric approach in the direction of not ascribing intrinsic value to the nature? Does anthropocentrism talk about sustainable development? Is anthropocentrism only a human centric approach towards nature? Does this approach have no appreciation of intrinsic value of nature? Again only sentient things have intrinsic value (Only sentience-centered value) may have several questions to answer i.e.; How can it be possible to limit the provenance of intrinsic value only to sentient things? Was this value present before it was valued by an evaluator? Another important approach towards nature says that only humans can generate intrinsic values, and ascribe it to some non-sentient things (Only anthropogenic values). Is it really true that only humans can generate intrinsic value? Does intrinsic value have independent status of existence? How humans generate intrinsic value if it is already present in nature independently? Intrinsic values exist independent of humans' appreciation (Anthropogenic values in nature). Is intrinsic value ontologically possible? Does it, in fact, independently exist? These questions direct us to think about who are the moral agents what is the moral standing of environment. There are arguments that those who have the freedom and rational capacities to be responsible for choices, or who are capable of moral reflections and decision are moral agents. This is, in fact, considered as a one sided theory. And that if one's continued existence is valuable for itself is a moral standing. In that case one's interests and choices may be weighed when deciding what is permissible to do. That is to say, which is owed by moral agents to those with moral standing? What moral duty do we have towards those with moral standing? These questions will be tried to address in this thesis.

The four approaches have raised several vital questions which need to be met. Hence, there arises a necessity of in-depth research analysis for a new direction to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature and this becomes the basic statement of this domain of research. The statement of this research problem may be formed in between the lines of epistemological and ontological or may give a road map for the better explanation of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.

Human being evaluates the things and events only when they take an interest. That is why a value relationship comes to the picture where it did not exist before. This evaluation is anthropogenic, which is generated by humans, but not center on humans (anthropocentric). Such process of evaluation requires some “properties” or “potentialities” in nature which are objective properties. For instance a plant can defend its own life, synthesize glucose by using photosynthesis. Animals have their own life, can be the subject, and can have their preferences.

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1.5: Background of the study

If we have a historical look, we find over thousands of years man has regarded himself at the center of this planet. The *Great Chain of Being* (God at the apex of the universe, with humanity second, and the natural world below humanity) and *The Pyramid of Being* testify it. This tradition continues from Plato-Aristotle through Aquinas to contemporary times. Bible story of creation goes too far to put the entire earth on human control. The main theme of the story is that God has created the

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In The Hymns of the *Rig Veda* stated about *Agni*, *Vāyu*, *Indra* etc. are considered as the sacred Gods for worship. Water serves as a unifying fluid between sky/heaven and earth as described in the *Rig Veda*. (10.0.1-14). The origin of life in water in the form of fish as the first incarnation of *Lord Vishnu* states about the organic life-seeds in the earth. The norms have also been suggested in the *Rig Vedato* maintain the sacred power of water. For example verse 4.56 of *Manu Smriti* states: “One should not cause urine, stool, cough in the water. Anything which is mixed with these impious objects water becomes polluted; blood and poison should not be thrown in to water”.

Desire is the primary cause of unhappiness and suffering (*duḥkha*), especially when we desire what we cannot have. Consequently, happiness is achieved through renunciation and by restricting ourselves to our immediate needs. Humans do not try to obtain the grace of the gods but, through compassion and constant individual effort, by following the Noble Eightfold Path and observing *Dharma*, they seek to ultimately reach the perfect world of *Nirvāṇa*. Buddhists encourage non-violence and therefore this is one of the most compatible religions with the idea of preserving nature in its untamed state. Buddhism and Hinduism do not grant humans the status of “Master of nature”. These faiths exalt non-attachment to material goods and consider ignorance to be a sin which has major ecological ramifications.

R. Renugadevi, in her *Environmental ethics in the Hindu Vedas and Purāṇas in India* holds the *Vedas* are ancient Indian compilations of the Aryan period ranging between 2500 to 1500 B.C. *Rig Veda* especially mentions about environment on several occasions. A verse from the *Rig-Veda* states that “the sky is like father, the earth like mother and the space as their son. The universe consisting of the three is like a family and any kind of damage done to any one of the three throws the universe out of balance”. Vedic culture and Vedic scriptures reveal a clear concept about the earth’s ecosystems and the necessity for maintaining their balance. Another verse from *Rig Veda* says “Thousands and Hundreds of years if you want to enjoy the fruits and happiness of life then take up systematic planting of trees”. These verses carry a message to desist from inflicting any injury to the earth and embark upon constant a forestation for survival or else the ecological balance of the earth would be jeopardized. *Rig Veda* has dwelt upon various components of the ecosystem and their importance. “Rivers occasion widespread destruction if their coasts are damaged or destroyed and therefore trees standing on the coasts should not be cut off or uprooted”. Modern civilization is experiencing the wrath of flood due to erosion of river embankments everywhere and only tree plantations along river banks cannot prevent erosion.

The *Upaniṣadas* were the final stage in the development of Vedic literatures consisting of answers to some philosophical questions. The practice of *Vanmahotsava* is over 1500 years old in India. The *Matsyapurāṇa* tells about it. *Agnipurāṇa* says that the plantation of trees and creations of gardens leads to eradication of sin. In *Padmapurāṇa* the cutting of a green tree is an offence punishable in hell.

The problem we face today is that there is a huge gap between our ethical judgments about the ecological crisis on the one hand and our ethical behavior according to these judgments on the other. Intrinsic value, thus, plays a crucial role in framing the variety of moral judgments. The fundamental form of consequentialism, hence, argued that an action’s *moral worth* is exclusively determined by its intrinsically better consequences from many other actions, which are performed under the circumstances. There are also other theories that hold that the rightness and wrongness of an action has to do wholly or partly with the intrinsic value of the

consequences of the actions one can perform. However, intrinsic value is also referred to judgments about responsibility if one is *morally responsible* for doing some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does. Intrinsic value can also be related to *moral justice* if relevant to judgments of justice. It is good if justice is done and bad if justice is denied. And in this way it appears that the justice is intimately tied to intrinsic value. Lastly, there are also issues which are thought to be judgments about *moral virtue and vice* that draw attention about the questions of intrinsic value, such as virtues are good, and vices bad, and that appear closely connected to such value.

Kant himself does not use the language of intrinsic value. It is Tom Regan in ‘Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake’ represents Kant’s position on the maxim i.e. “certain individuals exist as ends-in-themselves” and “those individuals who have this status, because they have value in themselves apart from their value as a means relative to someone’s else’s end, can be said to have intrinsic value and called it ends-in-itself theory of intrinsic value”. Some philosophers deny that intrinsic value can be relational. For instance, according to Noah Lemos, when one says that something is intrinsically good, in the sense with which we are concerned, he means that, that it is intrinsically good period.” However, Lemos does attempt to capture something like an account of relational intrinsic value.

1.6: Objectives and research gap

The questions whether, nature has intrinsic value, and whether all value require an evaluator is raised in the traditional environmental ethics. These questions are raised between nature objectivists and value subjectivists. The former presupposes that nature is intrinsically valuable, while the later holds that it takes an evaluator to ascribe value. In this dissertation, an attempt will be made to find out a collaborative and discursive process to account for those dual ways of proving intrinsic value in nature keeping in mind the followings.

1. To clarify the concept of intrinsic value from different philosophers’ standpoints.
2. To highlight the state of intrinsic value as discussed by Moore, Chisholm, Noah M. Lemos, John O’ Neill.

3. The ascription of intrinsic value and its outcome with the debates of Holmes Rolston, Robert Elliot, J. B. Callicott and Earnest Partridge
4. To examine whether intrinsic value is ascribed to nature.
5. To study the ontological and epistemological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.
6. To find out the debates which are more appropriate and have impact parameter.
7. To study and to find out amicable ways of ascribing intrinsic value to the nature from the dual aspects of ascriptions.

Morality requires that our sentiments must be balanced with relevant facts and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual philosophizes with more than just reason - we use our will, feelings, and our soul. We have an inclination that moral philosophy needs to be distinguished, predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral dilemmas, but nothing is beyond from the truth.

1.7: Methodology

The methodology selected for this research is introduced in its entirety and justified as similarities and differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The specific methods or activities like proportional and logical method will be appropriate and feasible to accomplish the objectives. These methods need to be both qualitative and quantitative in temperament. Whenever possible, these methods will identify the linkage between intrinsic value in nature from Western perspective and Indian Philosophy.

Also the proposal deployed the exploratory research design based on literature survey involving review of qualitative information published either in records/reports or journals/magazines/books. Top scholarly articles in which there are epistemological and ontological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature and which have an impact parameter will be considered as the universe of the study. The sampling is non-probability and purposive since the universe is purposively selected for the thesis.

Considering all these that have been discussed so far, we are to examine two broad assumptions which are the basis of the thesis.

First assumption

Even though there are diverse views, lots of criticisms, rejections, I will stick to what G. E. Moore exactly meant by *intrinsic value*. It consists of *intrinsic properties* and *intrinsic nature*. However, I differ from Moore's statement that intrinsic value is trans-worldly. I will try to defend it in chapter II.

Second Assumption

There is intrinsic value in nature and intrinsic value is independently objectively present in nature. I will try to defend it from western perspective and Indian perspective in chapter III and IV respectively.

Chapter-II

The Concept and Debates in Intrinsic Value

2.1: Introduction

The notion of intrinsic value is of paramount importance in ethics, and that this claim needs to be defended. There are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lies intrinsic goodness and badness. It is in virtue of intrinsic goodness and badness that other types of goodness and badness may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. Many ways philosophers try to clarify the concept of intrinsic value- sometimes from deontological way of explaining and sometimes from consequentialists' perception. Whatever the path of discussion, Human life always wants a good life in good environment and the major ethical theories recognize to promote what makes something good or what is that something that is intrinsic.

2.2: Plato, Aristotle and Kant

There are also accounts of the concept of intrinsic value as depicted by different philosophers time to time. Plato gave an analogy saying that the Good is in some way like a Sun.⁴ He suggested that each is a source of immense value. And just as the Sun is too blinding to observe directly with the naked eye, so the Good is too dazzling to contemplate directly with naked mind.

Plato says, "In the world of Knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion follow that, for old things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without having had a vision of this form no one can can't act with wisdom, either with in his own life or in matters of states".

⁴ Plato, (1958), *The Republic*, translated and with an introduction and notes by Francis MacDonald Cornord; New York and London, Oxford University Press, p -231.

Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*⁵ conceived goodness in other ways. We can assume that there are several sorts of ‘goodness’. First and foremost of course, there is intrinsic goodness, the “Chief Good” (in Aristotle’s phrase it means there are several lesser sorts of goodness. Aristotle indicates that he is searching for something that is so good that if you have it, your life can’t be improved by the addition of anything else. Happiness (which he takes to be an important thing) is alleged to be ‘not a thing counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by addition of even the last good - it is... “That which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. The intrinsically good is the most final good. Aristotle says that the Chief Good is something final.....always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Immanuel Kant likewise drew comparisons. In describing a thing he took to be good in some fundamental way, he tried to make it clear that this does not have its value because of its capacity to produce good results, for even if “by the niggardly provision of step motherly nature” it were to have no extrinsic value at all. “...it would still sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself. ...its usefulness would be only its setting as it were, so as to enable us to handle it more conveniently in commerce or to attract the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to those who are experts or to determine its worth.”⁶

2.3: G. E. Moore on intrinsic value

*Principia Ethica*⁷ of Moore asserts that what is “common and peculiar” to all ethical judgments is the concept of “good” - what Moore later calls “intrinsic value.” All ethical questions and claims can be divided into “two kinds.” One has to do with the good: what things “ought to exist for their own sakes? And the other concerns the right: “What kind of actions ought we to perform? One of *Principia*’s central claims

⁵Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* (2004) Translated by J.A. K. Thomson , Penguin Group , London , p-31.

⁶ Kant, Immanuel; (1959) *Foundation of Metaphysics of Morals*, translated with an *Introduction* by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis and New York; Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. p.10.

⁷ Moore, G. E; (1948), *Principia Ethica*, secs. 1–2, pp. 53–54. (G. E. Moore, “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” was originally published in 1922 as chap. 8 of *Philosophical Studies* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner), p. 253–75. It is included in Baldwin’s revised edition of *Principia Ethica*, p. 280–98.)

is that questions of the second kind can be reduced to those of the first. It means what one should do on an occasion reduces to which action, of those available, would produce the most good. "To assert that a certain line of conduct is, at a given time, absolutely right or obligatory," Moore writes, "is obviously to assert that more good or less evil will exist in the world, if it be adopted than if anything else be done instead."⁸ Moore distinguished his view from the view of deontological intuitionists, who held that "intuitions" could determine questions about what *actions* are right or required by duty. Moore, as a consequentialist, argued that "duties" and moral rules could be determined by investigating the effects of particular actions or kinds of actions, and so were matters for empirical investigation rather than direct objects of intuition. On Moore's view, "intuitions" revealed not the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, but only what things were good in themselves, as *ends to be pursued*.

G. E. Moore tries to define more precisely the most important question, which, is really at issue when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value, whether it is or is not a 'subjective' predicate.⁹ According to Moore, there are three chief cases in which this controversy is raised.

1. With regard to the conceptions of 'right' and 'wrong,' and the closely allied conception of 'duty' or 'what ought to be done.'
2. Secondly, with regard to 'good' and 'evil,' in some sense of those words in which the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from the conceptions of 'right' and 'wrong,' but in which nevertheless it is undeniable that ethics has to deal with them.
3. Thirdly, with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions, such as 'beautiful' and 'ugly;' or 'good' and 'bad,' in the sense in which these are applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics.

⁸ Ibid, p. 53-54

⁹ Moore, G. E.; (1922) *The Conception of Intrinsic Value*; *Philosophical Studies*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), P 260- 266

G. E. Moore makes a distinction between intrinsic properties and intrinsic nature. If it is said that two things have different intrinsic properties or are intrinsically different then it means that they may be either numerically different or qualitatively different. On the other hand if it said that two things have different intrinsic natures then it means that they are qualitatively different (besides being numerically different). Thus if two things have different intrinsic nature then they are both qualitatively and quantitatively different. From what is said above, i.e., intrinsic difference (in nature) is not merely numerical difference; one should not hastily conclude that intrinsic difference (in nature) always implies qualitative difference. Although qualitative difference between two objects implies difference in their intrinsic natures, yet the converse is not true. Intrinsic difference may or may not mean qualitative difference. So intrinsic difference may only mean quantitative difference. Two things may have different intrinsic natures in spite of being qualitatively alike; e.g., they may differ in respect of the degree in which they possess some quality. To take a concrete example: a very loud sound and a very soft sound – they are qualitatively alike and only quantitatively different. Thus qualitative difference is only one species of intrinsic difference. We can notice, here, that Moore's way of distinguishing between intrinsic nature and intrinsic property is not clear. This is because the difference between intrinsic natures and intrinsic property (of two things) both implies either quantitative difference or qualitative difference. Moore speaks of two equivalent conditions for any value to be intrinsic: -

- If two or more things are exactly alike (having same qualities) and possess intrinsic value then they all possess intrinsic value in the same degree.
- If two or more objects have intrinsic value in a certain degree then they will all possess it in same degree under any circumstances and under any causal laws. That is to say, if these two things existed in a different universe where causal laws are different from this universe then also those things will possess intrinsic value in the same degree.

He says that intrinsic value is not subjective, but objective. Intrinsic value does not depend on the human beings valuing them. He makes a distinction between intrinsic value and intrinsic property. Examples of intrinsic value are beauty,

goodness, etc. (In Chapter 3 of *Principia Ethica* Moore argues that the existence of beauty apart from any awareness of it has intrinsic value, but in Chapter 6 he allows that beauty on its own at best has little and may have no intrinsic value¹⁰. And in the later work *Ethics* he implicitly denies that beauty on its own has value¹¹.) Whereas examples of intrinsic property are yellowness, redness, etc. Intrinsic value constitutes a unique class of predicate because they do not have anything in common with other kinds of predicates of value. Both intrinsic property and intrinsic value depend on the intrinsic nature of the thing possessing them. However intrinsic value is not identical with intrinsic property. They are different. There is something in intrinsic value which is not present in intrinsic property. But Moore cannot say what this something is. John O'Neill was dissatisfied with G. E. Moore's view of intrinsic value and this will be elaborated in the later part of this chapter.

Human beings evaluate things and event only when they take an interest. That is why a value relationship comes into picture where it did not exist before. In the process of evaluation, especially when the evaluation of nature is concerned, philosophers become interested to the "properties" or "potentialities" which are objective properties. The question, "can moral values be assigned to these properties of nature" leads to a debate and it generates an idea of ascribing instrumental value to nature. Some philosophers say that nature has intrinsic value which becomes more significant from different point of view including preservation of nature even if it is within human centered framework. But before addressing the debates that involve in *intrinsic value*, a clear concept of it and how it can be warranted needs to be understood.

Intrinsic value has traditionally been considered as the prime subject matter of discussion specially in environmental ethics. We have already mentioned that there are diverse number of terms to refer to such value as used by philosophers such as "in itself," or "for its own sake," or "as such," or "in its own right." The term 'intrinsic value' and alternative term 'inherent worth' (though not widely used) mean, lexically synonymous. In the tenth edition of *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, the

¹⁰ Moore, G. E; (1948), *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, sec1–2, p. 53–54.

¹¹ Moore, G. E., *Ethics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 107.

term intrinsic is defined as “belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing.” And the term “inherent” is meant as “involved in the constitution or essential character of something...: intrinsic.” The English word “value” comes from the Latin word “*valere* to be worth, to be strong”; and “worth” comes from the old English word “*weorth* worthy, of value.” Thus it can be claimed that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) means that value (or worth) which belongs to its essential nature or constitution.

Intrinsic value plays an important role to influence the variety of moral judgments. For example, according to a fundamental form of consequentialism, whether an action is *morally right or wrong* has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances. Many other theories also hold that what it is right or wrong to do have at least in part to do with the intrinsic value of the consequences of the actions one can perform. Moreover, if, as is commonly believed, what one is *morally responsible* for doing is some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does, then intrinsic value would seem relevant to judgments about responsibility, too. Intrinsic value is also often taken to be pertinent to judgments about *moral justice* (whether having to do with moral rights or moral desert), insofar as it is good that justice is done and bad that justice is denied, in ways that appear intimately tied to intrinsic value. Finally, it is typically thought that judgments about *moral virtue and vice* also turn on questions of intrinsic value, in as much as virtues are good, and vices bad, again in ways that appear closely connected to such value.

Many theories of value are theories of intrinsic value. For example, hedonism says that pleasure is the only thing with positive intrinsic value and pain the only thing with negative intrinsic value. Critics of hedonism reply either that some pleasures are not intrinsically worthwhile - e.g., malicious pleasures - or that things other than pleasure are intrinsically worthwhile - e.g., knowledge and justice. In this case, the disputants agree that all value is either intrinsic or derivative from intrinsic value. Indeed, agreement on this point is sometimes even built into the definitions of key terms. According to an entry in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ‘an intrinsic

good is something valuable in itself; a non-intrinsic good is something valuable by virtue of its relationship to an intrinsic good'.¹²

2.4: Instrumental Value

Many writers distinguish intrinsic value from instrumental value, the value something has because it may prove useful in obtaining other things of value. Others allow also for contributory value. Something, such as a dissonant chord in a symphony, whose value depends upon being a part of a whole, is frequently called a contributory good, the value of a contributory good derives from the intrinsic value of the whole to which it contributes. One may explain that 'Intrinsic goods are to be contrasted with things that are extrinsically valuable and things that are necessary conditions of realizing intrinsic value'. In these views, intrinsic value is the source of all other value, so, if nothing were of intrinsic value, nothing could have any value at all. But it is also possible to hold that all value is instrumental and that there is no such thing as intrinsic value.

We can suppose that x has instrumental value to the extent that x has value that is due to x's being possibly instrumental in bringing about something else. Or, in terms of valuing, x is valued instrumentally to the extent that x is valued because x is (or would be) instrumental in bringing about something else. This definition does not require that what is brought about have intrinsic value.

Money has instrumental value because it can be used to purchase things; we can suppose this without having any particular purchases in mind and without supposing that the items that may be purchased are valued intrinsically. Many of these items - food, shelter, medical care, transportation, and clothing - are themselves highly valued; but it would seem that they themselves are valued instrumentally rather than intrinsically. Now food is valued in part because it tastes good and it is plausible that the experience of eating tasty food is intrinsically good. If so, money leads indirectly to something of intrinsic value. As we have seen, many philosophers assume that instrumental value is always in this way derivative of the expected

¹²Edwards, Paul, (1967), (eds), Encyclopedia of philosophy, Macmillan, New York.

intrinsic value to which something might lead. In what follows we will consider whether this is a defensible assumption.

2.5: Debates Concerning Intrinsic Value in Normative Ethics

Apart from G. E. Moore I would like to put forward the arguments of R. M. Chisholm, Noah M. Lemos and John O' Neill in connection with the debates concerning intrinsic value in normative ethics.

Chisholm's View

The distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'non-intrinsic' value is a prominent area of discussion in environmental ethics. From Plato through Aristotle, to Brentano to Mill, this discussion has been widely developed and has been a great concern for environmental ethics. These philosophers have taken into granted that if there is something 'good' then there is something intrinsically good or good in itself and if there is anything that is bad then there is something intrinsically bad or bad in itself. But for Chisholm, this distinction has been questioned in many ways and sometimes it became ridiculous. Chisholm first tried to define what intrinsic value is and in doing so he is concerned with the qualification that makes value intrinsic. In saying so Chisholm would like to state that the state of affair under which something is considered to be valuable is to be kept in isolation and such value is considered as the 'extrinsic' and not intrinsic since in such cases the value is dependent on the states of affair.¹³ For Chisholm, if a state of affairs is intrinsically good then it is intrinsically good in every possible world in which it obtains (or is true). But a state of affairs that is instrumentally good need not to be instrumentally good in every possible world in which it obtains.¹⁴ He, in this context, mentions that all intrinsic value concepts may be analyzed in terms of intrinsic preferability.

¹³ Roderick M. Chisholm;(1981), *Defining Intrinsic Value: Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 2*, Oxford University Press: p. 99-100

¹⁴ Ibid, p 99-100

Noah M. Lemos's View

In the first chapter of his book *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*,¹⁵ Lemos tries to give a detailed account of the concept of Intrinsic Value by analyzing different philosophers' views. Specially he makes known the analysis on the basis of the views of Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, Roderick M. Chisholm and examine that intrinsic value is such that which is explicated in terms of the notions of ethically 'fitting' or required emotional attitudes such as love, hate and preference. He points out some traditional views of intrinsic value.

1. The first view is that if something is intrinsically good than it cannot be intrinsically bad.
2. Intrinsic value is a non-relational concept.
3. For the cognitivists, we know that something is intrinsically good and something is intrinsically bad.
4. Intrinsic value is distinct from any natural property, relation or state of affair.
5. Lastly, intrinsic value of a thing does not depend on its being the object of any psychological attitude.

Franz Brentano¹⁶, C D Broad¹⁷, A C Ewing, R M Chisholm¹⁸ hold that something being intrinsically good may be understood in terms of its being 'correct' or 'fitting' to love or like that thing- in and for itself or its own sake. This concept of intrinsic value has certain intuitive appeal. Lemos also mentions some objections to these traditional views. The first objection is in explication of the notion of intrinsic value in terms of an ethical obligation, we are confusing intrinsic value with moral value, i.e. we are confusing intrinsic goodness with moral goodness. Secondly, it is also objectionable to prefer something other than intrinsically. And thirdly, two things

¹⁵Lemos, Noah M;(1994), *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 3-19

¹⁶ Franz Brentano, (1969)*The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, English edition edited by Roderick m Chisholm and translated by Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth schneewind (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul),p.18

¹⁷ C D Board, (1981), *Five types of Ethical Theory* (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1930) p.283

¹⁸ Roderick Chisholm; "Defining Intrinsic Value"; *Analysis* 41, (March), p.100

might have same intrinsic value, whereas the attitude and the feelings that are appropriate to one might be inappropriate to another.¹⁹

Lemos elaborates about the bearers of intrinsic value taking into in to consideration about the different traditional views. In this context he refers to Panayot Butchvarov who says that some properties are intrinsically good and some properties are intrinsically bad²⁰. For example, pleasure and wisdom are intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad. Chisholm also says that ‘state of affairs’ is the bearer of intrinsic value.²¹ On the other hand he points out approach of W. D. Ross who mentions ‘fact’ as the bearer of intrinsic value. However, Lemos took a stand in the line of Chisholm’s view after considering the different views as mentioned above. He also makes some metaphysical assumptions regarding state of affairs and properties. He suggests that it is not pleasure or perfect justice, considered as abstract properties that have intrinsic value. According to him wisdom, pleasure, beauty are ‘good making properties’²². He also points out that fact can also be the bearer of intrinsic value on the ground that if it is a fact that someone is suffering from pain then the fact is intrinsically bad and if it is a fact that makes someone happy, then the fact is intrinsically good. If facts are states of affairs that obtain and if facts are bearers of values then there is an understandable temptation to say that some states of affairs are bearers of value. Hence, by this, he made a distinction between facts and states of affairs. Intrinsic value is not contingent in nature, they are universal. Concrete particulars are not intrinsic as they do not bear universal character of intrinsic value. It has a distinctiveness for which something is intrinsically good or intrinsically bad and it must be complex objects like states of affairs or facts.

¹⁹Lemos, Noah M; (1994) *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 3-19

²⁰ Ibid, p 3-19

²¹ Charles Stevenson, Richard Brant, *Values and Morals ; Essays in honor of William Frankena*, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, Volume -13, the University of Michigan, D. Redial Publishing Company

²²Lemos, Noah M, P. 3-19

John O'Neill's View

The term intrinsic value has many senses. The variety of senses leads philosophers into confusion. Environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these varieties of senses. O'Neill discusses these senses as follows:²³

1. Intrinsic value is non-instrumental. The idea in regard to this case is that an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself. In environmental ethics it is argued that among the entities that have such non-instrumental value are non-human beings and states. It is this claim that Arne Naess makes in defending deep ecology.
2. The second sense is that intrinsic value means having a sort of intrinsic properties. It refers to the value of an object which has intrinsic properties. This view is developed by G. E. Moore. According to Moore, as O'Neill stated "To say a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." These properties come from the intrinsic nature of the object in question. The link between the thing's intrinsic value and its intrinsic property (ies) is immediate and does not depend on any relations between that entity and other things outside of it. Such relations might be, for example, those between the psychological states of valuers and the thing being valued. That is, this value can be characterized without reference to other objects and any of their states of affair.
3. The third meaning of intrinsic value as O'Neill stated is that intrinsic value is used as a synonym of objective value. It means that the value of an object possesses independently of humans' perception. This meaning of intrinsic value has some sub-varieties. i.e. (a) if non humans have intrinsic value then this claim is a meta-ethical claim. (b) It denies the subjective view that the source of all value lies in the evaluators' preferences, affinities and so on.

The environmental ethicists, according to Neill, uses the term "intrinsic value" in the first sense - non-humans are ends-in-themselves. However in order to

²³Neill, J. O', "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," *The Monist*, vol. 75, No 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature (April 1992); Oxford University Press. P.119-137

strengthen their position the environmental ethicists claim that the term “intrinsic value” is also used in both second and first senses. Among these three senses of “intrinsic value”, John O’Neill accepts the third sense and partially the second sense. He believes that the first sense (Moore’s sense) is not acceptable i.e. intrinsic value is non-instrumental and that an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself.

Regarding the second sense i.e., intrinsic value in the sense of objective value we find two types of objectivity - weak objectivity and strong objectivity. Neill believes that intrinsic value can be objective only in the strong sense. Unlike the non-anthropocentrists, he also shows that if intrinsic value can be used in the sense of the subjective value (as opposed to objective value), then such an intrinsic value can establish non-anthropocentrism. He discusses the first two senses of the term intrinsic value.

First Sense

Moore holds that an object possesses intrinsic value by virtue of its intrinsic nature. All the objects possessing intrinsic value possess it equally; there is no hierarchy of intrinsic value. Secondly, if an object has intrinsic value then it will possess it in the same way throughout its existence. Neill argues that such a concept of intrinsic value cannot establish non-anthropocentrism. Intrinsic nature or property is a non-relational property. Neill gives two explanations of “non-relational property”:²⁴

1. Non-relational properties are those that persist regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects.
2. Non-relational properties are those that can be characterized without reference to other objects.

According to Neill, non-anthropocentrism offers the following arguments to prove that nature has intrinsic value. The argument is:

- To hold an environmental ethics is to hold that non-human natural objects have intrinsic value.

²⁴ Neill, J. O’, “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value,” *The Monist*, vol. 75, No 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature (April 1992); Oxford University Press. P.119-137

- The value objects have in virtue of their relational properties, e.g. their rarity, cannot be intrinsic values.
- The value objects have in virtue of their relational properties had no place in an environmental ethic.

This argument will be clearer through the following example: Rarity is a relational property of an object since this property depends on the non-existence of other objects and thereby cannot be characterized without reference to other objects. Nowadays a special status is ascribed to the rare entities of our environment, such as endangered species, flora and fauna, etc. In Neill's view, such rarity seems to confer a special value, but not intrinsic value to these natural objects. Hence such value has no place in environmental ethics which confers intrinsic value to nature. Objects possessing non-relational property have intrinsic value. All the animals, plants, etc. have intrinsic value in the sense of non-relational property.

Neill objects to the above argument because it commits the fallacy of equivocation. The term 'intrinsic value' is used in two different senses. In the first premise it means non-instrumental value whereas in the second premise it means value an object possesses in virtue of its non-relational properties (Moore's sense of intrinsic value). This is a gross mistake because the two senses are distinct from each other. Intrinsic value in the Moorean sense means also non-instrumental value but not vice-versa. A thing may have non-instrumental value, but not intrinsic value (Moorean sense). e.g., wilderness has non-instrumental value because it is not any means to satisfy human desires. But wilderness cannot be said to have intrinsic value (Moorean sense); wilderness has value because it is untouched by humans which is equivalent to saying that wilderness has value in virtue of its relation with humans. Thus wilderness has a relational property, and not a non-relational property. At the same time wilderness has intrinsic value. So non-instrumental value and non-relational property are not equivalent to each other. Thus the term 'intrinsic value' is not used in the same sense throughout the above argument and this kind of fallacy is called fallacy of equivocation. Hence the above argument is invalid. Moorean sense of intrinsic value (non-relational property) cannot attribute intrinsic value to

wilderness. Neill thus shows that environmental ethicists cannot use intrinsic value in the first sense (Moorean sense).

Second Sense

Let us now discuss Neill's account of whether the term 'intrinsic value' can be used in the second sense – intrinsic value means objective value as opposed to subjective. A thing has subjective value if it is dependent on the valuation of the evaluator. In other words, if an evaluator says that something X is valuable then and then only X becomes valuable. On the contrary, an objective value is independent of the valuation of an evaluator. The value of X, in this case, is not dependent upon whether a subject confers value on it. X has value whether or not X is valuable to a subject. Those who maintain that intrinsic value is objective value in this sense argue that to say that non-human nature has objective value is to say that it has intrinsic value. But Neill does not think that subjectivism leads to anthropocentrism. The subjectivist asserts that the only sources of value are the evaluative attitudes of humans. But this does not mean that the only ultimate objects of value are humans. Neill takes up the theory of Emotivism to explain his claim.

C.L.Stevenson, an emotivist, defines intrinsic value as non-instrumental value. Intrinsically good means good for its own sake, as an end in itself, which is distinct from good as a means to something else. He holds: 'X' is intrinsically good asserts that the speaker approves of 'X' intrinsically and acts emotively to make the hearer or hearers likewise approve of 'X' intrinsically."²⁵ Neill claims that this 'X' can very well be non-human entity instead of being only human attitudes. An emotivist believes that ecosystem has intrinsic value and acts emotively, e.g., expresses her joy in the existence of natural ecosystem, whereas expresses her pain in the destruction of nature by humans. Thus nature has intrinsic value according to this view.

Some may object, still, that emotivism does not support environmental ethics. Since humans are the only source of value, a world without humans (even in the presence of non-human) would have no value at all. Neill's rejoinder is that emotivism does not confine moral utterances only to the periods in which human exists, e.g., an emotivist can express his joyous mood in saying "Wilderness exist

²⁵Stevenson, C. L; (1994) *Ethics and Language* ,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 16

after the extinction of human species”. Thus subjectivism does not support anthropocentrism. In fact subjectivism can establish non-anthropocentrism by attributing intrinsic value to nature.

On the other hand, objectivism is not an adequate theory to prove that nature has intrinsic value. The objectivist account of value is whether or not something has value does not depend on the attitudes of humans. This something i.e., what kind of objects have intrinsic value is not specifically stated by them. So this “something” can be humans or attitudes of humans. Objectivism, thus, is compatible with anthropocentrism. For anthropocentrism states that non-human nature does not have intrinsic value. According to the objectivists, evaluative properties of objects are real properties of objects - evaluative properties exist independently of the evaluations of evaluators (humans).

Neill speaks of two interpretations of the phrase “independently of the evaluations of evaluators” or we can say “real property”.

- In the weak interpretation, the evaluative properties of objects are properties that exist in the absence of evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is one that exists in the absence of any being experiencing that object.
- On the other hand, in the strong interpretation the evaluative properties of objects can be characterized without reference to evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is that which can be characterized without reference to the experiences of an experiencer.

In accordance with the weak interpretation of “real property” we have weak objectivity and, in accordance with the strong interpretation of this term we have strong objectivity. He does not admit that weak objectivity will help to establish the view that nature has intrinsic value. But he admits that strong objectivity will help to prove that non-humans have intrinsic value.

2.6: Debates concerning Intrinsic value in Environmental Ethics and its Implications

Let us begin by distinguishing between anthropocentric and various types of non-anthropocentric theories, before turning to the debate over subjective versus objective intrinsic value. When the term ‘anthropocentric’ was first coined in the

1860s, amidst the controversy over Darwin's theory of evolution, to represent the idea that humans are the center of the universe²⁶, anthropocentrism considers humans to be the most important life form, and other forms of life to be important only to the extent that they affect humans or can be useful to humans. In an anthropocentric ethic, nature has moral consideration because degrading or preserving nature can in turn harm or benefit humans. For example, using this ethic it would be considered wrong to cut down the rainforests because they contain potential cures for human diseases.

We generally refer to “nonhuman nature” as “nonhuman beings.” These phrases are not intended to imply a specifically Kantian, rather than a Moorean i.e., states of affairs notion of nonhuman intrinsic value. While may say that environmental ethicists have perhaps tended toward a more Kantian concept of intrinsic value, in many cases the literature in environmental ethics could be interpreted through either a Moorean or a Kantian lens. Moore's environmental ethics is consequentialists' perception whereas Kant's view is deontological. Although the implications of these two different interpretations of intrinsic value are certainly not trivial to conservation, it is unfortunately beyond our scope to engage fully with these finer nuances. Therefore, we should not point specifically to either a Kantian or a Moorean interpretation of intrinsic value, unless otherwise noted. Throughout this chapter and in our discussion, “intrinsic value of nonhuman nature” or “intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings” should be read to imply, “intrinsic value of nonhuman nature or its interests,” or, “intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings or states of affairs pertaining to them.”

Environmental ethics have sought to more comprehensively account for intrinsic value in the natural world by extending the theory of intrinsic value beyond humans alone (i.e., beyond anthropocentrism) to also include various sets of nonhumans (i.e., non-anthropocentrism). Before Leopold's *land ethic*, there was no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow

²⁶Campbell, E. K. (1983). *Beyond anthropocentrism*: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, p. 54-67.

upon it. Thus the enlargement of ethics to this third element in human environment is . . . an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.²⁷ But what is intrinsic value?

Expressions such as “this should be preserved for *its own sake*” are very common: but there are philosophers and scientists who opposed to apply such common concept to natural phenomena. For them there must be an evaluator valuing things—that is, there must be humans in the picture. In a sense this is true. Theories of value, like theories of gravity and rules of logical or methodological inferences, are human products. But this does not rule out the possibility of truth or correctness. For Arne Naess the positions in philosophy often referred to as “value nihilism” and “subjectivity of value” rejects the concept of valid norms. Other positions accept the concept.²⁸

Anthropocentrism, as we define it, is the view that only humans possess intrinsic value, and therefore humans alone are worthy of direct moral consideration. Non-anthropocentrism, conversely, is any perspective recognizing intrinsic value in at least some nonhumans, and thus granting those nonhumans direct moral consideration. Anthropocentrism is often, incorrectly conflated with anthropogenesis, the idea that as humans everything we do is, by necessity, human-centered. Sometimes the anthropogenic acknowledgment of intrinsic value in the nonhuman world is referred to as “weak anthropocentrism”. On the definition above, this position is not anthropocentric, and can instead be considered a form of subjectivist non-anthropocentrism. To elucidate by analogy, humans are perhaps trivially “self-centered,” in that we can only see the world through our own eyes, but we need not be morally “self-centered,” in the sense that we think and care only about ourselves. In a similar way, anthropocentrism is centered on humans because it only attributes intrinsic value to humans, not because only humans attribute intrinsic value.

Biocentric environmental ethicists argue that life, or simply “being alive,” is the criterion for intrinsic value. What is referred to here as an ‘ecocentric’ ethic comes from the term first coined ‘biocentric’ in 1913 by an American biochemist,

²⁷Leopold, A. (1949). *A Sand Country Almanac*: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 238-239

²⁸Naess, A. (1993). Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 70–82.

Lawrence Henderson, to represent the idea that the universe is the originator of life²⁹. This term was adopted by the ‘deep ecologists’ in the 1970s to refer to the idea that all life has intrinsic value (Nash, 1989). In an ecocentric ethic nature has moral consideration because it has intrinsic value, value aside from its usefulness to humans. Using this ethic, for example, one could judge that it would be wrong to cut down the rainforests because it would cause the extinction of many plant and animal species. Biocentric versions of intrinsic value are often rooted in conation, the condition of striving to fulfill one’s interests or pursue one’s good. Paul Taylor, for example, describes living beings as “teleological centers of a life” that seek to thrive and flourish³⁰. On this basis he argues all living beings possess an equal degree of intrinsic value which he also calls “inherent value”. Holmes Rolston argues that living beings literally embody in fulfilling their individual and evolutionary interests.

In ecocentric ethics, the extension of intrinsic value goes beyond living beings to the other nonhuman entities such as species or ecosystems. Some ecocentric philosophers use the conative properties of living individuals to ground the intrinsic value of ecological collectives, which are characterized either literally or by analogy as living beings. Some thinker argues that species and ecosystems, like individual organisms, have morally relevant interests. Similarly, there are others who proposes that species are of life (i.e., made up of individual living organisms), if not literally alive, and therefore have intrinsic value. James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, depicting planet Earth as an integrated, homeostatic living organism, could also be used as a basis for a biocentric environmental ethic³¹. More commonly, however, environmental ethical theories extend intrinsic value to ecological collectives on grounds other than their status as or resemblance to individual living entities. Deep Ecology, for example, is an ecocentric ethic attributing intrinsic value to the flourishing of life in all its richness and complexity. For Deep Ecologists’ individual human selves and their flourishing nature are fully realized in relation to the

²⁹Campbell, E. K., (1983), *Beyond anthropocentrism*: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, p.54-67.

³⁰ Taylor, P.W., (1981), *The Ethics of Respect for Nature*; Environmental Ethics 3, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 197–218.

³¹ Lovelock, J., (2000), *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, P. 45.

ecological Self, which integrates humans, nonhumans, and the abiotic environment. Callicott, in a different vein, defends the intrinsic value of ecological collectives by developing the philosophical underpinnings for Aldo Leopold's celebrated land ethic. According to Callicott human attribution of intrinsic value reflects a socio-biological adaptation for altruistic sentiments, such as love and respect for the moral community, which over evolutionary time have increasingly extended from inner kin groups to human society and eventually the full biotic community of "soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land".³²

Philosophically, it is important for environmental ethicists to establish a sound ontological and epistemological basis for nonhuman intrinsic value, the wider, more practical significance of this project lies in defining the normative or ethical repercussions that follow from acknowledging intrinsic value in nonhuman nature. Paul Taylor, for example, argues that we should adopt a "biocentric outlook,"³³ conferring due respect to all living beings as bearers of intrinsic value. In another context Rolston suggests, we have commitment to protect nonhuman bearers of intrinsic value from destruction for more recent accounts justifying preservation on the basis of intrinsic value, while ecofeminists like Warren³⁴ suggests an ethic of engagement with love and care for nonhuman others.

More generally, environmental ethicists often suggest intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings should be granted direct moral consideration like good pester. The idea behind direct moral consideration is that humans, at the very least, should recognize and consider the interests of all morally relevant beings, i.e., beings who possess intrinsic value, in making decisions that might affect them. Some philosophers have suggested we ought to go even further and grant universal moral consideration. Arguments of this sort recognize that any criterion used to distinguish bearers from non-bearers of intrinsic value is contestable, and to some extent

³²Callicott, J.B., (1989), In *Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, p.

³³Taylor, Paul W. (1986). *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.

³⁴ Warren, K.J., (1990), *The power and the promise of ecological feminism*: *Environmental Ethics* 12, p.125–146.

arbitrary. Of course, universal consideration creates a host of practical challenges (how to arbitrate among interests or make tradeoffs if everything has moral standing?), leading philosophers to distinguish between basic moral consideration and higher tiers of ethical concern and obligation. But as persuasively argued by some thinkers, universal consideration is less a normative guide to navigate practical situations than a dramatic re-orientation of worldview, in which the license to unilaterally exploit or disregard entities as mere things, without first exploring the possibility that they may have morally relevant interests, becomes indefensible.

Ethics, one of the major sub-disciplines of philosophy, has historically been concerned only with humans and human affairs. As part of a wave of environmental consciousness taking shape in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental ethics emerged with the primary objective of pushing ethics, including theories of intrinsic value, beyond the human realm. Though we cannot provide a comprehensive survey in this review, we will offer a concise overview of some of the major positions on intrinsic value in environmental ethics. We begin by distinguishing between anthropocentric and various types of non-anthropocentric theories, before turning to the debate over subjective versus objective intrinsic value. We may say by discussing some of the ethical implications we might recognize intrinsic value in nonhuman nature.

Intrinsic value is a multifaceted concept that can be considered from various angles of philosophical inquiry, including the following:

1. **Ontological:** What is intrinsic value? What sorts of things possess intrinsic value? Are there degrees of intrinsic value and can intrinsic value be summed or otherwise aggregated?
2. **Epistemological:** How can we recognize intrinsic value and, if relevant, differences in degrees of intrinsic value? Is intrinsic value a discoverable, objective property of the world, or a subjective attribution of (human) valuers?
3. **Ethical:** What obligations or duties do moral agents have in relation to intrinsic value? How should we balance these duties/obligations against other ethical considerations (e.g., issues of justice or rights)?

Ontology, epistemology, and ethics are the three major dimensions of intrinsic value, which philosophers use to develop and explain their particular interpretation of

the concept. Different theories will be characterized by different ideas about the ontological, epistemological, and ethical status of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic value signifies recognition of fundamental goodness in the world. Though it may appear quite basic at first glance, the concept of intrinsic value is multifaceted, with philosophically rich ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions. Philosophers have characterized these dimensions differently, and it would be misleading to suggest any one, monolithic concept of intrinsic value emerges from the philosophical literature. We can distinguish between two major schools of thought on intrinsic value, one generally aligned with the work of G.E. Moore, and the other more closely aligned with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. These two camps diverge primarily in identifying different types of things as bearers of intrinsic value, which in turn leads to different ideas about how humans ought to conduct themselves in relation to intrinsic value.

Home Rolston's conception of intrinsic value

Rolston³⁵ debated about what environment has “good” in itself which is remarkably a milestone to the celebrated ethical issues in the present day context. For him, caring for the planet is a means to the end of nature only. We witness, as Rolston argues that from plants to the higher sentient animals have a sound survival system. They are capable to value their own world. An animal values its own life for what it is in itself intrinsically. In the same way plants make themselves, overhaul injuries, move water, and photo-synthase from cell to cell; they stock sugar, make toxins and adjust their leaves in defense against grazers, they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of possible insects and responses to other plants; they make thrones and trap insects. Hence a life is defended for what it is in itself. Even organism has a “good” of its kind; it defends of its own kind as a good kind.³⁶ Hence these show that everything in nature is valuable and able to value of its own. Holmes Rolston III says that environmental ethics should pay primary attention on nature

³⁵Rolston, Homes; (2006), *Art, Ethics and Environment: A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, P. 1-11.

³⁶Ibid, p. 1-11

itself and not on human interests.³⁷ In his opinion, environmental ethics is not an ethics of resource use; it is also not one of benefits, costs and their just distribution; it is also not one of pollution levels or needs of future generations.³⁸ He believes that an environmental ethic must illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards the natural environment without giving priority to human interest.

Tom Regan's View

Tom Regan is on the opinion that ethics which lays primary importance on human interests would give us an ethics for the use of the environment and the ethics which sets primary importance on nature is an ethics of the environment. He speaks of two types of environmental ethics - *ethics for the use of the environment* and *ethics of the environment*³⁹. The first one echoes anthropocentrism and the second echoes non-anthropocentrism. The advocate of an environmental ethic of the *second kind* hold that an ethic of such kind can be established if they provide proofs that animals, plants and all non-living things have intrinsic value. J. Baird Callicott adheres to this view when he says: "An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms and a hierarchy of super organism entities – population, species.... and the biosphere".⁴⁰

The environmental ethics which Holmes Rolston III and J. Baird Callicott propose is precisely an ethic of the environment which accounts for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards nature as a whole by appealing to its intrinsic value. Such an ethic attributes different intrinsic values to different living beings of nature, such as greater intrinsic value to wild in comparison to domestic organisms.

Regan examines this particular conception of environmental ethic and concludes that such a conception rests on a mistake because there is no satisfactory

³⁷Rolson, Holmes III, (1994), *Conserving Natural Value*. New York: Columbia University Press, p.

³⁸ Holmes Rolston III, (1975), Is There an Ecological Ethic?: *Ethics*, Vol. 85, No. 2, The University of Chicago Press, p. 93-109

³⁹ Regan, Tom, (1981), "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic." *Environmental Ethics* 3.1: p.19-34.

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 19-34.

theory of intrinsic value which can provide a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic (ethic of the environment)⁴¹. Regan is concerned with two issues. Firstly, what is the role played by the concept of intrinsic value in establishing the non-anthropocentric ethic? His intention is not to define intrinsic value, but the role played by it in framing a proper environmental ethic. He assumes that if intrinsic value is possessed by an entity then the thing is good-in-itself. Secondly he discusses four different theories of intrinsic value. These theories differ from each other in the following respects:

- some are monistic (only one thing is intrinsically valuable e.g., Hedonism) whereas some are pluralistic (more than one thing is intrinsically valuable e.g., Moore's view);
- some theories present intrinsic value as the sole ground of our moral obligation e.g., classical utilitarianism whereas some theories present intrinsic value as merely one of the grounds of our moral obligation e.g., Rolston's view;
- The kinds or types of objects possessing intrinsic value are all different in the four theories (one theory advocates that pleasure possess intrinsic value, another theory regards beauty as intrinsically valuable, another one says rational autonomous individuals possess intrinsic value and the last one says that ecosystem possesses intrinsic value).

This last difference, according to Regan, is concerned with the ontology of intrinsic value and it is more fundamental than the first two because he believes that this point has not been discussed much earlier in the philosophical literature regarding intrinsic value in general or intrinsic value of nature in particular. Regan discusses in detail this issue and argues that ignoring this discussion is a mistake.

Ernest Partridge's View

In an abstract of a paper, Ernest Partridge said that wilderness can be defended in terms of the intrinsic value of the experience that is gained through encountering it. He also said, affirming the intrinsic goodness is one thing and justifying is another. Intrinsic value is not arguable by an appeal to other values. To

⁴¹ Regan, T, (1992), Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake? *Monist*, 75, p. 161–182.

offer normative support of a value is to presume that value is derivative; that is not intrinsic. While an intrinsic value can be examined and recognized, it is not likely to be found as the conclusion of an argument. It is, in this sense, in the nature more of a datum (like pain or yellow) than of an assertion...something one has rather than one derives.⁴²

For Partridge, perhaps the best approach to a justification of intrinsic worth of wilderness may be of the experiences of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evolves directly by that experience. In this regard, Partridge elaborated his own experiences which he considered to be phenomenological.

Ben Bradley's View

As per Ben Bradley, there is a dichotomy between Moore and Kant in the concept of intrinsic value⁴³. While Moore is saying that states of affairs such as states of pleasure or desire, satisfaction are the bearers of intrinsic value Kant viewed that concrete objects like people are intrinsically valuable. Hence both the views are seemed to be contradictory. A short analysis can show the picture between Moore and Kant. Moore's theory of intrinsic value has three components:

1. That to say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it ought to exist for its own sake, is good in itself.
2. That to say that something has intrinsic value is to attribute to it a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property.
3. That concerning the claim that something has intrinsic value 'no relevant evidence whatever can be adduced.....we can guard against error only by taking care that, when we try to answer a question of this kind, we have before our minds that question only, not some other.'

⁴²Partridge, Ernest, *Meditations on wilderness*, The Wilderness Experience as Intrinsically Valuable, Viewpoint, Wisconsin Institute, unpublished and unsubmitted paper in early 1970.

⁴³ Bradley, Ben, (2006), *Ethical theory and the moral practice*; vol. 9, No. 2, published by Springer, p. 111-130

In these three central components the first one is an analysis of the concept of intrinsic value. The second establishes that Moore's view is a realist, objectivist and naturalist. And third is a thesis about epistemology of value is suitably elaborated.

"Nonhuman nature" is a highly generalized term. Non-anthropocentric theories actually fall along a spectrum of inclusivity, with increasingly expansive theories attributing intrinsic value to increasingly wider circle of beings, and for different reasons. As such, the arguments a conservationist might use to defend the intrinsic value of some nonhuman entity (or its interests) and advocate its protection would depend on which set of nonhumans was of moral concern. By referring to the intrinsic value of "nonhuman nature," we are vastly simplifying a multidimensional concept that has been debated at length by the environmental ethics community. It is also important to note that non-anthropocentric conceptualizations of intrinsic value are not unilaterally conducive to conservation efforts. Consider, for example, a case in which the re-introduction of predators might serve overall ecosystem health. An animal-centrist, concern for the resultant stress and suffering of individual prey, might not support predator re-introduction, arguing that the rights or welfare of individual animals ought to take moral precedence over the health of the system. In this paper we emphasize non-anthropocentric theories of intrinsic value as an ethical basis for conservation. However, it is also the case that nonhuman intrinsic value might, in some instances, present complex ethical challenges for conservation.

In the Moorean ethical tradition, moral agents should strive to maximize the goodness of the world, as measured by the intrinsic value of its constituent states of affairs. Though perhaps, conceptually simple, the task of computing the intrinsic value of some situation, let alone the whole world, is operationally challenging to say the least. For example, consider the state of affairs, which might have intrinsic value to degree five. It would seem to make sense that also has intrinsic value to degree five. But is the intrinsic value different? Or is a distinct state of affairs with negative intrinsic value that does not affect the positive intrinsic value of Lester's pleasure? Our point is that there is no objectively "correct" way to define states of affairs, let alone assign them degrees of intrinsic value, and different philosophers have proposed different ways to handle computation and aggregation of intrinsic value.

While for Moore intrinsic value is generally associated with the consequentialist ethics, which focus mostly on producing good or beneficial outcomes, Kantian intrinsic value is generally associated with deontological ethics, which focus more on appropriate intentions and dutiful conduct. In terms of intrinsic value, consequentially right conduct will maximize the positive intrinsic value of the world's states of affairs, while deontologically right conduct will demonstrate due honor or respect to bearers of intrinsic value. For example, a consequentialist might justify trophy hunting by citing the financial benefits it creates for conservation programs or local communities. A deontologist, on the other hand, might believe on principle that life is sacred and should not be sacrificed for sport or recreation, no matter how many beneficial outcomes might be achieved as a result. Along these lines, Kantian intrinsic value is used to ground normative claims about the duties and obligations moral agents have toward bearers of intrinsic value. Kant, for example, believed bearers of intrinsic value should be treated with respect, “always at the same time as end and never merely as means”. Interpreting this normative injunction as it applies specifically to nonhuman beings has been an important part of the environmental ethical agenda.

Eugene C. Hargrove's View

The non-anthropocentrists were dissatisfied with the concept of instrumental value of nature and with arguments based on human use and benefit from nature. Some of them propagated the view that nature has the right to be preserved. They argue that nature has intrinsic value and so nature has the right to protection from careless handling of human beings. According to these environmentalists, unlike traditional intrinsic value (which is attributed to art) nature possesses non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. This non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is opposed to instrumental value and consequently the term “anthropocentric” becomes a synonym for the word “instrumental”.

However, Hargrove believes that this is a misconception due to the fact that the pragmatists wanted to eliminate intrinsic value and propagate instrumental value. He insists that “anthropocentric” is not a synonym for “instrumental”. Rather the word “anthropocentric” means “viewing anything from the standpoint of human” or

“human-centered”. In his article “Weak Anthropocentric intrinsic value”, he holds that non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theories are broadly divided into two kinds – an objectivist version and a subjectivist version. He will gradually show that both these versions have certain drawbacks and so they cannot encounter anthropocentrism. He offers his own theory called “weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory” as a guideline to preserve and protect nature. He discusses in detail the objectivist and subjectivist intrinsic value theories and also Pragmatic instrumentalism. Finally, he presents his own new theory.

Hargrove begins with the concept of moral and immoral acts. In the history of western civilization, there have been two contrasting approaches towards morality. One is called virtue approach, where people were trained to develop a good moral character because moral persons alone can act morally. Such an approach is found in ancient and medieval periods. The other view is called rule approach where certain universal rules are to be followed very strictly. This approach is found in modern period. The effect or intention of rule approach, according to him, is to limit the range of ethical decision making so that weak our unscrupulous moral agents cannot waiver or modify universal rules to satisfy their own immoral desires.⁴⁴

The purpose behind the objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value seems to be similar to the rule approach because objective intrinsic value is independent of human judgments and man’s cultural ideals. Human judgments and their cultural ideals, at present, support preservation of nature but in future they may change in such a way as to destroy nature. So Paul Taylor a prominent proponent of objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory says that anthropocentrism is related to human culture; if a particular society’s culture does not promote nature’s preservation then the people of that society would not preserve or protect nature. Hargrove speaks of two kinds of rules – constitutive and non-constitutive which correspond to the rules of a game and the rules of a good play. Constitutive rules are those which if followed exactly under any circumstances produce a moral act. On the other hand, there is

⁴⁴Hargrove, E.C., (1992), Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No 2, Oxford University Press, 183–208.

relaxation on non-constitutive rules. These rules may be followed exactly or may be followed with slight deviation as circumstances demand. Objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is similar to constitutive rules because such values, being independent of human judgments and their culture, automatically generate moral behaviour in man.

The history of environmental ethic has seen changes frequently occurring in human attitudes towards environment. For instance, people initially thought that nature was not beautiful and this attitude changed afterwards. However the objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, like constitutive rules, has a stronger approach because it believes in the existence of intrinsic values in nature without being dependent on individual's attitude at all. But the question is: how can we persuade the ordinary people to believe in the independent existence of such values in nature? Hargrove suggests that it is better to discard objective non-anthropocentric value theory. We should defend the values of nature on the ground that they are a part of our culture. We can focus on the merits of these values as culturally evolved values. In this context he speaks about four kinds of values:-

- Non-anthropocentric instrumental value
- Anthropocentric instrumental value
- Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value
- Anthropocentric intrinsic value

Non-anthropocentric instrumental value – such a value is derived from the instrumental relationship of benefit and harm between plants and animals. It is maintained that one object (existing in nature) either instrumentally benefits another or not, irrespective of human's thinking and knowledge about its existence. Such values are independent of human judgments. Anthropocentric instrumental value indicates whether a plant or an animal is useful to humans or any living being. Such judgments are made by humans. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is possessed by living organisms that are centers of purposes and use nature for their own benefits. These values do not depend on human interests. Anthropocentric intrinsic value is totally dependent on humans. Living beings and nonliving entities are intrinsically valuable according to human beings. Such values are totally dependent on human judgments. Thus from this discussion we find that non-anthropocentrism stands for

“not viewing from human standpoint” whereas anthropocentrism stands for “viewing from human standpoint”.

Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists have two reasons to object to anthropocentric intrinsic value theories:-

1. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic values are desperately required to defeat anthropocentric instrumental values.
2. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists claim that there can only be one kind of intrinsic value and that is non-anthropocentric value.

Hargrove seriously objects to this second reason. The claim made in the second point, that there is only one kind of intrinsic value or even that this one kind is relevant to environmental ethics, is unacceptable to Hargrove. It appears to him that there is a competition between various conceptions of intrinsic value and among this recognition of anthropocentric intrinsic value is harmful to non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Against such an idea, Hargrove argues that anthropocentric intrinsic values are absolutely essential in environmental ethics and are not in competition with non-anthropocentric intrinsic values.

Paul Taylor is a proponent of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. He speaks of three kinds of intrinsic value – the immediately good, the intrinsically valued and inherent worth. He defines the immediately good as “any experience or activity of a conscious being which it finds to be enjoyable, satisfying, pleasant, or worthwhile in itself.”⁴⁵ This value is sometimes called intrinsic value. He proceeds to define the intrinsically valued and inherent worth. As Taylor says “An entity is intrinsically valued in this sense only in relation to its being valued in a certain way by some human evaluator. The entity may be a person, animal or plant, a physical object, a place or even a social practice”.⁴⁶ A person assigns such a value to an entity only when it is precious or he admires it, loves it or appreciates it. This entity may be a ceremonial occasion, historically significant objects, significant locations, natural wonders, works of art, ruins of ancient culture and also living beings (e.g., a pet dog/cat, rare plants, etc.). From a moral point of view, we have the negative duty not

⁴⁵Taylor, P.W, (1981), *The Ethics of Respect for Nature*; Environmental Ethics 3, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 197–218.

⁴⁶ Ibid p. 197-218

to destroy, harm, damage or misuse the thing and also a positive duty to protect it from being destroyed, harmed, damaged or misused by others. Finally, inherent worth is the value of a thing because it has a good of its own. Such an entity's good (welfare, well-being) deserves consideration and concern of all moral agents and the entity's good should be promoted and protected as an end-in-itself for the sake of that entity. This entity is a living being (human or animal or plant) and not any non-living things. These entities are objects of respect. This respect should not be confused with the attitudes which we have towards intrinsically valued entities.

Hargrove believes that Taylor's concepts of intrinsically valued and inherent worth are close to the concepts of anthropocentric intrinsic value and non-anthropocentric intrinsic value respectively. Hargrove feels that the central issue in Taylor's discussions is whether the intrinsically valued can be separated from inherent worth. If they cannot be then human beings can assign intrinsic value to those having inherent worth. Two questions may be raised here according to Hargrove:

1. Firstly Taylor has not shown that respecting something is equivalent to assigning intrinsic value to that thing, although he rightly holds that respect should not be identified with love, admiration and appreciation which are forms of intrinsic valuing. But Hargrove thinks that respecting something is nothing but intrinsically valuing it.
2. Secondly, Taylor said that an object possessing inherent worth is "seen" as an object of respect and this implies that no human judgment is involved here. Human beings simply see or discover that an object possesses inherent worth and then automatically respect that object. This account, according to Hargrove, is implausible.

Hargrove thinks just the opposite of what Taylor said. Hargrove feels that when an entity is seen to possess inherent worth, human beings alone can decide to value it intrinsically on the basis of cultural values. Thus human judgment has to be involved in case of respecting a living being. He explains his point with an example from the films 'Alien' and 'Aliens'. The aliens reproduce within another living organism which may be a human. The new-born comes out of that organism killing

that organism. Now these aliens have goods of their own and so have inherent worth. From this fact it follows that men will automatically respect the aliens (according to Taylor's theory) and will have moral duty to protect and preserve the aliens. But Hargrove thinks this is not the case. He says human beings will have such a moral duty and intrinsically value those aliens only if they (human beings) decide to do so. In the present case humans may not decide to intrinsically value the aliens because:

- Aliens are not safe to people and
- Aliens would have to be in its natural ecosystem and not in another ecosystem where they are very destructive.

In fact, Hargrove wants to show that a creature's good of its own is not irrelevant to the moral concern of the humans; only thing is that after realizing a creature's own good, humans decide to value it intrinsically and also show moral concern.

Hargrove points out another defect in Taylor's theory. The non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory fails to include nonliving objects in the purview of moral concern of humans because nonliving objects do not have inherent worth (only living beings, Taylor says, have inherent worth). So Hargrove do not support non-anthropocentric value theory and speaks of "weak anthropocentric theory" where humans out of cultural values will attribute intrinsic value to the nonliving entities. Among the nonliving entities cave is one example which will show the hollowness of objectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory in protecting and preserving the caves. Cave is not an object at all. It is a hollow space in layers of sediments. One can argue to preserve and protect cave following Taylor's definition of inherent worth. Bats, insects, worms etc. have inherent worth because they are living beings and they live in caves. So we can preserve and protect caves in terms of preserving bats, worms, etc. But this argument, Hargrove thinks, is not sound to generate preservationist concern. The strongest argument for protection and preservation of caves can be provided by "weak anthropocentrism". Humans will attribute intrinsic value to the caves and then decide to protect and preserve the caves. People will decide to act in such a way so as to preserve natural beauty. Hargrove clearly states

that he disagrees with objectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory on two points:

1. Only living entities deserve moral concern from humans and
2. Humans themselves do not attribute intrinsic value to living or non-living beings.

He highlights some portions of Rolston's theory to show the need of anthropocentric intrinsic value theory. Holmes Rolston III, an advocate of objectivist non-anthropocentric value theory, divides the world into two groups - beholders of value (humans) and holders of value (organisms with goods of their own) the value that the beholders behold.

Rolston also speaks of value producers or systemic value. Ecosystem has systemic value since it produces value and ecosystem can also be termed as a value holder because it projects, conserves and elaborates value holders (living beings). Rolston cannot give much importance to natural beauty because he adheres to objective non-anthropocentric value. But contrarily we find that he appreciates natural beauty. To quote Hargrove "Rolston writes, no philosopher has a better feel for and appreciation of natural beauty than he does". So Rolston has to introduce anthropocentric intrinsic valuing to make place for his own aesthetic values rather than to propagate non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory.

Let us now consider the theory of Subjectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Callicott is the most renowned advocate of subjectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory. Callicott developed two theories: First he has argued that humans confer intrinsic value on nature, but for the sake of nature itself. Second, human beings have to realize that he is one with nature.⁴⁷ An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which may serve human beings. A non-anthropocentric value theory (or

⁴⁷Callicott J. B, (1984) Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics; American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications, p. 299-309

axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some non-human beings.⁴⁸

So, if man is intrinsically valuable then nature is also intrinsically valuable. He believes that his theory is non-anthropocentric because human beings value something (nature) other than themselves; his theory is intrinsic because humans value nature for the sake of nature itself. He says that it is only humans who make decisions about which thing to be valued and which things not. They may value an object either intrinsically or instrumentally. They value nature as a possessor of intrinsic value.

An intrinsically valued entity, according to this theory, is one which is valuable “for” its own sake, for itself, but it is not valuable “in” itself, i.e. its value is not independent of any human consciousness. Hargrove makes three points about Callicott’s theory: First, Hargrove believes that it is not true that only humans can impose value on an object, otherwise the object would not have any value. On the contrary, nature has intrinsic value independently of being valued by humans. Second, Callicott’s position cannot be termed non-anthropocentric as he holds that the source of all values is human consciousness and this view reflects nothing but anthropocentrism. Third, his theory is “too much subjective”.

Hargrove argues when it is said that values depend entirely on human beings, it does not mean that all such values should be considered as merely subjective. There are some such values which are objective in character since these are values which are accepted by all the people of a particular society, e.g., cultural values. So these values can be regarded as objective in a sense. Similarly when human beings impose value on nature for its own sake then also these values are objective. Hargrove moves on to discuss a very important issue related to anthropocentric intrinsic value theory.

1. The term “intrinsic value” is confusing or mystical.
2. It will be easier for ordinary people to understand a value-theory if it is based on instrumental value.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 299-309

These arguments are put forward by the Pragmatic instrumentalists who believe that nature has only instrumental value. Hargrove dismisses the above two criticisms. Many environmental philosophers will disagree with this second criticism. It is certain that if we impose instrumental value to nature then it will devalue nature. Conferring instrumental value to nature will not persuade people to look at nature with respect.

Hargrove turns to the first criticism. Bryan Norton, a renowned pragmatist, says that nature has transformative value – a value that changes human life.⁴⁹ Hargrove disagrees with this concept of transformative value and says that it is not true that valuing nature will change a human life or move him emotionally. Valuing nature depends on our social standards just as valuing paintings depend on some social standards. The famous painting of Mona Lisa has intrinsic value not because it changes the life of viewers.

In fact many thinkers would not even understand the depth of the painting but still would appreciate it because the experts value it on the basis of some social ideals. Similarly nature has also intrinsic value relative to some social standards and ideals. Nature has cultural value. It is valuable in a non-instrumental way which cannot be rated in terms of money. People cannot fix any rate for buying or selling natural objects. Actually, nature is priceless or we can say, it is too valuable for any price to be set upon them. Nature is to be valued aesthetically and scientifically so that we all exempt from using nature as our means. Nature is comparable to paintings because paintings are also kept away from the market value system. Such values which we impose on nature or paintings are due to our desires as individuals, as a society, as a historically evolved culture to value some objects non-instrumentally.

Finally, Hargrove speaks about his own theory termed ‘Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory’. He justifies the name of his theory in the following way. It is termed weak anthropocentrism rather than anthropocentrism to specify the fact that nature is not to be valued instrumentally, nature has intrinsic value. The term “anthropocentrism” is indispensable in the name of his theory. Whatever is valued in

⁴⁹Hargrove, E.C, (1992), Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No 2, Oxford University Press, p. 183–208.

whatever way (either instrumentally or intrinsically) is to be valued by humans. It is humans who impose value on any object. So we cannot do away with the term “anthropocentrism”. But this does not imply that humans always value things instrumentally. There are some things which humans value intrinsically.

It is a wrong conception that human can value things only instrumentally. The term “non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is really more problematic than the term anthropocentric intrinsic value ...”. In case of the former name, the word “non-anthropocentric” is reluctant. The word “intrinsic” means “for its own sake”. Nature has intrinsic value means it has value-in-itself, it is valued for its own sake.

The term “non-anthropocentric” means that an object’s value is not derived from the value of a human evaluator. An object has value independently of any human beings. Thus the meanings of the terms “intrinsic” and “non-anthropocentric” are same. So Hargrove chose the name ‘anthropocentric intrinsic value’ for this theory. By this name, he emphasized the fact that nature has intrinsic value (value for its own sake) and humans value nature intrinsically (humans value nature for its own sake).

2.7: Conclusive remark

The dilemma is that most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in nature. That is the challenge. The debates about the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequentialists’ form to the deontologists’ structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the inalienable right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures’ basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving core of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our

Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to one of the most prominent European philosophers, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), for his statement: "Cogito ergo sum". Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as "useless" as astronomy. Galileo Galilei (1564- 1642) proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665), G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized.

The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Neass, Homes Rolstom III and many others along with the American Indian. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all its forms.

The Western human-nature dichotomy has long been criticized by environmental ethicists as a fundamental problematic of the modern age, which must be dissolved to curb the trend of increasing and irreversible environmental degradation. Dismantling the dichotomy could potentially de-center humans from the moral universe, into a more evolutionarily and ethically accurate position alongside the rest of the biota. And yet, if humans come to view themselves as part of nature, why or on what grounds would we ever limit the human enterprise? The great potential of a non-dichotomized view of humans and nature is balanced by an equally

great risk, that the use of important conservation strategies like protected areas often justified by ethical appeals presupposing a separation of humans and nature may no longer be utilized even though these strategies may still be effective and justifiable on other ethical grounds. Therefore, the intellectual shift toward socio-ecological systems thinking, “humans and nature”, is both promising and precarious. While this shift has begun to blur the boundaries between humans and nature, it also necessitates a careful and creative ethical framework suited to the unique challenges of protecting the complex world we inhabit.

Some thinkers made an effort in this direction, proposing new normative postulates for modern conservationists in a paper that stimulated lively discussion and debate. Two years later, however, this debate was stifled by the pragmatic call for conservationists to stop bickering over values, embrace their differences, and focus on outcomes on the ground. This pragmatic turn is somewhat puzzling, in that it suggests conservation is more of a practice than a mission, or more of a means than an end. In its pragmatic stance, conservation appears to operate with the primary agenda of “working,” a normative pursuit whose only principled commitment is to be effective. But we might stop to ask, effective to what end? What actually constitutes success? As individuals and as a community, how do conservationists define their mission in the 21st century?

Chapter-III

Intrinsic Value in Nature: Debates and Dimensions

3.1: Introduction

One of the most common tasks of environmental ethicists has to frame theories according to which nature (or some non-human natural entities) possesses intrinsic value. However, from time to time we have seen efforts to refute this project, the claim being that not only are the particular theories suggested as inconsistent, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature—at least in some purportedly important sense of “intrinsic value”—is in principle indefensible.

Environmental ethics is one among several new kinds of applied philosophies, which also arose during the seventies. That is, it may be understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to emergent practical environmental problems. On the other hand, it may be understood to be an exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by the magnitude and dimension of these problems. If defined in the former way, then the work of environmental ethics is that of a traditional philosophical task; if defined in the latter way, it is that of a theoretician or philosophical architect. However, in ethics if interpreted as an essentially theoretical, not applied discipline, the most important philosophical task for environmental ethics is the development of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism that inculcate value theory. Indeed, as the discussion which follows will make clear, without a non-anthropocentric direction the innovatory objectives of theoretical environmental ethics would be betrayed and the whole enterprise would let down in to its everyday routine, applied counterpart.

3.2: Debates on intrinsic value in nature

Western attitude towards nature grew out of a blend of those of the Hebrew people, as represented in the early books of Bible, and the philosophy of ancient Greek, particularly that of Aristotle. The Hebrew and Greek traditions made human beings the centre of the moral universe- indeed not merely the centre, but very often, the entirety of morally significant feature of this world. When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as the hierarchies in which less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more. To quote Aristotle,

“Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man- domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools.

Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all the animals for the sake of man”.⁵⁰

To take on environmental ethics, it may be necessary to perceive environmental issues from different philosophical angles. In doing so it is an obligation for philosophers and ethicists to articulate a passable universal ideal so that environmental problems can be perceived in a proper manner. Moreover, how we see nature and suggest norms by which our interactions with the environment are to be judged are also matters of concerned. Many questions are raised regarding the scope and issues related to environmental ethics. A proper analysis, in fact, shows that traditional western ethics is man centered. Human life is considered superior to any other life form. Accordingly, no intrinsic value is admitted beyond humans. Contemporary environmental ethics, however, begins with ‘moral extentionism.’

⁵⁰Aristotle,(1916), politics, London, p. 16

There are some debates in this regard.

- i) To what extent of the nature/environment, is to be accorded intrinsic value, and consequently, moral worth?
- ii) What is the criterion of according moral value? Some like Peter Singer, favour sentience criterion, while conservationists speak of biospheric egalitarianism. The latter hold that trees and plants have non-felt goals of their own. Even in an eco-system, species are to be accorded moral value.
- iii) Whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality.
- iv) Can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance? The welfarists say, 'no'. Conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system. Some thinkers like Warwick Fox, do not find any necessary connection between value ascription and conservation.⁵¹ They think deep self-realisation is needed. Some other thinks that only sentient beings have intrinsic value.
- v) The *fifth* debate is regarding absolute, objective value. Some feel that environmental values are not universal. They support relativist environmentalism.

Let us elaborate these debates thoroughly and comprehensively. The first debate is whether moral worth can be extended to the non-human entities and if it is then what is the criteria of such extension. The argument, in favour of those who support moral extension beyond human, may be put forward in the following way.

1. Moral concern deserves for anyone who has an interest in, or desire for, their own well-being.
2. Humans show a desire for their own well-being, and thus they deserve moral respect. That is, the well-being of other beings ought to be respected and protected, because these other beings have a desire for their own well-being just as we do.

⁵¹Fox, Warwick, (1993), "What Does the Recognition of Intrinsic Value Entail?" *Trumpeter* 10, P. 101

3. Yet humans are not the only entities possessing such interests or desires. Other animals also show a desiring interest in their own well-being, and thus they too deserve moral respect just as humans.

The first and second assumptions are basic premises of many acceptable ethics, while the third assumption is the important extension in the reasoning of environmentalists and animal rights advocates. If both human and nonhuman beings desire their own well-being and have a sentient capacity for experiencing pain; then both kinds of beings, in similar ways, can be either benefited or harmed. Hence, both kinds of beings qualify for moral concern. To grant moral respect to the one kind, but not the other, is inconsistent. However, this extension limits only to the *sentient beings* whereas environmental ethicists may go beyond the sentient beings. Aldo Leopold makes a significant entry in this regard in 1949 with the celebrated land ethic “A Sand County Almanac.” In that book Leopold advanced the idea of biotic right, the concept that everything on this planet, including soil and water, is ecologically equal to man and shares equally in “the right to continued existence.” In thus rising above utilitarianism, Leopold became the most important source of modern bio- centric or holistic ethics. He holds that there is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. . . The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is. . .an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.⁵²

3.2.1: Homes Rolston’s approach

Holmes Rolston, another contender of the first debate, advocates that there is no better evidence of nonhuman values and valuers than spontaneous wild life, born free and on its own.⁵³ Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, care for their young, flee from threats, grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited and sleepy. They feel pain of getting injured and treat themselves by licking their

⁵²Leopold, A; (1949), *A Sand Country Almanac*: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 238-9

⁵³Rolston, Holmes;(2006), *Art, Ethics and Environment: A Free Inquiry Into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, P 1-11

wounds. Thus we are quite convinced that value is more than anthropocentric. These wild animals defend their own lives because they have a good of their own. There is somebody behind the fur or downs. Our gaze is returned by an animal that itself has a concerned outlook. Here is value right before our eyes, right behind those eyes. Animals are valuable by themselves, able to value things in their own world. They preserve a valued self-identity as they deal with the changing world. There is intrinsic certainty for an animal as it values its own life for what it is in itself. Humans have used animals for as long as anyone can recall, instrumentally. And if we minutely look at the animal's nature, in most of their moral traditions, they have also made place for duties concerning the animals for which they were responsible, domestic animals, or toward the wild animals which they hunted. We modern people are too wise, if we think that ethics is only for people. But extension of moral concern goes beyond as we understand that animal lives command our appropriate respect for the intrinsic value present there. This is, of course, only an ethic for mammals, to some extent for vertebrates too, and this is only a small percentage of living things.

In the same way, as Rolston argues that a plant is not a subject, but neither is it a lifeless object, like a stone. Plants, quite alive, are unified entities of the botanical though not of the zoological kind, that is, they are not unitary organisms highly incorporated with centered neural control, but they are linked organisms, with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative units, additional stem nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as well as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds. Plants make themselves; they repair injuries; they move water, nutrients, and photosynthate from cell to cell; they store sugars; they make toxins and regulate their levels in defense against grazers; they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of pollinating insects and the responses of other plants; they emit allelopathic agents to suppress invaders; they make thorns, trap insects. A plant, like any other organism, sentient or not, is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, nourishing and reproducing itself, executing its program, making a way through the world. It checks against performance by means of responsive capacities with which to measure success. On the basis of its genetic information, the organism distinguishes between what *is* and what *ought to be*. The

organism is an axiological system, though not a moral system. So the tree grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists death. Trees have its own defense mechanism for which tree is defended for what it is in itself. Every organism has a *good-of-its-kind*; it defends its own kind as a *good kind*. Thus, the plant, as we were arguing, is involved in conservation biology. This is surely a matter of understanding that the plant is valuable, able to value itself on its own.

3.2.2: Edwin P. Pister's approach

Edwin P. Pister, a Fishery Biologist by profession in California, had a tough time to save the extinction of several species of desert fishes living in small islands of water in an ocean of dry land. He and his associates took the case of the Devil's Hole pupfish to save them from extinction. The fishes were threatened by agro business persons pumping groundwater for irrigation. Pister took a long journey to do the best needed including knocking the door of Supreme Court of the United States and ultimately he won the case.⁵⁴ This happened because Pister felt a *moral* accountability to save them from extinction without considering about whether they had instrumental value or not but they had, Pister believed, *intrinsic value*. However, this is totally a "philosophical" concept and he was unable to explain to his colleagues and constituents. As one put it, "When you start talking about morality and ethics, you lose me."⁵⁵ Finally, Pister found a way to put the concept of intrinsic value across clearly. To the question *What good is it?* He replied, *What good are you?* The answer compelled the questioner to test the fact that he or she regards his or her own total value to exceed his or her instrumental value. In general, people hope to be instrumental to their family, friends, and society. Even though we prove to be good for nothing, we believe, nevertheless, that we are still entitled to life, to liberty, to the pursuit of happiness. (If only instrumentally valuable people enjoyed a claim to live, the world might not be afflicted with human overpopulation and overconsumption; certainly we would have no need for expensive hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, and

⁵⁴Pister, P. Edwin; (1985). "Desert Pupfishes: Reflections on Reality, Desirability, and Conscience." *Fisheries*, 10/6: p 10-15

⁵⁵ -----; (1987). "A Pilgrim's Progress from Group A to Group B", In *Companion to A Sand County Almanac*, J. Baird Callicott (ed.). Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 228

the like.) The dignity and the respect of human beings direct to the commands of human ethical entitlement. This is ultimately grounded in our claim to possess intrinsic value.

3.2.3: Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor's approach

Albert Schweitzer, in advocating moral worth to nature, stated that the every life that wills to live and exist in the midst of life which wills to live. It is like one's drive to live where there is a longing for more life. There is enigmatic exaltation of the will which is called pleasure, and terror in face of annihilation and injury to the will to live which is called pain. In the same way, life obtains in all the will to live around us. There is no concern whether it can express itself to our comprehension or whether it remains unvoiced. Hence for Schweitzer, there is a 'reverence for life' toward all will to live, as towards one's own. Thus, the great concern of the fundamental principle of morality lies herein. Maintaining and cherishing life is considered as good and in contradiction it is evil to destroy and to check life. A man is a moral man only when he obeys the limitation laid on him to help all life which he is able to help, and when he goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living.⁵⁶ Paul Taylor, an American philosopher defends the same line of thought that Schweitzer advocates. For him every living thing is pursuing its own good in its own unique way. Once we see this, we can see all living things "as we see ourselves" and therefore, "we are ready to place the same value on their existence as we do on our own."⁵⁷ Taylor advocates that intrinsic value can be ascribed to species, to natural system over and above individuals.⁵⁸ Since, he argues, we ascribe intrinsic value to humans, we must ascribe intrinsic value to all other living beings for the sense that there is no rational basis to accept human as superior to other beings. Any individual who exists as a teleological centre of life does possess intrinsic value, and this characteristic is shared by all living beings. Taylor's notion of individual's welfare or good is broader than those of having consciousness or having interest. Any living

⁵⁶Schweitzer, Albert, (1929), *Civilisation and Ethics*; part 2 of the philosophy of civilization, 2nd ed., trans C. T. Campion, London, p. 246-7

⁵⁷Taylor, Paul, (1986), *Respect for Nature*, Princeton, p. 45 and 128.

⁵⁸ Taylor, P, (1981), *The Ethics of Respect of Nature*, *Environmental Ethics*, 3, p. 198

organism aims at realizing, what it considers, to be its own welfare. So any living organism has a definite purpose which it wants to accomplish in its life. This realization of purpose of completeness is relevant to possessing intrinsic value. This shows, at least in this sense, that there is no difference between humans and non-humans so far as intrinsic value is concerned. For them, nature has inherent or intrinsic good and this good is such that it deserves concern and consideration of all moral agents and the realization of good is to be promoted and protected.

3.2.5: Peter Singer's approach

However, Peter Singer has a different tone of voice with regard to the above mentioned arguments specially to Schweitzer and Taylor approaches. For him the defends that have been offered by both Schweitzer and Taylor for their ethical views are that they use language metaphorically and then argue as if what they have said is literally true.⁵⁹ We may often talk about “plants” seeking water or light so that they can survive, and this way of thinking about plants makes it easier to accept talk of their “will to live,” or them “pursuing their own good”. But once we stop to reflect on the fact that plants are not conscious and cannot engage in any intentional behaviour, it is clear that all this language is metaphorical. For example, a river is pursuing its own good and striving to reach the sea. Singer, therefore, suggests that in case of plants, rivers etc., it is possible to give a purely physical explanation of what is happening; and in the absence of consciousness, there is no good reason why we should have greater respect for the physical process that govern the growth and decay of living things than we have for those that govern non-living things. Again if we accept Taylor's thesis that humans and members of other species be treated at par, then herd culling would not be allowed because the same treatment to humans would definitely be regarded as immoral, as it would amount to genocide. Another problem that Taylor may face is the discrimination among species which preservationists usually do. Preservationists treat individuals of an endangered species with special care and withhold the similar kind of treatment to individuals of other species which are not so endangered. Hence individual of one species are being used as means for

⁵⁹Singer, P; (1993), Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, p. 278-9.

the preservation of individuals of another species. Hence, it seems, approaches of Schweitzer and Taylor are more likely anthropocentric than non-anthropocentric.

3.2.6: J. B. Callicott's approach

Drawing the line of Pister, J. B. Callicott called his argument as the “phenomenological proof” for the existence of intrinsic value. He raised a fundamental question i.e. *how do we know that intrinsic value exist* to establish his proof. This question, however, is similar to the question i.e. *how do we know that consciousness exists?*⁶⁰ Both consciousness and intrinsic value are matter of irrefutable introspection. Pister's question “*What good are you?*” draws our attention that one's own intrinsic value is simply unavoidable. More importantly Callicott argues that if we fail to establish intrinsic value in nature then there is no meaning of environmental ethics as because intrinsic value is the most distinct feature of environmental ethics. If nature does not possess intrinsic value, then environmental ethics will remain as an application of human centered ethics. He also holds that moral truth can be acknowledged and this moral truth is instrumental to justify that nature has intrinsic value. Thus Callicott had refuted Bryan Norton's⁶¹ anthropocentric approaches towards nature. In this context, Callicott referred the instances of voluntary freeing the slaves of plantation owners in Southern America during the period of Abraham Lincoln. The concept is that if the slaves are freed then they will get a chance to cherish their life and improve their value system. The same argument can be produced in case of environment. Human beings as we believe have intrinsic value having a life form of their own and we believe that to dominate or to enslave human beings like slaves is wrong. In the same way cannot we begin to believe that other species too are intrinsically valuable? Therefore, as argued, being

⁶⁰Callicott, J. Baird; (1995), *Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis*, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.

⁶¹Norton, Bryan; (1992), *Epistemology and Environmental Value*, *Monist* 75: P. 208-26.

(Notes: Bryan Norton fairly asks why we should want a *distinct*, non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. There is the intellectual charm and challenge of creating something so novel. And that, combined with a passion for championing nature, is reason enough for me, a philosopher, to search for an adequate theory of intrinsic value in nature. But so personal, so self-indulgent a reason is hardly adequate. What can a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic *do* to defend nature against human insults that an anthropocentric ethic cannot?)

intrinsically valuable, destroying or harming other species is wrong. Destruction of nature is a risk of our own injury and for the future generations of human beings in many ways if we do not watchfully preserve other species. This shows that Callicott arrives at an approach that promotes non-anthropocentrism in a different way. For him, both self-love and sympathy are primitive human moral sentiments. Human sentiments are the results of human reactions to the world; they are results of the ways in which humans are affected by the surrounding world.

Callicott also put forward teleological argument for the existence of intrinsic value in nature.⁶²In *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, in fact, a similar kind of argument was found. For Aristotle human happiness is an end in itself. The argument can be produced as that the existence of means leads to the existence of ends which implies that one means may exist for the sake of another. For example, the train of means must, as Aristotle argued, terminate in an end which is not, in turn, a means to something else; an end-in-itself. Otherwise the train of means would be endless and unanchored. And since means are valued instrumentally and ends-in-themselves are valued intrinsically. Moreover, if ends-in-themselves exist then they must if means do. Again, if means exist then intrinsic value exists. However, Callicott's argument seems to be contradictory when he says that the *means* are instrumental to achieve *end-in-itself*. His concept of self-love and sympathy, the primitive human moral sentiments, may be considered a means to achieve the end i.e. pleasure (a view of ethical teleology). This argument somehow invites the doorstep of anthropocentrism as Callicott augments to say that primitive human sentiments are there in humans because experience shows that it gives a better survival chance in the environment.

3.2.7: Arne Naess's approach

Arne Naess took a strong stand questioning the esteemed German philosopher Immanuel Kant's insistence that human beings are never used *merely* as a means to an end. But why should this philosophy apply only to human beings? Are there no

⁶²Callicott, J. Baird; (1995), *Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis*, *The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.

other beings with intrinsic value? What about animals, plants, landscapes, and our very special old planet as a whole?

Arne Naess, a revolutionary environmentalist mentioned that there is existence of greatness in nature other than human. For him, “To meet a big, wild animal in its own territory may be frightening, but it gives us an opportunity to better understand who we are and our limits of control: the existence of greatness other than the human.”⁶³

Furthermore, Naess elaborated, in regard to environmental issues, that the process of so-called *identification* perhaps is more important than any other. We always have a tendency to see ourselves in everything alive. We try to identify ourselves with the death struggle of an insect the way a mature human beings experience spontaneously of their own death. We relate ourselves with sentiments in a way that the other animals and insects struggle for relieve from pain, and death. We react spontaneously to the pain of persons we love and try to identify with the person’s sentiments as if the reflection on pain is a good in itself. However, to philosophize “seeing oneself in others” is a difficult job. A complete report on the death struggle of an insect as some of us experience such an event must include the positive and negative values that are attached to the event as firmly as the duration, the movements, and the colors involved.⁶⁴ So, for him, there is a considerable majority that adheres to the ideas about the rights and value of life forms. And a strong conviction is established that *every life form has its place in nature* that we must respect. Naess, in the first of eight points charter what he coined as “the platform of deep ecology,” or rather, one formulation of such a platform stated that the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth has inherent value. And from the above he had successfully concluded that the value of nonhuman life forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.

⁶³Naess, A, (2005). The heart of the forest. In A. Drengson & H. Glasser (Eds.), *Selected Works of Arne Naess*, X, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, p. 551–553.

⁶⁴Naess, A, (1993), Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 70–82

In oppose to these views propagated by the philosophers as has been discussed so far, there are group of thinkers who have drawn a different line of thoughts in regard to the moral extension to non-human world.

3.2.8: Robert Elliot's approach

Robert Elliot, taking into account of consequentialist and deontologist position, claimed to conceive that if wild nature has intrinsic value, then there is an obligation to preserve it and to restore it. There is a connection between value and obligation. If wild nature has intrinsic value it is because it exemplifies value adding properties. Elliot's favourite candidates are naturalness and aesthetic value. The aesthetic value draws together various other suggested value-adding properties other than naturalness, such as diversity, stability, complexity, beauty, harmony, creativity, organization, intricacy, elegance and richness. Specially such properties might be value-adding in their own right, but additionally they might, in conjunction with other properties, constitute the property of being aesthetically valuable, which is likewise value-adding. In this context Elliot focuses on naturalness and considers some objections to naturalness and considers some objections to the claim that it is value-adding.⁶⁵

3.2.9: Bryan Norton's approach

Another advocate of this debate is Bryan Norton and for him nature functions spontaneously to produce a pool of raw materials and also as a dumping ground for our wastes. Human beings in most way fail to understand that nature deliver incalculable ecological services. Again we also fail conceive that nature is a source of aesthetic delight and spiritual stimulus. Norton argues, to support nature protection we need to act in accordance with the interests of future generations (as well as of present persons). Because of it the ecological services and psycho-spiritual resources received from nature are taken into account with great enthusiasm. Hence protection of nature is unavoidable even for the respect for human beings (or for human

⁶⁵ Elliot, Robert;(1992), *Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness*, The Monist, Vol. 75, No. 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature, Oxford University Press,p. 138-160

interests). Thus, for Norton, there is no difference between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics in respect to its prescription in personal practices and public policies.⁶⁶

Let us turn to the second debate i.e. whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality. When we say that this human has intrinsic value, and this tree has intrinsic value, and this virtue has intrinsic value, and this owl has intrinsic value, etc., give way to feeling that the claim to accord moral worth to nature consists in two parts (i) plenty of entities have intrinsic value, and (ii) they have the same sort of intrinsic value with equal quantity. The second part is ambiguous because having the same property “*p*” might happen either “*p*” is equally applies to e.g. *x* and *y*, and “*p*” comes to *x* and *y* in degrees. The ambiguity concerns the issue whether intrinsic value is held equally by all intrinsically valuable entities. Some adopted the version of environmental egalitarianism and some other rejected it.

Aldo Leopold, Homes Rolston III, Arne Neass favour equal moral worth to all beings, whereas Moorean group is talking about degree of values. Again, Charles Cockell and some other debated that environmental policy has a size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals, hence they bear less “degree” of intrinsic value. The campaigns for the protection of endangered creatures almost always focus on those that are large and impressive. The list of species whose decline or abuse has caught the attention of environmentalists includes: Rhinos, elephants, tigers, whales, seals, lions, turtles, polar bears, many types of birds, domesticated animals, animals used for vivisection, and so on. Evident within the history of environmental ethics and environmental policy is the consistent importance of the size of organisms. Environmentalists do not often concern themselves with the decline of small rodents, insects, or crustaceans.⁶⁷ There are some notable exceptions.

⁶⁶Norton, Bryan; (1991), *Toward Unity Among Environmentalists*. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶⁷Cockell, Charles S; (2008), *Environmental Ethics and Size*; *Ethics and the Environment*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring), Indiana University Press, p. 23-39

The protection of the monarch butterfly has been an on-going concern for the North American Butterfly Association, and it is an example of a small creature that has attracted the attention of environmentalists and policy makers. In the United States, each state has a symbolic state insect, illustrating that some small organisms have value (although it is not clear what sort of ‘value’ mascots and state insects have to the valuer. Is this a reflection of an instrumental value - some type of competitiveness by each state to have a distinctive insect - or an expression of a belief in the intrinsic value of insects?).

To move on to the third debate related to both welfarism as well as conservationism a massive contradiction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is vividly acknowledged. Asking question like, “can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance?” has occupied a significant place in environmental ethics. Legally animals have no rights. Property rights are still the premier means of addressing the environment. But man centered approach towards environment is an illegitimate way of giving preference to human interest only. Specisism is discrimination on the basis of species only, without sufficient moral reason. Non-anthropocentrism helps to get rid of traditional attitude towards animals. The fact that it fails to mitigate the dichotomy between biotic and abiotic is mere abstraction and it leads to eco-centrism. Some sort of Anthropocentrism is unavoidable; a ‘perspectival’ anthropocentrism is objectionable. The main *objectionable* concern of Anthropocentrism is the human interest at the expense of non-human animals and non-inclusion of *intrinsic value* to non-human world. That only the human has reason, capacity of communication is factually incorrect. In this context a lot of examples like monkey and Rhinoceros can be provided. Even some non-anthropocentric approaches cannot go deep to the issues of endangered species and the ecosystem. Moral standing of the whole nature, including abiotic part is to be acknowledged. But at this juncture, we are in a pendulum of “The life boat ethics”, where ethics is on one side and development is on the other side. The reason why this dichotomy continues is as because the welfarists say, ‘no’ to any

damage to the non-human world and the conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system.

3.3: Criterion for acknowledging Intrinsic Value in Nature

Now the question “what are the criteria of acknowledging intrinsic value in nature?” needs to be answered in the light to grasp the very idea of intrinsic value in nature. The criterion will perhaps serve the required demand for the debate related to the value ascription and subjective objective dichotomy, which fall under the debate of (iv) and (v).

Before proceeding to examine the epistemological status of attributions of independent value to natural objects, it is necessary to distinguish two importantly different theories regarding that value. Some advocates of independent value in nature believe that nature is valuable in the strong, “intrinsic” sense that natural objects have value entirely independent of human consciousness. According to this theory, the value in nature existed prior to human consciousness and it will continue to exist even after human consciousness disappears. Other theorists adopt a less heroic version of the hypothesis, accepting that valuing is a conscious activity and that value, therefore, will be only “inherent” in nature. According to the inherentists, nature has value that is independent of the values and goals of human valuers -it is not merely instrumental to human ends-but this value is attributed by conscious valuers, either human or otherwise.

Hence the intrinsic value question reflects a long-standing conflict between rival epistemologies, with realists and relativists squaring off in a new arena. For their part, neo-pragmatists adopt an anti-foundationalist stance: the moral and ontological status of nonhuman nature need not be settled - indeed cannot be settled - before engaging in collective action on behalf of the environment. Radical pluralism at the level of conceptual frameworks need not preclude a workable accord on policy. On this view, solutions to environmental problems what Norton called contextual

sensitivity which is different from metaphysical certainty.⁶⁸ In this context Norton assumed two concerns:

- i) The Epistemic Question: Can environmentalists claim that their goals and the value claims that support them are epistemically justifiable, that they are more than merely subjective preferences?
- ii) The Locational Question: Can environmentalists' values are located "out there" in the world itself, independent of human consciousness?

From the above two issues it can be understood that defenders of independent value in nature are incorporated by a commitment to a particular conception of objectivity. According to this conception: For any characteristic, can be objectively attributed to an object x, only if subject S "finds," or "locates," in x; both and must, that is, exist independently of human consciousness. Because they share this basic criteriological assumption, the positions of Callicott and Rolston fall in direct opposition to each other: Rolston believes, and Callicott denies, that it is possible to achieve "objectivity" for environmental values, according to this locational criterion. Callicott, for example, states the issue as follows: "the very sense of the hypothesis that inherent or intrinsic value exists in nature seems to be that value inheres in natural objects as an intrinsic characteristic, that is, as part of the constitution of things. To assert that something is inherently or intrinsically valuable seems, indeed, to entail that its value is objective." Callicott, however, believes that there are "insurmountable logical impediments to axiological objectivism."⁶⁹ Rolston, on the other hand, begins his essay, "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" with a quotation from William James with which Callicott would agree. It concludes: "Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may appear imbued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind."⁷⁰ Rolston further states, "Nature, indeed, is infinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear her beauty as she wears colour

⁶⁸Nunez, Theodore W; (1999), Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p. 105-128

⁶⁹Callicott, J. B, (1989), *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), p. 159.

⁷⁰Rolston, Holmes III, (1986), *Philosophy Gone Wild*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, p. 91.

or sound. Why then should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?"⁷¹ He goes on to note that science itself seems hard put to maintain "objectivity."

Ernest Partridge, an eminent British philosopher advocates, and so, perhaps the best approach to a justification of the intrinsic worth of wilderness may be through an account of the experience of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second-hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evoked directly by that experience. To do this, one will call upon the nearest and most vivid source at his disposal: one's own experience. One needs to attempt, at the outset at least, to relate this experience with the least possible amount of preconception or post-analysis. Thus Partridge's approach is *phenomenological*. Following this exercise, phenomenological "brackets" has to be removed and attempt to be made to account for and qualify this experience. This is, of course, as Partridge said a thought- experiment that one might wish to try himself.⁷²

Let us turn to the second debate i.e. Whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality.

Aldo Leopold, Homes Rolston III, Arne Neass are in favour of equal moral worth to all beings, whereas Moorean group is talking about degree of values. Again some other talks that decision on environmental issues are adhered according to the sizes of species belonging to nature. In the other way one can talk about the degrees of intrinsic value. According to Moore, to say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.⁷³ But we can talk more or less amount of intrinsic value only when we talk of more or less amount of intrinsic properties possessed by an object. Intrinsic property changes only when the constitution of the object changes. Also we cannot compare the intrinsic value of an object with intrinsic value of another object in the sense that we cannot claim that

⁷¹Ibid, p. 91.

⁷² Partridge, Ernest; (1970), *Meditations on Wilderness, The Wilderness Experience as Intrinsically Valuable* unpublished and unsubmitted in 1970.

⁷³Moore, G. E; (1922) *The Conception of Intrinsic Value; Philosophical Studies*, (Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London) , P 260- 266

intrinsic value of a particular object is higher or lower than that of another. Intrinsic properties are incommensurable.⁷⁴ So comparing the intrinsic value of an object with that of another object is possible only against the background of a theory which contains all the possible intrinsic properties of all the objects. And perhaps, this seems to be hardly possible to accomplish.

Environmental policy is also size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals. Campaigns for the protection of endangered creatures almost always focus on those that are large and impressive. The list of species whose decline or abuse has caught the attention of environmentalists includes: elephants, tigers, whales, seals, lions, turtles, polar bears, many types of birds, domesticated animals, animals used for vivisection, and so on. Evident within the history of environmental ethics and environmental policy is the consistent importance of the size of organisms. Environmentalists do not often concern themselves with the decline of small rodents, insects, or crustaceans.⁷⁵ There are some notable exceptions. The protection of the monarch butterfly has been an on-going concern for the North American Butterfly Association, and it is an example of a small creature that has attracted the attention of environmentalists and policy makers. In the United States, each state has a symbolic state insect, illustrating that some small organisms have value (although it is not clear what sort of 'value' mascots and state insects have to the valuer. Is this a reflection of an instrumental value - some type of competitiveness by each state to have a distinctive insect - or an expression of a belief in the intrinsic value of insects?).

⁷⁴Chakraborty, N. N; (2004), In Defense of Intrinsic Value in Nature, New Age Publishers, Kolkata, p. 41-42

⁷⁵Cockell, Charles S; (2008), Environmental Ethics and Size; Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring), Indiana University Press, p. 23-39

3.4: Dimensions of the Debates

In the long run, the set of ethical virtues praised and the set of ethical prohibitions adopted by the ethic of specific societies will always reflect the conditions under which they must live and work in order to survive. The anthropocentric subjective argument already put forwarded may raise the environmental ethical issues within the framework of man's interest in nature. The varieties of anthropocentric arguments against the pollution, the use of gases harmful to ozone layer, the burning of fossil fuels, the destruction of forests, could be couched in terms of the harm of human health. The rise in sea level will wipe out the entire island nations such as the Maldives which is only a meter above the sea level. So it is obvious that there is value in preserving our environment even within a "human-centered moral framework". This is, hence, a kind of dimension that can be considered as "human-centered moral framework".

If examined thoroughly the debates related to intrinsic value in nature also leads us to think about the wilderness of nature that provides opportunities for recreation. It is assumed that future generation will also value wilderness for the same reasons as we value it today. Hence from ethical point of view economic growth is not more important than preservation of forests, etc. Wilderness is the source of greatest feelings of aesthetic appreciation, rising to an almost spirituality. It will do more to develop character than watching television for an equivalent time. It is for that reason that environmentalists are right to speak of a 'world heritage'. It is something that we have inherited from our ancestors, and that we must preserve for our descendants, if they are to have it at all. The appreciation of wilderness has never been higher than it is today. Wilderness is valued as something of immense beauty and is a reservoir of scientific knowledge still to be gained. We need to be understood that the virgin nature is the product of all the millions of years that have passed since the beginning of our planets. We may gain short term benefits, a luxury life style in a high rise sophisticated apartment by destroying our environment. But such boost may be futile in a fraction of second by a single jerk of earthquake. The recent such occurrences of earthquakes laughed at the human boost. This anthropocentric

approach, even though faced severe criticism from philosophers of other community, cannot be denied its significance even though within human centered framework. However, there are much more important issues which to be discussed considering its objective epistemic aspect.

We have already seen that it is arbitrary to hold that only human beings are intrinsically valuable. If we find value in human conscious experiences, we cannot deny that there is value at least some experiences of non-human beings. Although some debates about significant environmental issues can be conducted by appealing only to long term interests of our own species, in any serious exploration of environmental values a central issue will be the question of intrinsic value. If we go beyond the interest of human beings to the interest of all non-human will perhaps give us the answer to the question at issue. But there is fundamental moral disagreement; a disagreement about the kind of beings ought to be considered in our moral deliberation. However, to extend an ethic in a plausible way beyond sentient beings is a difficult task, because it might be thought that if we limit ourselves to living things, the answer is not difficult to find. But the attempts and approaches to ascribe intrinsic value in nature has opened up some new dimensions in the domain of environmental ethics. To talk about non-anthropocentrism leads us to the question of subjective/objective dichotomy, the question about mind independent existence of intrinsic value. And hence any theory that ascribes intrinsic value to nature makes two claims- 1) Nature is valuable because of what it is, not because of its relation with us. 2) The value in nature is objective in the sense that it is not a matter of individual taste or personal preference. The question is also incorporated about the satisfaction of certain requirements that constitute a consistent common moral norm. To say that if a thing/ state of affairs possess intrinsic value, then things/ state of affairs being similar to it in relevant aspects should be regarded as possessing intrinsic value. For example, since humans have intrinsic value and animals are regarded as similar to humans hence animals should possess intrinsic value or vice-versa.

Chapter-IV

Intrinsic Value in Nature: An Analysis from Indian Perspective

4.1: Introduction

One of the most important tasks of environmental philosophy is to construct a system of normative guidelines governing human's attitudes, behaviour, and action towards nature. Thus there are some fundamental questions to be asked are: how ought human, either as an individual or as a group, to behave, to act, toward nature? As we have discussed in the previous chapters by 'nature' we understand the nonhuman environment where human finds himself within. Questions like these presuppose the appropriateness of the application of moral, ethical concepts towards nature, viz., stones, fish, bears, trees, water, and so on. Any feasible environmental philosophy needs to provide adequate answers to these following three questions:

- What is the nature of nature?
- What is the nature of human?
- How should human relate to nature?

The complex of the problems constituting environmental crisis are environmental pollution, the aesthetic degradation of nature, human overpopulation, resource depletion, ecological destruction, and, now emerging as the most pressing and desperate of problems, abrupt, massive species extinction. These problems, which are essentially Western in nature, are not only tough and global but also they are peculiar as they appear to be resulted from both (1) a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of nature/environment and (2) an exclusion of nature/environment from moral concern or consideration in Western thought. Hence, to address environmental problems and eventually to ameliorate the environmental crisis requires the followings:

- (i) The metaphysical foundations must be brought into alignment with ecology- the principal basic science of the environment and
- (ii) An ethical theory must be enlarged so as to include within its purview both nonhuman natural entities and since the proposed metaphysical revision, most

generally conceived, subverts the concept of ontologically independent entities nature as a whole.

Thus, the theoretical project of environmental ethics on each of these two heads - the metaphysical and the axiological - has two basic phases, the first critical, the second is constructive.

In the history of Western thought, nature has been primarily appreciated as instrumentally valuable. In *Genesis*, it is said that God gives humankind 'dominion over the earth,' that is that natural things were created for the use and employment of man's happiness. In Platonic philosophy, from Plato to Plotinus, the created world is seen as instrumentally valuable for approaching an understanding of the formal good, and ultimately the Good. One might tend to think that nature was regarded as instrumentally good, but intrinsically bad by Platonic philosophers.

However, there is a tendency in Platonism and Neoplatonism, one which has a profound influence on subsequent Western philosophy, to regard nature as intrinsically good. Of course we understand such an idea under the rubric of providence. We can see the clues of these ideas in Plato's *Timaeus*, and explicit expressions of it in Plotinus' *Enneads*. This concept of providence holds a powerful influence over the thinking of all subsequent Western philosophy up to Enlightenment. To hold a belief in providence is to believe that the world is fundamentally good, that, being created by a good and benevolent deity, it could not possibly be bad. We can find in Leibniz, in 17th Century maintaining that this is "the best of all possible worlds." Despite the discontent caused by Leibniz's impersonal God, his belief in a providential world order is characteristic of that period of intellectual development that which we refer to as Enlightenment.

The initial criticism focused simplistically on the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition in Western philosophy. This criticism was primarily cosmological and metaphysical, but had clear moral implications which came under attack in the following manner.

1. God - the locus of the holy or sacred - transcends nature.

2. Nature is a profane artifact of a divine, craftsman-like creator. The essence of the natural world is informed matter: God divided and ordered an inert, plastic material-the void/waters/dust or clay.
3. Man exclusively is created in the image of God and thus is segregated, essentially, from the rest of nature.
4. Man is given dominion by God over nature.
5. God commands man to subdue nature and multiply himself.
6. The whole metaphysical structure of the Judeo-Christian world view is political and hierarchical: God over Man, Man over Nature-which results in a moral pecking order or power structure.
7. The image-of-God in Man is the ground of man's intrinsic value. Since nonhuman natural entities lack the divine image, they are morally disenfranchised. They have, at best, instrumental value.
8. This notion is compounded in the later Judeo-Christian tradition by Aristotelian - Thomistic teleology - rational life is the *telos* of nature and hence all the rest of nature exists as a means-a support system-for rational man.

An influential example which is essentially nonprofessional way of criticizing Western metaphysical and moral traditions from an environmental point of view was expressed by landscape architect Ian McHarg in the following paragraph:

"The great Western religions born of monotheism have been the major source of our moral attitudes. It is from them that we have developed the preoccupation with the uniqueness of man, with justice and compassion. On the subject of nature, however, the Biblical creation story of the first chapter of *Genesis*, source of the most generally accepted description of man's role and powers, only fails to correspond to reality as we observe it, but in its insistence dominion and subjugation of nature, encourages the most exploitative destructive instincts in man rather than those that are deferential and creative. Indeed, if one seeks license for those who would increase radioactivity, create canals and harbors with atomic bombs, employ poisons without constraint, or give consent to the bulldozer mentality, there could be no better injunction than this text. Here can be found the sanction and injunction to conquer nature-the enemy, the threat to Jehovah. The creation story in Judaism was absorbed unchanged into Christianity. It emphasized

the exclusive divinity of man, his God-given dominion over all things and licensed him to subdue the earth.”⁷⁶

Given this metaphysical and axiological conceptual composite at the core of the predominant and prevailing Western world view, the environmental crisis is the predictable, the inevitable, outcome. McHarg argued that:

“Our failure is that of the Western World and lies in prevailing values. Show me a man-oriented society in which it is believed that reality exists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos is a structure erected to support man on its pinnacle, that man exclusively is divine and given dominion over all things, indeed that God is made in the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their landscapes. I need not look far for we have seen them-the hot-dog stands, the neon shill, the tacky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined landscapes. This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropocentric man; he seeks not unity with nature but conquest”.⁷⁷

Thus, McHarg argued that to solve environmental crisis, it is necessary to construct or to adopt a different metaphysics and a different axiology. In the classic of early environmental ethics literature, Lynn White, Jr., makes the following remark:

“What we do about ecology [that is, the natural environment] depends on ideas of the man-nature relationship. More science and more technology going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion, rethink our old one. The beatniks, who are the basic revolutionaries of our show a sound instinct in their affinity for Zen Buddhism, which conceives man-nature relationship as very nearly the mirror image of the Christian view”.⁷⁸

The views of Lynn White and several environmental philosophers argue that the Western worldview and religious traditions which encourage dominion and control over nature bear the responsibility for the tragic state of our world resources and ecology today. The extension of this position is that Asian traditions have the philosophical resources that constrain consumerism, encourage renunciation, and support eco-friendly traditions. If indeed Asian traditions in general and Hinduism in particular, have fundamentally eco-friendly philosophy and texts that encourage frugality, lack of possessions, and worldviews that include nature as continuous with

⁷⁶Ian L. McHarg,(1969), *Design With Nature Garden City*, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., p. 26.

⁷⁷*Ibid.* p.24

⁷⁸ Lynn White;(1967), ‘Historical Roots of Ecological Crisis’*Science*, Vol. 155, Issue-3767, p. 1203-1207.

human life, one may wonder why the countries in which these religions have been practiced have had a terrible record in ecological disasters and rampant industrialization. The answers are obviously complex.

There are several articles on environmental philosophy presuppose that there is a definite connection between worldviews and practice. While there is some justifications to the last statement (all Jains who believe in non-violence are usually vegetarians), we must acknowledge that there are competing forces that determine behaviour within the Hindu philosophy. Recent academic scholarship tends to blame Western thought and Western actions for the devastation of land in Third-World countries. J. B. Callicott suggested that Western intellectual colonization is responsible for the failures we see in Eastern and Southern Asia. This view is also advocated by some Indian authors. As Lance Nelson notes, Vandana Shiva, ‘an important voice of the ecology movement in India, focuses almost entirely on the West, and the Third World’s experience of colonialism, modernization, modernist developmentalism, and so on, as the root of her country’s environmental devastation. She thus tends to ignore the pre-colonial aspects of the problem. In particular, she tends to give romanticized readings of the environmental implications of certain aspects of Hindu thought’.⁷⁹

4.2: Distinctiveness of Value

There is a common belief, which is also reinforced by S. Radhakrishnan, that Indian tradition is in and out spiritual in nature. Indian tradition is disrespectful of material progress and affluence and all that matters is progress in the realm of consciousness and spirit and not in physical and the surrounding material/nature environment. There are two clear trends in our cultural tradition. They are *ātmavādi* (spiritualistic) and *anātmavādi* or *svabhāvavādi* (materialistic). The conception of the ultimate values or *summum bonum* of life does also bear out this contention. Four *puruṣārthas* or basic values depend on the nature of the philosophical system as how these values are ordered and priority accorded to them. Sri Aurobindo, the great sage

⁷⁹Narayanan, Vasudhara; (1997), “One Tree Is Equal to Ten Sons”: Hindu Responses to the Problems of Ecology, Population, and Consumption, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer, p.291-332.

and savant of modern India, very aptly remarks, “A true happiness in this world is the right terrestrial aim of man, and true happiness lies in the finding and maintenance of natural harmony of spirit, mind, and body. Culture is to be valued to the extent to which it has discovered the right key of this harmony and organized its expressive motives and movements. And a civilization must be judged by the manner in which all its principles, Ideas, form ways of living work to bring that harmony out, manage its rhythmic play and secure its continuance or the development of its motives.”⁸⁰

There are several definitions for values which as follows:-

- Value is that which satisfies human desire. This definition is not acceptable to learned persons because satisfaction of desire itself is not the aim of human life. It is needed for the preservation and development of life.
- Some thinkers define it as that which preserves and develops life, but this too is not acceptable, since it is the definition of biological values only.
- It is defined as that which is conducive to self-perfection. Most of the thinkers appreciate and accept this definition since it refers to the whole system of human value.

A value is a value because it speaks to our condition, answers to our need and completes some demand of our nature. And the moral, central and fundamental demand is the value attaching to its fulfillment. In fact value lacks universal definition. According to Rokeach “values are beliefs about how one ought or ought not to behave or about some state of existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are abstract ideals, positive or negative, that represent a person’s beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals”.⁸¹ A value is a standard to influence the values, attitude and actions of others; it is like a yardstick to measure the actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations and purifications of ourselves and others.

4.3: Intrinsic Value as a Guide to Action towards Nature

In philosophical analysis, the examination of intrinsic value and instrumental value are closely linked to ethics. But the philosophical examination of intrinsic value

⁸⁰Shastree, N. K, (2006), (edit.), Value Management in Professions, New Delhi, Concept publishing company, p. 54.

⁸¹ Gupta, N.L, (2002), *Human Values for the 21st Century* (New Delhi, Anmol Publications Pvt Ltd), p. 14.

and intrinsically valuing as distinct from ethics came of age in the mid-twentieth century in different ways in the pragmatic, analytic, and the phenomenological traditions. But if all the perspectives and meanings of intrinsic value and instrumental value relate, to the idea of choice, they also relate to ideas about what we ought to do. Intrinsic value in this sense give rise to general standards and ideals by which we judge our own and others conduct; also give rise to specific obligations.⁸² Generally, it is believed that it would be impossible to make choice without values. Purely factual analyses of any given situation can only ever tell us what might be the consequences of different course of action. But simply knowing the consequence would not help us to choose unless this has some means of determining this set of consequence to be preferable. And that is not a factual question but a matter of values. The vision in environmental philosophy is to create a stand on which everything in this planet is loved, valued and able to fulfill their potential.

As we have already discussed in Chapter-Two that values which are instrumental in achieving some end are known as instrumental values. For example a sacred thing has intrinsic value. Anything which serves as a means to growth has instrumental value. There is no clear cut division between the intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic value in a different context becomes instrumental and vice-versa. The intrinsic values as well as instrumental values are problematic. To regard them as settled and to pursue those with any certitude seem to invite trouble. One always sees these values changing in all culture, though their rapidity with which the change takes place differs from culture to culture. 'Values change in spite of its universal character. One has, therefore, not simply to adjust to the changing values but to understand the process to change and to establish new values in cooperation with the process of nature.'⁸³

We would like to point out what is distinctive about the Indian conception of intrinsic value. Since, according to the definition and we have already discussed in Chapter-Two that whatever is the means of satisfying any of the needs felt by human is an instrumental value; the number of such values becomes almost infinite. But a

⁸² Chris Beckett, Andrew Maynard; (2005), *Values and Ethics in Social work, An Introduction*(London; Sage Publications), p.11

⁸³Joshi, H. M;(1986),*Knowledge, Value and Other Essays*, (Naroda, Jaya Prakashan), p. 248.

little reflection will show that there is no certainty with regard to several among them that they will secure the end that is sought to be attained through them. What was successful once or in the case of one person may not be so at another time or in the case of another person. Secondly, even when the means prove successful, the satisfaction derived through them is only provisional in that it is sooner or later replaced by a desire for some other mode of satisfaction. Thus, as ordinarily known to us, the instrumental values are for the most part unwarranted and the intrinsic values are all unstable (*ariätyantika*).⁸⁴ That is the irony of life, and it makes us ask whether there are any values that are not vitiated by these defects. The Indian answer to this question, to state it very broadly, is that there are two such values, viz. *dharma* and *mokṣa*. The other values are all brought under the heads of *artha* and *kāma*. These are the four well-known *puruṣārthas* - *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa*. We may call the former pair worldly values, and the latter spiritual. When it is said that Indian philosophy is one of values, it means that it primarily deals with these *puruṣārthas* and that the consideration of metaphysical questions comes in only as a matter of course. Thus *artha*, as generally understood, can only be a means while *mokṣa* is always conceived as an end.⁸⁵ However the conception of *dharma* is not to be considered as the means of achieving *mokṣa*. *Dharma* is the central point of Indian ethics which is to be dealt with in details.

4.4: Hindu Ethics, Intrinsic Value and Nature/Environment

Historically, the protection of nature and wildlife was an ardent article of faith, reflected in the daily lives of people, enshrined in myths, folklore, religion, arts, and culture. Some of the fundamental principles of nature/environment - the inter-relationship and interdependence of all life-were conceptualized in the Indian ethos and reflected in the ancient scriptural text, the *Isopaniṣad*, over 2000 years ago. According to *Isopaniṣad*, this universe is the creation of the Supreme Power meant

⁸⁴*Ariätyantika*, This list, though old and well-recognised, is not altogether satisfactory for instrumental values are located in it with intrinsic ones. Thus *artha*, as generally understood, can only be a means while *mokṣa* is always conceived as an end.

⁸⁵Hiriyanna, M;(1938), *The Indian Conception of Values*, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 10-24

for the benefit of all his creation. Each individual life-form must, therefore, learn to enjoy its benefits by forming a part of the system in close relation with other species. No species in the planet earth are permitted to encroach upon the other's rights which justify the intrinsic values in nature in Indian tradition.

The oldest visual image of the human interest, love, and reverence for nature in Indian tradition can be found in the 10,000 year-old cave paintings at Bhimbetka in the Central parts of India depicting birds, animals, and human beings living in harmony. The Indus Valley Civilization provides evidences of human interests in wildlife, as seen in seals depicting images of rhino, elephant, bull, etc. Historically, conservation of nature and natural resources was an innate aspect of the Indian mind and faith, reflected in religious practices, folklore, art and culture permeating every aspect of the daily lives of people. Scriptures and preaching that exhort reverence for nature and relate to conservation can be found in most of the religions that have flourished in the Indian subcontinent. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Islam; and others place great emphasis on the values, beliefs, and attitudes that relate to the cross-cultural universality of respect for nature and the elements that constitute the universe. The concept of sinning against nature existed in various religious systems. Classical Indian myth is replete with similes of human in unison with the nature/environment. Many of the rituals which to modern society may seem meaningless and superstitious were traditional strategies to preserve the intrinsic relationship between man and nature. The worship of trees, animals, forests, rivers, and the sun, and considering the earth itself as Mother Goddess, were part of the Indian tradition.

In spite of the depletion of forests in many parts of India, some sacred groves still remain intact as an oasis in deserts, conserving rich biological diversity. The maintenance of sacred groves can thus be considered to be an outstanding example of a traditional practice that has contributed to forest conservation, even though as a small measure. There are also examples of sacred ponds attached to temples in many parts of India. Some of these have been responsible for the protection of certain endangered species of turtles, crocodiles, and the rare fresh water sponge.

Many plants and animals have from historical times been considered sacred in India by various communities. The most outstanding examples are the peepal tree. The banyan trees and other trees have been traditionally revered and therefore never cut. There are a number of trees and plants considered sacred and grown in temple premises and are protected in other localities. More than a hundred such species of trees/plants in Indian society are considered sacred by various communities and religious faiths. These include the sandalwood tree, beetle nut, palm, *neem*, coconut, palm, *champā*, lotus, *tulsi*, and pepper, etc. Such traditional cultural attitudes, though based on religious faith, have made significant contribution in the protection and propagation of various species of trees and plants in India.

There are also other scriptures encourage planting of trees, condemned the destruction of plants and forests, prescribe that trees are like children. In this context, a passage from the *MatsyaPurāṇam* is instructive. The Goddess Parvati planted a sapling *Ashoka* tree and took good care of it. She watered it and took care of it, it grew well. The divine beings and sages came and told her: O [Goddess] ... almost everyone wants children. When people see their children grandchildren, they feel they have been successful. What do you by creating and rearing trees like sons...? Parvati replied: 'One who a well where there is little water lives in heaven for as many years as are drops of water in it. One son is like ten reservoirs and one tree is equal to ten sons (*daśasamodruma*). This is my standard and I will protect the universe guard it... (*Matsya Purāṇam*-154:506-512). The words of Parvati are relevant today. Trees offer more than aesthetic pleasure, shade, and fruits. They are vital to maintain our eco-system, planet, our well-being, and Parvati extols them by saying they are able to ten sons. The main *Purāṇas*, texts of myth and lore, composed approximately between the fifth and tenth centuries C.E. have wonderful passages on trees. The *VarāhaPurāṇa* says that one who plants five trees does not go to hell, and the (*Vishnu Dharmottara* 3.297.13) that one who plants a tree will never fall into hell. The *Puranas* differ in the number and description of the universe, and one may perhaps take the liberty of interpreting as symbolic of various levels of suffering, including a steamy planet we keep poking holes in the ozone layer. The *MatsyaPurāṇam* describes a celebration for planting trees and calls it the festival of trees. These

traditional cultural attitudes are the exposition of reverence for nature/environment and embodiment of sacredness and gratitude for life.

Many animals are considered sacred and worshipped by several Hindu and other communities, have received protection for centuries. The peafowl, sacred to lord *Kārttikeya* is never hunted and is protected. Even rodents are considered sacred and are allowed to breed in the famous temple of goddess *Karṇīmāta* in Rajasthan. The tiger and the cobra, though greatly feared, are afforded protection and respected on religious grounds.

Indian painting, sculpture, architectural ornamentation, and the decorative arts is replete with themes from nature and wildlife reflecting love and reverence, and therefore the ethics of conservation. A wide range of images of forests, plants, and animals are to be found in Indian miniature paintings and sculpture. The theme of the Hindu god Krishna's life depicted in miniature paintings underlines an appreciation of ecological balance. He is shown persuading people to worship the mountain in order to ensure rainfall. Krishna swallowing the forest fire also signifies a concern for the protection of forests and wildlife.

Innumerable examples of the status given to plants and animals can also be seen in the traditional sculptural art of India. The concept of *Vanadevatās* (tree goddesses), vehicles of Gods and Goddesses, sacred trees, tree and animal worship are depicted in stone and metal sculptures independently, or as part of temples, palaces, and historical buildings. In literature and scriptures too there has been considerable depiction of the appreciation and love for nature: *Mahākavi* Kalidasa, a prominent poet of the fourth century AD visualized, a cloud as a messenger in his *Meghadutam* and went into raptures when describing various seasons in his *Ritusamhāram*. Such an involvement with nature is reflected even in the visual arts which excel in their minute depiction of nature.

Indian literature effectively mirrors the ethos of its deep and sympathetic understanding of animals through innumerable stories. Even amongst these one could pertinently mention are the *Hitopadeśa*, the *Panchatantra* or the *Shuka-saptati* which abound in allegorical references to the animal world. The impact of the *Panchatantra* was so great that as early as the seventh century AD it was

translated into Arabic and has been very popular in the Arab and Persian world ever since. Though an interior form of life, animals have been endowed with ennobling qualities which provide lessons in morals relevant even to human beings.

We can find an extensive literature in Hindu philosophy on environmental Ethics in many of its scriptures. Along with the *Upaniṣads*, the *BhagavadGītā*s having more vital essences, which provide enough resources concerning environment. The general ethical framework and some specific passages from the above texts, however help us to reconstruct traditional views on certain issues like *ahimsā*, *dharma*, anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, question of value etc. By describing so, it is often necessary to make explicit what is implicit in order to show the importance of ethics towards environment. The consciousness of ethical principles can definitely bring out a new beginning towards nature. Hindu religious doctrines as a foundation for environmental ethics provide us with certain normative criteria for our attitude towards nature. We may begin with an overview of sources, methods and types of analysis in Hindu ethics. We may give our attention to certain discussions on scriptures in the Hindu tradition which expresses the sacredness of life and gratitude for life.

Hindu ethics uses the term *Dharma* to refer to what we call 'Ethics'. It is one among the goals of human life - the *Puruṣārthas* (*Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Mokṣa*). It is the root of other goals. It makes other goals possible. It gives life a purpose, design or *telos*. *Dharma* has been divided into two types: *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya*. *Dharmasūtras* and *Dharmasastra* texts give description of these two types of *Dharma*. *Viśeṣa* refers to conditional and relative duties with regard to castes, sex, stages of life, region, occupation and kinship. *Sāmānya* refers to generic moral principles (*sādharaṇa dharma*) and are twofold: sacredness of life and gratitude for life. There are four sources of *dharma* such as: *Śruti* (transcendent authority), *Smṛiti* (another category of scripture), *Sadāchāra* (the behaviour of good people), *Anubhava* (conscience or knowledge derived from personal experience). All these four sources are arranged in a descending order of authority. *Śruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Sadāchāra* and *Anubhava* are considered as foundations of Hindu Ethics. According to Klostermaier:

“*Dharma* presupposes a social order in which all functions and duties are assigned to separate classes whose smooth interaction guarantees the well-being of society as a whole and beyond this, maintains the harmony of the whole Universe”⁸⁶.

This means that *Dharma*, at least theoretically is its own justification: *dharma* does not depend on a personal authority that could also make exceptions and pardon transgressors. In its strictest and fullest sense, *dharma* coincides with Hindu moral philosophy. Though from an absolutist, *Vedāntist's* standpoint, good and evil are relative, the two sides of one coin as it were, the *Dharmaśāstra* tradition of India has laboured continuously to sharply separate *dharma* from *adharma* to spell out quite unambiguously what is meant by ‘righteousness’ and ‘unrighteousness’. Hindu moral philosophy however does an analysis of *sanātana dharma* (eternal *dharma*). They are universally and unconditionally binding on all humans. They are the foundation or precondition for all duties. Crawford observes:

“*Sanātana dharma* performs the role of watch-dog over parochial and provincial egoism.... the motivation behind *sādhāraṇa dharma* is twofold: the sacred and secular. *Sāmānya dharma* is impersonal and Trans-subjective for it transcends the illusory duality between self and other.”⁸⁷

The scope for interpretation of *dharma* brings out two facts:

- If a norm appears just once in *Śruti*, in as much as that idea becomes popular in later ages it can be legitimized
- Even ideas that never appear in *Śruti* can be introduced through one of the other foundations by arguing that they make explicit what is implicit in *Śruti*.

These two facts influence the order of listed values and can be changed depending on what seems relevant for a certain epoch. Therefore traditions cause elimination of undesired prescriptions from *Śruti* passages and elimination of values which do not seem relevant to the times. Bernard Gert⁸ asserts another type of analysis in Hindu ethics. He writes: Morality is a public system applying to all

⁸⁶Klostermaier, K. K.: *A Survey of Hinduism*, Quoted in Katherine K. Young, ‘Hindu Bioethics’, in Paul F. Camenisch (edit.): *Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics*, p.48-49.

⁸⁷Crawford, S.C.: *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals*, K. L. Mukhopadhyay (January 1, 1974)1974,p. 51.

⁸Gert, Bernard, *Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules*, Oxford University Press Inc, 1988, p. 6.

rational persons governing behaviour which affects others and which has the minimization of evil as its core. According to Bernard Gest, ten moral rules can be the core of human virtues. They are 'do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disable, do not deprive of freedom, do not deprive of pleasure, do not deceive, keep your promise, do not cheat, obey the law, do your duty'. These moral rules emphasize that prevention of evil is the most important goal of *Hindu dharma*. Gert thinks, the ultimate design (*telos*) of human life is to encourage spiritual development. In a better society it is less likely that a person will unjustifiably break moral rules. He analyses Hindu Ethics as a matter of morality, which is deontological. Gert confirms that according to the ancient Hindu thinkers, *Sāmānya dharma* is universal, public morality and it encourages by rewards and punishments. From this we can see a shift from a focus on injunctions and prohibitions in *Śruti* to a focus on virtues in *Śmṛiti*.

Virtues in *Śmṛiti* consider prevention of evil as their most important goal. The question of nonviolence arises in this virtue of prevention of evil. Non-violence (*ahimsā*) defines the moral 'bottom-line'. Other virtues on the lists identify common values. Young writes: 'Hindu moralists take into account the mundane goals of the individual's happiness and society's well-being as well as the supra mundane goal of spiritual liberation'.⁹ This type of analysis about dharma helps to ascertain the significance of Aristotelian method of analysis about dharma, even today, in the midst of elimination of undesired prescriptions from *Śruti* scriptures.

MacIntyre quotes Aristotle that: 'The virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve *eudemonia* and the lack of which will frustrate his movement toward that *telos*.... To act virtuously ... is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues'.¹⁰ This shows that the practice of virtues creates a stable and harmonious society by recognizing unity-indifference. Similarly, Hindu moral philosophy calls for benevolence and service to the world. Hindu virtues also encourage spiritual development, the ultimate *telos* or purpose of human life. Virtues can redeem and completes nature through human-

⁹Young, Catherine K., Hindu Bioethics, in Paul. F. Camenisch, edit., Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics, p.13.

¹⁰MacIntyre, A: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. The Old Piano Factory, 1981, p. 139-149.

beings. In short we can see that Hindu moral philosophy is largely a kind of virtue ethics. This emphasizes the importance of righteousness and its analysis as a significant factor to define Hindu moral philosophy.

In Indian tradition, nature has been worshiped and respected as God and deity who have given a wide range of scope for considering nature having a sort of value in it. Compiling all these aspects a trend of conflicts still resisting so far as ascribing value in nature is concern. Classical texts of Hinduism enumerate the goals or matters of value of a human being. These are *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* - the circle of life and death. While *dharma*, wealth, sensual pleasure is usually seen as this-worldly, *mokṣa* is liberation from this world and the repeated rebirths of a soul. There are texts deal with *dharma*, wealth, sensual pleasure, and liberation. The multiple Hindu traditions do differ from other world religions in having this variety of goals and array of texts to go with them. What all this translates is that there are several competing conceptual systems, intersecting distinct, which inform human behaviour and thus making nature intrinsically valuable.

The texts that deal with *mokṣa* or liberation are generally concerned with three issues:

- The nature of reality, including the Supreme being the human soul
- The way to the supreme goal; and
- The nature supreme goal.

Generally, the nature of reality/supreme being is *taṭtvā*. These texts do not focus much on ethics or righteous behaviour world; that is the province of *dharma* texts. The theological texts that deal with *taṭtvā* focus on weaning a human being from earthly pursuit of happiness to what they consider to be the supreme of liberation (*mokṣa*) from this life. It is important to keep this taxonomy in mind, because theological doctrines do not necessarily trickle into *dhārmic* or ethical injunctions; in many Hindu traditions, in fact, is a disjunction between *dharma* and *mokṣa*.

One may say that there is a fundamental opposition between them: '*mokṣa* is a release from the entire realm which is governed by *dharma*... It stands, therefore, in opposition to *dharma*. *Mokṣa* however, is abandonment of the established order, not

in favor of anarchy, favor of a self-realization which is precluded in the realm of *dharma*. *Dharma* texts promote righteous behavior on earth, and *mokṣa* texts encourage one to be detached from such concerns. A few texts like the *Bhagavad Gitā* have tried to bridge *dharma* and *mokṣa* paradigms.

There are various religious sects in Hindu moral philosophy living in complete socio-cultural harmony. Reverence for nature and its creations is the unifying ethical principle in almost all religions of India. They have all kept nature above man. Our ancient people learnt to live with five elements of nature, the “earth”, “water”, “air”, “light” and “cosmos” and actually worshipped them in reality and symbolically. We have lot of information about the relationships between human and nature and human behaviour and indebtedness towards nature from the writing in the ancient Indian treaties and literatures, the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads* are all religions prevailing in Indian tradition.

Religious precepts are embedded in the respective scriptures of religions. They also seem to find their expression in the structured legal systems of various traditions and communities. The praxis-centered concepts influenced wide range of ethical thoughts in such a way that environmentalists support their demands and principles and thought it significant to look into these religious moorings. Environmental Ethics had developed as a response to failure of each ethical theories or incapability of ethical doctrines to deal with problems faced by mankind in understanding humans’ moral status *vis-à-vis* nature. It is an acknowledged fact that religions have not only determined the way we perceive the world but also set roles individuals play in nature.

Consequently, neither religion nor environmental ethics can survive in all times unless and until they are tied up with appropriate hermeneutics. It may be necessary that a moral science of environment and its underpinnings in theological doctrines have to have redefined and re-coordinated for a proper interdisciplinary articulation.

4.5: Concept of intrinsic value from Indian perspective

Many authors claim that certain Indian texts deny that nature has intrinsic value. If nature has value at all, it has means to *mokṣa* or liberation. This view is

unlikely as an understanding in Indian tradition that accepts the doctrines of *ahimsā* and *karma*. Christopher G. Framarin⁸⁸ argues that in Indian Philosophy, if nature has value at all, it has only instrumental value, as a means to *mokṣa* which he considered as an ‘instrumentalist interpretation’ and this is implausible as an interpretation of any Indian tradition that accepts the doctrines of *ahimsa* and *karma*. The proponent of this view must explain the connection between *ahimsa* and merit by citing the connection between *ahimsā* and *mokṣa*. He must say that *ahimsā* is valuable, and therefore produces merit, because *ahimsā* is instrumentally valuable as a means to *mokṣa*. *Ahimsā* is means to *mokṣa*, however, because it produces merit. Hence, the explanation is circular. Framarin also said that the instrumentalist interpretation entails that morality is strictly arbitrary - it might just as well be that *himsā* produces merit, *ahimsā* produces demerit. Hence the instrumentalist interpretation is implausible.⁸⁹

In order to avoid this consequence, something other than *moksha* has intrinsic value. One alternative is that the value of *ahimsa* derives from the intrinsic value of the unharmed entities⁹⁰. This view explains the connection between *ahimsā*, merit, and *mokṣa* straightforwardly. Since certain entities are intrinsically valuable, non-harm towards them is meritorious. Since non-harm towards these entities is meritorious, the agent accrues merit. And since the agent accrues merit, he moves closer to *mokṣa*. Hence, it can be argued that this interpretation is more plausible than another alternative, according to which the value of nature derives from this-worldly utility for humans. The basic instrumentalist interpretation is that there will be a tight connection between a tradition’s assessment of the value of nature, on the one hand, and a tradition’s rules governing the treatment of nature, on the other. Indeed, we should be able to infer the most basic moral guidelines that govern the treatment of nature from a tradition’s assessment of its value and vice versa. Hence, it might be thought that an inference can be drawn from certain Indian traditions’ explicit claims about the proper treatment of nature to a claim about the value of nature. Specifically,

⁸⁸ Christopher G. Framarin ;(2011)*The value of Nature in Indian (Hindu) Traditions* in *Religious Studies*, 47,3, p. 285-300

⁸⁹ Ibid; 285

⁹⁰ Ibid ;P. 285

one might argue that the moral principle of *ahimsā* entails that nature has intrinsic value - that its value is not derived exclusively from the value of further ends to which it is means.

The case for the intrinsic value of nature is not as simple as we think. According to B. K. Lal, the virtue of ahimsa can be explained in the following way. ‘The Hindu recommendation to cultivate attitude [namely, ahimsa] toward animals is based not the animal as such but on considerations about how the attitude is part of the purificatory steps that bring men’⁹¹. For Lal, discourage harm to animals because animals are intrinsically valuable end of *mokṣa*. Both the attitude of *ahimsā*, then, and animals themselves, are only instrumentally valuable, as a means to the further end of *mokṣa*. Presumably Lal would also deny that other natural entities, like plants, have intrinsic value. Lance E. Nelson defends a similar interpretation of *Advaita* and the *Bhagavad Gitā* with regard to nature more generally. In the case of *Advaita*, Nelson concludes that ‘all that is other than the *Ātman* [true self], including nature, is without intrinsic value’.⁹² Similarly, he argues that according to the *Bhagavadgitā*, ‘[i]t is the self (*ātman*) that is important, not nature’⁹³. If nature has any value at all, it is merely instrumental, as a means to attaining or realizing the *ātman*. Since the seeker attains or realizes the atman only if she attains or realizes *mokṣa*, Lal’s and Nelson’s views are roughly the same: only *mokṣa* has intrinsic value; if nature has value at all, it has instrumental value as a means to *mokṣa*. Nelson offers two distinct arguments for his conclusion.

1. The first argument might be called the ‘argument from illusion’. Everything other than the atman is a product of *māyā*, and hence illusory. Anything that is illusory is devoid of intrinsic value. Hence everything other than the *ātman* is devoid of intrinsic value. Since nature is other than the *ātman*, nature is devoid of intrinsic value.

⁹¹Lal, Basant K, ‘Hindu perspectives on the use of animals in science’, in Tom Regan (ed.) *Animals and Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science* (Philadelphia PA: Temple University Press, 1986).

⁹² Nelson, Lance E. (2000) ‘Reading the BhagavadGitā from an ecological perspective’, in Chappel, C& Tucker *Hinduism and Ecology*.

⁹³ Nelson, Lance E; (2000), *Nature in Indian (Hindu) traditions* 287, p.140

2. The second argument might be called the ‘argument from pain’. It states that the world of *samsāra* (rebirth) and everything in it is inherently painful and unsatisfactory. If the world of *samsāra* and everything in it is inherently painful and unsatisfactory, then it has only negative value. If *samsāra* and everything in it has only negative value, then it lacks positive intrinsic value.

The instrumentalist interpretation requires further clarification. Within many Indian texts and traditions, morally praiseworthy and blameworthy actions are typically accompanied by merit and demerit, respectively. Instances of this claim are so widespread that they hardly need mention. *Manusmṛti* 5.52-53, for example, reads:

“No one else is a producer of demerit as much as the person who, outside of (acts of) worship to ancestors or gods, desires to increase his own meat by means of the meat of another. The one who performs the horse sacrifice every single year for 100 years and the one who will not eat meat are equal; the fruit (results) of the merit (meritorious actions) of these two is equal”.⁹⁴

For the person who eats meat indiscriminately, verse in the *Manusmṛti*-5.55, plays on a whose meat (*māṁsa*) I eat in this world, he this, the wise say, is the derivation of the thought is that by eating meat, an individual being eaten, or some equivalent pain, in another birth.⁹⁵ The *Mahābhārata* makes identical claims as follows:

“He, O King, who will not eat any meat for his entire life, he will attain a large place in heaven. In this [I have] no doubt. Those who eat the living flesh of beings are also eaten by those living beings. Of this, I have no doubt. Since he (*sa*) me (*mām*), therefore I will eat him as well. Let you know, O Bharata, this (is) the derivation of the word *māṁsa*”.

These passages make clear that both ahimsa and *himsā* have consequences in the form of merit and demerit, respectively. The punishment for harm is subjection to (at least) equivalent harm. One reward for non-harm is a lavish place in heaven.

⁹⁴Jha, Ganganath;(1999), (edit.) *Manusmṛti with the ‘Manubhāṣya’ of Medhātithi*, Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 5, P.52-53

⁹⁵Ibid

Furthermore, it is a platitude within the Indian traditions that demerit is counter-productive to the attainment or realization of *mokṣa*.

So, presumably part of what the proponents of the instrumentalist interpretation mean when they say that ahimsa is a means to *mokṣa* is that ahimsa is a means to avoiding the demerit that both arises as a result of *himsā* and postponements of *mokṣa*. Roy W. Perrett takes Lal to be making this point when he says that from an Indian point of view the reason one should avoid meat-eating and harm to animals more generally is not that it is immoral to eat meat, but that it is imprudent to do so, since it leads to one's further entanglement in the cycle of rebirth and suffering.⁹⁶ Harm to animals produces demerit, which prolongs *samsāra*, and hence postpones that which one attains when one escapes *samsāra* - namely *mokṣa*. It is because the postponement of moksha is of intrinsic disvalue that demerit has instrumental disvalue, and *himsā* has instrumental disvalue because it produces demerit. At the very least, *ahimsā* is a means to avoiding these consequences of *himsā*, and its value is at least partly explained by this. The benefits of *ahimsā* are not entirely negative, however. It is also a platitude within the Indian traditions that certain forms of merit are a condition of the eventual attainment or realization of *mokṣa*. Consider a straightforward argument for this claim: in order to be born a human being, one must have sufficient merit. In order to attain *mokṣa*, one must be born a human being. Hence in order to attain *mokṣa*, one must accrue sufficient merit. Hence *ahimsā* is a means to *mokṣa* at least in part because it is a means to merit.

O. P. Dwevedi in his essay *Dhārmic ecology*⁹⁷ mentioned about Eco-spirituality from four different angles. *VasudevaSarbam, vasudhaivakutambakam, sarva-bhuta-hita*. One of the main postulates of *Bhāgavad Gitā* is that the Supreme Being resides in all.⁹⁸ Chapter -7, verse - 9 of *Gitā* states,

Only after taking many births is a wise person able to comprehend the basic philosophy of creation; which is: whatever is, is *Vasudeva*. If anyone understands this fundamental, such a person is indeed a *Mahātma*.

⁹⁶Perrett, Roy W. (1993) 'Moral vegetarianism and the Indian tradition', in Ninian Smart & Shivesh Thakur (eds) *Ethical and Political Dilemmas of Modern India* (New York NY: St Martin's Press)

⁹⁷*Hinduism and Ecology*, 2000, edit. Christopher Key Chappel and Mary Evelyn Tucker, Harvard University Press. , p-5

⁹⁸*Bhāgavad Gitā*, 7:9.

In *Gītā*-13:13, lord Krishna says, “He resides in everywhere.” The same way of explanation being found in *ŚrīmadBhāgavadMahāpurāṇa*,⁹⁹ “ether, air, fire, water, earth, planets, all creatures, directions, trees and plants, rivers and seas, they all are organs of God’s body; remembering this, a devotee respects all species.” The basic concept is that the presence God in all and treating the creation in respect without harming and exploiting others. In the *Mahābhārata*,¹⁰⁰ it is claimed that all living beings have soul, and God resides as their inner soul: *sarbobhūtāmbhūtastho*. This means that no species will encroach upon the other rights without permission. This stipulation is also endorsed in another stanza in *Mahābhārata* which is as follows:

“The father of all creatures, made the sky. From sky He made water, and from water he made fire and air. From fire and water the earth came into existence. Actually mountains are his bones, earth is the flesh, sea is the blood, and sky is his abdomen. The sun and moon are his eyes. The upper part of the sky is his head, the earth is his feet. The directions are his hands.”¹⁰¹

This shows that the God and the nature are one and the same in Indian philosophical tradition. Hence if *Brahman* is being realized by *Atman* and *Brahman* exists in all and realization of *Brahman* is the ultimate liberation (*moṁṣa*) which is being considered having intrinsic value than all creations of *Brahman* too have the same value.

4.6: Scriptural importance of Hindu Environmental Ethics

Ethics in general can be confirmed with concerned theories. But religious ethics is always obligatory to their respective scriptures. Unless and until there is definitely a matured moral thinking, scripture of a religion cannot be explicable. Acceptance by a group or a sect is not the issue. The issue is how far the moral law is justifiable to scriptures. The salient features must be disciplined according to the scriptural text even if it is revealed in different times and situations. The value of

⁹⁹*SrīmadBhāgavad Mahāpurāṇa*, 2: 2- 41.

¹⁰⁰*Mahabharata, MakshadharmaParva*, Trns, Ganguly, Kishori Mohan 182: 20.

¹⁰¹*Mahabharata, MakshadharmaParva*, Trns, Ganguly, Kishori Mohan 182:14-19

language, whether it is sacred or ordinary, is not important while its significance lies in the concurrence to scripture.

Vedas contain justifications in value of nature and its intrinsic capacity. The *Rig*, *Yajur*, *Sāma* and *Atharva* explain the patterns of worship and its dignitaries. Each *Veda* has *mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka* and *Upaniṣad*. *Mantras* are *Samhitās*. It gives order of rituals. *Brāhmaṇa* explains the *Prajāpati* as *Iśwara* or Almighty. *Āraṇyakas* are secret spiritual advices. *Upanishads* explain spiritual wisdom and noble paths to *mokṣa*. *Gītā* gives *Bhakti Mārga* significantly, in the midst of *Karma mārga* and *jñānamārga*. *Gītā* is the gospel for liberation from *ajñāna*. *Gītā* explains *bhakti mārga* as *Karma mārga*. We can summarize *Vedas* as exemplifying *Sādhāṇadharma* rather than *Viśeṣadharma*. But *Gītā* emphasizes *Viśeṣadharma* that gives responsibilities of *Brāhmin*, *Ṛṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas* and *Śudras*, which are entirely different. Each category has each *Viśeṣadharma*. But every life has equal *āśramadharmas* - *Brahmacarya*, *Gārhasthya*, *Vānaprastha* and *Sanyāsa*.

The *Vedas* expresses concern for nature by providing a metaphysical union between the human and non-human beings, the adherence to which seems necessary for us to establish and sustain a proper relationship between the physical nature and us. In ecological terms the Vedic hymns provide us with a number of insights. *Vedas* speak of an inexplicable unity of creation and a mysterious interconnectedness of everything to everything else. Each thing has an interest and purpose to fulfill in the web of being. It is this that makes each and everything worthy of moral consideration.

A remarkable feature of the Hindu religious tradition pointed out by Billimoria, is that ethical ponderings from its very beginnings were closely related to the awareness of nature. The underlying principle is *Ṛta* or the cosmic order. According to the *Ṛta* the highest good is identified with the total harmony with the cosmic or natural order. Crawford writes:

“The ethical impact of *Ṛta* on the vedic mind is seen in the confidence it generated in respect to the goodness of life in the world - consciousness of *Ṛta* imported the feeling of being at home in the world. It offered solidarity and security. The world was not a place where blind, capricious forces held

sway, but was a benevolent habitat in which men could expect to enjoy all the good things of life - material and spiritual.”¹⁰²

We can find in *Atharva Veda* that *satya* is identified with *Dharma* which is the law that governs all beings, there by rendering the notion of *Ṛta* in a deeper ethical sense.

With the *Upaniṣads*, the early ritualism of *Vedas* gave way to metaphysical knowledge that contributed significantly in evolving a worldview that accorded the highest or transcendental prominence to the supreme principle called *Brahman*. *Brahman* was conceived as the ultimate reality that characterizes the Self of all beings. In fact *Brahman* as the indivisible, ultimate reality of which no greater can be conceived becomes the presupposition for all other thinking, be it intellectual, social or moral. This metaphysical view is called *Vedānta* philosophy. However in some dominant forms of *Vedānta*, the reality of the world and all things and relations within them is taken to be illusory, the only reality being *Brahman*. Thus, *AdvaitaVedānta* speaks of the world as *māyā*, as ultimately unreal.

Hinduism is a religious tradition where we can find the interconnected concepts of non-injury (*ahimsā*), the oneness of all living beings and self- realization. Environmental ethics acquires a vital significance in Hindu scriptures. According to Naess, all Hindu scriptures have become part of the vocabulary of environmental ethics. He interprets *Bhagavad Gitā* and other texts of Hinduism as supporting Deep Ecology. Verse 6:29 of *Bhagavad Gitā* is very significant to Environmental Ethics. It reads:

“*Sarvabhuta-sthamatmanamSarva-bhutamcatmaniiksate
yoga yuktatmasarvatraSamadarsanah*”.

This means, “He sees himself is yoked in discipline, and who sees the same everywhere.” It is but natural for any one with some knowledge of the religious traditions constituting Hinduism to find the interconnectedness between human and his environment, which provides universal harmony. Without self-realization, the above-mentioned harmony will be impracticable. However not all environmental

¹⁰²Crawford. S. C.: *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals*, Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, 1982, p. 14

thinkers would agree with the Hindu conception of discipline and the ideal of self-realization as necessary requirements for environmental ethics. Thus Jacobsen argues:

“Environmentalism teaches neither liberation from the world nor the ultimate value of the social order. On the contrary environmentalism has *samsāra*, the world of the natural processes of birth, flourishing of life, decay and death as its ultimate concern.”³²

If so, what is the relevance of the *Gītā* and how does it relate to ecosophy? Jacobsen investigates to tackle these hurdles through the commentaries of the *Gītā*. This helps us to acquire a coordinated concept, which forms a methodology in Hindu environmentalism. The *Gītā* comprises chapters -23 to 40 of the *Bhīṣmaparva* of the *Mahābhārata*, but it has been treated as a separate work. It recounts the dialogue between the God Krishna and one of the Pāṇḍava brothers, Arjuna, just before the beginning of the battle of Kurukṣetra between the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas. Arjuna was a Kṣatriya and it was therefore his duty to fight battles.

At the beginning of the Kurukṣetra battle Arjuna suffers a breakdown and wants to withdraw from the battle because he feels that killing other humans would be wrong and would destroy social order or *dharma*. But Lord Krishna convinces Arjunathat there is a superior order for ahimsa and its *dharma* is the knowledge of the self. It transforms the material principles of *dharma* to a conception of *svadharma*.

This conception of *dharma* exhorts one to perform one’s duties by forgetting the results of one’s actions. The unique message of the *Gita* is that if one’s duties are performed without attachment to the fruits of action, that is, without egoism, one is not bound to the world of rebirth (*samsāra*). Discipline is more important than *ahimsā*. Self-realization is nevertheless an acknowledged fact of discipline. *Ahimsā* is only a distinguished reality of discipline. *Ahimsā* cannot survive the entire gamut of being. If *ahimsā* is taken into account in its entirety the systems of organic life will collapse. Brokington points out that “*Dharma* is incomplete, if it contemplates *ahimsā* alone.”¹⁰³

³² Jacobsen, Knut A. : *Bhagavadgita, Ecosophy T. and Deep Ecology* in *Inquiry*, Vol. 39, No.:2, June 96, p 233.

¹⁰³ Brockington, J. L, (1996), *The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its Continuity and Diversity*, Quoted in Knut A. Jacobsen: *Bhagavadgita, Ecosophy T. and Deep Ecology* in *Inquiry*, vol. 39, No. 2, p.220.

Ramanuja gives a purely religious interpretation of *Bhagavad Gitā*. According to him the world is part of God and totally dependent on him, but it is a mistake to identify the self with the body and the natural processes. Inequality belongs to *Prkṛiti*. Living beings do not share one self, but the selves of beings are similar. Thus, when one knows one's own self, one knows that all other *ātman*s have the same form. Mādhva reads the import of Hindu texts not as espousing monism but as monotheism. He believed in a personal God (*paramēśvara*). God controls everything. However all these commentators accord the real identity of the self and its relationships as conducive to a genuine environmental ethics.

The contemporary thinkers like Gandhi and Radhakrishnan have played a major role that could creatively reinterpret Hinduism as supporting the deep ecology to a great extent. Monastic traditions defined Hinduism with a focus on the liberation from the world. Contemporary thinkers used the religious foundations of Hinduism as a tool to eradicate the social evils in Hindu society. This improvement gave new meanings to the concepts of dharma, self-realization and the unity of all beings. Modern Indian thinking is radical in interpreting *Bhagavad Gitā* as a science of salvation.

Arvind Sharma affirms the combination of ascetic and contemplative ideas of Gandhi and Radhakrishnan to a programme for political action.¹⁰⁴ Gandhi thought *Mokṣa* as inseparably related to one's social duty (*dharma*). He found the essence of the *Gitā* (18: 2-55 and 2-72). He calls them as the markings of a *satyāgrahi* (*sthitaprajña*). Naess notes: Gandhi recognised a basic common right to live and blossom to self-realisation applicable to any being having interests or needs. Gandhi made manifest the internal relation between self-realization, non-violence and what is sometimes called bio-spherical egalitarianism. Radhakrishnan comments on the *Bhagavad Gitā*, 6: 29, in the following way:

Though, in the process of attaining the vision of self, we had to retreat from outward things and separate the self from the world, when the vision is attained the world is drawn into the self. On the ethical plane, this means that there should grow a

¹⁰⁴ Sharma, Arvind, *The Hindu Gita: Ancient and classical interpretations of the Bhagvatgita*, Quoted in Knut A. Jacobsen, op.cit., p.226

detachment from the world and when it is attained, a return to it through love, suffering and sacrifice for it. The sense of a separate finite self with its hopes and fears, its likes and dislikes is destroyed.¹⁰⁵

Arne Naess' statement on Gandhi is also relevant to the above interpretation given by Radhakrishnan. From this discussion we can say, according to the philosophies of oneness, the path goes first inwards only to lead out again to everything. The path of action, *Karmamārga*, leads a *Karmayogi* into contact with all creatures. This path enables one to see the greater self everywhere.

4.7: *Ahimsā* and Environmental Ethics

Let us examine the role of *ahimsā* as the ethical principle and virtue par excellence. *Ahimsā* as a central concept of ethics, and virtue in particular, creates some moral dilemmas with regard to certain environmental paradoxes. *Ahimsā* can be defined as 'sanctity of life' in western parlance while it is 'non-injury' principle in the east. We can see religious-moral connotations of ahimsa in *ChhāndogyaUpaniṣad*, which speaks of non-injury, safety and protection. Ahimsa can be a universal moral principle, which keeps the ultimate goal of life as liberation. However, there are disputes on accepting ahimsa as moral principle because of its conditional, partial sense. Thus Young asks: 'Can *ahimsā* be called as a moral principle when it is conditional and partial in sense?'

But this issue is not very serious before modern ethical thinkers who encouraged *ahimsā* as an immediate tool to solve several ethical issues. Hindu concept of ahimsa states 'what ought to be done rather than what is useful to do'. Heterodox Hindu movements (Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism) also upheld the validity of ahimsa. The desire to live and the avoidance of death are common to all sentient beings. We can see several passages from *Mahābhārata*, which claims that one who is wise gives the gift of fearlessness (*abbaya*) to all beings. This improves our understandings about ethics and our environmental need. Our ethical life provides concentration in future security. Our violence is certainly reflective upon

¹⁰⁵Radhakrishnan, S,(1996),*TheBhagvatgita*, Quoted in Knut A. Jacobsen: Bhagavatgita, Ecosophy T, and Deep Ecology' in *Inquiry*, Vol 39, No: 2, p 230.

environmental ethics. The *Yajurveda* states ‘may all beings look at me with a friendly eye, may I do likewise and may we all look on each other with the eyes of a friend’ (*Yajurveda* 36: 18).

A benevolent world is not automatic. It is the responsibility of the people as upholders of cosmic order to uphold life itself by holding back fear and ensuring confidence. This confidence in one’s life creates truly donors of life to others. Protect ourselves through causing no harm to others.

Ahimsa, through environmentally sound ethical principles, is given exemplary significance in Jainism. According to Jainism ‘The virtue of protecting a single creature is greater than the charity of the whole earth, for life is dear to man so much so that even by receiving the whole earth in his sway he does not want to die’¹⁰⁶. At the core of Jainism lie the five vows that dictate the everyday lives of its adherents. These five vows are *ahimsā* (nonviolence), *satya* (truthfulness), *asteya* (not stealing), *brahmacharya* (sexual restraint) and *aparigraha* (non-possession). One undertakes these vows to ensure that no harm is brought to all possible life forms. For practicing Jainas, to hurt any being would result in the thickening of one’s Karma, which would hinder the progress towards liberation. As pointed out by Chappell, the worldview of the Jainas might be termed as ‘bio-cosmology’. The Jaina vows can be reinterpreted in an ecological sense as fostering an attitude of respect for all life forms¹⁰⁷.

Gandhian theory of non-violence has been a great influence in keeping social and political moral values sincerely. The practice of ahimsa is not at the level of an abstract, intellectual, plane but is an experiential fact that has significance throughout our life. *Mahābhārata* conceives non-violence with two terms – *abhayadanam* (the gift of fearlessness or security) and *sarvadanebhyahuttāman* (the noblest of all gifts). Gandhi realises that absence of wish or renunciation of the feeling of enmity is very much involved in implementation of non-violence principle. Gandhi does not exclude the nonhuman beings in the process of bringing harmony across the universe.

¹⁰⁶ Walli, K, *Conception of Ahimsa in Indian Thought* Bharata Manisha, 1974, p 61.

¹⁰⁷ Chapple, Christopher K. ‘Hinduism, Jainism, and Ecology’, Center for the Study of World Religions, 2000, p. 19-54.

Harmonious life is the life of life (*JivoJivasyaJivanam*). Gandhi gives a positive connotation to the notion of *ahimsā* by defining it as ‘love’. This active love or non-violence is not a cloistered virtue to be practiced by the individual for his peace and final salvation, but a rule of conduct for society if it is to live consistently with human dignity. Gandhi makes non-violence as an obligatory discipline to all. It is a religion, which transforms all human relationship as a way of life. Gandhi sees *ahimsa* as an ocean of compassion. *Ahimsa* ruled out all forms of selfishness including ‘blind attachment’ to life. Gandhi affirms the doctrine of non-violence in such a way that preservation of life is not to convince others about the moral duty to protect life, particularly when one’s life itself is uncertain. It is my conscience that judges at the end of my life if it permits harmony and non-violence.

4.8: *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* on environment

The root of environmental issues can be traced back to the days of *Vedic* and *Upaniṣadic* period of Indian Philosophy. Contemporary Indian thoughts also ignited these issues time to time. A study of Indian Philosophical texts shows that there is no specific independent ethical branch in Indian Philosophy which makes a spectacle elaboration on environmental ethics like western philosophers do. More clearly, plugs on intrinsic values were rarely discussed in *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads*. However, environmental issues were cornered from different metaphysical entities.

Thousands of years ago, *Vedas* were written. That the *Vedas* are likened to the great Himalayas is an emphasis of dealing with environmental issues. Kālidasa in the first *śloka* of the *Kumārasambhavam* has a beautiful description of the Himalayas, standing like a great measuring rod by which alone the depth and the grandeur of human history and civilization can be measured. The *Vedas* are like the Himalayas because in the same way that the life-giving streams come down from the Himalayas to irrigate the land below, so also our great scriptures have flown down to the present day. And if the *Vedas* are like the Himalayas, then the *Upaniṣads* are like those great

peaks bathed in the eternal sunshine of wisdom that you see if you are flying parallel to the Himalayas¹⁰⁸.

The *Upaniṣads*, therefore, signify in some ways the high inscription of our cultural, spiritual and environmental tradition. The *Upaniṣadic* thoughts are the representations of different dialogues between the guru and the *śiṣya*, the sage and his disciples and hence *Upanishads* are not monolithic commands issued by some invisible deity as believed in western tradition. And the dialogues deal with the great questions of human existence, of why we are here, what is our goal in life, what is the meaning of everything around us, what is the power that energizes all of us, our minds, our hearts, our bodies and which saturates the entire universe and most importantly our place in the universe and our relation to it. This gives us spectacular glimpse of our relation and responsibility to nature and the uniqueness of it which can be augmented for the argument to establish that there is an entity in nature which can be considered as intrinsic.

The Upanishads are known as Vedanta because they come chronologically at the end of the Vedic collection. At the end of the Vedic collections is the *Jñanakanda*, the way of wisdom, the Upanishads, the high watermark of knowledge. Traditionally there were supposed to be 108 Upanishads. The important ones that have come down to us upon which AdiShanakaracharya has written his great luminous commentaries are ten: the *Isha*, the *Kena*, the *Katha*, the *Prashna*, the *Mundaka*, the *Mandukya*, *Taittiriya*, *Aitereya*, *Chandogya*, *Brihadaranyaka*. These ten and the *Shwetashwatara* represent the major Upanishads. They range from cryptic texts like the *Mandukya* which has only 12 verses, the *Ishavasyopanishad* which has 18 verses, to much larger texts like the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya* with hundreds of verses.

Now the Upanishads are so vast and varied that it is difficult even to begin to try and condense them. But one important cardinal concept of Upanishads must have highlighted what represents the very concept of environment and nature. This will

¹⁰⁸Karan Singh, (2001), Source: India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, RELOCATING IDENTITIES (MONSOON), India International Centre, p.100-108

also show that the teachings of the Vedanta are in fact becoming more and more relevant and important as we hurtle headlong into the 21st century.

The most important cardinal concept of *Vedanta* is of the all-pervasive *Brahman*: the power, the light that pervades this entire universe; not only this tiny speck of dust that we call the planet earth, but the billions upon billions of galaxies in the endless universe around us, *Ananta kotibrahmanda*. Everything in this magnificent universe is the *Brahman*. Everything that has manifested, and everything that will be manifested, is illuminated by the same spiritual power. The concept of the *Brahman* in the Upanishads is as it were the spiritual correlate of the unified field theory to explain the multifarious phenomenon around us. So the first basic concept of the Upanishads is the concept of the all-pervasive *Brahman*.

Another important concept of Upanishad is the concept of Atman, the Self; the realization not of God but of the self. This is not about the false self, not the ego that accompanies us every day with self-importance, but the deepest self which is in the inner recesses of our being, of our consciousness - that is known as the Atman. It is this Atman which is present in every creature and every being. As we move up the ladder of evolution to come to the human race, the Atman there becomes self-consciousness. As Shri Aurobinda points out, for the first time with the advent of the human race we have a creature capable of self-consciousness and self-realization. The Upanishads have a marvelous term for the human race, *amritasyaputrah*: the 'children of immortality'. The *Atman* is the divine spark encapsulated by the very fact that we are human in our consciousness. It is fanning this spark of divinity within us into the blazing fire of spiritual realization that is the true goal of human existence: the joining of the *Atman* and the *Brahman*.¹⁰⁹

Indeed, the rise of the Advaita philosophy may be traced to the realization that human beings live in a more than human world, characterized by mutual interdependence and more importantly, that any alienation of the two spheres could spell doom for the earth. In the *TaittiriyaBrahmana*, we are told that "the same divine milk that circulates through creatures here on earth lights the suns - all the suns of the

¹⁰⁹ Karan Singh, (2001), India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, RELOCATING IDENTITIES (MONSOON), p. 100-108

galaxy. It condenses also into the forms of the clouds. It pours down as rain and feeds the earth, the vegetation and the animals. The individual with the awareness of this secret cannot be avaricious for any portion of the abundant food that may come to him. He will share it willingly with his companions. He will not wish to break the circuit by hoarding the substance to himself.... His food avails him nothing: when he eats, eats his own death”¹¹⁰. Those aphoristic words from Aruni to his son “That thou art” (*Tat tvamasi*) sum up the entire Vedic conception of reality including the nonhuman sphere. *Tat tvamasi* enjoins one to be aware of the identity of one’s core essence with the hidden substance of all and everything, and not to be alienated from the nonhuman world.

The *Upanishads* thus had exhibited the place of human in this cosmos and their duties towards nature even though they do not directly tell us about the intrinsic value of nature. But in analyzing these cardinal concepts also make us aware that the spiritual attachment of human beings with nature is a kind of attachment with something permanent entity having a sort of intrinsicness.

4.9: Nature in the *Brahmanas* and *Aranyakas* ***Brahmanas***

The *Brahmanas* are texts written in Sanskrit prose that deals with detailed description of sacrifices and other rituals. They give proper rules for the conduct of *yajnas* in which *Vedic* mantras are used in order to propitiate Gods like Indra, Agni, Soma etc. In addition to the ritualistic material, the *Brahmanas* also contain religious philosophy, stories etc. which support the *yajna* mode of worship. Each *Veda* has its own *Brahmana*. Some scholars include *Brahmanas* also under the title of *Veda*. The *Brahmana* portions are traditionally followed by *Aranyakas* and *Upanisads*. The *Aranyakas* explain the various forms of *Upasana* and the *Upanisads* are philosophical treatises. The authors of the *Brahmanas* understood that Sun is actually nothing else than fire. Rituals were done to praise the Vedic deities who in turn protected the living beings and fulfilled their desires. Rain was essential for a prosperous life. The

¹¹⁰Radhakrishnan S. (1989), *The Principal Upanishads*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. P. 525-563

Vedic people knew that rain is produced from clouds, clouds from smoke, smoke from fire. At the same time they recognize that fire and water has mutual enmity.

Importance of rainy season is that it has the capacity of the fulfilling of one's desires. Plants are the result of the swelling of waters. Because the plant grow whenever the water swells. According to the *Brahmanas* is the womb of waters. The waters have their own light. *Satapatha Brahmanas* says that lightning is the light of water.

Aranyakas

The authors of these texts believe that the water is born of fire. Water is the nectar. Cosmic waters are the rains. This entire world is established in cosmic waters. Clouds, lightning, thunders and rains are the four forms of water. Cosmic waters are there in all directions. Herbs are produced from earth.

According to *Aranyaka* Agni is the nourisher, Agni is the abode of waters and Agni is the sun. Agni is verily, the lord of food grains. Water is born of fire. Agni is the lightning. As is the sun in the heaven so is the eye in the head. Lightning is placed in the sun. Sun is the soul of movable and immovable world. Sky is established on the earth and everything is installed in the sky. Earth came out of water. Herbs grow on earth and the clouds satisfy the earth. The earth was born from water. The earth is honey to all beings. Of all created beings earth is the essence and from the earth the herbs are produced. The importance of water and plants to live on earth is being taught in the *Upanisads*.

In *Aitareyopanisad*, Vayu is the deity that never sets. From ether was born air. This prana is vayu. The air entered into the nostrils assuming the form of breath. The *Upanisad's* injunction with regard to kala (time) is "Do not decry the seasons", Time, nature, necessity, chance, the elements and the Purusa should be regarded as the causes. These must be pondered upon. The month verily is Prajapati. Its dark half is indeed food or matter.

4.10: The Concept of Nature in *Ramayana*

The author of *Ramayana*, Valmiki was a son of nature. According to the

legend Valmiki was a hunter in his early life. He turned to asceticism advised by the saptarsis and lived in the forest in his Asramas and he became a great sage. In his *Ramayana*, which is the first kavya, it is no wonder that nature is a main subject of description. The inspiration for Valmiki's writing of *Ramayana* was given from a tragic experience he had accidentally in the forest. In the morning while he was on the banks of the Tamasa River, a hunter came there and killed one of the Kraunca bird couples. The cry of the he-bird at the death of his mate deeply disturbed Valmiki's mind. He felt compassion towards the bird and anger towards the hunter. At that time from his sorrowful mind the first poetry was produced.

*Maa Nishada Pratistham Tvamagamahsāsvati Samaa
YatKraunchamithunaadekamAvadhiKaamamohitam*

This verse is indeed a caution against the greed of humans who interfere in the forest and destroy its living beings. Valmiki's attitude towards nature is clearly visible in his first poem. In *Ramayana* most part of the story is taking part in the forest. Valmiki gives the first forest experience to Rama and Laksmana when they were young boys. Visvamitra comes to the palace of Dasaratha and requests to send Rama and Laksmana and they went to Visvamitra's hermitage which was far away from Ayodhya. On the way they had to cross rivers, forests and valleys by foot. They had to first cross the Sarayu on the banks of which Ayodhya existed. They watched the place where Sarayu meets Jahnavi.

Rama, Laksmana and Visvamitra spent the day on the banks of the sona river. The sona river joined Jahnavi the holy river worshipped by ascetics. Having seen that sona river furnished with sacred water and frequented by swans and cranes, Rama and Laksmana were very delighted and they took up their quarters on the bank of that river. Where the two holy rivers become one, there they spent that night. Next morning they were crossing the river then they heard a thunderous noise. Then the sage told the story about the cause of that noise. Brahma once created out of his mind a lake, which is named Manasa Sarovara. This river Sarayu comes out of it and flows all along the edge of Ayodhya city. In this spot Sarayu blends with the golden water of the river Ganga.

After a while they reached a dark forest. No light from the Sun could filter into the forest. So thickly was the tree branches intertwined. There the beetles were making shrill music and the wild animals were roaring and making their characteristic noises. Even the birds seemed to cry harshly and there was no music emanating from their throats. Thus the forest was so dark to see anything.

Visvamitra was pleased with the natural curiosity of the young brothers. Then he told the story of that forest. Once that forest was a country named Malada and Karusa. There lived a terrible demoness Tataka by name. She was ugly, horrible to look at and cruel by nature. This demoness had occupied the place of entrance to the countries and no human beings dared to enter there. She was extremely fond of human flesh. Thus that country became a horrible forest and it is known as Tatakavana.

Birds and deer dwelling in Siddhasrama followed the high souled Visvamitra having asceticism for wealth. On the way to Mithila they entered the hermitage of Gautama. There Ahalya who was turned to a rock by Gautama's curse was waiting for the touch of Rama's blessed feet to purify her and to sanctify the ashrama. After liberating her from the curse Rama and Laksmana saluted her and flowers rained from the heavens on them. On their way to Mithila they spent that night on the banks of sona river. In the morning the music of the birds and the rustling of the river woke them up. After morning ceremonies they walked fast towards the north. They saw the sacred river Gargi. They were thrilled at the sight of the river with swans and lotuses floating on its surface. Then Rama wants to hear the story of the sacred river Ganga, How the Ganga was flowing in three directions and embracing the three worlds, falls into the lord of streams and rivers. Visvamitra started the story, 'There is a mountain by name Himavan. Himavan is the lord of all mountains and he had two daughters

4.11: Conclusive Remarks

In this chapter we have examined the eco-aesthetic concern of ancient literature in Sanskrit. The pantheism of the Vedas reflects the intimate relation between men and deified natural forces. *Agni, Indra, Varuna* and other Vedic deities clearly shows that they are personified natural forces. They were most powerful. In the *Brahmanas* there is a desire to subjugate nature by magical powers. During this

time the external nature were studied extensively and the ancient science like Ayurveda began to flourish. After the Vedic period the yajna cult became weak and the worship of personal Gods became popular. In *Valmiki's Ramayana* the description of nature is given importance. Nature is presented as a coherent and harmonious system of existence. The seers in the *tapovanas* are portrayed as examples of the natural life. *Ramayana* is always supplied with the energy of nature and Sita is the true daughter of nature. When compare to *Mahabharata*, *Ramayana* is friendlier towards forests. The two epics together draws an ecological map of India from Himalayas to Srilanka. Kalidasa has followed the style of Valmiki in describing nature and human life.

Before we conclude we must note one clear difference between Hindu ethics and Environmentalism. Hindu ethics upholds the freedom from samsara but on the other hand environmentalism upholds the preservation of samsara. However Hindu ethics and Environmentalism do not neglect the need of universal harmony, which we can confirm from the above mentioned findings. Environmentalism once more disagrees with Hindu ethics in the self-realization methodology. In Hindu ethics, particularly in Advaita, self-realization stands for the negation of plurality between beings while environmentalism defines self-realization as realization of the non-difference of oneself and the processes of the natural world without sacrificing plurality.

Environmentalism is capable of a theory, which gives unity al beings but does not mean that all beings share the same self as that of Hindu theology. From the above, we can observe the importance of nature and how it becomes an organic form with man as its head. When man becomes a Buddha (an enlightened one) one begins to attend to the need of protecting nature and hence the beginnings of a proper Environmental Ethics. Man is the custodian, guardian and overseer, but he cannot escape from his confirmed positions throughout the daily routine of nature.

From the above discussions we may note that Semitic and non-Semitic religious teachings have contributed significantly to environmental ethics. East-West hermeneutics helped Environmental Ethics to a greater extent in the midst of limitations of any one paradigm. As seen from our discussions on the religious ethical

teachings, we note that both anthropocentrism and ecocentrism have their roots in various religious doctrines. Thus in the next two chapters we take up these perspectives for a critical appraisal.

One theme within contemporary environmentalist discourse concerns the idea that the way in which people treat their natural environment can be related to their religious beliefs and practices. While the majority of studies have tended to emphasize instances where religion is believed to have played a positive and beneficial role in environmental conservation, religion can also act against the interest of environmental protection (Nelson the Judaeo-Christian tradition is often “environmental crisis” because of humanity and nature. Nature deals with this area of religious traditions as inherently. In particular, it is argued that religious traditions teach that the earth is significant (it has “intrinsic value”) because recognition of this “bio-divinity” environment and to be careful in their treatment of the natural world. While “bio-divinity” has been a feature of many religious-cultural traditions throughout history, it is, however, important to distinguish this from what we have called “religious environmental-ism”, which involves the conscious application of religious ideas to contemporary concerns about an environmental crisis.

Chapter-V

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, as we have discussed, the concept about intrinsic value and its ascription to nature that has been acknowledged from normative perspectives, leads us to a situation where multiple options have been queued for further examination- both in western and Indian traditions. However, our limitation, when perused to investigate the debates and dimensions of intrinsic value in nature, is only to find out these multiple options from where more research works may be undertaken. These multifaceted outcomes will have a positive imprint and has notable impact in the philosophical arena especially in environmental ethical theories.

The debates began with the theoretical analysis of the terminology starting from G. E. Moore. We have already discussed how philosophers try to clarify the concept of intrinsic value- from consequentialists' perception and deontologists' perception as well. Being a consequentialist, as already been discussed, Moore's argument is to distinguish "good" from "duties" and "right" and "duties" and "right" are reducible to "good" – to a higher value which has been considered as intrinsic value. Furthermore, we have also examined Moore's argument that "duties" and moral rules are not direct matter of intuition rather they are objects of empirical investigation such that intuition does not reveal rightness and badness of specific actions, it only reveals what is good in themselves or as *ends to be perused*. The conception of good as intrinsic, therefore, is misunderstood such as the kind of impression that good is having some sense of right or wrong or some sense of aesthetic feeling like beauty or ugly which are subjective in nature. When Moore talks about the sense of intrinsic value he makes it clear that intrinsic nature is different from intrinsic properties and that intrinsic nature is objective. Moore's status regarding the intrinsic nature of a thing is ontological, that intrinsic value is trans-worldly valid and he is handling the problem directly without much emphasis on epistemic and linguistic antiquity. However, there are varieties of senses of the

conception of intrinsic value as Neill has introduced.¹¹¹ These senses of intrinsic value are used interchangeably and because of this, environmental ethics suffer from a conflation from these varieties of senses. We will concern here only the sense of intrinsic value that means having a sort of intrinsic properties. This means that value is used to refer to the value of an object which has merely because of its intrinsic properties. This concept is developed by G. E. Moore. The question about non-relational properties of intrinsic value may be undertaken in two different ways i.e. (i) the non-relational properties of an object are those that continue to be exist regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects. This view is considered as a concept of weak interpretation. (ii) The non-relational properties are those that can be characterized without reference to other objects and this is a concept of strong interpretation. Without humans the world might have some, but only insignificant value and hence Moore falls under the category of weak interpretation.¹¹² Again, to be 'objective' does not mean not subjective, in fact, people tend to argue for objectivity from the intrinsic nature, of those properties. Intrinsic nature, the '*internality*' as Moore coined, is something unique what distinguishes it from intrinsic properties, however, what is that something need to be elaborated to clarify the conception of intrinsic value in which Moore perhaps failed. When we talk about the intrinsic properties belonging to an object, we talk about the instrumental value of the object and this is significantly different from the intrinsic nature.

In the line of Moore, with certain differences, Chisholm defined intrinsic value in terms of *qualification* that makes value intrinsic. The bearers of intrinsic value, as Chisholm holds, are states of affairs, which qualify something as intrinsic. The state of affairs reflects all the good and evil that there is in the possible world. To say, *p* is intrinsically good is to say that *p*'s goodness does not require that there be some other good state of affair which neither includes *p* nor is included within *p*. Chisholm holds that the state of affairs is not "intrinsic nature" or "intrinsic properties", it is the possible world in which "intrinsic value states" reflect. What makes Chisholm treatment different from Moore is that 1) intrinsic value is relative to

¹¹¹ Neill, O' John, (1992), The Varieties of Intrinsic Value; The Monist, Vol. 75, No. 2; Oxford University Press, p. 119-137

¹¹² Moore, G. E, (1903), Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 28.

a particular world and he restricts intrinsic value to the limits of possible world only
 2) intrinsic value reflects all good and evil in a possible world. So sum total of all good and evil are manifested in the *intrinsic value states* not in the transcendental world.

To examine the traditional approaches towards intrinsic value, as discussed so far, Lemos, in clarifying the concept of intrinsic value, criticizes that both Moore and Chisholm adopt an “isolation approach”¹¹³, even though they differ in some vital issues. Chisholm approach may be called as “intentionally isolationist” because it stresses the intentional attitude (*ethically fitting attitude of love, hate and preferability*) of considering and preparing state of affairs as such, in isolation from the inspection and ranking of other, wider states of affairs. We may contrast this form of isolation approach with what we may call “deontological isolation”¹¹⁴. Along with W. D. Ross, Moore suggests that “by calling a thing intrinsically good we mean that it would be good even if nothing else existed.”¹¹⁵ Lemos rejects this type of isolationism as adopted by Moore because there are certain sorts of things that are intrinsically good but simply could not be the only thing that exists. For example, Dhrupad is happy and that is intrinsically good. If there are certain abstract entities such as numbers or properties or states of affairs that necessarily exist, it would be impossible for Dhrupad’s being happy to be the only thing that exists. More important, though, is the fact that Dhrupad’s being happy could not exist without Dhrupad’s existence. At the same time it may be that Dhrupad’s having certain pleasures and certain desires satisfied and his having certain beliefs to the effect that he had those pleasures and that his desires were satisfied. It is to be noted, in spite of different approaches, that both Chisholm and Moore hold that if a thing has certain intrinsic value, then it must have that value whenever it occurs. As such Moore’s and Chisholm’s definitions of intrinsic value imply the thesis of universality. It would be penetrating to say that the definitions of intrinsic value as Moore and Chisholm have adopted, have the thesis of universality in terms of logical explication. If P’s being intrinsically better than Q is a

¹¹³Lemos, Noah M,(1994), *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 10

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 10

¹¹⁵ Moore, G. E, (1930), *Ethics*, p. 38; W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford University Press), p.73

matter of P and Q necessarily such that the inspection of both requires one to prefer P to Q, then P would be intrinsically better than Q whenever P and Q occur. Hence for both Dhrupad's being pleased is intrinsically better than Angshruta's being suffering, and the former will be always better than the latter whenever the two occur. This thesis of universality, however, has been challenged in many ways and we will consider this in the latter part of this chapter. Lemos, therefore, considers that intrinsic goodness and badness, and other related value concepts are explicated in terms of the notion of "ethical requirement."¹¹⁶ For him we can explicate intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness, and other related value concepts, in terms of such concepts "being intrinsically worthy of love" and "being intrinsically worthy of hate." So being intrinsically good may be understood in terms of its being correct or fitting to love or like that thing in and so far itself for its own sake. It means, if a fact is intrinsically good, then the scrutiny of just that obtaining state of affairs requires that one not hate it in and for itself. To say that something is to be intrinsically good or intrinsically bad requires ethical attitudes like love, hate or preference. This explication leads Lemos to defend Chisholm's definition of intrinsic value and also defends that facts or states of affairs are the bearers of intrinsic value and at the same time rejects Moore's intrinsic properties. For Lemos, Moore's explication is such that there are intrinsic properties but do not exemplified in the possible world. For example "x is a property" and "it is possible that there is something that exemplifies x." This means that there are no properties that cannot be exemplified. Thus, although there is a property of being round and square, there is no property of being round and square together. However, there are also properties which can be the objects of certain intentional attitudes, which can be conceived, considered and attributed. There are also states of affairs, that exists but do not obtain, there are states of affairs that necessarily obtain and that necessarily do not obtain, there are states of affairs that is impossible, there is fact as a state of affairs that obtains and lastly there are states of affairs that can be the intentional attitudes.

¹¹⁶Lemos, Noah M,(1994), *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 12

To speak on Lemos reasonably, we find a serious problem when we consider intrinsic goodness or badness in terms of “ethically fitting” or “correct emotion.” Lemos suggests that intrinsic value, in the sense of something being valuable in and of itself, be explicated in terms of ethically “fitting” or “required” emotional attitudes of love, hate and preference. Lemos has taken this concept of intrinsic value from Brentano, Broad, Ewing and Chisholm. But a question arises, what is it about the “ethical fittingness” of love, hate or preference that makes something as intrinsic? While we may reasonably grant that emotional attitudes of love, hate and preference enable us to focus upon the intrinsic, it does not demonstrate us why intrinsically valuable “in and of itself”, is valuable. What makes that intrinsically valuable, valuable? It seems that we are given the tools to distill the intrinsically valuable from the instrumentally valuable from a set items that we know to have value, but we are left without the way to differentiate, from a group of items whose value status is unknown, which, if any, are intrinsically valuable. If something is intrinsically valuable in the sense of being valuable “in and of itself”, then by its very nature, its value cannot be explicated by reference to any relationship, let alone any attitudinal relationships- that it may have with persons. Central to the notion of something being intrinsically valuable “in and of itself” is that its value is thoroughly independent of any personal connections. Ethically fittingness explication leads us to a situation where we have only ordinary understanding of intrinsic value without making any difference it from instrumental value. To make it clear let’s refer again to instrumental value that we have discussed in the second chapter. We characterize instrumental value as that value an object has in virtue of its service to us. In a nutshell, an object has positive value or good, if it serves what we desire, and has negative value, or is bad, if it thwarts our desire. It is the service of the object that makes it valuable. This is why we have no difficulty of conceiving intrinsic value, different from instrumental value, that is, value as an end- as valuable, for it is simply that which satisfies or frustrates our desire for nothing other than itself. It is also unlikely that Emotivists’ conception of intrinsic value can be accepted as it inducts only human beings having it and also being subjective. In the same way, objectivists’ position is also questionable if it accepted such that evaluative properties of objects

are real properties of objects - evaluative properties exist independently of the evaluations of evaluators (humans). In this case, perhaps, Neill perception is clear and sound if embodied in the strong sense of intrinsic value i.e. the evaluative properties of objects can be characterized without reference to evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is that which can be characterized without reference to the experiences of an individual. As per Neill analysis Moore's sense of intrinsic value cannot attribute intrinsic value to wilderness, because it commits a fallacy of equivocation. Neill's contention is strong in the when he states that an emotivist can express his joyous mood in saying "Wilderness exist after the extinction of human species". By this way, in fact, subjectivism can establish non-anthropocentrism by attributing intrinsic value to nature.

Jonathan O'Neill has isolated three distinct definitions of intrinsic value (O'Neill, 1992) while Dale Jamieson has isolated four in chapter three of his book "Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction" (Jamieson, 2008). For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I will address the three varieties of intrinsic value discussed by Sandler¹¹⁷. In formulating an environmental ethical theory one must be sensitive to these distinctions and be prepared to apply their preferred definition consistently. O'Neill identifies three senses of intrinsic value which are different from Sandler's. They are (1) "non-instrumental value", (2) "non-relational (Moorean) value" and (3) "objective value". O'Neill's second sense of intrinsic value, non-relational (Moorean) value defines intrinsic value as, value an object has solely in virtue of its 'intrinsic properties'. G.E. Moore believed that intrinsic properties were non-relational. (see O'Neill, 1992, p. 123). These properties come from the intrinsic nature of the object in question. The link between the thing's intrinsic value and its intrinsic property (ies) is immediate and does not depend on any relations between that entity and other things outside of it. Such relations might be, for example, those between the psychological states of valuers and the thing being valued. That is, this value can be characterized without reference to other objects and any of their states.

¹¹⁷Sandler, Ronald, (2012), "Intrinsic Value, Ecology, and Conservation", *Nature Education Knowledge*, 3: p.4.

Being the turning point of environmental ethics, the debates between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is more crucial which dilutes the subjective-objective dichotomy. These debates are basically debates of Kantian and Moorean approaches towards environment, debates between *means* and *ends*. These tend us to whether nature should be preserved for *its own sake* or whether it is a pseudoscientific approach if they are applied to natural phenomena. The debates also enlarge from anthropogenic to biocentric or ecocentric forms. But so far as intrinsic value is concerned, even though they have their own status, all differ ontologically as well as epistemologically. Moore's argument is sound enough ontologically but without epistemic concern. Most of the philosophers who fall under biocentric and ecocentric domain maintain an egalitarian approach, adhering that nature needs to attribute intrinsic value to the flourishing of life in all its richness and complexity, having an obligation to protect nonhuman, having engagement with and care for nonhuman and others, and sometimes even to go beyond and grant universal moral consideration. Except to grant universal moral consideration, remaining views are more or less accepted here and there, universal moral consideration may create practical challenges. If we turn into the epistemic concern then perhaps Partridge argument is worthy when he says that justification of intrinsic worth of wilderness may be of the experiences of wilderness. When the debates about anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are gearing up, it has been stated that the central point of this bifurcation is because of the subjective/objective concern of intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism advocates subjective as well objective approaches and non-anthropocentrism advocates objective approaches. Any theory ascribing intrinsic value makes two claims as has been discussed so far i.e. (i) Nature is valuable because of what it is, not because of its relation to us. (ii) The value of nature is objective in the sense that it is not a matter of individual taste or personal preference.

To answer the question about epistemic concerns let us look into an epistemological aspect related to the objectivity of intrinsic value. When we say "how things are", we pursue a kind of objectivity and hereby tread on controversial

philosophical ground. There are three forms of realism which dwells on this issue.¹¹⁸ The Moderate Realism admits that something exists objectively, that is, logically and causally independent of someone's conceiving that thing. The Ordinary Realism advocates that the token of most ordinary psychological and physical types exist objectively. And the Scientific Realism proposes that the tokens of most scientific types exist objectively. Our concern in this context is the logical and causal independence of someone's conceiving a particular thing. This argument can help us in establishing that intrinsic value is objective without depending logically and causally on someone's conceiving of. To put bluntly about objectivity of intrinsic value, let us just talk of how that value is independently of what any conceiver takes to be. Some opponents of talk of objectivity of intrinsic value have overlooked an important distinction between (i) the conceiving dependence of one's conceiving of something, and (ii) the conceiving dependence of what one's conceiving represents. For example one's conceiving that 'X is wet' plainly represents 'X' is wet. It follows that one's conceiving of 'X is wet' depends on conceiving, but it does not follow that 'X is wet' depends on someone's conceiving. The same is applied in case of objectivity of intrinsic value. Some philosophers have questioned the intelligibility of any notion of objectivity of intrinsic value relying on a concept "how intrinsic value really is" or "how intrinsic value is independently conceived of". This group of philosophers often speaks on that the sterility of attempts to give sense to phrases like 'the world in itself' is completely unspecified and unspecifiable. For them conceiving existence of independent intrinsic value makes no sense. But the objectivity of intrinsic value is more than conceiving of. The epistemologists' concern basically is not the truth of objectivity of intrinsic value rather the kind of epistemic support available for it.

Most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in environment/nature. This, in fact, is a big challenge in any discussion on intrinsic value. Thus, the debates on the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequentialists' form to the deontologists'

¹¹⁸Moser, K Paul; (1999), Realism, Objectivity, Skepticism, *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*; Edited, Greco, J and Sora, E; Blackwell Publishers Inc, Malden, Massachusetts, p.71

structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the absolute right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures' basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving force of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to Descartes, for his statement: "Cogito ergo sum". Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as "useless" as astronomy. Galileo Galilei proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton, Pierre de Fermat, G. W. Leibniz and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized. The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Neass, Homes Rolstom III and many others which have already discussed in chapter three. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in

harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all forms. However, in both the theories it is assumed that environmental ethics is grounded by intrinsic value.

Now the prime question of importance in environmental ethics is whether intrinsic value can be ascribed beyond sentient beings that too in equal degree? In this context what I try to forward the idea of Peter Singer about the moral disagreement referring to the kinds of beings ought to be considered in our moral deliberations. To extent an ethic beyond sentient beings is a difficult task. Sentient creatures have wants and desires. In reaching moral decisions affecting sentient creatures, we can attempt to add up the different actions on all the sentient creatures affected by the alternative actions open to us. This will provide us at least some guidelines to take a moral decision like what might be the right thing to do. But there is nothing that corresponds to what it is like to be a tree dying because its roots have been flooded. Once we abandon the interests of the sentient creatures as our source of value, where do we find value? What is good or bad for non-sentient creatures, and why does it matter? Therefore, limiting ourselves only to living things is not too difficult to answer.

Some may argue, however, that a person can still believe that they have moral obligations to protect the environment for anthropocentrically-oriented utilitarian reasons. But many environmentalists think that utilitarian reasons of that kind are not enough of a warrant for real moral obligations to protect the environment. For instance, a biocentrist thinks that *all* living organisms are due moral consideration. But since at least some organisms do not appear to have any substantial utilitarian value for human beings, most biocentrists think that anthropocentric utilitarian concerns aren't enough of a warrant for the protection of all of life either. However, should it turn out that *all* living organisms have at least some utilitarian value; an instrumentalist could claim that we would have an obligation to protect them as one would protect a useful instrument. Under those conditions a person could embrace an instrumentalist take on value and also be a biocentrist.

Arguments have also been produced that there is something "flourishing as good in itself", we may refer to Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor's 'reverence of life' and 'pursuing its own good in its own unique way' respectively. To defend both

Schweitzer and Taylor is difficult in the sense that rather arguing literally, they use metaphorical language. It seems, therefore, that the way they arguing is spiritual than epistemic. It is, of course possible to give a physical explanation of what is happening about tree, rivers etc. in absence of their consciousness and we may have respect towards wilderness or the ecosystem but at the same time it is also argued that they will not be equally treated having value as such sentient beings have.

To absorb the debates whether intrinsic value in nature depends on human's perspective or it is independent of human judgment, ethicists have diverse opinions as has been discussed so far. Broadly speaking non-anthropocentrism has two basic forms i.e. ecocentrism and biocentricism. These two forms focus many questions of environmental issues. Non-anthropocentrism in ethics is basically the claim that there are things beside human beings and their states such as living organisms, species, or ecosystems that have intrinsic value.

There are two basic positions within biocentrism, (1) Biocentric individualism and (2) Biocentric Holism. Biocentric individualism claims that *individual living organisms* are directly morally considerable. Biocentric holism, on the other hand, claims that groups of individual organisms, most notably *species*, are the objects of direct moral consideration. A species is a collective unit of individual living organisms that typically are reproductively isolated.¹¹⁹

A biocentrist could embrace individualism, holism or both. An ecocentrist claims that entities above and beyond mere individual biological organisms and species have value. For the ecocentrist, the domain of value should encompass ecosystems, communities, and habitats, etc. A community is an association of different species of individual organisms that usually inhabit a common location or habitat. A habitat includes both biotic *and* abiotic factors which vary on the basis of things like soil type, vegetation type, salinity, altitude, availability of water, climate, temperature, etc. Another somewhat perplexing aspect of the distinction between biocentrism and ecocentrism lies in differences over what it means for something to be "alive". For many ecocentrists the land, habitats and ecosystems themselves simply

¹¹⁹B.G.Norton *The Preservation of Species: The Value of Biological Diversity*, 1986, Princeton University Press.

are alive just as much as individual organisms are. This claim, however, is quite controversial and not universally accepted.

Given that specific habitats are often home to specific organisms, most biocentrists have an interest in habitat protection as well. They do not see biological interests as being all that separate from ecological or ecosystem-level interests.¹²⁰ Respect for the organism means respecting its habitat and surroundings. Also, the dividing line between biocentrism and ecocentrism is not precisely clear cut. An individual animal can also serve as a host to a number of other species that live either in it or on it. So, is the animal in question an ecosystem? Or is it a single biological organism?¹²¹ A deep ecologist stress human's place in an interconnected web of ecological relations and of human's oneness with nature.¹²² Gaia theorists think that the Earth itself is one living organism with perhaps its own consciousness and one of the key figures in Gaia theory is James Lovelock.¹²³

Environmentalists are concerned with what *kind* of value that living organisms, species, and ecosystems possess. Many of them maintain that the kind of value they have is *intrinsic*. Biocentrists, for example believe that life has intrinsic value while many ecocentrists believe that ecosystems have such value. Some may even go so far as to claim that the universe as a whole is an object of value.¹²⁴ Also, Mark Lupisella, a NASA scientist, has argued that the cosmocentric perspective might also serve us well in the endeavor to communicate with extraterrestrial life forms. Both humans and extraterrestrials could communicate over something they value in common, namely our "ultimate shared cosmic origins".¹²⁵

¹²⁰To that end see, Philip Carafo's discussion of the connection between the preservation of species and preservation of habitat or communities in "For a Grounded Conception of Wilderness and More Wilderness on the Ground", *Ethics and the Environment*, 2001, 6:1-17

¹²¹For this view see Aldo Leopold's "The Land Ethic" in *A Sand County Almanac*. Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess and George Sessions also hold this view.

¹²²The term "Deep Ecology" was first coined by Arne Naess (1973) in "The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement", *Inquiry*, 16:95-100.

¹²³ For an interesting discussion on the connection between Gaia theory and environmental ethics see Anthony Weston's (1987) "Forms of Gaian Ethics", *Environmental Ethics*, 9:217-230.

¹²⁴ Frank Lunger defends the intrinsic moral value of the cosmos in "Anthropocentrism vs. Cosmocentrism: Groping Towards a Paradigm Shift", *The Newsletter of the Philosophical Discussion Group of British Mensa*, 2000, 102, (<http://theotodman.com/c10208.htm>).

¹²⁵See M.L. Lupisella, "Cosmocentrism and the Active Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence", *Astrobiology Science Conference*, 2010.

One of the motivating reasons for the biocentrist's endorsement of the claim that living organisms have intrinsic value is that they feel that a proper attitude of respect for nature should move us away from construing things such as non-human living organisms as being only instrumentally valuable for human purposes. Thinking that nature has such value also encourages movement away from radically subjectivist notions of what has value ("I know that *you* think that butterflies are non-instrumentally valuable, but that's just your opinion from your perspective!"). Embracing nature's intrinsic value moves us towards an attitude of evaluation that considers nature and the objects found in nature as morally valuable regardless of how useful or instrumental they might be for us and regardless of whether they happens to be valued merely on the basis some individual's personal opinion. Intrinsic value is usually put in contrast with either radically subjective views of value or strictly instrumentalist value for human beings. Environmentalists think that we should move away from thinking that the natural world only has these kinds of value. First, environmentalists think that if we continue to believe that nonhumans, species or ecosystems only have instrumental value then we will not have the proper attitude about the environment that we should. Instead of regarding nature as a mere collection of useful instruments, we should regard it as being good in itself. For example, the biocentrist thinks that *all* organisms are valuable, not just the ones that happen to be useful to *Homo sapiens*. They think that a person who believes that all nonhuman moral value is merely instrumental doesn't really have any good reason (apart from those instrumental values themselves) to adequately respect living things that aren't useful for us.

Second, many environmentalists want to avoid radically subjective views about the value of the natural world. They think that if environmental value should turn out to be just a matter of personal preference or opinion, then there wouldn't be any objectively right or wrong answer as to what our moral obligations are towards nature. For instance, should a person choose to regard the red-cockaded woodpecker to be without moral value (as a result of her own personal taste) then that person isn't necessarily committing any moral oversight by having that preference or of thinking

that she had no moral obligations toward that species or an individual of that species. Consequently such a person's ethical view cannot be criticized as inadequate. Her view of the moral status of the bird is simply different from, but not inferior to, the biocentrist's view. And since no one preference is inherently better than any other, a preference for non-biocentrism isn't necessarily wrong or inferior to biocentrism according to this type of subjectivism. Holmes Rolston III, a significant contributor to environmental ethics, has argued that this kind of subjectivity in environmental ethics must be challenged. He writes, "With the environmental turn, so surprising and pressing in the final quarter of our century, [this] subjectivism in values needs review..."¹²⁶ Rolston is wary about the prospect that subjectivism may hold for an environmental ethic. He believes "value is (in part) provided objectively in nature". But he also holds that "value arises only as a product of subjective experience, albeit relationally in nature..."¹²⁷ Rolston claims that the objective properties in nature bring about in a perceiver the (admittedly) subjective experience of morally valuing the thing perceived. While some environmental philosophers may want to claim that this view is ultimately a form of value subjectivism, Rolston maintains that it can still avoid a subjectivist meta-ethic.

Some may argue, however, that a person can still believe that they have moral obligations to protect the environment for anthropocentrically-oriented utilitarian reasons. But many environmentalists think that utilitarian reasons of that kind are not enough of a warrant for real moral obligations to protect the environment. For instance, a biocentrist thinks that *all* living organisms are due moral consideration. But since at least some organisms do not appear to have any substantial utilitarian value for human beings, most biocentrists think that anthropocentric utilitarian concerns aren't enough of a warrant for the protection of all of life either. However, should it turn out that *all* living organisms have at least some utilitarian value, an instrumentalist could claim that we would have an obligation to protect them as one would protect a useful instrument. Under those conditions a person could embrace an instrumentalist take on value and also be a biocentrism.

¹²⁶Rolston, Holmes III (1982). "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" *Environmental Ethics*, 4: 125-151, p. 126.

¹²⁷Ibid, p. 144).

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CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

SUBHRA NAG:	FEMINIST ETHICS: RECONSIDERING ETHICS FROM FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE(S)	1-10
ADITI DASGUPTA:	A CONTEXTUAL NEGOTIATION BETWEEN AMBEDKAR AND THE INDIAN MARXISTS	11-22
ANIRBAN MUKHERJEE:	THE CHALLENGE FOR EDUCATION AND THE PRACTICE OF PHILOSOPHY	23-29
KOUSHIK JOARDAR :	DETERMINISM: AN ARGUMENT FROM MYTHS AND TRAGEDIES	30-39
JYOTISH C. BASAK:	INTEGRITY: AN ANALYSIS	40-50
L. BISHWANATH SHARMA:	THE CONCEPT OF <i>DHARMA</i> IN THE <i>BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ</i>	51-55
NGALEKNAO RAMTHING:	DO BUSINESS CORPORATIONS HAVE A CONSCIENCE?	56-62
SWAGATA GHOSH:	COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE AND POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN SĀMKHYA PHILOSOPHY	63-82
ANUREEMA BHATTACHARYYA:	REVIEW OF ETHICAL NATURALISM AS A FORM OF COGNITIVISM AND REALISM	83-92
ANUMITA SHUKLA AND MAYANK BORA:	ALETHIC RELATIVISM AND FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT	93-109
MANORANJAN MALLICK:	USE THEORY OF MEANING IN <i>TRACTATUS</i>	110-119
SASHI MOHAN DAS:	INTRINSIC VALUE IN NATURE: SOME CONTEMPORARY DEBATES	120-136
BALARAM KARAN:	GANDHI'S VIEWS ON <i>VARṆA-VYAVASTHĀ</i> IN INDIA: SOME REFLECTIONS	137-148
SOMA SARKAR:	TAGORE'S EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT	149-160
KABITA ROY:	TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD	161-171
PRIYANKA HAZRA:	FEMINISTS' PERSPECTIVES ON PROSTITUTION	172-185
JOLY ROY:	ETHICAL CODES IN ADMINISTRATION IN ANCIENT INDIA	186-198
OUR CONTRIBUTORS		199
NOTE TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS		200
OUR PUBLICATIONS		202

EDITORIAL

This universe of ours, the universe of the senses, the rational, the intellectual, is bounded on both sides by the illimitable, the unknowable, the ever unknown. Herein is the search, herein are the inquiries, herein are the facts, whence comes the illumination which is known as philosophy. To quote Vivekananda: “man finds himself driven to a study of the beyond. Life will be a desert; human life will be vain if we cannot know the beyond. It is very well to say: Be contented with the things of the present; the cows and the dogs are, and all animals and that is what make them animals. It is philosophy, the inquiry into the beyond, which makes the difference between man and an animal. Well has it been said that man is the only animal that naturally looks upwards; every other animal naturally looks prone. That looking upward and going upward and seeking perfection are what is called salvation, and the sooner a man begins to go higher, the sooner he raises himself towards this idea of truth as salvation. It does not consist in the amount of money in your pocket, or the dress you wear, or the house you live in, but in the wealth of spiritual thought in your brain. That is what makes for human progress, that is the source of all material and intellectual progress, the motive power behind, the enthusiasm that pushes mankind forward.”

A system of philosophy is generally tested by its ethical doctrine. ‘Though a criticism of life, philosophy is judged by its capacity to improve life’. Let us, therefore, ask how far philosophy satisfies the demands of moral consciousness. Advanced thought and research in philosophy has its own fashions, and it has become a philosophic fashion of the present day to consider everything from multidisciplinary perspectives. But the careful observer will notice that this approach is instinct with ethical interest.

We are happy to publish *Philosophical Papers: Journal of the Department of Philosophy* Volume-14, March, 2018, (UGC enlisted) before the philosophical community. The contributors in the present volume have made an attempt to discuss diverse perspectives in philosophy. We are thankful to the contributors, the esteemed members of the editorial board, all colleagues of our Department for their valuable suggestion, support for the publication of this journal. We are thankful to our Honorable Vice-Chancellor, the Finance Officer (Officiating), and the University Press, without which the publication of the journal would not have been possible.

Subhra Nag in her paper 'Feminist Ethics: Reconsidering Ethics from Feminist Perspective(s)' does a re-reading of the traditional ethics from a feminist viewpoint, taking into consideration the now quite lengthy debate within the different kinds of feminism. The feminists attempted to question the notions of impartiality and universality in earlier ethics. What to do with the mainstream ethical theories as well as how to position feminist ethics are also important matters in the feminist handling of the issue. The contribution of feminist ethics need not be confined only to women's issues but need to have a bearing upon the practice of ethics as such. Universal ethics that allows diverse voices to be heard is a path that many feminists adopt.

Aditi Dasgupta in her paper traces the early years of B. R. Ambedkar and the Marxist movement and helps us to understand the dilemma that each of them was facing during the nationalist movement for freedom in India. Ambedkar was concerned for his community and the pain of casteism that it had to suffer and the Marxists were interested in improving the situation of the working class, and both these concerns were not priorities in the nationalist movement. Gandhi had his views regarding caste, being against untouchability but not letting go of the division. Dasgupta points out following Ambedkar that Gandhi's inability to go with supporting a complete breaking up of the caste system was a way for him to not antagonize the caste Hindus. She sees caste as an earlier specimen of the class dynamics. She also engages with Ambedkar's reading of Marxism and his reservations. Ambedkar was especially concerned with the lack of importance to individual efforts in Marxism. Dasgupta thinks that the fears and reservations of Ambedkar were misplaced to some extent, although admitting that the lack of caste sensitiveness in the Marxists has been reflected in their inability to make inroads in the northern states in post-independence electoral politics. Dasgupta, in the end, argues that in fact, the Marxist intellectuals can be the bearers of Ambedkar's vision.

Anirban Mukherjee in his paper 'The Challenge for Education and the Practice of Philosophy' argues for the extension of philosophical practice to educational processes and training. He contends that education for the future is challenging, as the future is unknown and the project of conceptualising an ideal world is an ongoing one. Hence, education to be useful needs to prepare the present generation to deal

with uncertainties and alternative perspectives. These are capabilities that philosophers possess as part of their training. Hence, the tools of the philosophers should be made a regular part of the general training of all students.

Generally, it is believed that Determinism is a rich and varied concept. Jordan Howard Sobel in *Puzzles for the Will: Fatalism, Newcomb and Samarra, Determinism and Omniscience* classifies at least ninety varieties of what determinism could be like. When it comes to think about what deterministic laws and theories in physical sciences might be like, the situation is much clearer. There is a criterion by which we can judge whether a law is deterministic. A theory would then be deterministic just in case all its laws taken as a whole were deterministic. In contrast, if a law fails this criterion, then it is indeterministic and any theory whose laws taken as a whole fail this criterion must also be indeterministic. Koushik Joardar in his contribution tries to explain determinism from the Greek perspective to the contemporary period. What he attempts to show is that determinism has the capacity of self-correction and it entails laws whether moral or legal. Thus, it reflects the normative sensitivities of the agent. The moral is not reducible to the legal. But what is legal has moral overtones.

Integrity is a concept that is so oft-used that most of the times we assume that it is a very admirable one, a clearly understood notion and that it is always in accord with morality. However, a survey of literature that came up in the last couple of decades in analysis of this concept and a little ponderance over the issue make us think that it is not so as it appears to most of us to be. Rather the concept is a very complex one, susceptible to many interpretations and even always does not go hand in hand with morality. When we try to analyse the concept to get into its core all these features come to the forefront. It is interesting to find that even some interpretations go against our common-sense expectations. Jyotish C. Basak in his contribution cites the example of Bernard Williams whose writings fuelled the debate on integrity in the contemporary period. Following his writings he finds a number of philosophers stepped in to explore the notion as a result of which a vast literature has come up and it immensely helped him to illuminate the concept of integrity.

L. Bishwanath Sharma in 'The Concept of *Dharma* in the *Bhagavad Gītā*' deals with how *Gītā* can guide one towards moral fulfillment and tries to unravel the moral

message of the great work. The concept of *dharma* is central to this text. *Dharma* is presented as that which sustains the society and is imperative for all. He draws attention to how *dharma* is related to one's abilities and results in the flowering of the potential inherent in one. The welfare of one is linked to the welfare of all, *lokasaṃgraha*. To achieve that through the path of *dharma*, one must act from one's own 'station in life'.

Ngleknao Ramthing in 'Do Business Corporations have a Conscience?' has raised an important question regarding the moral responsibility of business entities. Linked to this is the issue regarding moral agency and moral rights of such organisations. But do they have a conscience? There is an inherent difficulty in imagining corporates as intentional like individuals or treating them as persons. Ramthing points out that there is also a view that as corporations have goals and strategies, they should also have a conscience. The decisions of the corporation are an agglomeration of that of the individuals and hence, the individuals become the bearers of the responsibility and choice. He refers to the view of Velasquez who holds that the individuals within the corporate have to be held responsible for the corporate actions, for it is they who determine the actions of the corporate. However, Ramthing argues that the corporations, though just legal entities, have to hold a certain responsibility for their actions, and the organization has a greater continuity than the members of that corporation who may have defined actions at some point of time and then moved on.

Swagata Ghosh in 'Cognition and Consciousness: An Analysis of the Nature and Possibility of Knowledge in Sāṃkhya Philosophy' provides a detailed study of how knowledge is understood in the Sāṃkhya system taking into consideration the views of Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikṣu. Knowledge as transformation, *cittavṛtti*, is located in *citta* and hence, is internal. *Ekapratibimbavāda* and *anyonyaprativimbavāda* are discussed at length and the paper provides an extremely lucid exposition into the debates regarding the issue of consciousness and self-reflexivity in knowledge formation.

Anumita Shukla and Mayank Bora in their paper 'Alethic Relativism and Faultless Disagreement' deal with faultless disagreement (FD), taking different attitudes towards a statement such as 'Liquorice is tasty'. They mention Kölbel as holding that this is because of a 'relativism about truth' or Alethic Relativism (AR). They deal

with how to accommodate a genuine and faultless disagreement from an immersed perspective. With indexical relativism, of course, FD will vanish. The reader again could look at it from his/her normative perspective or a dissociated perspective (DP). They try to show that from a DP there can be an FD. There is a thorough discussion of Kölbel and Boghossian relating to this issue.

Anureema Bhattacharyya in her paper 'Review of Ethical Naturalism as a Form of Cognitivism and Realism' deals with the issue of how ethical naturalism fits in with cognitivism and realism. She starts by explaining the different meanings of naturalism in ethics but confines her discussion to the sense in which ethical judgements include ethical terms, which in turn can be defined in terms of factual terms. There is a difference between subjective and objective naturalism. There are certain problems with individual subjective naturalism, general subjective naturalism and interest theory of naturalism. She objects to regarding subjective naturalism as cognitive in character. Objective naturalism which bases our approval or disapproval in the nature of the object to make us tend towards such reactions also has its problems. The tendency view which focuses just on the tendency aspect is more liable to be cognitive in character. Spencer's evolutionary naturalism falls prey to the desire to understand morality in terms of evolution which is difficult to verify. She concludes by showing how the theories of naturalism relate to realism.

Manoranjan Mallick made an attempt to explore Wittgenstein's notion of use theory of meaning in the context of the ongoing debate between the Classical Wittgensteinians and the New Wittgensteinians. Classical Wittgensteinians have been finding the divide between Wittgenstein's early and later works quite significant for understanding his writings. The *a priori* logical structure of language in the *Tractatus* gets replaced in later writings by a *posterior* method of assigning meaning by looking into the working of language. This shift, for classical Wittgensteinians defines the divide between the early and the later Wittgenstein. Contrary to the classical readings, new Wittgensteinians propose a post modernist reading of Wittgenstein's writings. They hold that there is important continuity between Wittgenstein's early and later works. Highlighting the notion of meaning as use New Wittgensteinians see a clear thematic continuation in Wittgenstein's early and later works.

Value-theoretic terminology is diverse. Traditionally, “intrinsic value” is understood as synonymous with the idea of being “valuable as an end”. Thus, philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic. The questions whether, nature has intrinsic value, and whether all value require an evaluator is raised in the traditional environmental ethics. These questions are raised between nature objectivists and value subjectivists. The former presupposes that nature is intrinsically valuable, while the later holds that it takes an evaluator to ascribe value. Sashi Mohan Das made an attempt to find out a collaborative and discursive process to account for those dual ways of proving intrinsic value in nature from the contemporary environmental philosophers’ view.

Balaram Karan in his paper ‘Gandhi’s Views on *Varṇa-Vyavasthā* in India: Some Reflections’ deals with the problem of caste discrimination and how Gandhian explorations in this area can help us understand the problem and find a possible way out of it. He dwells on the distinction between the *varṇa* system and the caste system, and how even Gandhi held that one should stick to the calling, livelihood as determined by *varṇa* although he did not believe in any hierarchy among the *varṇas*. Hence, he thought of the caste system, which embodied that hierarchy, as a perversion of the *varṇa* system. The fallout of the caste system gets expressed in the idea of purity of some *varṇas* and the practice of treating some people as untouchable to protect the purity of the ‘pure’ ones. Gandhi fought against the system of untouchability and thought of it as an abuse of the *varṇa* system. Karan goes on to state how Gandhi has a favourable stance towards the *varṇa* system and argues that the suggestions of Gandhi are difficult to accept.

Soma Sarkar in her paper ‘Tagore’s Educational Thought’ explains how Tagore included a vision of cosmopolitanism in his education system. The paper describes the atmosphere in the Tagore family in the early years of Rabindranath as liberal and seriously concerned with the issue of education. Rabindranath in his initial years was drawn to nationalism, but realizing its limitations, gradually shifted towards a cosmopolitan attitude in educational practice. She refers to the writing and lectures of

Tagore including his novels to show how his view of education was moulded by his socio-political views and his vision of India.

Kabita Roy in her paper ‘Transcendental Method’ explicates the concepts of the transcendental, transcendental method and transcendental argument in Kant. ‘Transcendental’ in Kant means the ‘conditions of knowing’ and ‘transcendental method’ includes the transcendental arguments. Roy explains in the paper how Kant uses the transcendental argument to counter the sceptic’s challenge and that of the different kinds of idealism as well as to situate human cognition. In this context, the different kinds of deduction are enumerated upon.

Prostitution is now identified as a trans-national issue requiring global solutions in relation to its regulation and legislation, but the question of what constitutes a properly feminist response remains a matter of dispute. Ongoing conflicts within the feminist circles over the meanings of sexuality for women, combined with the United Nation’s acknowledgment of women’s rights as human rights, have produced divergent conceptions of prostitution as a legitimate target of governmental intervention. Feminists contends that prostitution constitutes a form of violence against women and hence a violation of human rights. Priyanka Hazra in her contribution tries to show that prostitution still remains socially constructed as a crime with the prostitute as either a criminal or a victim. She tries to conclude that feminists on both sides agree that contempt and stigma have adverse side effects on prostitution and still prevalent in the 21st century, and will continue as long as prostitution is socially constructed as a crime.

The moral theories that have come up in modern times and especially in the West are indeed very sophisticated postulations. However, Indian thinkers in ancient times though did not speak in terms of these sophisticated theories; they developed some code of conduct for rulers, other administrators as well as for the common man. Adherence to these codes of conduct was the primary requirement for rulers and also for others. Joly Roy in her venture delineates some codes taking clues from some ancient texts - *Arthaśāstras*, *Dharmaśāstras*, epics and *Nītiśāstras*.

ANIRBAN MUKHERJEE

INTRINSIC VALUE IN NATURE: SOME CONTEMPORARY DEBATES *

SASHI MOHAN DAS

Introduction

One of the most common tasks of environmental philosophers is to frame some theories according to which nature including non-human entities possesses intrinsic value. However, from time to time we have seen efforts to refute the claim being that not only are the particular theories as suggested inconsistent, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature - at least in some allegedly important sense of “intrinsic value” - is in principle indefensible.

Environmental philosophy is one among several new sorts of applied philosophies, which arose during the seventies. That is, it may be understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to emergent practical environmental problems. It may be understood to be an exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by the magnitude and dimension of these problems. If defined in the former way, then the work of environmental philosophy is that of a traditional philosophical task; if defined in the latter way, it is that of a theoretician or philosophical architect. However, in ethics if interpreted as an essentially theoretical, not applied discipline, the most important philosophical task for environmental ethics is to develop anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism that inculcate a value theory in application. Indeed, as the discussion which follows will make clear, without a non-anthropocentric direction the innovatory aspirations of theoretical environmental ethics would be let down and the whole initiative would collapse in to its everyday routine to the applied counterpart.

Intrinsic value signifies recognition of fundamental goodness in the world. Though it may appear quite basic at first glance, the concept of intrinsic value is complex, with philosophically rich ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions. Philosophers have characterized these dimensions differently, and it would be misleading to suggest any one, monolithic concept of intrinsic value emerges from the philosophical literature. One may distinguish between two major schools of thought on intrinsic value, one generally aligned with the work of G.E. Moore, and the other more closely aligned with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. These two camps diverge primarily in identifying different types of things as bearers of intrinsic value, which in turn leads to different ideas about how humans ought to conduct themselves in relation to intrinsic value.

* I acknowledge my deep sense of gratitude and sincere thanks to Dr. Laxmikanta Padhi for his help and suggestions in framing this paper.

The Concept of Intrinsic value:

Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. Philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic. The term ‘intrinsic value’ and the less-used alternative term ‘inherent worth’ mean, lexically speaking, pretty much the same thing. According to the *Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary*, “intrinsic” means “belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing” and “inherent” means “involved in the constitution or essential character of something intrinsic.” The word “value” comes from the Latin word “*valere* to be worth, to be strong”; and “worth” comes from the old English word “*weorth* (worthy), of value.” Lexically speaking, to claim that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) is to claim that its value (or worth) belongs to its essential nature or constitution.

According to G.E. Moore¹ “To say that a kind of value is ‘intrinsic’ means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.” He says that intrinsic value is not subjective, but objective. Intrinsic value does not depend on the human beings valuing them. He makes a distinction between intrinsic value and intrinsic property. Examples of intrinsic value are beauty, goodness, etc. In *Principia Ethica*, Moore argues that the existence of beauty apart from any awareness of it has intrinsic value, but he allows that beauty on its own at best has little and may have no intrinsic value². In *Ethics* Moore implicitly denies that beauty on its own has value³. Whereas examples of intrinsic property are yellowness, redness, etc. Intrinsic value constitutes a unique class of predicate because they do not have anything in common with other kinds of predicates of value. Both intrinsic property and intrinsic value depend on the intrinsic nature of the thing possessing them. However intrinsic value is not identical with intrinsic property, they are different. There is something in intrinsic value which is not present in intrinsic property. To conceptualize intrinsic value, Lemos,⁴ tries to give a detailed account of intrinsic value and examine that intrinsic value is such that which is explicated in terms of the notions of ethically ‘fitting’ or required emotional attitudes such as love, hate and preference. Lemos elaborates that some properties are intrinsically good and some properties are intrinsically bad⁵. For example, pleasure and wisdom are intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad. Chisholm also says that

¹Moore, G. E; *The Conception of Intrinsic Value*; *Philosophical Studies*, Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1922, P. 260- 266.

² *Ibid.* 1–2, pp. 53–54.

³ Moore, G. E *Ethics* London: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 107.

⁴Lemos, Noah M; *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge University Press, 1994, P. 3-19

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 3-19.

‘state of affairs’ is the bearer of intrinsic value.⁶ Lemos suggests that it is not pleasure or perfect justice, considered as abstract properties that have intrinsic value. According to him wisdom, pleasure, beauty are ‘good making properties’⁷. The distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘non-intrinsic’ value for Chisholm, has been questioned in many ways and sometimes it became ridiculous. Chisholm, in course of his deliberation, tried to define what intrinsic value is and in doing so, he is concerned with the qualification that makes value intrinsic. In saying so, Chisholm states that the state of affair under which something is considered to be valuable is to be kept in isolation and such value is considered as ‘extrinsic’ and not intrinsic since in such cases the value is dependent on the states of affair.⁸ For Chisholm, if a state of affairs is intrinsically good then it is intrinsically good in every possible world in which (or is true). But a state of affairs that is instrumentally good need not to be instrumentally good in every possible world in which it obtains.⁹ He, in this context, mentions that all intrinsic value concepts may be analyzed in terms of intrinsic preferability.

Thus, we can see that intrinsic value is a multifaceted concept that can be considered from various angles of philosophical inquiry, in the following manner:

1. Ontological: What is intrinsic value? What sorts of things possess intrinsic value? Are there degrees of intrinsic value and can intrinsic value be summed or otherwise aggregated?
2. Epistemological: How can we recognize intrinsic value and, if relevant, differences in degrees of intrinsic value? Is intrinsic value a discoverable, objective property of the world, or a subjective attribution of (human) valuers?
3. Ethical: What obligations or duties do moral agents have in relation to intrinsic value? How should we balance these duties/obligations against other ethical considerations (e.g., issues of justice or rights)?

Ontology, epistemology, and ethics are the three major dimensions of intrinsic value, which philosophers use to develop and explain their particular interpretation of the concept. Different theories will be characterized by different ideas about the ontological, epistemological, and ethical status of intrinsic value.

Contemporary Approach of Intrinsic value in Nature:

In environmental philosophy, it is necessary to perceive environmental issues from different philosophical directions. Philosophers and ethicists have obligation to formulate a passable worldview

⁶ Charles Stevenson, Richard Brant ‘Values and Morals: *Essays in honor of William Frankena*, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, Springer Netherlands, 1978.

⁷ Lemos, Noah M; *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge University Press, 1994, P. 3-19

⁸ Chisholm, Roderick M; *Defining Intrinsic Value: Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 2* Apr., 1981, Oxford University Press: p. 99-100

⁹ Ibid, p 99-100

through which the problems are seen, how we see nature and suggest norms by which our interactions with the environment are to be judged. A proper analysis shows that traditional Western ethics is basically anthropocentric. Human life is not comparable with any other lives. For them, only humans are intrinsically valuable. But contemporary environmental philosophy begins with 'moral extensionism' and deals with questions like 'to what extent of the nature/environment, is to be accorded intrinsic value? What is the criterion of according moral value?' Some philosophers like, Peter Singer, favours the criteria of "sentience"¹⁰, while conservationists speak of biospheric egalitarianism. According to them, trees and plants have non-felt goals of their own. Even in an eco-system, species are to be accorded moral value. To ask whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees while others claim that this is an undue partiality.

While dealing with the debate related to welfarism vs conservationism questions like 'can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance' are asked. The welfarists' response is obviously negative. Conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system. Some thinkers like Warwick Fox, do not find any necessary connection between value ascription and conservation. They think deep self-realisation is a prerequisite.¹¹ Some claims that environmental values are not universal and support relativist environmentalism. On the other hand third world environmentalism is different. Let us elaborate the debates thoroughly and comprehensively. The first debate is whether moral worth can be extended to the non-human entities and if it is then what is the criteria of such extension. The argument, in favour of those who support moral extension beyond human, may be put forward in the following way.

- Moral concern deserves for anyone who has an interest in, or desire for, their own well-being.
- Humans show a desire for their own well-being, and thus they deserve moral respect. That is, the well-being of other beings ought to be respected and protected, because these other beings have a desire for their own well-being just as we do.
- Yet humans are not the only entities possessing such interests or desires. Other animals also show a desiring interest in their own well-being, and thus they too deserve moral respect just as humans.

The first and second assumptions are the basic premises of many ethical discussions, while the third one is the important extension in the reasoning of environmentalists and animal rights advocates. If both human and nonhuman beings desire their own well-being and have a sentient capacity for experiencing pain; then both kinds of beings, in similar ways, can be either benefited or harmed. Hence, both kinds of beings qualify for moral concern. To grant moral respect to the one kind, but not the other, is inconsistent. However, this extension limits only to the *sentient beings* whereas environmental ethicists go beyond

¹⁰Singer, P., *Practical Ethics*, Cambridge University Press. 1993, P. 264-65

¹¹Fox, Warwick; 1993; "What Does the Recognition of Intrinsic Value Entail?" *Trumpeter* 10, p-101.

sentient beings. Aldo Leopold makes a significant entry in this regard in 1949 with the celebrated land ethic “A Sand County Almanac.” Leopold advanced the idea of biotic right, the concept that everything on this planet, including soil and water, is ecologically equal to man and shares equally in “the right to continued existence.” In thus rising above utilitarianism, Leopold became the most important source of modern biocentric or holistic ethicist. Leopold holds that there is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. . . The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is. . .an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.¹²

Rolston’s Approach:

Rolston¹³ argued that there is no better evidence of nonhuman values and valuers than spontaneous wild life, born free and on its own. Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, care for their young, flee from threats, grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited and sleepy. They suffer injury and lick their wounds. Here we are quite convinced that value is non-anthropocentric. These wild animals defend their own lives because they have a good of their own. There is somebody there behind the fur or feathers. Our gaze is returned by an animal that it has a concerned outlook. Here is value right before our eyes, right behind those eyes. Animals are value-able, able to value things in their world. They maintain a valued self-identity as they cope through the world. An animal values its own life for what it is in itself, intrinsically. Humans have used animals for as long as anyone can recall, instrumentally. And in most of their moral traditions, they have also made place for duties concerning the animals for which they were responsible, domestic animals, or toward the wild animals which they hunted. Animal lives command our appropriate respect for the intrinsic value present there. But this is only an ethic for mammals, perhaps for vertebrates, and this is only a fractional percentage of living things.

Rolston mentioned that a plant is not a subject, but neither is it an inanimate object, like a stone. Plants, quite alive, are unified entities of the botanical though not of the zoological kind, that is, they are not unitary organisms highly integrated with centered neural control, but they are modular organisms, with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative modules, additional stem nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as well as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds. Plants make themselves; they repair injuries; they move water, nutrients, and photosynthate from cell to cell; they store sugars; they make toxins and regulate their levels in defense against grazers; they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of pollinating insects and the responses of other plants; they emit allelopathic agents to suppress invaders; they make thorns, trap insects. A plant, like any

¹²Leopold, A. (1949). *A Sand Country Almanac: With Essays on Conservation from Round River*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 238-9

¹³Rolston, Holmes; *Art, Ethics and Environment: A Free Inquiry Into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006. pp 1-11

other organism, sentient or not, is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its program, making a way through the world, checking against performance by means of responsive capacities with which to measure success. On the basis of its genetic information, the organism distinguishes between what *is* and what *ought to be*. The organism is an axiological system, though not a moral system. So the tree grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists death. A life is defended for what it is in itself. Every organism has a *good-of-its-kind*; it defends its own kind as a *good kind*. The plant, as we were saying, is involved in conservation biology. Does not that mean that the plant is valuable, able to value itself on its own?

Edwin P. Pister's Approach:

Edwin P. Pister¹⁴, a retired Associate Fishery Biologist by profession with the California Department of Fish and Game, worked long and hard to save from extinction several species of desert fishes living in small islands of water in an ocean of dry land. He and his allies took the case of the Devil's Hole pupfish - threatened by agro business persons pumping groundwater for irrigation - all the way to the United States Supreme Court; and won. Pister argues for *moral* responsibility to save them from extinction without considering about whether they had instrumental value or not but they had, Pister believed, *intrinsic value*. But this "philosophical" concept was hard to explain to colleagues and constituents. As one put it, "When you start talking about morality and ethics, you lose me."¹⁵ Finally, Pister found a way to put the concept of intrinsic value across clearly. To the question *What good is it?* he replied, *What good are you?* That answer forces the questioner to confront the fact that he or she regards his or her own total value to exceed his or her instrumental value. Many people hope to be instrumentally valuable -- to be useful to family, friends, and society. But if we prove to be good for nothing, we believe, nevertheless, that we are still entitled to life, to liberty, to the pursuit of happiness. (If only instrumentally valuable people enjoyed a claim to live, the world might not be afflicted with human overpopulation and over-consumption; certainly we would have no need for expensive hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, and the like.) Human dignity and the respect it commands - human ethical entitlement - is grounded ultimately in our claim to possess intrinsic value.

Callicott's Approach:

Drawing the line of Pister, J. B. Callicott¹⁶ called this the phenomenological proof for the existence of intrinsic value. The question "*How do we know that intrinsic value exists?*" is similar to the

¹⁴ Pister, P. Edwin; 1985, "Desert Pupfishes: Reflections on Reality, Desirability, and Conscience." *Fisheries*, 10/6: pp 10-15.

¹⁵ Pister, P. Edwin, 1987, "A Pilgrim's Progress from Group A to Group B," in *Companion to A Sand County Almanac*, J. Baird Callicott (edit.). Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987, pp 228

¹⁶ Callicott, J. Baird; 1995, *Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis*, *The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.

question “*How do we know that consciousness exists?*” We experience both consciousness and intrinsic value introspectively and irrefutably. Pister’s question “*What good are you?*” simply serves to bring one’s own intrinsic value to one’s attention. More importantly Callicott mentioned that if we fail to establish intrinsic value in nature then there is no meaning of environmental ethics as because intrinsic value is the most distinct feature of environmental ethics. If nature, that is, lacks intrinsic value, then environmental ethics is but a particular application of human-to-human ethics. He also acknowledged about moral truth to justify that nature has intrinsic value by refuting Bryan Norton’s¹⁷ anthropocentric approaches towards nature. In this context Callicott referred the instances of voluntary freeing the slaves of plantation owners in Southern America during the period of Abraham Lincoln. The concept is that if the slaves are freed then they will get a chance to form, re-form and improve their value system. The same argument can be produced in case of environment. Human beings, we believe, have intrinsic value. Therefore, we think that to enslave human beings is wrong. And besides, slavery is economically backward. Similarly, other species, we are beginning to believe, are also intrinsically valuable. Therefore, to render other species extinct is wrong. And besides, we risk injuring ourselves and future generations of human beings in a wide variety of ways if we do not vigilantly preserve other species.

Callicott also put forwarded teleological argument for the existence of intrinsic value in nature.¹⁸The argument appears to be analogous to Aristotle’s at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* for something -- human happiness, Aristotle believed -- that is an end in itself. The existence of means, in short, implies the existence of ends. Though one means may exist for the sake of another -- say, a forge for the making of shovels -- the train of means must, Aristotle argued, terminate in an end which is not, in turn, a means to something else: an end-in-itself. Otherwise the train of means would be infinite and unanchored. And since means are valued instrumentally and ends-in-themselves are valued intrinsically, if ends-in-themselves exist -- and they must if means do; and means do -- then intrinsic value exists.

Arne Naess’ Approach:

Arne Naess took a strong stand questioning the venerable German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s insistence that human beings are never used *merely* as a means to an end. But why should this philosophy apply only to human beings? Are there no other beings with intrinsic value? What about animals, plants, landscapes, and our very special old planet as a whole?

¹⁷Norton, Bryan (1992). "Epistemology and Environmental Value." *Monist* 75: 208-26.

(Notes: Bryan Norton fairly asks why we should want a *distinct*, non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. There is the intellectual charm and challenge of creating something so novel. And that, combined with a passion for championing nature, is reason enough for me, a philosopher, to search for an adequate theory of intrinsic value in nature. But so personal, so self-indulgent a reason is hardly adequate. What can a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic *do* to defend nature against human insults that an anthropocentric ethic cannot?)

¹⁸Callicott, J. Baird;1995, *Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis*,The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 3, Spring,Presbyterian College.

Arne Naess, a revolutionary environmentalist mentioned that there is existence of greatness in nature other than human. For him, “To meet a big, wild animal in its own territory may be frightening, but it gives us an opportunity to better understand who we are and our limits of control: the existence of greatness other than the human.”¹⁹

Furthermore, Naess elaborates that there is one process that perhaps is more important in this respect than any other: the process of so-called *identification*. We tend to see ourselves in everything alive. We observe the death struggle of an insect, but as mature human beings we spontaneously also experience our own death in a way, and feel sentiments that relate to struggle, pain, and death. Spontaneous identification is of course most obvious when we react to the pain of persons we love. We do not observe that pain and by reflecting on it decide that it is bad. What goes on is difficult to describe; it is a task of philosophical phenomenology to try to do the job. Here it may be sufficient to give some examples of the process of identification, or “seeing oneself in others.” A complete report on the death struggle of an insect as some of us experience such an event must include the positive and negative values that are attached to the event as firmly as the duration, the movements, and the colors involved.²⁰ So, for him, there is a substantial majority with quite far-reaching ideas about the rights and value of life forms, and a conviction that *every life form has its place in nature* that we must respect. Naess, in the first of eight points charter what he coined as “the platform of deep ecology,” or rather, one formulation of such a platform stated that the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth has inherent value. The value of nonhuman life forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. In oppose to these views propagated by the philosophers as has been discussed so far, there are group of thinkers who have drawn a different line of thoughts in regard to the moral extension to non-human world.

Elliot’s Approach:

Robert Elliot, taking into account of consequentialist and deontologist position, claimed to conceive that if wild nature has intrinsic value, then there is an obligation to preserve it and to restore it. There is a connection between value and obligation. If wild nature has intrinsic value it is because it exemplifies value adding properties. Elliot’s favourite candidates are naturalness and aesthetic value. The aesthetic value draws together various other suggested value-adding properties other than naturalness, such as diversity, stability, complexity, beauty, harmony, creativity, organization, intricacy, elegance and richness. Particular such properties might be value-adding in their own right, but additionally they might, in conjunction with other properties, constitute the property of being aesthetically valuable, which is likewise value-adding. In

¹⁹Naess, A. 2005; The heart of the forest. In A. Drengson & H. Glasser (Eds.), *Selected Works of Arne Naess*, X (pp. 551–553). Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer

²⁰Naess, A. 1993; Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air* (pp. 70–82). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

this context Elliot focuses on naturalness and considers some objections to naturalness and considers some objections to the claim that it is value-adding.²¹

Bryan Norton's approach:

Another advocate of this debate is Bryan Norton²² and for him nature serves us in more ways than as a pool of raw materials and a dump for wastes. It provides priceless ecological services, many of which we imperfectly understand. And, undefiled, nature is a source of aesthetic gratification and religious inspiration. When the interests of future generations (as well as of present persons) in the ecological services and psycho-spiritual resources afforded people by nature are taken into account, respect for human beings (or for human interests) is quite enough to support nature protection, Norton argues. Thus anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric environmental ethics “converge”; that is, both prescribe the same personal practices and public policies. Let us turn to the second debate i.e. whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality.

Aldo Leopold, Holmes Rolston III, Arne Neess favour equal moral worth to all beings, whereas Moorean group is talking about degree of values. Again, Charles Cockell and some other debated that environmental policy has a size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals, hence they bear less “degree” of intrinsic value. The campaigns for the protection of endangered creatures almost always focus on those that are large and impressive. The list of species whose decline or abuse has caught the attention of environmentalists includes: Rhinos, elephants, tigers, whales, seals, lions, turtles, polar bears, many types of birds, domesticated animals, animals used for vivisection, and so on. Evident within the history of environmental ethics and environmental policy is the consistent importance of the size of organisms. Environmentalists do not often concern themselves with the decline of small rodents, insects, or crustaceans.²³ There are some notable exceptions. The protection of the monarch butterfly has been an ongoing concern for the North American Butterfly Association, and it is an example of a small creature that has attracted the attention of environmentalists and policy makers. In the United States, each state has a symbolic state insect, illustrating that some small organisms have value (although it is not clear what sort

²¹ Elliot, Robert; ‘Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness’, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No. 2, *The Intrinsic Value of Nature* (APRIL 1992), pp. 138-160; Oxford University Press

²²Norton, Bryan; 1991, *Toward Unity Among Environmentalists*. New York: Oxford University Press.

²³Cockell, Charles S; *Environmental Ethics and Size*; *Ethics and the Environment*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring, 2008), pp. 23-39, Indiana University Press

of 'value' mascots and state insects have to the valuer. Is this a reflection of an instrumental value - some type of competitiveness by each state to have a distinctive insect - or an expression of a belief in the intrinsic value of insects?).

To move on to the third debate related to both welfarism as well as conservationism a massive contradiction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is vividly acknowledged. To shift to the question "can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance?" has occupied a significant place in environmental ethics. Legally animals have no rights. Property rights are still the premier means of addressing the environment. But man centered approach towards environment is an illegitimate way of giving preference to human interest only. Specism is discrimination on the basis of species only, without sufficient moral reason. Non-anthropocentrism helps to get rid of traditional attitude towards animals. The fact that it fails to mitigate the dichotomy between biotic and abiotic is mere abstraction and it leads to eco-centrism. Some sort of Anthropocentrism is unavoidable; a 'perspectival' anthropocentrism is objectionable. The main *objectionable* concern of Anthropocentrism is the human interest at the expense of non-human animals and non-inclusion of *intrinsic value* to non-human world. That only the human has reason, capacity of communication is factually incorrect. In this context a lot of examples like monkey and Rhinoceros can be provided. Even some non-anthropocentric approaches cannot go deep to the issues of endangered species and the ecosystem. Moral standing of the whole nature, including abiotic part is to be acknowledged. But at this juncture, we are in a pendulum of "The life boat ethics", where ethics is on one side and development is on the other side. The reason why this dichotomy continues is as because the welfarists say, 'no' to any damage to the non-human world and the conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system.

Criteria for acknowledging intrinsic value in nature:

Now the question "what are the criteria of acknowledging intrinsic value in nature?" needs to be answered in the light to grasp the very idea of intrinsic value in nature. The criterion will perhaps serve the required demand for the debate related to the value ascription and subjective objective dichotomy.

Before proceeding to examine the epistemological status of attributions of independent value to natural objects, it is necessary to distinguish two importantly different theories regarding that value. Some advocates of independent value in nature believe that nature is valuable in the strong, "intrinsic" sense that natural objects have value entirely independent of human consciousness. According to this theory, the value in nature existed prior to human consciousness and it will continue to exist even after human consciousness disappears. Other theorists adopt a less heroic version of the hypothesis, accepting that valuing is a conscious activity and that value, therefore, will be only "inherent" in nature. According to the inherentists,

nature has value that is independent of the values and goals of human valuers -it is not merely instrumental to human ends-but this value is attributed by conscious valuers, either human or otherwise.

Hence the intrinsic value question reflects a long-standing conflict between rival epistemologies, with realists and relativists squaring off in a new arena. For their part, neo-pragmatists adopt an anti-foundationalist stance: the moral and ontological status of nonhuman nature need not be settled - indeed cannot be settled - before engaging in collective action on behalf of the environment. Radical pluralism at the level of conceptual frameworks need not preclude a workable accord on policy. On this view, solutions to environmental problems what Norton called contextual sensitivity which is different from metaphysical certainty.²⁴ In this context Norton assumed two concerns:

- i) The Epistemic Question: Can environmentalists claim that their goals and the value claims that support them are epistemically justifiable, that they are more than merely subjective preferences?
- ii) The Locational Question: Can environmentalists' values be located "out there" in the world itself, independent of human consciousness?

From the above two issues it can be understood that defenders of independent value in nature are unified by a commitment to a particular conception of objectivity. According to this conception: For any characteristic, can be objectively attributed to an object x, only if subject S "finds," or "locates," in x; both and must, that is, exist independently of human consciousness. Because they share this basic criteriological assumption, the positions of Callicott and Rolston fall in direct opposition to each other: Rolston believes, and Callicott denies, that it is possible to achieve "objectivity" for environmental values, according to this locational criterion. Callicott, for example, states the issue as follows: "the very sense of the hypothesis that inherent or intrinsic value exists in nature seems to be that value inheres in natural objects as an intrinsic characteristic, that is, as part of the constitution of things. To assert that something is inherently or intrinsically valuable seems, indeed, to entail that its value is objective." Callicott, however, believes that there are "insurmountable logical impediments to axiological objectivism."²⁵ Rolston, on the other hand, begins his essay, "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" with a quotation from William James with which Callicott would agree. It concludes: "Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may appear imbued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind."²⁶ Rolston further states, "Nature, indeed, is infinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear her beauty as she wears colour or sound.

²⁴Nunez, Theodore W.; Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 105-128, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

²⁵Callicott, J. B.; In Defense of the Land Ethic: *Essays in Environmental Philosophy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 159.

²⁶ Rolston H. III; *Philosophy Gone Wild* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1986), p. 91.

Why then should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?"²⁷ He goes on to note that science itself seems hard put to maintain "objectivity."

Ernest Partridge, an eminent British philosopher advocates, and so, perhaps for him the best approach to a justification of the intrinsic worth of wilderness may be through an account of the experience of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second-hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evoked directly by that experience. To do this, one will call upon the nearest and most vivid source at his disposal: one's own experience. One needs to attempt, at the outset at least, to relate this experience with the least possible amount of preconception or post-analysis. Thus Partridge's approach is *phenomenological*. Following this exercise, phenomenological "brackets" has to be removed and attempt to be made to account for and qualify this experience. This is, of course, as Partridge said a thought- experiment that one might wish to try himself.²⁸

Conclusion:

The dilemma is that most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in environment/nature. That is the challenge. The debates on the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequentialists' form to the deontologists' structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the inalienable right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures' basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving core of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to Descartes, for his statement: "Cogito ergo sum". Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as "useless" as astronomy. Galileo Galilei proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 91.

²⁸ Partridge, Ernest; 1970, *Meditations on Wilderness, The Wilderness Experience as Intrinsically Valuable*.

mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton, Pierre de Fermat, G. W. Leibniz and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized.

The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Naess, Homas Rolston III and many others along with the American Indian. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all forms.

The Western human-nature dichotomy has long been criticized by environmental ethicists as a fundamental problematic of the modern age, which must be dissolved to curb the trend of increasing and irreversible environmental degradation. Dismantling the dichotomy could potentially de-center humans from the moral universe, into a more evolutionarily and ethically accurate position alongside the rest of the biota. And yet, if humans come to view themselves as part of nature, why or on what grounds would we ever limit the human enterprise? The great potential of a non-dichotomized view of humans and nature is balanced by an equally great risk, that the use of important conservation strategies like protected areas often justified by ethical appeals presupposing a separation of humans and nature may no longer be utilized even though these strategies may still be effective and justifiable on other ethical grounds. Therefore, the intellectual shift toward socio-ecological systems thinking, “humans and nature”, is both promising and precarious. While this shift has begun to blur the boundaries between humans and nature, it also necessitates a careful and creative ethical framework suited to the unique challenges of protecting the complex world we inhabit.

Some thinkers made an effort in this direction, proposing new normative postulates for modern conservationists in a paper that stimulated lively discussion and debate. Two years later, however, this debate was stifled by the pragmatic call for conservationists to stop bickering over values, embrace their differences, and focus on outcomes on the ground. This pragmatic turn is somewhat puzzling, in that it suggests conservation is more of a practice than a mission, or more of a means than an end. In its pragmatic stance, conservation appears to operate with the primary agenda of “working,” a normative pursuit whose only principled commitment is to be effective. But we might stop to ask, effective to what end? What actually constitutes success? As individuals and as a community, how do conservationists define their mission in the 21st century?

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
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SYNOPSIS

Introduction

Value-theoretic terminology is diverse. Philosophers often speak of “intrinsic value”, extrinsic value”, “instrumental value”, “non-instrumental value”, “value as an end”, “final value”, etc. Thus, some terminological explication is in order. Traditionally, “intrinsic value” is understood as synonymous with the idea of being “valuable as an end”. Thus, philosophers use a number of terms to refer to such value. The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that thing has “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is not intrinsic.

With this terminology in mind, the first point to make is that intrinsic value can take at least two forms. Intrinsic value can be relational as well as non-relational. An object is relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good for something or someone. Claims about the nature of well-being or prudential value are claims about relational intrinsic value. My experience of pleasure at a specific time is intrinsically good for me. An object is non-relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good period, or full stop. Indeed, particular objects can be relationally intrinsically valuable but not non-relationally intrinsically valuable, and vice versa. That something is good for me relationally does not guarantee that that thing is intrinsically good tout court non-relationally. My experience of pleasure might be intrinsically good for me, but might nevertheless lack non-relational intrinsic value. For instance, if I am a cold-blooded murderer, my experience of pleasure might be relationally intrinsically valuable, but it might, nevertheless, fail to be non-relationally intrinsically valuable. It might be intrinsically better; some have claimed that cold-blooded murderers feel pain than pleasure, though such pain is certainly intrinsically worse for them than pleasure.

Ascribing intrinsic values to nature

There are two aspects of ascribing intrinsic values to nature. One is epistemological which is in a direction that to ascribe anything valuable there must be an evaluator to value it. “Value is never found in objects in itself as property. It

consists in a relation to an appreciating mind”. There is another aspect of ascribing intrinsic value to the nature which states that nature has its value of its own without any consideration of an evaluator. Despite the language of value conferral, if we try to take the term *intrinsic* seriously, this cannot refer to anything the object gains, to something *within* the present tree or the past trilobite, for the human subject does not really place anything on or in the natural object. We have only a 'truncated sense' of *intrinsic*. The *attributes* under consideration are objectively there before humans come, but the *attribution* of value is subjective. The object causally affects the subject, who is excited by the incoming data and translates this as value, after which the object, the tree, appears as having value, rather like it appears to have green colour. But nothing is really added *intrinsically*; everything in the object remains what it was before. Despite the language that humans are the *source* of value which they *locate* in the natural object, no value is really located there at all. The term *intrinsic*, even when reduced, is misleading. Here lies the great importance of debate to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature.

Statement of the Problem

From Aristotle, we can find that there is a gap between ethical judgment and ethical behavior which is explained in terms of the *akrasia* or impotence of people to act in accordance with reason. According to Aristotle, such a state is due to emotions or feelings which prevent rational choice, for instance our appetite for pleasure. Can we blame people's irresponsiveness or indifference with regard to the ecological crisis on their irrationality or hedonism? As a consequence, we could explore interventions with the aim of making more reasonable choices in environmental affairs, ranging from education for sustainable development in order to increase environmental consciousness, to all kinds of policies for the restriction of industrial pollution, the preservation of natural resources or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

The two basic directions of ascribing intrinsic value to nature, i.e. there must be an appreciating mind to value something and hence value is subjective in one hand and intrinsic value is objective, independent of any subject on the other

hand gives rise to several questions for which we found different approaches to assign value to the nature. Only human beings have intrinsic value (only anthropocentric value) itself gives rise to several questions i.e. is anthropocentric approach in the direction of not ascribing intrinsic value to the nature? Does anthropocentrism talk about sustainable development? Is anthropocentrism only a human centric approach towards nature? Does this approach have no appreciation of intrinsic value of nature? Again only sentient things have intrinsic value (Only sentience-centered value) may have several questions to answer i.e.; How can it be possible to limit the provenance of intrinsic value only to sentient things? Was this value present before it was valued by an evaluator? Another important approach towards nature says that only humans can generate intrinsic values, and ascribe it to some non-sentient things (Only anthropogenic values). Is it really true that only humans can generate intrinsic value? Does intrinsic value have independent status of existence? How humans generate intrinsic value if it is already exist in nature independently? Intrinsic values can arise independent of humans (Anthropogenic values in nature). Is intrinsic value ontologically possible? Does it, in fact, independently exist?

These four approaches have raised several vital questions which need to be met. Hence, there arises a necessity of in-depth research analysis for a new direction to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature and this becomes the basic statement of this domain of research. The statement of this research problem may be formed in between the lines of epistemological and ontological or may give a road map for the better explanation of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.

Significance of the proposed study

Human being evaluates the things and events only when they take an interest. That is why a value relationship comes to the picture where it did not exist before. This evaluation is anthropogenic, which is generated by humans, but not center on humans (anthropocentric). Such process of evaluation requires some “properties” or “potentialities” in nature which are objective properties. For instance a plant can defend its own life, synthesize glucose by using

photosynthesis. Animals have their own life, can be the subject, and can have their preferences.

Interaction with the nature is an important issue in the present day context not only for philosophers but also for the all others so far as well-beings of all living beings is concerned. In Indian we have a great respect to the nature; we call the earth as eternal mother, *Vasundharā*. In religion, there are beliefs and practices to respect trees, animals. But the present day concern is difficult because of the everyday scientific inventions, industrializations, discovering atom bombs, constructing mega dams etc. which have destroyed all age old ecology for which living and non-living beings have been suffering. The vital question is how do we interact with nature is a major concern of all. As Mckibben says, “we are living in a post natural world”. Nature has been used and destroyed as much as we want without considering the nature centered moral framework. But as the days passed and sufferings mount to peak nature has been looked into from a different angle. Philosophers try to add moral values to the nature. But again, a question may arise, how moral value can be assigned to nature? This leads to a debate and it generates an idea of ascribing instrumental value to the nature. Some philosophers say that it has an intrinsic value. This debate becomes more significant from different point of view including preservation of nature even if it is within the human centered framework.

Literature Review

If we have a historical look, we find over thousands of years man has regarded himself at the center of this planet. The *Great Chain of Being* (God at the apex of the universe, with humanity second, and the natural world below humanity) and *The Pyramid of Being* testify it. This tradition continues from Plato-Aristotle through Aquinas to contemporary times. Bible story of creation goes too far to put the entire earth on human control. The main theme of the story is that God has created the nature and men have *dominion* over the entire nature. This story shows two different human attitudes towards the nature. (Bible, 18) The word *dominion* justifies it. 1. as a license to do as we will. 2. as a directive to look after them.

In the present context, we are more concerned for human survival rather than the nature. McKibben in his *The End of Nature* says, 'We are living in a post natural world.' Contemporary ethicist, Steven Schwarzschild holds that the commands in the *Bible* ultimately teach us to despise, dislike and conquer the nonhuman world. The Copenhagen and the France conferences on climate change are also human centered. These certify that the moral duties are derived from our direct duties to human inhabitants only.

Among environmental ethicists in the West, at least, there is widespread agreement that the forester and ecologist Aldo Leopold provided a benchmark against which subsequent environmental ethics can be measured. His short essay "The Land Ethic" in *A Sand County Almanac* provided an evocative and profound effort to articulate ethical guidelines for human interactions with nature. In it Leopold defined ethics as guidelines for social or ecological situations, based on individual membership in "a community of interdependent parts." Applying this definition to the environment, a "land ethic," he claimed, "simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land". This enlargement of humans' moral community transformed their place in relation to the nature, relation to the natural environment, "from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it". Leopold's land ethic provided a model of and foundation for a type of environmental ethics now known as "ecocentrism" or alternatively "biocentrism".

Arne Naess in his "The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement" stated that ecologically responsible policies are concerned only in part with pollution and resource depletion. There are deeper concerns which touch upon principles of diversity, complexity, autonomy, decentralization, symbiosis, egalitarianism, and classlessness.

Partridge Earnest in his "On the Possibility of a Global Environmental Ethic" holds given the alarming news that is coming in from the environmental sciences, we would be well advised to regard Nature as a common threat. However, we would also be both tactically and morally misguided to "regard Mother Nature in general as [our] enemy." Nature is not malicious or

blameworthy. And yet, while nature is not a moral agent, it is, in an important yet figurative sense, about to launch a dreadful retaliation against us. For the atmospheric and ecological scientists tell us that the same physical, chemical and biological processes which nurtured and sustained us as a species, have been so distorted by our thoughtless interventions upon the environment, that we are about to face consequences that we can barely foresee or scarcely imagine.

Gicu-Gabriel Arsene, in his, *The human-nature relationship: The emergence of environmental ethics* holds that a closer examination of traditional Indian philosophical systems reveals their complex and often sophisticated nature. In this wide variety of beliefs and attitudes, humans, animals, plants, gods and the earth are all subject to cosmic laws and the place of humankind in the universe is variable. Hinduism can be criticized for the fact that it focuses on transcendence and that, to some extent, it neglects pragmatic aspects such as defining the place of humankind within the universe. Mahatma Gandhi, the famous Hindu who made *ahimsa* popular, has inspired many environmentalists.

In The Hymns of the *Rig Veda* stated about *Agni*, *Vāyu*, *Indra* etc. are considered as the sacred Gods for worship. Desire is the primary cause of unhappiness and suffering (*duḥkha*), especially when we desire what we cannot have. Consequently, happiness is achieved through renunciation and by restricting ourselves to our immediate needs. Humans do not try to obtain the grace of the gods but, through compassion and constant individual effort, by following the Noble Eightfold Path and observing *Dharma*, they seek to ultimately reach the perfect world of *Nirvāṇa*. Buddhists encourage non-violence and therefore this is one of the most compatible religions with the idea of preserving nature in its untamed state. Buddhism and Hinduism do not grant humans the status of “Master of nature”. These faiths exalt non-attachment to material goods and consider ignorance to be a sin which has major ecological ramifications.

R. Renugadevi, in her *Environmental ethics in the Hindu Vedas and Purāṇas in India* holds the *Vedas* are ancient Indian compilations of the Aryan period ranging between 2500 to 1500 B.C. *Rig Veda* especially mentions about environment on several occasions. A verse from the *Rig-Veda* states that “the sky

is like father, the earth like mother and the space as their son. The universe consisting of the three is like a family and any kind of damage done to any one of the three throws the universe out of balance”. Vedic culture and Vedic scriptures reveal a clear concept about the earth’s ecosystems and the necessity for maintaining their balance. Another verse from *Rig Veda* says “Thousands and Hundreds of years if you want to enjoy the fruits and happiness of life then take up systematic planting of trees”. These verses carry a message to desist from inflicting any injury to the earth and embark upon constant a forestation for survival or else the ecological balance of the earth would be jeopardized. *Rig Veda* has dwelt upon various components of the ecosystem and their importance. “Rivers occasion widespread destruction if their coasts are damaged or destroyed and therefore trees standing on the coasts should not be cut off or uprooted”. Modern civilization is experiencing the wrath of flood due to erosion of river embankments everywhere and only tree plantations along river banks cannot prevent erosion.

The *Upaniṣadas* were the final stage in the development of Vedic literatures consisting of answers to some philosophical questions. The practice of *Vanmahotsava* is over 1500 years old in India. The *Matsyapurāṇa* tells about it. *Agnipurāṇa* says that the plantation of trees and creations of gardens leads to eradication of sin. In *Padmapurāṇa* the cutting of a green tree is an offence punishable in hell.

Objectives

The problem we face today is that there is a huge gap between our ethical judgments about the ecological crisis on the one hand and our ethical behavior according to these judgments on the other. Many philosophers consider intrinsic value to be crucial to a variety of moral judgments. For example, according to a fundamental form of consequentialism, whether an action is *morally right or wrong* has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances. Many other theories also hold that what it is right or wrong to do have at least in part to

do with the intrinsic value of the consequences of the actions one can perform. Moreover, if, as is commonly believed, what one is *morally responsible* for doing is some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does, then intrinsic value would seem relevant to judgments about responsibility, too. Intrinsic value is also often taken to be pertinent to judgments about *moral justice* insofar as it is good that justice is done and bad that justice is denied, in ways that appear intimately tied to intrinsic value. Finally, it is typically thought that judgments about *moral virtue and vice* also turn on questions of intrinsic value, inasmuch as virtues are good, and vices bad, again in ways that appear closely connected to such value.

Kant himself does not use the language of intrinsic value. It is Tom Regan in ‘Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake’ represents Kant’s position on the maxim i.e. “certain individuals exist as ends-in-themselves” and “those individuals who have this status, because they have value in themselves apart from their value as a means relative to someone’s else’s end, can be said to have intrinsic value and called it ends-in-itself theory of intrinsic value”. Some philosophers deny that intrinsic value can be relational. For instance, according to Noah Lemos, when one says that something is intrinsically good, in the sense with which we are concerned, he means that, that it is intrinsically good period.” However, Lemos does attempt to capture something like an account of relational intrinsic value.

The questions whether, nature has intrinsic value, and whether all value require an evaluator is raised in the traditional environmental ethics. These questions are raised between nature objectivists and value subjectivists. The former presupposes that nature is intrinsically valuable, while the later holds that it takes an evaluator to ascribe value. In this proposal, an attempt will be made to find out a collaborative and discursive process to account for those dual ways of proving intrinsic value in nature keeping in mind the followings.

- To highlight the state of intrinsic value as discussed by Moore, Brentano, Kant and Holmes Rolston.
- To examine whether intrinsic value is ascribed to nature.

- To study the ontological and epistemological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.
- To find out the debates which are more appropriate and have impact parameter.
- To study and to find out amicable ways of ascribing intrinsic value to the nature from the dual aspects of ascriptions.

Research Gap

Morality requires that our sentiments must be balanced with relevant facts and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual philosophizes with more than just reason - we use our will, feelings, and our soul. We have an inclination that moral philosophy needs to be distinguished, predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral dilemmas, but nothing is beyond from the truth.

In the history of Western thought, nature has been primarily appreciated as instrumentally valuable. In *Genesis*, it is said that God gives humankind ‘dominion over the earth,’ that is that natural things were created for the use and employment of man’s happiness. In Platonic philosophy, from Plato to Plotinus, the created world is seen as instrumentally valuable for approaching an understanding of the formal good, and ultimately the Good, or the Neoplatonic One. One might tend to think that nature was regarded as instrumentally good, but intrinsically bad by Platonic philosophers.

However, there is a tendency in Platonism and Neoplatonism, one which has a profound influence on subsequent Western philosophy, to regard nature as intrinsically good. Of course we understand such an idea under the rubric of providence. We can see the clues of these ideas in Plato’s *Timaeus*, and explicit expressions of it in Plotinus’ *Enneads*. This concept of providence holds a powerful influence over the thinking of all subsequent Western philosophy up to Enlightenment. To hold a belief in providence is to believe that the world is fundamentally good, that, being created by a good and benevolent deity, it could not possibly be bad. We can find in Leibniz, in 17th Century maintaining that this is “the best of all possible worlds.” Despite the discontent caused by Leibniz’s

impersonal God, his belief in a providential world order is characteristic of that period of intellectual development that which we refer to as Enlightenment.

In Indian context, nature has been worshiped and respected as God and deity who have given a wide range of scope for considering nature having a sort of value in it. Compiling all these aspects a trend of conflicts still resisting so far as ascribing value in nature is concern.

Methodology

The methodology selected for this proposed research is introduced in its entirety and justified as similarities and differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The specific methods or activities like proportional and logical method will be appropriate and feasible to accomplish the objectives. These methods need to be both qualitative and quantitative in temperament. Whenever possible, these methods will identify the linkage between intrinsic value in nature from Western perspective and Indian Philosophy.

Also the proposal deployed the exploratory research design based on literature survey involving review of qualitative information published either in records/reports or journals/magazines/books. Top scholarly articles in which there are epistemological and ontological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature and which have an impact parameter will be considered as the universe of the study. The sampling is non-probability and purposive since the universe is purposively selected for the proposed study.

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Chapter-1

Introduction

1.1: What is environmental ethics?

To talk about environmental ethics, as the topic of the thesis falls under this category, brings three things to our mind, i.e. environment, environmental ethics and environmental philosophy. Environment is everything around humans which is not strictly man made like, wild nature, fields, ditches etc. Environmental ethics, on the other hand, dwells on our treatment towards natural entities, our relationship with them and moral standing of those entities. Again, environmental philosophy deals with the knowledge about natural entities. It also enquires whether natural entities can know themselves as humans do, or are they rational like humans? What is the mode of existence of ecosystem?

Traditional ethics concerns about intra-human duties, specially duties among contemporaries. Environmental ethics extends the scope of ethical concerns beyond one's community and nation to include not only all people everywhere but also animals and whole of nature, the biosphere both present and future generation. Environmental ethics takes the consensus from environmental politics, environmental economics, environmental sciences and environmental literature. The distinctive perspectives and methodologies of these disciplines provide important inspiration for environmental ethics, the environmental ethics offers value foundation for these discipline. They reinforce, influence and support each other. The plurality of environmental ethics which is interpreted in terms of anthropocentrism, animal liberation, rights theory, biocentrism and ecocentrism provide unique and reasonable justification for environmental protection. However, their approaches are different, but by and large the share the common goals.

Let us quote of Claire Palmer from the introduction to the *Blackwell Anthology on Environmental Ethics* at least to grasp the basic concept of what environmental ethics is.

“A wide spectrum of ethical positions is covered by the umbrella term ‘environmental ethics.’ These positions draw on a variety of ethical traditions, from Plato and Aristotle to Mill and Moore. As one might expect, a vigorous debate is being conducted between those advocating such diverse approaches. Certain key questions lie at its heart. One central area of debate concerns value theory in environmental ethics. What is considered valuable, and from where does such value come?”¹

Besides what is in Palmer’s quotation, there are more fundamental questions in environmental ethics such as, “What is the nature of the value that nonhumans have?” “Is the value in question objective or subjective?” “Is it intrinsic or extrinsic?” “Is value instrumental or non-instrumental?” These questions are primarily focused on the nature of the value of nonhumans and the environment and can be summed up by the basic question, “What kind of value do these things have?” Thus, we could perhaps rephrase Palmer’s key question in environmental ethics as three separate questions: “What are the things that have value? What is the nature of value do these things have? And, what is the source of such value?”

1.2: Value centric terminology

There is, of course, the question of what exactly the term “value” itself means as there are many ways to use this terminology. We often see that the term value has being coined as “intrinsic value”, “inherent value”, “extrinsic value”, “instrumental value”, “non-instrumental value”, “value as an end”, “final value”, etc. Thus, some terminological explication is in order. Traditionally, “intrinsic value” is understood as synonymous with the idea of being “valuable as an end”. In this way, it can be understood that there are number of references to the term value. Thus intrinsic value of something is a value that referred to the terms like “in itself,” or “for its own sake,” or “as such,” or “in its own right.” Extrinsic value is value that is opposite to intrinsic.² I will assume that value is the same thing as what G.E. Moore calls “goodness” or “good” terms which he believes are indefinable notions that are “simple”. Moore writes, “What, then, is good? How is good to be defined? What I

¹Palmer, Clare (2003). “An Overview of Environmental Ethics.” in *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell publishing, p.16.

²Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value; Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, first published Tue Oct 22, 2002; substantive revision Wed Jan 9, 2019

want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about this I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement... But if we understand the question in this sense, my answer to it may seem a very disappointing one. If I am asked, 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I have to say about it...My point is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to anyone who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is."³

With this terminology in mind, the first point to make is that intrinsic value can take at least two forms. Intrinsic value can be relational as well as non- relational. An object is relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good for something or someone. Claims about the nature of well-being or prudential value are claims about relational intrinsic value. My experience of pleasure at a specific time is intrinsically good for me. An object is non-relationally intrinsically good if it is intrinsically good period, or full stop. Indeed, particular objects can be relationally intrinsically valuable but not non-relationally intrinsically valuable, and vice versa. We, therefore, may say that something is good for me, or relationally, does not guarantee that that thing is intrinsically good tout court, or non-relationally. My experience of pleasure might be intrinsically good for me, but might nevertheless lack non-relational intrinsic value. For instance, if I am a cold-blooded murderer, my experience of pleasure might be relationally intrinsically valuable, but it might, nevertheless, fail to be non-relationally intrinsically valuable. It might be intrinsically better; some have claimed that cold-blooded murderers feel pain than pleasure, though such pain is certainly intrinsically worse for them than pleasure.

1.3: Aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature

There are two aspects of ascribing intrinsic values to nature. One is epistemological which is in a direction that to ascribe anything valuable there must be an evaluator to value it. "Value is never found in objects in itself as property. It consists in a relation to an appreciating mind". There is another aspect of ascribing

³ Moore, G.E. (1948) *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 6-7

intrinsic value to the nature which states that nature has its value of its own without any consideration of an evaluator. Despite the language of value conferral, if we try to take the term *intrinsic* seriously, this cannot refer to anything the object gains, to something *within* the present tree or the past trilobite, for the human subject does not really place anything on or in the natural object. We have only a ‘truncated sense’ of *intrinsic*. The *attributes* under consideration are objectively there before humans come, but the *attribution* of value is subjective. The object causally affects the subject, who is excited by the incoming data and translates this as value, after which the object, the tree, appears as having value, rather like it appears to have green colour. But nothing is really added *intrinsically*; everything in the object remains what it was before. Despite the language that humans are the *source* of value which they *locate* in the natural object, no value is really located there at all. The term *intrinsic*, even when reduced, is misleading. Here lies the great importance of debate to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature.

From Aristotle, we found that there is a gap between ethical judgment and ethical behavior which is explained in terms of the *akrasia* or impotence of people to act in accordance with reason. According to Aristotle, such a state is due to emotions or feelings which prevent rational choice, for instance our appetite for pleasure. Can we blame people’s irresponsiveness or indifference with regard to the ecological crisis on their irrationality or hedonism? As a consequence, we could explore interventions with the aim of making more reasonable choices in environmental affairs, ranging from education for sustainable development in order to increase environmental consciousness, to all kinds of policies for the restriction of industrial pollution, the preservation of natural resources or the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

1.4: Different approaches to assign value

The two basic directions of ascribing intrinsic value to nature, i.e. there must be an appreciating mind to value something and hence value is subjective in one hand and intrinsic value is objective, independent of any subject on the other hand gives rise to several questions for which we found different approaches to assign value to the nature. Only human beings have intrinsic value (only anthropocentric value) itself

gives rise to several questions i.e. is anthropocentric approach in the direction of not ascribing intrinsic value to the nature? Does anthropocentrism talk about sustainable development? Is anthropocentrism only a human centric approach towards nature? Does this approach have no appreciation of intrinsic value of nature? Again only sentient things have intrinsic value (Only sentience-centered value) may have several questions to answer i.e.; How can it be possible to limit the provenance of intrinsic value only to sentient things? Was this value present before it was valued by an evaluator? Another important approach towards nature says that only humans can generate intrinsic values, and ascribe it to some non-sentient things (Only anthropogenic values). Is it really true that only humans can generate intrinsic value? Does intrinsic value have independent status of existence? How humans generate intrinsic value if it is already present in nature independently? Intrinsic values exist independent of humans' appreciation (Anthropogenic values in nature). Is intrinsic value ontologically possible? Does it, in fact, independently exist? These questions direct us to think about who are the moral agents what is the moral standing of environment. There are arguments that those who have the freedom and rational capacities to be responsible for choices, or who are capable of moral reflections and decision are moral agents. This is, in fact, considered as a one sided theory. And that if one's continued existence is valuable for itself is a moral standing. In that case one's interests and choices may be weighed when deciding what is permissible to do. That is to say, which is owed by moral agents to those with moral standing? What moral duty do we have towards those with moral standing? These questions will be tried to address in this thesis.

The four approaches have raised several vital questions which need to be met. Hence, there arises a necessity of in-depth research analysis for a new direction to ascribe intrinsic value to the nature and this becomes the basic statement of this domain of research. The statement of this research problem may be formed in between the lines of epistemological and ontological or may give a road map for the better explanation of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.

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1.5: Background of the study

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Gicu-Gabriel Arsene, in his, *The Human-Nature Relationship: The emergence of environmental ethics* advocates that a closer examination of traditional Indian philosophical systems reveals their complex and often sophisticated nature. In this wide variety of beliefs and attitudes, humans, animals, plants, gods and the earth are all subject to cosmic laws and the place of humankind in the universe is variable. Hinduism can be criticized for the fact that it focuses on transcendence and that, to some extent, it neglects pragmatic aspects such as defining the place of humankind within the universe. Mahatma Gandhi, the famous Hindu who made *ahimsa* popular, has inspired many environmentalists.

In The Hymns of the *Rig Veda* stated about *Agni*, *Vāyu*, *Indra* etc. are considered as the sacred Gods for worship. Water serves as a unifying fluid between sky/heaven and earth as described in the *Rig Veda*. (10.0.1-14). The origin of life in water in the form of fish as the first incarnation of *Lord Vishnu* states about the organic life-seeds in the earth. The norms have also been suggested in the *Rig Vedato* maintain the sacred power of water. For example verse 4.56 of *Manu Smriti* states: “One should not cause urine, stool, cough in the water. Anything which is mixed with these impious objects water becomes polluted; blood and poison should not be thrown in to water”.

Desire is the primary cause of unhappiness and suffering (*duḥkha*), especially when we desire what we cannot have. Consequently, happiness is achieved through renunciation and by restricting ourselves to our immediate needs. Humans do not try to obtain the grace of the gods but, through compassion and constant individual effort, by following the Noble Eightfold Path and observing *Dharma*, they seek to ultimately reach the perfect world of *Nirvāṇa*. Buddhists encourage non-violence and therefore this is one of the most compatible religions with the idea of preserving nature in its untamed state. Buddhism and Hinduism do not grant humans the status of “Master of nature”. These faiths exalt non-attachment to material goods and consider ignorance to be a sin which has major ecological ramifications.

R. Renugadevi, in her *Environmental ethics in the Hindu Vedas and Purāṇas in India* holds the *Vedas* are ancient Indian compilations of the Aryan period ranging between 2500 to 1500 B.C. *Rig Veda* especially mentions about environment on several occasions. A verse from the *Rig-Veda* states that “the sky is like father, the earth like mother and the space as their son. The universe consisting of the three is like a family and any kind of damage done to any one of the three throws the universe out of balance”. Vedic culture and Vedic scriptures reveal a clear concept about the earth’s ecosystems and the necessity for maintaining their balance. Another verse from *Rig Veda* says “Thousands and Hundreds of years if you want to enjoy the fruits and happiness of life then take up systematic planting of trees”. These verses carry a message to desist from inflicting any injury to the earth and embark upon constant a forestation for survival or else the ecological balance of the earth would be jeopardized. *Rig Veda* has dwelt upon various components of the ecosystem and their importance. “Rivers occasion widespread destruction if their coasts are damaged or destroyed and therefore trees standing on the coasts should not be cut off or uprooted”. Modern civilization is experiencing the wrath of flood due to erosion of river embankments everywhere and only tree plantations along river banks cannot prevent erosion.

The *Upaniṣadas* were the final stage in the development of Vedic literatures consisting of answers to some philosophical questions. The practice of *Vanmahotsava* is over 1500 years old in India. The *Matsyapurāṇa* tells about it. *Agnipurāṇa* says that the plantation of trees and creations of gardens leads to eradication of sin. In *Padmapurāṇa* the cutting of a green tree is an offence punishable in hell.

The problem we face today is that there is a huge gap between our ethical judgments about the ecological crisis on the one hand and our ethical behavior according to these judgments on the other. Intrinsic value, thus, plays a crucial role in framing the variety of moral judgments. The fundamental form of consequentialism, hence, argued that an action’s *moral worth* is exclusively determined by its intrinsically better consequences from many other actions, which are performed under the circumstances. There are also other theories that hold that the rightness and wrongness of an action has to do wholly or partly with the intrinsic value of the

consequences of the actions one can perform. However, intrinsic value is also referred to judgments about responsibility if one is *morally responsible* for doing some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does. Intrinsic value can also be related to *moral justice* if relevant to judgments of justice. It is good if justice is done and bad if justice is denied. And in this way it appears that the justice is intimately tied to intrinsic value. Lastly, there are also issues which are thought to be judgments about *moral virtue and vice* that draw attention about the questions of intrinsic value, such as virtues are good, and vices bad, and that appear closely connected to such value.

Kant himself does not use the language of intrinsic value. It is Tom Regan in ‘Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake’ represents Kant’s position on the maxim i.e. “certain individuals exist as ends-in-themselves” and “those individuals who have this status, because they have value in themselves apart from their value as a means relative to someone’s else’s end, can be said to have intrinsic value and called it ends-in-itself theory of intrinsic value”. Some philosophers deny that intrinsic value can be relational. For instance, according to Noah Lemos, when one says that something is intrinsically good, in the sense with which we are concerned, he means that, that it is intrinsically good period.” However, Lemos does attempt to capture something like an account of relational intrinsic value.

1.6: Objectives and research gap

The questions whether, nature has intrinsic value, and whether all value require an evaluator is raised in the traditional environmental ethics. These questions are raised between nature objectivists and value subjectivists. The former presupposes that nature is intrinsically valuable, while the later holds that it takes an evaluator to ascribe value. In this dissertation, an attempt will be made to find out a collaborative and discursive process to account for those dual ways of proving intrinsic value in nature keeping in mind the followings.

1. To clarify the concept of intrinsic value from different philosophers’ standpoints.
2. To highlight the state of intrinsic value as discussed by Moore, Chisholm, Noah M. Lemos, John O’ Neill.

3. The ascription of intrinsic value and its outcome with the debates of Holmes Rolston, Robert Elliot, J. B. Callicott and Earnest Partridge
4. To examine whether intrinsic value is ascribed to nature.
5. To study the ontological and epistemological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature.
6. To find out the debates which are more appropriate and have impact parameter.
7. To study and to find out amicable ways of ascribing intrinsic value to the nature from the dual aspects of ascriptions.

Morality requires that our sentiments must be balanced with relevant facts and reason. Philosophy is a “human product”; each individual philosophizes with more than just reason - we use our will, feelings, and our soul. We have an inclination that moral philosophy needs to be distinguished, predictable and dependable, with absolute answers to complex moral dilemmas, but nothing is beyond from the truth.

1.7: Methodology

The methodology selected for this research is introduced in its entirety and justified as similarities and differences between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The specific methods or activities like proportional and logical method will be appropriate and feasible to accomplish the objectives. These methods need to be both qualitative and quantitative in temperament. Whenever possible, these methods will identify the linkage between intrinsic value in nature from Western perspective and Indian Philosophy.

Also the proposal deployed the exploratory research design based on literature survey involving review of qualitative information published either in records/reports or journals/magazines/books. Top scholarly articles in which there are epistemological and ontological aspects of ascribing intrinsic value to nature and which have an impact parameter will be considered as the universe of the study. The sampling is non-probability and purposive since the universe is purposively selected for the thesis.

Considering all these that have been discussed so far, we are to examine two broad assumptions which are the basis of the thesis.

First assumption

Even though there are diverse views, lots of criticisms, rejections, I will stick to what G. E. Moore exactly meant by *intrinsic value*. It consists of *intrinsic properties* and *intrinsic nature*. However, I differ from Moore's statement that intrinsic value is trans-worldly. I will try to defend it in chapter II.

Second Assumption

There is intrinsic value in nature and intrinsic value is independently objectively present in nature. I will try to defend it from western perspective and Indian perspective in chapter III and IV respectively.

Chapter-II

The Concept and Debates in Intrinsic Value

2.1: Introduction

The notion of intrinsic value is of paramount importance in ethics, and that this claim needs to be defended. There are many varieties of goodness and badness. At their core lies intrinsic goodness and badness. It is in virtue of intrinsic goodness and badness that other types of goodness and badness may be understood, and hence that we can begin to come to terms with questions of virtue and vice, right and wrong, and so on. Many ways philosophers try to clarify the concept of intrinsic value- sometimes from deontological way of explaining and sometimes from consequentialists' perception. Whatever the path of discussion, Human life always wants a good life in good environment and the major ethical theories recognize to promote what makes something good or what is that something that is intrinsic.

2.2: Plato, Aristotle and Kant

There are also accounts of the concept of intrinsic value as depicted by different philosophers time to time. Plato gave an analogy saying that the Good is in some way like a Sun.⁴ He suggested that each is a source of immense value. And just as the Sun is too blinding to observe directly with the naked eye, so the Good is too dazzling to contemplate directly with naked mind.

Plato says, "In the world of Knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential form of Goodness. Once it is perceived, the conclusion follow that, for old things, this is the cause of whatever is right and good; in the visible world it gives birth to light and to the lord of light, while it is itself sovereign in the intelligible world and the parent of intelligence and truth. Without having had a vision of this form no one can can't act with wisdom, either with in his own life or in matters of states".

⁴ Plato, (1958), *The Republic*, translated and with an introduction and notes by Francis MacDonald Cornord; New York and London, Oxford University Press, p -231.

Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*⁵ conceived goodness in other ways. We can assume that there are several sorts of ‘goodness’. First and foremost of course, there is intrinsic goodness, the “Chief Good” (in Aristotle’s phrase it means there are several lesser sorts of goodness. Aristotle indicates that he is searching for something that is so good that if you have it, your life can’t be improved by the addition of anything else. Happiness (which he takes to be an important thing) is alleged to be ‘not a thing counted as one good thing among others- if it were so counted it would clearly be made more desirable by addition of even the last good - it is... “That which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. The intrinsically good is the most final good. Aristotle says that the Chief Good is something final.....always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Immanuel Kant likewise drew comparisons. In describing a thing he took to be good in some fundamental way, he tried to make it clear that this does not have its value because of its capacity to produce good results, for even if “by the niggardly provision of step motherly nature” it were to have no extrinsic value at all. “...it would still sparkle like a jewel in its own right, as something that had its full worth in itself. ...its usefulness would be only its setting as it were, so as to enable us to handle it more conveniently in commerce or to attract the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs, but not to recommend it to those who are experts or to determine its worth.”⁶

2.3: G. E. Moore on intrinsic value

*Principia Ethica*⁷ of Moore asserts that what is “common and peculiar” to all ethical judgments is the concept of “good” - what Moore later calls “intrinsic value.” All ethical questions and claims can be divided into “two kinds.” One has to do with the good: what things “ought to exist for their own sakes? And the other concerns the right: “What kind of actions ought we to perform? One of *Principia*’s central claims

⁵Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics* (2004) Translated by J.A. K. Thomson , Penguin Group , London , p-31.

⁶ Kant, Immanuel; (1959) *Foundation of Metaphysics of Morals*, translated with an *Introduction* by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis and New York; Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. p.10.

⁷ Moore, G. E; (1948), *Principia Ethica*, secs. 1–2, pp. 53–54. (G. E. Moore, “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” was originally published in 1922 as chap. 8 of *Philosophical Studies* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner), p. 253–75. It is included in Baldwin’s revised edition of *Principia Ethica*, p. 280–98.)

is that questions of the second kind can be reduced to those of the first. It means what one should do on an occasion reduces to which action, of those available, would produce the most good. “To assert that a certain line of conduct is, at a given time, absolutely right or obligatory,” Moore writes, “is obviously to assert that more good or less evil will exist in the world, if it be adopted than if anything else be done instead.”⁸ Moore distinguished his view from the view of deontological intuitionists, who held that “intuitions” could determine questions about what *actions* are right or required by duty. Moore, as a consequentialist, argued that “duties” and moral rules could be determined by investigating the effects of particular actions or kinds of actions, and so were matters for empirical investigation rather than direct objects of intuition. On Moore’s view, “intuitions” revealed not the rightness or wrongness of specific actions, but only what things were good in themselves, as *ends to be pursued*.

G. E. Moore tries to define more precisely the most important question, which, is really at issue when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value, whether it is or is not a ‘subjective’ predicate.⁹ According to Moore, there are three chief cases in which this controversy is raised.

1. With regard to the conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ and the closely allied conception of ‘duty’ or ‘what ought to be done.’
2. Secondly, with regard to ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ in some sense of those words in which the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from the conceptions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ but in which nevertheless it is undeniable that ethics has to deal with them.
3. Thirdly, with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions, such as ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly;’ or ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ in the sense in which these are applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics.

⁸ Ibid, p. 53-54

⁹ Moore, G. E.; (1922) *The Conception of Intrinsic Value*; *Philosophical Studies*, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), P 260- 266

G. E. Moore makes a distinction between intrinsic properties and intrinsic nature. If it is said that two things have different intrinsic properties or are intrinsically different then it means that they may be either numerically different or qualitatively different. On the other hand if it said that two things have different intrinsic natures then it means that they are qualitatively different (besides being numerically different). Thus if two things have different intrinsic nature then they are both qualitatively and quantitatively different. From what is said above, i.e., intrinsic difference (in nature) is not merely numerical difference; one should not hastily conclude that intrinsic difference (in nature) always implies qualitative difference. Although qualitative difference between two objects implies difference in their intrinsic natures, yet the converse is not true. Intrinsic difference may or may not mean qualitative difference. So intrinsic difference may only mean quantitative difference. Two things may have different intrinsic natures in spite of being qualitatively alike; e.g., they may differ in respect of the degree in which they possess some quality. To take a concrete example: a very loud sound and a very soft sound – they are qualitatively alike and only quantitatively different. Thus qualitative difference is only one species of intrinsic difference. We can notice, here, that Moore's way of distinguishing between intrinsic nature and intrinsic property is not clear. This is because the difference between intrinsic natures and intrinsic property (of two things) both implies either quantitative difference or qualitative difference. Moore speaks of two equivalent conditions for any value to be intrinsic: -

- If two or more things are exactly alike (having same qualities) and possess intrinsic value then they all possess intrinsic value in the same degree.
- If two or more objects have intrinsic value in a certain degree then they will all possess it in same degree under any circumstances and under any causal laws. That is to say, if these two things existed in a different universe where causal laws are different from this universe then also those things will possess intrinsic value in the same degree.

He says that intrinsic value is not subjective, but objective. Intrinsic value does not depend on the human beings valuing them. He makes a distinction between intrinsic value and intrinsic property. Examples of intrinsic value are beauty,

goodness, etc. (In Chapter 3 of *Principia Ethica* Moore argues that the existence of beauty apart from any awareness of it has intrinsic value, but in Chapter 6 he allows that beauty on its own at best has little and may have no intrinsic value¹⁰. And in the later work *Ethics* he implicitly denies that beauty on its own has value¹¹.) Whereas examples of intrinsic property are yellowness, redness, etc. Intrinsic value constitutes a unique class of predicate because they do not have anything in common with other kinds of predicates of value. Both intrinsic property and intrinsic value depend on the intrinsic nature of the thing possessing them. However intrinsic value is not identical with intrinsic property. They are different. There is something in intrinsic value which is not present in intrinsic property. But Moore cannot say what this something is. John O'Neill was dissatisfied with G. E. Moore's view of intrinsic value and this will be elaborated in the later part of this chapter.

Human beings evaluate things and event only when they take an interest. That is why a value relationship comes into picture where it did not exist before. In the process of evaluation, especially when the evaluation of nature is concerned, philosophers become interested to the "properties" or "potentialities" which are objective properties. The question, "can moral values be assigned to these properties of nature" leads to a debate and it generates an idea of ascribing instrumental value to nature. Some philosophers say that nature has intrinsic value which becomes more significant from different point of view including preservation of nature even if it is within human centered framework. But before addressing the debates that involve in *intrinsic value*, a clear concept of it and how it can be warranted needs to be understood.

Intrinsic value has traditionally been considered as the prime subject matter of discussion specially in environmental ethics. We have already mentioned that there are diverse number of terms to refer to such value as used by philosophers such as "in itself," or "for its own sake," or "as such," or "in its own right." The term 'intrinsic value' and alternative term 'inherent worth' (though not widely used) mean, lexically synonymous. In the tenth edition of *Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, the

¹⁰ Moore, G. E; (1948), *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, sec1–2, p. 53–54.

¹¹ Moore, G. E., *Ethics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 107.

term intrinsic is defined as “belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing.” And the term “inherent” is meant as “involved in the constitution or essential character of something...: intrinsic.” The English word “value” comes from the Latin word “*valere* to be worth, to be strong”; and “worth” comes from the old English word “*weorth* worthy, of value.” Thus it can be claimed that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) means that value (or worth) which belongs to its essential nature or constitution.

Intrinsic value plays an important role to influence the variety of moral judgments. For example, according to a fundamental form of consequentialism, whether an action is *morally right or wrong* has exclusively to do with whether its consequences are intrinsically better than those of any other action one can perform under the circumstances. Many other theories also hold that what it is right or wrong to do have at least in part to do with the intrinsic value of the consequences of the actions one can perform. Moreover, if, as is commonly believed, what one is *morally responsible* for doing is some function of the rightness or wrongness of what one does, then intrinsic value would seem relevant to judgments about responsibility, too. Intrinsic value is also often taken to be pertinent to judgments about *moral justice* (whether having to do with moral rights or moral desert), insofar as it is good that justice is done and bad that justice is denied, in ways that appear intimately tied to intrinsic value. Finally, it is typically thought that judgments about *moral virtue and vice* also turn on questions of intrinsic value, in as much as virtues are good, and vices bad, again in ways that appear closely connected to such value.

Many theories of value are theories of intrinsic value. For example, hedonism says that pleasure is the only thing with positive intrinsic value and pain the only thing with negative intrinsic value. Critics of hedonism reply either that some pleasures are not intrinsically worthwhile - e.g., malicious pleasures - or that things other than pleasure are intrinsically worthwhile - e.g., knowledge and justice. In this case, the disputants agree that all value is either intrinsic or derivative from intrinsic value. Indeed, agreement on this point is sometimes even built into the definitions of key terms. According to an entry in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ‘an intrinsic

good is something valuable in itself; a non-intrinsic good is something valuable by virtue of its relationship to an intrinsic good'.¹²

2.4: Instrumental Value

Many writers distinguish intrinsic value from instrumental value, the value something has because it may prove useful in obtaining other things of value. Others allow also for contributory value. Something, such as a dissonant chord in a symphony, whose value depends upon being a part of a whole, is frequently called a contributory good, the value of a contributory good derives from the intrinsic value of the whole to which it contributes. One may explain that 'Intrinsic goods are to be contrasted with things that are extrinsically valuable and things that are necessary conditions of realizing intrinsic value'. In these views, intrinsic value is the source of all other value, so, if nothing were of intrinsic value, nothing could have any value at all. But it is also possible to hold that all value is instrumental and that there is no such thing as intrinsic value.

We can suppose that x has instrumental value to the extent that x has value that is due to x's being possibly instrumental in bringing about something else. Or, in terms of valuing, x is valued instrumentally to the extent that x is valued because x is (or would be) instrumental in bringing about something else. This definition does not require that what is brought about have intrinsic value.

Money has instrumental value because it can be used to purchase things; we can suppose this without having any particular purchases in mind and without supposing that the items that may be purchased are valued intrinsically. Many of these items - food, shelter, medical care, transportation, and clothing - are themselves highly valued; but it would seem that they themselves are valued instrumentally rather than intrinsically. Now food is valued in part because it tastes good and it is plausible that the experience of eating tasty food is intrinsically good. If so, money leads indirectly to something of intrinsic value. As we have seen, many philosophers assume that instrumental value is always in this way derivative of the expected

¹²Edwards, Paul, (1967), (eds), Encyclopedia of philosophy, Macmillan, New York.

intrinsic value to which something might lead. In what follows we will consider whether this is a defensible assumption.

2.5: Debates Concerning Intrinsic Value in Normative Ethics

Apart from G. E. Moore I would like to put forward the arguments of R. M. Chisholm, Noah M. Lemos and John O' Neill in connection with the debates concerning intrinsic value in normative ethics.

Chisholm's View

The distinction between 'intrinsic' and 'non-intrinsic' value is a prominent area of discussion in environmental ethics. From Plato through Aristotle, to Brentano to Mill, this discussion has been widely developed and has been a great concern for environmental ethics. These philosophers have taken into granted that if there is something 'good' then there is something intrinsically good or good in itself and if there is anything that is bad then there is something intrinsically bad or bad in itself. But for Chisholm, this distinction has been questioned in many ways and sometimes it became ridiculous. Chisholm first tried to define what intrinsic value is and in doing so he is concerned with the qualification that makes value intrinsic. In saying so Chisholm would like to state that the state of affair under which something is considered to be valuable is to be kept in isolation and such value is considered as the 'extrinsic' and not intrinsic since in such cases the value is dependent on the states of affair.¹³ For Chisholm, if a state of affairs is intrinsically good then it is intrinsically good in every possible world in which it obtains (or is true). But a state of affairs that is instrumentally good need not to be instrumentally good in every possible world in which it obtains.¹⁴ He, in this context, mentions that all intrinsic value concepts may be analyzed in terms of intrinsic preferability.

¹³ Roderick M. Chisholm;(1981), *Defining Intrinsic Value: Analysis, Vol. 41, No. 2*, Oxford University Press: p. 99-100

¹⁴ Ibid, p 99-100

Noah M. Lemos's View

In the first chapter of his book *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*,¹⁵ Lemos tries to give a detailed account of the concept of Intrinsic Value by analyzing different philosophers' views. Specially he makes known the analysis on the basis of the views of Franz Brentano, A. C. Ewing, Roderick M. Chisholm and examine that intrinsic value is such that which is explicated in terms of the notions of ethically 'fitting' or required emotional attitudes such as love, hate and preference. He points out some traditional views of intrinsic value.

1. The first view is that if something is intrinsically good than it cannot be intrinsically bad.
2. Intrinsic value is a non-relational concept.
3. For the cognitivists, we know that something is intrinsically good and something is intrinsically bad.
4. Intrinsic value is distinct from any natural property, relation or state of affair.
5. Lastly, intrinsic value of a thing does not depend on its being the object of any psychological attitude.

Franz Brentano¹⁶, C D Broad¹⁷, A C Ewing, R M Chisholm¹⁸ hold that something being intrinsically good may be understood in terms of its being 'correct' or 'fitting' to love or like that thing- in and for itself or its own sake. This concept of intrinsic value has certain intuitive appeal. Lemos also mentions some objections to these traditional views. The first objection is in explication of the notion of intrinsic value in terms of an ethical obligation, we are confusing intrinsic value with moral value, i.e. we are confusing intrinsic goodness with moral goodness. Secondly, it is also objectionable to prefer something other than intrinsically. And thirdly, two things

¹⁵Lemos, Noah M;(1994), *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 3-19

¹⁶ Franz Brentano, (1969)*The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, English edition edited by Roderick m Chisholm and translated by Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth schneewind (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul),p.18

¹⁷ C D Board, (1981), *Five types of Ethical Theory* (New York; Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1930) p.283

¹⁸ Roderick Chisholm; "Defining Intrinsic Value"; *Analysis* 41, (March), p.100

might have same intrinsic value, whereas the attitude and the feelings that are appropriate to one might be inappropriate to another.¹⁹

Lemos elaborates about the bearers of intrinsic value taking into in to consideration about the different traditional views. In this context he refers to Panayot Butchvarov who says that some properties are intrinsically good and some properties are intrinsically bad²⁰. For example, pleasure and wisdom are intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad. Chisholm also says that ‘state of affairs’ is the bearer of intrinsic value.²¹ On the other hand he points out approach of W. D. Ross who mentions ‘fact’ as the bearer of intrinsic value. However, Lemos took a stand in the line of Chisholm’s view after considering the different views as mentioned above. He also makes some metaphysical assumptions regarding state of affairs and properties. He suggests that it is not pleasure or perfect justice, considered as abstract properties that have intrinsic value. According to him wisdom, pleasure, beauty are ‘good making properties’²². He also points out that fact can also be the bearer of intrinsic value on the ground that if it is a fact that someone is suffering from pain then the fact is intrinsically bad and if it is a fact that makes someone happy, then the fact is intrinsically good. If facts are states of affairs that obtain and if facts are bearers of values then there is an understandable temptation to say that some states of affairs are bearers of value. Hence, by this, he made a distinction between facts and states of affairs. Intrinsic value is not contingent in nature, they are universal. Concrete particulars are not intrinsic as they do not bear universal character of intrinsic value. It has a distinctiveness for which something is intrinsically good or intrinsically bad and it must be complex objects like states of affairs or facts.

¹⁹Lemos, Noah M; (1994) *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 3-19

²⁰ Ibid, p 3-19

²¹ Charles Stevenson, Richard Brant, *Values and Morals ; Essays in honor of William Frankena*, edited by Alvin I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim, Volume -13, the University of Michigan, D. Redial Publishing Company

²²Lemos, Noah M, P. 3-19

John O'Neill's View

The term intrinsic value has many senses. The variety of senses leads philosophers into confusion. Environmental ethics suffer from a conflation of these varieties of senses. O'Neill discusses these senses as follows:²³

1. Intrinsic value is non-instrumental. The idea in regard to this case is that an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself. In environmental ethics it is argued that among the entities that have such non-instrumental value are non-human beings and states. It is this claim that Arne Naess makes in defending deep ecology.
2. The second sense is that intrinsic value means having a sort of intrinsic properties. It refers to the value of an object which has intrinsic properties. This view is developed by G. E. Moore. According to Moore, as O'Neill stated "To say a kind of value is intrinsic means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question." These properties come from the intrinsic nature of the object in question. The link between the thing's intrinsic value and its intrinsic property (ies) is immediate and does not depend on any relations between that entity and other things outside of it. Such relations might be, for example, those between the psychological states of valuers and the thing being valued. That is, this value can be characterized without reference to other objects and any of their states of affair.
3. The third meaning of intrinsic value as O'Neill stated is that intrinsic value is used as a synonym of objective value. It means that the value of an object possesses independently of humans' perception. This meaning of intrinsic value has some sub-varieties. i.e. (a) if non humans have intrinsic value then this claim is a meta-ethical claim. (b) It denies the subjective view that the source of all value lies in the evaluators' preferences, affinities and so on.

The environmental ethicists, according to Neill, uses the term "intrinsic value" in the first sense - non-humans are ends-in-themselves. However in order to

²³Neill, J. O', "The Varieties of Intrinsic Value," *The Monist*, vol. 75, No 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature (April 1992); Oxford University Press. P.119-137

strengthen their position the environmental ethicists claim that the term “intrinsic value” is also used in both second and first senses. Among these three senses of “intrinsic value”, John O’Neill accepts the third sense and partially the second sense. He believes that the first sense (Moore’s sense) is not acceptable i.e. intrinsic value is non-instrumental and that an object has intrinsic value if it is an end in itself.

Regarding the second sense i.e., intrinsic value in the sense of objective value we find two types of objectivity - weak objectivity and strong objectivity. Neill believes that intrinsic value can be objective only in the strong sense. Unlike the non-anthropocentrists, he also shows that if intrinsic value can be used in the sense of the subjective value (as opposed to objective value), then such an intrinsic value can establish non-anthropocentrism. He discusses the first two senses of the term intrinsic value.

First Sense

Moore holds that an object possesses intrinsic value by virtue of its intrinsic nature. All the objects possessing intrinsic value possess it equally; there is no hierarchy of intrinsic value. Secondly, if an object has intrinsic value then it will possess it in the same way throughout its existence. Neill argues that such a concept of intrinsic value cannot establish non-anthropocentrism. Intrinsic nature or property is a non-relational property. Neill gives two explanations of “non-relational property”:²⁴

1. Non-relational properties are those that persist regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects.
2. Non-relational properties are those that can be characterized without reference to other objects.

According to Neill, non-anthropocentrism offers the following arguments to prove that nature has intrinsic value. The argument is:

- To hold an environmental ethics is to hold that non-human natural objects have intrinsic value.

²⁴ Neill, J. O’, “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value,” *The Monist*, vol. 75, No 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature (April 1992); Oxford University Press. P.119-137

- The value objects have in virtue of their relational properties, e.g. their rarity, cannot be intrinsic values.
- The value objects have in virtue of their relational properties had no place in an environmental ethic.

This argument will be clearer through the following example: Rarity is a relational property of an object since this property depends on the non-existence of other objects and thereby cannot be characterized without reference to other objects. Nowadays a special status is ascribed to the rare entities of our environment, such as endangered species, flora and fauna, etc. In Neill's view, such rarity seems to confer a special value, but not intrinsic value to these natural objects. Hence such value has no place in environmental ethics which confers intrinsic value to nature. Objects possessing non-relational property have intrinsic value. All the animals, plants, etc. have intrinsic value in the sense of non-relational property.

Neill objects to the above argument because it commits the fallacy of equivocation. The term 'intrinsic value' is used in two different senses. In the first premise it means non-instrumental value whereas in the second premise it means value an object possesses in virtue of its non-relational properties (Moore's sense of intrinsic value). This is a gross mistake because the two senses are distinct from each other. Intrinsic value in the Moorean sense means also non-instrumental value but not vice-versa. A thing may have non-instrumental value, but not intrinsic value (Moorean sense). e.g., wilderness has non-instrumental value because it is not any means to satisfy human desires. But wilderness cannot be said to have intrinsic value (Moorean sense); wilderness has value because it is untouched by humans which is equivalent to saying that wilderness has value in virtue of its relation with humans. Thus wilderness has a relational property, and not a non-relational property. At the same time wilderness has intrinsic value. So non-instrumental value and non-relational property are not equivalent to each other. Thus the term 'intrinsic value' is not used in the same sense throughout the above argument and this kind of fallacy is called fallacy of equivocation. Hence the above argument is invalid. Moorean sense of intrinsic value (non-relational property) cannot attribute intrinsic value to

wilderness. Neill thus shows that environmental ethicists cannot use intrinsic value in the first sense (Moorean sense).

Second Sense

Let us now discuss Neill's account of whether the term 'intrinsic value' can be used in the second sense – intrinsic value means objective value as opposed to subjective. A thing has subjective value if it is dependent on the valuation of the evaluator. In other words, if an evaluator says that something X is valuable then and then only X becomes valuable. On the contrary, an objective value is independent of the valuation of an evaluator. The value of X, in this case, is not dependent upon whether a subject confers value on it. X has value whether or not X is valuable to a subject. Those who maintain that intrinsic value is objective value in this sense argue that to say that non-human nature has objective value is to say that it has intrinsic value. But Neill does not think that subjectivism leads to anthropocentrism. The subjectivist asserts that the only sources of value are the evaluative attitudes of humans. But this does not mean that the only ultimate objects of value are humans. Neill takes up the theory of Emotivism to explain his claim.

C.L.Stevenson, an emotivist, defines intrinsic value as non-instrumental value. Intrinsically good means good for its own sake, as an end in itself, which is distinct from good as a means to something else. He holds: 'X' is intrinsically good asserts that the speaker approves of 'X' intrinsically and acts emotively to make the hearer or hearers likewise approve of 'X' intrinsically."²⁵ Neill claims that this 'X' can very well be non-human entity instead of being only human attitudes. An emotivist believes that ecosystem has intrinsic value and acts emotively, e.g., expresses her joy in the existence of natural ecosystem, whereas expresses her pain in the destruction of nature by humans. Thus nature has intrinsic value according to this view.

Some may object, still, that emotivism does not support environmental ethics. Since humans are the only source of value, a world without humans (even in the presence of non-human) would have no value at all. Neill's rejoinder is that emotivism does not confine moral utterances only to the periods in which human exists, e.g., an emotivist can express his joyous mood in saying "Wilderness exist

²⁵Stevenson, C. L; (1994) *Ethics and Language* ,New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 16

after the extinction of human species”. Thus subjectivism does not support anthropocentrism. In fact subjectivism can establish non-anthropocentrism by attributing intrinsic value to nature.

On the other hand, objectivism is not an adequate theory to prove that nature has intrinsic value. The objectivist account of value is whether or not something has value does not depend on the attitudes of humans. This something i.e., what kind of objects have intrinsic value is not specifically stated by them. So this “something” can be humans or attitudes of humans. Objectivism, thus, is compatible with anthropocentrism. For anthropocentrism states that non-human nature does not have intrinsic value. According to the objectivists, evaluative properties of objects are real properties of objects - evaluative properties exist independently of the evaluations of evaluators (humans).

Neill speaks of two interpretations of the phrase “independently of the evaluations of evaluators” or we can say “real property”.

- In the weak interpretation, the evaluative properties of objects are properties that exist in the absence of evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is one that exists in the absence of any being experiencing that object.
- On the other hand, in the strong interpretation the evaluative properties of objects can be characterized without reference to evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is that which can be characterized without reference to the experiences of an experiencer.

In accordance with the weak interpretation of “real property” we have weak objectivity and, in accordance with the strong interpretation of this term we have strong objectivity. He does not admit that weak objectivity will help to establish the view that nature has intrinsic value. But he admits that strong objectivity will help to prove that non-humans have intrinsic value.

2.6: Debates concerning Intrinsic value in Environmental Ethics and its Implications

Let us begin by distinguishing between anthropocentric and various types of non-anthropocentric theories, before turning to the debate over subjective versus objective intrinsic value. When the term ‘anthropocentric’ was first coined in the

1860s, amidst the controversy over Darwin's theory of evolution, to represent the idea that humans are the center of the universe²⁶, anthropocentrism considers humans to be the most important life form, and other forms of life to be important only to the extent that they affect humans or can be useful to humans. In an anthropocentric ethic, nature has moral consideration because degrading or preserving nature can in turn harm or benefit humans. For example, using this ethic it would be considered wrong to cut down the rainforests because they contain potential cures for human diseases.

We generally refer to “nonhuman nature” as “nonhuman beings.” These phrases are not intended to imply a specifically Kantian, rather than a Moorean i.e., states of affairs notion of nonhuman intrinsic value. While may say that environmental ethicists have perhaps tended toward a more Kantian concept of intrinsic value, in many cases the literature in environmental ethics could be interpreted through either a Moorean or a Kantian lens. Moore's environmental ethics is consequentialists' perception whereas Kant's view is deontological. Although the implications of these two different interpretations of intrinsic value are certainly not trivial to conservation, it is unfortunately beyond our scope to engage fully with these finer nuances. Therefore, we should not point specifically to either a Kantian or a Moorean interpretation of intrinsic value, unless otherwise noted. Throughout this chapter and in our discussion, “intrinsic value of nonhuman nature” or “intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings” should be read to imply, “intrinsic value of nonhuman nature or its interests,” or, “intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings or states of affairs pertaining to them.”

Environmental ethics have sought to more comprehensively account for intrinsic value in the natural world by extending the theory of intrinsic value beyond humans alone (i.e., beyond anthropocentrism) to also include various sets of nonhumans (i.e., non-anthropocentrism). Before Leopold's *land ethic*, there was no ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow

²⁶Campbell, E. K. (1983). *Beyond anthropocentrism*: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, p. 54-67.

upon it. Thus the enlargement of ethics to this third element in human environment is . . . an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.²⁷ But what is intrinsic value?

Expressions such as “this should be preserved for *its own sake*” are very common: but there are philosophers and scientists who opposed to apply such common concept to natural phenomena. For them there must be an evaluator valuing things—that is, there must be humans in the picture. In a sense this is true. Theories of value, like theories of gravity and rules of logical or methodological inferences, are human products. But this does not rule out the possibility of truth or correctness. For Arne Naess the positions in philosophy often referred to as “value nihilism” and “subjectivity of value” rejects the concept of valid norms. Other positions accept the concept.²⁸

Anthropocentrism, as we define it, is the view that only humans possess intrinsic value, and therefore humans alone are worthy of direct moral consideration. Non-anthropocentrism, conversely, is any perspective recognizing intrinsic value in at least some nonhumans, and thus granting those nonhumans direct moral consideration. Anthropocentrism is often, incorrectly conflated with anthropogenesis, the idea that as humans everything we do is, by necessity, human-centered. Sometimes the anthropogenic acknowledgment of intrinsic value in the nonhuman world is referred to as “weak anthropocentrism”. On the definition above, this position is not anthropocentric, and can instead be considered a form of subjectivist non-anthropocentrism. To elucidate by analogy, humans are perhaps trivially “self-centered,” in that we can only see the world through our own eyes, but we need not be morally “self-centered,” in the sense that we think and care only about ourselves. In a similar way, anthropocentrism is centered on humans because it only attributes intrinsic value to humans, not because only humans attribute intrinsic value.

Biocentric environmental ethicists argue that life, or simply “being alive,” is the criterion for intrinsic value. What is referred to here as an ‘ecocentric’ ethic comes from the term first coined ‘biocentric’ in 1913 by an American biochemist,

²⁷Leopold, A. (1949). *A Sand Country Almanac*: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 238-239

²⁸Naess, A. (1993). Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 70–82.

Lawrence Henderson, to represent the idea that the universe is the originator of life²⁹. This term was adopted by the ‘deep ecologists’ in the 1970s to refer to the idea that all life has intrinsic value (Nash, 1989). In an ecocentric ethic nature has moral consideration because it has intrinsic value, value aside from its usefulness to humans. Using this ethic, for example, one could judge that it would be wrong to cut down the rainforests because it would cause the extinction of many plant and animal species. Biocentric versions of intrinsic value are often rooted in conation, the condition of striving to fulfill one’s interests or pursue one’s good. Paul Taylor, for example, describes living beings as “teleological centers of a life” that seek to thrive and flourish³⁰. On this basis he argues all living beings possess an equal degree of intrinsic value which he also calls “inherent value”. Holmes Rolston argues that living beings literally embody in fulfilling their individual and evolutionary interests.

In ecocentric ethics, the extension of intrinsic value goes beyond living beings to the other nonhuman entities such as species or ecosystems. Some ecocentric philosophers use the conative properties of living individuals to ground the intrinsic value of ecological collectives, which are characterized either literally or by analogy as living beings. Some thinker argues that species and ecosystems, like individual organisms, have morally relevant interests. Similarly, there are others who proposes that species are of life (i.e., made up of individual living organisms), if not literally alive, and therefore have intrinsic value. James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, depicting planet Earth as an integrated, homeostatic living organism, could also be used as a basis for a biocentric environmental ethic³¹. More commonly, however, environmental ethical theories extend intrinsic value to ecological collectives on grounds other than their status as or resemblance to individual living entities. Deep Ecology, for example, is an ecocentric ethic attributing intrinsic value to the flourishing of life in all its richness and complexity. For Deep Ecologists’ individual human selves and their flourishing nature are fully realized in relation to the

²⁹Campbell, E. K., (1983), *Beyond anthropocentrism*: Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 19, p.54-67.

³⁰ Taylor, P.W., (1981), *The Ethics of Respect for Nature*; Environmental Ethics 3, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 197–218.

³¹ Lovelock, J., (2000), *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth*. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, P. 45.

ecological Self, which integrates humans, nonhumans, and the abiotic environment. Callicott, in a different vein, defends the intrinsic value of ecological collectives by developing the philosophical underpinnings for Aldo Leopold's celebrated land ethic. According to Callicott human attribution of intrinsic value reflects a socio-biological adaptation for altruistic sentiments, such as love and respect for the moral community, which over evolutionary time have increasingly extended from inner kin groups to human society and eventually the full biotic community of "soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land".³²

Philosophically, it is important for environmental ethicists to establish a sound ontological and epistemological basis for nonhuman intrinsic value, the wider, more practical significance of this project lies in defining the normative or ethical repercussions that follow from acknowledging intrinsic value in nonhuman nature. Paul Taylor, for example, argues that we should adopt a "biocentric outlook,"³³ conferring due respect to all living beings as bearers of intrinsic value. In another context Rolston suggests, we have commitment to protect nonhuman bearers of intrinsic value from destruction for more recent accounts justifying preservation on the basis of intrinsic value, while ecofeminists like Warren³⁴ suggests an ethic of engagement with love and care for nonhuman others.

More generally, environmental ethicists often suggest intrinsically valuable nonhuman beings should be granted direct moral consideration like good pester. The idea behind direct moral consideration is that humans, at the very least, should recognize and consider the interests of all morally relevant beings, i.e., beings who possess intrinsic value, in making decisions that might affect them. Some philosophers have suggested we ought to go even further and grant universal moral consideration. Arguments of this sort recognize that any criterion used to distinguish bearers from non-bearers of intrinsic value is contestable, and to some extent

³²Callicott, J.B., (1989), In *Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*. State University of New York Press, Albany, NY, p.

³³Taylor, Paul W. (1986). *Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.

³⁴ Warren, K.J., (1990), *The power and the promise of ecological feminism*: *Environmental Ethics* 12, p.125–146.

arbitrary. Of course, universal consideration creates a host of practical challenges (how to arbitrate among interests or make tradeoffs if everything has moral standing?), leading philosophers to distinguish between basic moral consideration and higher tiers of ethical concern and obligation. But as persuasively argued by some thinkers, universal consideration is less a normative guide to navigate practical situations than a dramatic re-orientation of worldview, in which the license to unilaterally exploit or disregard entities as mere things, without first exploring the possibility that they may have morally relevant interests, becomes indefensible.

Ethics, one of the major sub-disciplines of philosophy, has historically been concerned only with humans and human affairs. As part of a wave of environmental consciousness taking shape in the 1960s and 1970s, environmental ethics emerged with the primary objective of pushing ethics, including theories of intrinsic value, beyond the human realm. Though we cannot provide a comprehensive survey in this review, we will offer a concise overview of some of the major positions on intrinsic value in environmental ethics. We begin by distinguishing between anthropocentric and various types of non-anthropocentric theories, before turning to the debate over subjective versus objective intrinsic value. We may say by discussing some of the ethical implications we might recognize intrinsic value in nonhuman nature.

Intrinsic value is a multifaceted concept that can be considered from various angles of philosophical inquiry, including the following:

1. **Ontological:** What is intrinsic value? What sorts of things possess intrinsic value? Are there degrees of intrinsic value and can intrinsic value be summed or otherwise aggregated?
2. **Epistemological:** How can we recognize intrinsic value and, if relevant, differences in degrees of intrinsic value? Is intrinsic value a discoverable, objective property of the world, or a subjective attribution of (human) valuers?
3. **Ethical:** What obligations or duties do moral agents have in relation to intrinsic value? How should we balance these duties/obligations against other ethical considerations (e.g., issues of justice or rights)?

Ontology, epistemology, and ethics are the three major dimensions of intrinsic value, which philosophers use to develop and explain their particular interpretation of

the concept. Different theories will be characterized by different ideas about the ontological, epistemological, and ethical status of intrinsic value.

Intrinsic value signifies recognition of fundamental goodness in the world. Though it may appear quite basic at first glance, the concept of intrinsic value is multifaceted, with philosophically rich ontological, epistemological, and ethical dimensions. Philosophers have characterized these dimensions differently, and it would be misleading to suggest any one, monolithic concept of intrinsic value emerges from the philosophical literature. We can distinguish between two major schools of thought on intrinsic value, one generally aligned with the work of G.E. Moore, and the other more closely aligned with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. These two camps diverge primarily in identifying different types of things as bearers of intrinsic value, which in turn leads to different ideas about how humans ought to conduct themselves in relation to intrinsic value.

Home Rolston's conception of intrinsic value

Rolston³⁵ debated about what environment has “good” in itself which is remarkably a milestone to the celebrated ethical issues in the present day context. For him, caring for the planet is a means to the end of nature only. We witness, as Rolston argues that from plants to the higher sentient animals have a sound survival system. They are capable to value their own world. An animal values its own life for what it is in itself intrinsically. In the same way plants make themselves, overhaul injuries, move water, and photo-synthase from cell to cell; they stock sugar, make toxins and adjust their leaves in defense against grazers, they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of possible insects and responses to other plants; they make thrones and trap insects. Hence a life is defended for what it is in itself. Even organism has a “good” of its kind; it defends of its own kind as a good kind.³⁶ Hence these show that everything in nature is valuable and able to value of its own. Holmes Rolston III says that environmental ethics should pay primary attention on nature

³⁵Rolston, Homes; (2006), *Art, Ethics and Environment: A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, P. 1-11.

³⁶Ibid, p. 1-11

itself and not on human interests.³⁷ In his opinion, environmental ethics is not an ethics of resource use; it is also not one of benefits, costs and their just distribution; it is also not one of pollution levels or needs of future generations.³⁸ He believes that an environmental ethic must illuminate, account for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards the natural environment without giving priority to human interest.

Tom Regan's View

Tom Regan is on the opinion that ethics which lays primary importance on human interests would give us an ethics for the use of the environment and the ethics which sets primary importance on nature is an ethics of the environment. He speaks of two types of environmental ethics - *ethics for the use of the environment* and *ethics of the environment*³⁹. The first one echoes anthropocentrism and the second echoes non-anthropocentrism. The advocate of an environmental ethic of the *second kind* hold that an ethic of such kind can be established if they provide proofs that animals, plants and all non-living things have intrinsic value. J. Baird Callicott adheres to this view when he says: "An adequate value theory for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics must provide for the intrinsic value of both individual organisms and a hierarchy of super organism entities – population, species.... and the biosphere".⁴⁰

The environmental ethics which Holmes Rolston III and J. Baird Callicott propose is precisely an ethic of the environment which accounts for or ground appropriate respect for and duty towards nature as a whole by appealing to its intrinsic value. Such an ethic attributes different intrinsic values to different living beings of nature, such as greater intrinsic value to wild in comparison to domestic organisms.

Regan examines this particular conception of environmental ethic and concludes that such a conception rests on a mistake because there is no satisfactory

³⁷Rolson, Holmes III, (1994), *Conserving Natural Value*. New York: Columbia University Press, p.

³⁸ Holmes Rolston III, (1975), Is There an Ecological Ethic?: *Ethics*, Vol. 85, No. 2, The University of Chicago Press, p. 93-109

³⁹ Regan, Tom, (1981), "The Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic." *Environmental Ethics* 3.1: p.19-34.

⁴⁰Ibid, p. 19-34.

theory of intrinsic value which can provide a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic (ethic of the environment)⁴¹. Regan is concerned with two issues. Firstly, what is the role played by the concept of intrinsic value in establishing the non-anthropocentric ethic? His intention is not to define intrinsic value, but the role played by it in framing a proper environmental ethic. He assumes that if intrinsic value is possessed by an entity then the thing is good-in-itself. Secondly he discusses four different theories of intrinsic value. These theories differ from each other in the following respects:

- some are monistic (only one thing is intrinsically valuable e.g., Hedonism) whereas some are pluralistic (more than one thing is intrinsically valuable e.g., Moore's view);
- some theories present intrinsic value as the sole ground of our moral obligation e.g., classical utilitarianism whereas some theories present intrinsic value as merely one of the grounds of our moral obligation e.g., Rolston's view;
- The kinds or types of objects possessing intrinsic value are all different in the four theories (one theory advocates that pleasure possess intrinsic value, another theory regards beauty as intrinsically valuable, another one says rational autonomous individuals possess intrinsic value and the last one says that ecosystem possesses intrinsic value).

This last difference, according to Regan, is concerned with the ontology of intrinsic value and it is more fundamental than the first two because he believes that this point has not been discussed much earlier in the philosophical literature regarding intrinsic value in general or intrinsic value of nature in particular. Regan discusses in detail this issue and argues that ignoring this discussion is a mistake.

Ernest Partridge's View

In an abstract of a paper, Ernest Partridge said that wilderness can be defended in terms of the intrinsic value of the experience that is gained through encountering it. He also said, affirming the intrinsic goodness is one thing and justifying is another. Intrinsic value is not arguable by an appeal to other values. To

⁴¹ Regan, T, (1992), Does environmental ethics rest on a mistake? *Monist*, 75, p. 161–182.

offer normative support of a value is to presume that value is derivative; that is not intrinsic. While an intrinsic value can be examined and recognized, it is not likely to be found as the conclusion of an argument. It is, in this sense, in the nature more of a datum (like pain or yellow) than of an assertion...something one has rather than one derives.⁴²

For Partridge, perhaps the best approach to a justification of intrinsic worth of wilderness may be of the experiences of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evolves directly by that experience. In this regard, Partridge elaborated his own experiences which he considered to be phenomenological.

Ben Bradley's View

As per Ben Bradley, there is a dichotomy between Moore and Kant in the concept of intrinsic value⁴³. While Moore is saying that states of affairs such as states of pleasure or desire, satisfaction are the bearers of intrinsic value Kant viewed that concrete objects like people are intrinsically valuable. Hence both the views are seemed to be contradictory. A short analysis can show the picture between Moore and Kant. Moore's theory of intrinsic value has three components:

1. That to say that something has intrinsic value is to say that it ought to exist for its own sake, is good in itself.
2. That to say that something has intrinsic value is to attribute to it a simple, unanalyzable, non-natural property.
3. That concerning the claim that something has intrinsic value 'no relevant evidence whatever can be adduced.....we can guard against error only by taking care that, when we try to answer a question of this kind, we have before our minds that question only, not some other.'

⁴²Partridge, Ernest, *Meditations on wilderness*, The Wilderness Experience as Intrinsically Valuable, Viewpoint, Wisconsin Institute, unpublished and unsubmitted paper in early 1970.

⁴³ Bradley, Ben, (2006), *Ethical theory and the moral practice*; vol. 9, No. 2, published by Springer, p. 111-130

In these three central components the first one is an analysis of the concept of intrinsic value. The second establishes that Moore's view is a realist, objectivist and naturalist. And third is a thesis about epistemology of value is suitably elaborated.

"Nonhuman nature" is a highly generalized term. Non-anthropocentric theories actually fall along a spectrum of inclusivity, with increasingly expansive theories attributing intrinsic value to increasingly wider circle of beings, and for different reasons. As such, the arguments a conservationist might use to defend the intrinsic value of some nonhuman entity (or its interests) and advocate its protection would depend on which set of nonhumans was of moral concern. By referring to the intrinsic value of "nonhuman nature," we are vastly simplifying a multidimensional concept that has been debated at length by the environmental ethics community. It is also important to note that non-anthropocentric conceptualizations of intrinsic value are not unilaterally conducive to conservation efforts. Consider, for example, a case in which the re-introduction of predators might serve overall ecosystem health. An animal-centrist, concern for the resultant stress and suffering of individual prey, might not support predator re-introduction, arguing that the rights or welfare of individual animals ought to take moral precedence over the health of the system. In this paper we emphasize non-anthropocentric theories of intrinsic value as an ethical basis for conservation. However, it is also the case that nonhuman intrinsic value might, in some instances, present complex ethical challenges for conservation.

In the Moorean ethical tradition, moral agents should strive to maximize the goodness of the world, as measured by the intrinsic value of its constituent states of affairs. Though perhaps, conceptually simple, the task of computing the intrinsic value of some situation, let alone the whole world, is operationally challenging to say the least. For example, consider the state of affairs, which might have intrinsic value to degree five. It would seem to make sense that also has intrinsic value to degree five. But is the intrinsic value different? Or is a distinct state of affairs with negative intrinsic value that does not affect the positive intrinsic value of Lester's pleasure? Our point is that there is no objectively "correct" way to define states of affairs, let alone assign them degrees of intrinsic value, and different philosophers have proposed different ways to handle computation and aggregation of intrinsic value.

While for Moore intrinsic value is generally associated with the consequentialist ethics, which focus mostly on producing good or beneficial outcomes, Kantian intrinsic value is generally associated with deontological ethics, which focus more on appropriate intentions and dutiful conduct. In terms of intrinsic value, consequentially right conduct will maximize the positive intrinsic value of the world's states of affairs, while deontologically right conduct will demonstrate due honor or respect to bearers of intrinsic value. For example, a consequentialist might justify trophy hunting by citing the financial benefits it creates for conservation programs or local communities. A deontologist, on the other hand, might believe on principle that life is sacred and should not be sacrificed for sport or recreation, no matter how many beneficial outcomes might be achieved as a result. Along these lines, Kantian intrinsic value is used to ground normative claims about the duties and obligations moral agents have toward bearers of intrinsic value. Kant, for example, believed bearers of intrinsic value should be treated with respect, “always at the same time as end and never merely as means”. Interpreting this normative injunction as it applies specifically to nonhuman beings has been an important part of the environmental ethical agenda.

Eugene C. Hargrove's View

The non-anthropocentrists were dissatisfied with the concept of instrumental value of nature and with arguments based on human use and benefit from nature. Some of them propagated the view that nature has the right to be preserved. They argue that nature has intrinsic value and so nature has the right to protection from careless handling of human beings. According to these environmentalists, unlike traditional intrinsic value (which is attributed to art) nature possesses non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. This non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is opposed to instrumental value and consequently the term “anthropocentric” becomes a synonym for the word “instrumental”.

However, Hargrove believes that this is a misconception due to the fact that the pragmatists wanted to eliminate intrinsic value and propagate instrumental value. He insists that “anthropocentric” is not a synonym for “instrumental”. Rather the word “anthropocentric” means “viewing anything from the standpoint of human” or

“human-centered”. In his article “Weak Anthropocentric intrinsic value”, he holds that non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theories are broadly divided into two kinds – an objectivist version and a subjectivist version. He will gradually show that both these versions have certain drawbacks and so they cannot encounter anthropocentrism. He offers his own theory called “weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory” as a guideline to preserve and protect nature. He discusses in detail the objectivist and subjectivist intrinsic value theories and also Pragmatic instrumentalism. Finally, he presents his own new theory.

Hargrove begins with the concept of moral and immoral acts. In the history of western civilization, there have been two contrasting approaches towards morality. One is called virtue approach, where people were trained to develop a good moral character because moral persons alone can act morally. Such an approach is found in ancient and medieval periods. The other view is called rule approach where certain universal rules are to be followed very strictly. This approach is found in modern period. The effect or intention of rule approach, according to him, is to limit the range of ethical decision making so that weak our unscrupulous moral agents cannot waiver or modify universal rules to satisfy their own immoral desires.⁴⁴

The purpose behind the objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value seems to be similar to the rule approach because objective intrinsic value is independent of human judgments and man’s cultural ideals. Human judgments and their cultural ideals, at present, support preservation of nature but in future they may change in such a way as to destroy nature. So Paul Taylor a prominent proponent of objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory says that anthropocentrism is related to human culture; if a particular society’s culture does not promote nature’s preservation then the people of that society would not preserve or protect nature. Hargrove speaks of two kinds of rules – constitutive and non-constitutive which correspond to the rules of a game and the rules of a good play. Constitutive rules are those which if followed exactly under any circumstances produce a moral act. On the other hand, there is

⁴⁴Hargrove, E.C., (1992), Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No 2, Oxford University Press, 183–208.

relaxation on non-constitutive rules. These rules may be followed exactly or may be followed with slight deviation as circumstances demand. Objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is similar to constitutive rules because such values, being independent of human judgments and their culture, automatically generate moral behaviour in man.

The history of environmental ethic has seen changes frequently occurring in human attitudes towards environment. For instance, people initially thought that nature was not beautiful and this attitude changed afterwards. However the objective non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory, like constitutive rules, has a stronger approach because it believes in the existence of intrinsic values in nature without being dependent on individual's attitude at all. But the question is: how can we persuade the ordinary people to believe in the independent existence of such values in nature? Hargrove suggests that it is better to discard objective non-anthropocentric value theory. We should defend the values of nature on the ground that they are a part of our culture. We can focus on the merits of these values as culturally evolved values. In this context he speaks about four kinds of values:-

- Non-anthropocentric instrumental value
- Anthropocentric instrumental value
- Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value
- Anthropocentric intrinsic value

Non-anthropocentric instrumental value – such a value is derived from the instrumental relationship of benefit and harm between plants and animals. It is maintained that one object (existing in nature) either instrumentally benefits another or not, irrespective of human's thinking and knowledge about its existence. Such values are independent of human judgments. Anthropocentric instrumental value indicates whether a plant or an animal is useful to humans or any living being. Such judgments are made by humans. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is possessed by living organisms that are centers of purposes and use nature for their own benefits. These values do not depend on human interests. Anthropocentric intrinsic value is totally dependent on humans. Living beings and nonliving entities are intrinsically valuable according to human beings. Such values are totally dependent on human judgments. Thus from this discussion we find that non-anthropocentrism stands for

“not viewing from human standpoint” whereas anthropocentrism stands for “viewing from human standpoint”.

Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists have two reasons to object to anthropocentric intrinsic value theories:-

1. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic values are desperately required to defeat anthropocentric instrumental values.
2. Non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theorists claim that there can only be one kind of intrinsic value and that is non-anthropocentric value.

Hargrove seriously objects to this second reason. The claim made in the second point, that there is only one kind of intrinsic value or even that this one kind is relevant to environmental ethics, is unacceptable to Hargrove. It appears to him that there is a competition between various conceptions of intrinsic value and among this recognition of anthropocentric intrinsic value is harmful to non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Against such an idea, Hargrove argues that anthropocentric intrinsic values are absolutely essential in environmental ethics and are not in competition with non-anthropocentric intrinsic values.

Paul Taylor is a proponent of non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. He speaks of three kinds of intrinsic value – the immediately good, the intrinsically valued and inherent worth. He defines the immediately good as “any experience or activity of a conscious being which it finds to be enjoyable, satisfying, pleasant, or worthwhile in itself.”⁴⁵ This value is sometimes called intrinsic value. He proceeds to define the intrinsically valued and inherent worth. As Taylor says “An entity is intrinsically valued in this sense only in relation to its being valued in a certain way by some human evaluator. The entity may be a person, animal or plant, a physical object, a place or even a social practice”.⁴⁶ A person assigns such a value to an entity only when it is precious or he admires it, loves it or appreciates it. This entity may be a ceremonial occasion, historically significant objects, significant locations, natural wonders, works of art, ruins of ancient culture and also living beings (e.g., a pet dog/cat, rare plants, etc.). From a moral point of view, we have the negative duty not

⁴⁵Taylor, P.W, (1981), *The Ethics of Respect for Nature*; Environmental Ethics 3, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 197–218.

⁴⁶ Ibid p. 197-218

to destroy, harm, damage or misuse the thing and also a positive duty to protect it from being destroyed, harmed, damaged or misused by others. Finally, inherent worth is the value of a thing because it has a good of its own. Such an entity's good (welfare, well-being) deserves consideration and concern of all moral agents and the entity's good should be promoted and protected as an end-in-itself for the sake of that entity. This entity is a living being (human or animal or plant) and not any non-living things. These entities are objects of respect. This respect should not be confused with the attitudes which we have towards intrinsically valued entities.

Hargrove believes that Taylor's concepts of intrinsically valued and inherent worth are close to the concepts of anthropocentric intrinsic value and non-anthropocentric intrinsic value respectively. Hargrove feels that the central issue in Taylor's discussions is whether the intrinsically valued can be separated from inherent worth. If they cannot be then human beings can assign intrinsic value to those having inherent worth. Two questions may be raised here according to Hargrove:

1. Firstly Taylor has not shown that respecting something is equivalent to assigning intrinsic value to that thing, although he rightly holds that respect should not be identified with love, admiration and appreciation which are forms of intrinsic valuing. But Hargrove thinks that respecting something is nothing but intrinsically valuing it.
2. Secondly, Taylor said that an object possessing inherent worth is "seen" as an object of respect and this implies that no human judgment is involved here. Human beings simply see or discover that an object possesses inherent worth and then automatically respect that object. This account, according to Hargrove, is implausible.

Hargrove thinks just the opposite of what Taylor said. Hargrove feels that when an entity is seen to possess inherent worth, human beings alone can decide to value it intrinsically on the basis of cultural values. Thus human judgment has to be involved in case of respecting a living being. He explains his point with an example from the films 'Alien' and 'Aliens'. The aliens reproduce within another living organism which may be a human. The new-born comes out of that organism killing

that organism. Now these aliens have goods of their own and so have inherent worth. From this fact it follows that men will automatically respect the aliens (according to Taylor's theory) and will have moral duty to protect and preserve the aliens. But Hargrove thinks this is not the case. He says human beings will have such a moral duty and intrinsically value those aliens only if they (human beings) decide to do so. In the present case humans may not decide to intrinsically value the aliens because:

- Aliens are not safe to people and
- Aliens would have to be in its natural ecosystem and not in another ecosystem where they are very destructive.

In fact, Hargrove wants to show that a creature's good of its own is not irrelevant to the moral concern of the humans; only thing is that after realizing a creature's own good, humans decide to value it intrinsically and also show moral concern.

Hargrove points out another defect in Taylor's theory. The non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory fails to include nonliving objects in the purview of moral concern of humans because nonliving objects do not have inherent worth (only living beings, Taylor says, have inherent worth). So Hargrove do not support non-anthropocentric value theory and speaks of "weak anthropocentric theory" where humans out of cultural values will attribute intrinsic value to the nonliving entities. Among the nonliving entities cave is one example which will show the hollowness of objectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory in protecting and preserving the caves. Cave is not an object at all. It is a hollow space in layers of sediments. One can argue to preserve and protect cave following Taylor's definition of inherent worth. Bats, insects, worms etc. have inherent worth because they are living beings and they live in caves. So we can preserve and protect caves in terms of preserving bats, worms, etc. But this argument, Hargrove thinks, is not sound to generate preservationist concern. The strongest argument for protection and preservation of caves can be provided by "weak anthropocentrism". Humans will attribute intrinsic value to the caves and then decide to protect and preserve the caves. People will decide to act in such a way so as to preserve natural beauty. Hargrove clearly states

that he disagrees with objectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory on two points:

1. Only living entities deserve moral concern from humans and
2. Humans themselves do not attribute intrinsic value to living or non-living beings.

He highlights some portions of Rolston's theory to show the need of anthropocentric intrinsic value theory. Holmes Rolston III, an advocate of objectivist non-anthropocentric value theory, divides the world into two groups - beholders of value (humans) and holders of value (organisms with goods of their own) the value that the beholders behold.

Rolston also speaks of value producers or systemic value. Ecosystem has systemic value since it produces value and ecosystem can also be termed as a value holder because it projects, conserves and elaborates value holders (living beings). Rolston cannot give much importance to natural beauty because he adheres to objective non-anthropocentric value. But contrarily we find that he appreciates natural beauty. To quote Hargrove "Rolston writes, no philosopher has a better feel for and appreciation of natural beauty than he does". So Rolston has to introduce anthropocentric intrinsic valuing to make place for his own aesthetic values rather than to propagate non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory.

Let us now consider the theory of Subjectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value. Callicott is the most renowned advocate of subjectivist non-anthropocentric intrinsic value theory. Callicott developed two theories: First he has argued that humans confer intrinsic value on nature, but for the sake of nature itself. Second, human beings have to realize that he is one with nature.⁴⁷ An anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common consensus, confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable only to the extent that they are means or instruments which may serve human beings. A non-anthropocentric value theory (or

⁴⁷Callicott J. B, (1984) Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics; American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4, University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical Publications, p. 299-309

axiology), on the other hand, would confer intrinsic value on some non-human beings.⁴⁸

So, if man is intrinsically valuable then nature is also intrinsically valuable. He believes that his theory is non-anthropocentric because human beings value something (nature) other than themselves; his theory is intrinsic because humans value nature for the sake of nature itself. He says that it is only humans who make decisions about which thing to be valued and which things not. They may value an object either intrinsically or instrumentally. They value nature as a possessor of intrinsic value.

An intrinsically valued entity, according to this theory, is one which is valuable “for” its own sake, for itself, but it is not valuable “in” itself, i.e. its value is not independent of any human consciousness. Hargrove makes three points about Callicott’s theory: First, Hargrove believes that it is not true that only humans can impose value on an object, otherwise the object would not have any value. On the contrary, nature has intrinsic value independently of being valued by humans. Second, Callicott’s position cannot be termed non-anthropocentric as he holds that the source of all values is human consciousness and this view reflects nothing but anthropocentrism. Third, his theory is “too much subjective”.

Hargrove argues when it is said that values depend entirely on human beings, it does not mean that all such values should be considered as merely subjective. There are some such values which are objective in character since these are values which are accepted by all the people of a particular society, e.g., cultural values. So these values can be regarded as objective in a sense. Similarly when human beings impose value on nature for its own sake then also these values are objective. Hargrove moves on to discuss a very important issue related to anthropocentric intrinsic value theory.

1. The term “intrinsic value” is confusing or mystical.
2. It will be easier for ordinary people to understand a value-theory if it is based on instrumental value.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 299-309

These arguments are put forward by the Pragmatic instrumentalists who believe that nature has only instrumental value. Hargrove dismisses the above two criticisms. Many environmental philosophers will disagree with this second criticism. It is certain that if we impose instrumental value to nature then it will devalue nature. Conferring instrumental value to nature will not persuade people to look at nature with respect.

Hargrove turns to the first criticism. Bryan Norton, a renowned pragmatist, says that nature has transformative value – a value that changes human life.⁴⁹ Hargrove disagrees with this concept of transformative value and says that it is not true that valuing nature will change a human life or move him emotionally. Valuing nature depends on our social standards just as valuing paintings depend on some social standards. The famous painting of Mona Lisa has intrinsic value not because it changes the life of viewers.

In fact many thinkers would not even understand the depth of the painting but still would appreciate it because the experts value it on the basis of some social ideals. Similarly nature has also intrinsic value relative to some social standards and ideals. Nature has cultural value. It is valuable in a non-instrumental way which cannot be rated in terms of money. People cannot fix any rate for buying or selling natural objects. Actually, nature is priceless or we can say, it is too valuable for any price to be set upon them. Nature is to be valued aesthetically and scientifically so that we all exempt from using nature as our means. Nature is comparable to paintings because paintings are also kept away from the market value system. Such values which we impose on nature or paintings are due to our desires as individuals, as a society, as a historically evolved culture to value some objects non-instrumentally.

Finally, Hargrove speaks about his own theory termed ‘Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value theory’. He justifies the name of his theory in the following way. It is termed weak anthropocentrism rather than anthropocentrism to specify the fact that nature is not to be valued instrumentally, nature has intrinsic value. The term “anthropocentrism” is indispensable in the name of his theory. Whatever is valued in

⁴⁹Hargrove, E.C, (1992), Weak anthropocentric intrinsic value, *The Monist*, Vol. 75, No 2, Oxford University Press, p. 183–208.

whatever way (either instrumentally or intrinsically) is to be valued by humans. It is humans who impose value on any object. So we cannot do away with the term “anthropocentrism”. But this does not imply that humans always value things instrumentally. There are some things which humans value intrinsically.

It is a wrong conception that human can value things only instrumentally. The term “non-anthropocentric intrinsic value is really more problematic than the term anthropocentric intrinsic value ...”. In case of the former name, the word “non-anthropocentric” is reluctant. The word “intrinsic” means “for its own sake”. Nature has intrinsic value means it has value-in-itself, it is valued for its own sake.

The term “non-anthropocentric” means that an object’s value is not derived from the value of a human evaluator. An object has value independently of any human beings. Thus the meanings of the terms “intrinsic” and “non-anthropocentric” are same. So Hargrove chose the name ‘anthropocentric intrinsic value’ for this theory. By this name, he emphasized the fact that nature has intrinsic value (value for its own sake) and humans value nature intrinsically (humans value nature for its own sake).

2.7: Conclusive remark

The dilemma is that most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in nature. That is the challenge. The debates about the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequentialists’ form to the deontologists’ structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the inalienable right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures’ basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving core of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our

Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to one of the most prominent European philosophers, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), for his statement: "Cogito ergo sum". Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as "useless" as astronomy. Galileo Galilei (1564- 1642) proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665), G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized.

The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Neass, Homes Rolstom III and many others along with the American Indian. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all its forms.

The Western human-nature dichotomy has long been criticized by environmental ethicists as a fundamental problematic of the modern age, which must be dissolved to curb the trend of increasing and irreversible environmental degradation. Dismantling the dichotomy could potentially de-center humans from the moral universe, into a more evolutionarily and ethically accurate position alongside the rest of the biota. And yet, if humans come to view themselves as part of nature, why or on what grounds would we ever limit the human enterprise? The great potential of a non-dichotomized view of humans and nature is balanced by an equally

great risk, that the use of important conservation strategies like protected areas often justified by ethical appeals presupposing a separation of humans and nature may no longer be utilized even though these strategies may still be effective and justifiable on other ethical grounds. Therefore, the intellectual shift toward socio-ecological systems thinking, “humans and nature”, is both promising and precarious. While this shift has begun to blur the boundaries between humans and nature, it also necessitates a careful and creative ethical framework suited to the unique challenges of protecting the complex world we inhabit.

Some thinkers made an effort in this direction, proposing new normative postulates for modern conservationists in a paper that stimulated lively discussion and debate. Two years later, however, this debate was stifled by the pragmatic call for conservationists to stop bickering over values, embrace their differences, and focus on outcomes on the ground. This pragmatic turn is somewhat puzzling, in that it suggests conservation is more of a practice than a mission, or more of a means than an end. In its pragmatic stance, conservation appears to operate with the primary agenda of “working,” a normative pursuit whose only principled commitment is to be effective. But we might stop to ask, effective to what end? What actually constitutes success? As individuals and as a community, how do conservationists define their mission in the 21st century?

Chapter-III

Intrinsic Value in Nature: Debates and Dimensions

3.1: Introduction

One of the most common tasks of environmental ethicists has to frame theories according to which nature (or some non-human natural entities) possesses intrinsic value. However, from time to time we have seen efforts to refute this project, the claim being that not only are the particular theories suggested as inconsistent, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature—at least in some purportedly important sense of “intrinsic value”—is in principle indefensible.

Environmental ethics is one among several new kinds of applied philosophies, which also arose during the seventies. That is, it may be understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to emergent practical environmental problems. On the other hand, it may be understood to be an exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by the magnitude and dimension of these problems. If defined in the former way, then the work of environmental ethics is that of a traditional philosophical task; if defined in the latter way, it is that of a theoretician or philosophical architect. However, in ethics if interpreted as an essentially theoretical, not applied discipline, the most important philosophical task for environmental ethics is the development of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism that inculcate value theory. Indeed, as the discussion which follows will make clear, without a non-anthropocentric direction the innovatory objectives of theoretical environmental ethics would be betrayed and the whole enterprise would let down in to its everyday routine, applied counterpart.

3.2: Debates on intrinsic value in nature

Western attitude towards nature grew out of a blend of those of the Hebrew people, as represented in the early books of Bible, and the philosophy of ancient Greek, particularly that of Aristotle. The Hebrew and Greek traditions made human beings the centre of the moral universe- indeed not merely the centre, but very often, the entirety of morally significant feature of this world. When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as the hierarchies in which less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more. To quote Aristotle,

“Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man- domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools.

Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all the animals for the sake of man”.⁵⁰

To take on environmental ethics, it may be necessary to perceive environmental issues from different philosophical angles. In doing so it is an obligation for philosophers and ethicists to articulate a passable universal ideal so that environmental problems can be perceived in a proper manner. Moreover, how we see nature and suggest norms by which our interactions with the environment are to be judged are also matters of concerned. Many questions are raised regarding the scope and issues related to environmental ethics. A proper analysis, in fact, shows that traditional western ethics is man centered. Human life is considered superior to any other life form. Accordingly, no intrinsic value is admitted beyond humans. Contemporary environmental ethics, however, begins with ‘moral extentionism.’

⁵⁰Aristotle,(1916), politics, London, p. 16

There are some debates in this regard.

- i) To what extent of the nature/environment, is to be accorded intrinsic value, and consequently, moral worth?
- ii) What is the criterion of according moral value? Some like Peter Singer, favour sentience criterion, while conservationists speak of biospheric egalitarianism. The latter hold that trees and plants have non-felt goals of their own. Even in an eco-system, species are to be accorded moral value.
- iii) Whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality.
- iv) Can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance? The welfarists say, 'no'. Conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system. Some thinkers like Warwick Fox, do not find any necessary connection between value ascription and conservation.⁵¹ They think deep self-realisation is needed. Some other thinks that only sentient beings have intrinsic value.
- v) The *fifth* debate is regarding absolute, objective value. Some feel that environmental values are not universal. They support relativist environmentalism.

Let us elaborate these debates thoroughly and comprehensively. The first debate is whether moral worth can be extended to the non-human entities and if it is then what is the criteria of such extension. The argument, in favour of those who support moral extension beyond human, may be put forward in the following way.

- 1. Moral concern deserves for anyone who has an interest in, or desire for, their own well-being.
- 2. Humans show a desire for their own well-being, and thus they deserve moral respect. That is, the well-being of other beings ought to be respected and protected, because these other beings have a desire for their own well-being just as we do.

⁵¹Fox, Warwick, (1993), "What Does the Recognition of Intrinsic Value Entail?" *Trumpeter* 10, P. 101

3. Yet humans are not the only entities possessing such interests or desires. Other animals also show a desiring interest in their own well-being, and thus they too deserve moral respect just as humans.

The first and second assumptions are basic premises of many acceptable ethics, while the third assumption is the important extension in the reasoning of environmentalists and animal rights advocates. If both human and nonhuman beings desire their own well-being and have a sentient capacity for experiencing pain; then both kinds of beings, in similar ways, can be either benefited or harmed. Hence, both kinds of beings qualify for moral concern. To grant moral respect to the one kind, but not the other, is inconsistent. However, this extension limits only to the *sentient beings* whereas environmental ethicists may go beyond the sentient beings. Aldo Leopold makes a significant entry in this regard in 1949 with the celebrated land ethic “A Sand County Almanac.” In that book Leopold advanced the idea of biotic right, the concept that everything on this planet, including soil and water, is ecologically equal to man and shares equally in “the right to continued existence.” In thus rising above utilitarianism, Leopold became the most important source of modern bio- centric or holistic ethics. He holds that there is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. . . The extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is. . .an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity.⁵²

3.2.1: Homes Rolston’s approach

Holmes Rolston, another contender of the first debate, advocates that there is no better evidence of nonhuman values and valuers than spontaneous wild life, born free and on its own.⁵³ Animals hunt and howl, find shelter, seek out their habitats and mates, care for their young, flee from threats, grow hungry, thirsty, hot, tired, excited and sleepy. They feel pain of getting injured and treat themselves by licking their

⁵²Leopold, A; (1949), *A Sand Country Almanac*: With Essays on Conservation from Round River. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 238-9

⁵³Rolston, Holmes;(2006), *Art, Ethics and Environment: A Free Inquiry Into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. Newcastle. UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, P 1-11

wounds. Thus we are quite convinced that value is more than anthropocentric. These wild animals defend their own lives because they have a good of their own. There is somebody behind the fur or downs. Our gaze is returned by an animal that itself has a concerned outlook. Here is value right before our eyes, right behind those eyes. Animals are valuable by themselves, able to value things in their own world. They preserve a valued self-identity as they deal with the changing world. There is intrinsic certainty for an animal as it values its own life for what it is in itself. Humans have used animals for as long as anyone can recall, instrumentally. And if we minutely look at the animal's nature, in most of their moral traditions, they have also made place for duties concerning the animals for which they were responsible, domestic animals, or toward the wild animals which they hunted. We modern people are too wise, if we think that ethics is only for people. But extension of moral concern goes beyond as we understand that animal lives command our appropriate respect for the intrinsic value present there. This is, of course, only an ethic for mammals, to some extent for vertebrates too, and this is only a small percentage of living things.

In the same way, as Rolston argues that a plant is not a subject, but neither is it a lifeless object, like a stone. Plants, quite alive, are unified entities of the botanical though not of the zoological kind, that is, they are not unitary organisms highly incorporated with centered neural control, but they are linked organisms, with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative units, additional stem nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as well as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds. Plants make themselves; they repair injuries; they move water, nutrients, and photosynthate from cell to cell; they store sugars; they make toxins and regulate their levels in defense against grazers; they make nectars and emit pheromones to influence the behavior of pollinating insects and the responses of other plants; they emit allelopathic agents to suppress invaders; they make thorns, trap insects. A plant, like any other organism, sentient or not, is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, nourishing and reproducing itself, executing its program, making a way through the world. It checks against performance by means of responsive capacities with which to measure success. On the basis of its genetic information, the organism distinguishes between what *is* and what *ought to be*. The

organism is an axiological system, though not a moral system. So the tree grows, reproduces, repairs its wounds, and resists death. Trees have its own defense mechanism for which tree is defended for what it is in itself. Every organism has a *good-of-its-kind*; it defends its own kind as a *good kind*. Thus, the plant, as we were arguing, is involved in conservation biology. This is surely a matter of understanding that the plant is valuable, able to value itself on its own.

3.2.2: Edwin P. Pister's approach

Edwin P. Pister, a Fishery Biologist by profession in California, had a tough time to save the extinction of several species of desert fishes living in small islands of water in an ocean of dry land. He and his associates took the case of the Devil's Hole pupfish to save them from extinction. The fishes were threatened by agro business persons pumping groundwater for irrigation. Pister took a long journey to do the best needed including knocking the door of Supreme Court of the United States and ultimately he won the case.⁵⁴ This happened because Pister felt a *moral* accountability to save them from extinction without considering about whether they had instrumental value or not but they had, Pister believed, *intrinsic value*. However, this is totally a "philosophical" concept and he was unable to explain to his colleagues and constituents. As one put it, "When you start talking about morality and ethics, you lose me."⁵⁵ Finally, Pister found a way to put the concept of intrinsic value across clearly. To the question *What good is it?* He replied, *What good are you?* The answer compelled the questioner to test the fact that he or she regards his or her own total value to exceed his or her instrumental value. In general, people hope to be instrumental to their family, friends, and society. Even though we prove to be good for nothing, we believe, nevertheless, that we are still entitled to life, to liberty, to the pursuit of happiness. (If only instrumentally valuable people enjoyed a claim to live, the world might not be afflicted with human overpopulation and overconsumption; certainly we would have no need for expensive hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, and

⁵⁴Pister, P. Edwin; (1985). "Desert Pupfishes: Reflections on Reality, Desirability, and Conscience." *Fisheries*, 10/6: p 10-15

⁵⁵ -----; (1987). "A Pilgrim's Progress from Group A to Group B", In *Companion to A Sand County Almanac*, J. Baird Callicott (ed.). Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, p. 228

the like.) The dignity and the respect of human beings direct to the commands of human ethical entitlement. This is ultimately grounded in our claim to possess intrinsic value.

3.2.3: Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor's approach

Albert Schweitzer, in advocating moral worth to nature, stated that the every life that wills to live and exist in the midst of life which wills to live. It is like one's drive to live where there is a longing for more life. There is enigmatic exaltation of the will which is called pleasure, and terror in face of annihilation and injury to the will to live which is called pain. In the same way, life obtains in all the will to live around us. There is no concern whether it can express itself to our comprehension or whether it remains unvoiced. Hence for Schweitzer, there is a 'reverence for life' toward all will to live, as towards one's own. Thus, the great concern of the fundamental principle of morality lies herein. Maintaining and cherishing life is considered as good and in contradiction it is evil to destroy and to check life. A man is a moral man only when he obeys the limitation laid on him to help all life which he is able to help, and when he goes out of his way to avoid injuring anything living.⁵⁶ Paul Taylor, an American philosopher defends the same line of thought that Schweitzer advocates. For him every living thing is pursuing its own good in its own unique way. Once we see this, we can see all living things "as we see ourselves" and therefore, "we are ready to place the same value on their existence as we do on our own."⁵⁷ Taylor advocates that intrinsic value can be ascribed to species, to natural system over and above individuals.⁵⁸ Since, he argues, we ascribe intrinsic value to humans, we must ascribe intrinsic value to all other living beings for the sense that there is no rational basis to accept human as superior to other beings. Any individual who exists as a teleological centre of life does possess intrinsic value, and this characteristic is shared by all living beings. Taylor's notion of individual's welfare or good is broader than those of having consciousness or having interest. Any living

⁵⁶Schweitzer, Albert, (1929), *Civilisation and Ethics*; part 2 of the philosophy of civilization, 2nd ed., trans C. T. Campion, London, p. 246-7

⁵⁷Taylor, Paul, (1986), *Respect for Nature*, Princeton, p. 45 and 128.

⁵⁸ Taylor, P, (1981), *The Ethics of Respect of Nature*, *Environmental Ethics*, 3, p. 198

organism aims at realizing, what it considers, to be its own welfare. So any living organism has a definite purpose which it wants to accomplish in its life. This realization of purpose of completeness is relevant to possessing intrinsic value. This shows, at least in this sense, that there is no difference between humans and non-humans so far as intrinsic value is concerned. For them, nature has inherent or intrinsic good and this good is such that it deserves concern and consideration of all moral agents and the realization of good is to be promoted and protected.

3.2.5: Peter Singer's approach

However, Peter Singer has a different tone of voice with regard to the above mentioned arguments specially to Schweitzer and Taylor approaches. For him the defends that have been offered by both Schweitzer and Taylor for their ethical views are that they use language metaphorically and then argue as if what they have said is literally true.⁵⁹ We may often talk about “plants” seeking water or light so that they can survive, and this way of thinking about plants makes it easier to accept talk of their “will to live,” or them “pursuing their own good”. But once we stop to reflect on the fact that plants are not conscious and cannot engage in any intentional behaviour, it is clear that all this language is metaphorical. For example, a river is pursuing its own good and striving to reach the sea. Singer, therefore, suggests that in case of plants, rivers etc., it is possible to give a purely physical explanation of what is happening; and in the absence of consciousness, there is no good reason why we should have greater respect for the physical process that govern the growth and decay of living things than we have for those that govern non-living things. Again if we accept Taylor's thesis that humans and members of other species be treated at par, then herd culling would not be allowed because the same treatment to humans would definitely be regarded as immoral, as it would amount to genocide. Another problem that Taylor may face is the discrimination among species which preservationists usually do. Preservationists treat individuals of an endangered species with special care and withhold the similar kind of treatment to individuals of other species which are not so endangered. Hence individual of one species are being used as means for

⁵⁹Singer, P; (1993), Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, p. 278-9.

the preservation of individuals of another species. Hence, it seems, approaches of Schweitzer and Taylor are more likely anthropocentric than non-anthropocentric.

3.2.6: J. B. Callicott's approach

Drawing the line of Pister, J. B. Callicott called his argument as the “phenomenological proof” for the existence of intrinsic value. He raised a fundamental question i.e. *how do we know that intrinsic value exist* to establish his proof. This question, however, is similar to the question i.e. *how do we know that consciousness exists?*⁶⁰ Both consciousness and intrinsic value are matter of irrefutable introspection. Pister's question “*What good are you?*” draws our attention that one's own intrinsic value is simply unavoidable. More importantly Callicott argues that if we fail to establish intrinsic value in nature then there is no meaning of environmental ethics as because intrinsic value is the most distinct feature of environmental ethics. If nature does not possess intrinsic value, then environmental ethics will remain as an application of human centered ethics. He also holds that moral truth can be acknowledged and this moral truth is instrumental to justify that nature has intrinsic value. Thus Callicott had refuted Bryan Norton's⁶¹ anthropocentric approaches towards nature. In this context, Callicott referred the instances of voluntary freeing the slaves of plantation owners in Southern America during the period of Abraham Lincoln. The concept is that if the slaves are freed then they will get a chance to cherish their life and improve their value system. The same argument can be produced in case of environment. Human beings as we believe have intrinsic value having a life form of their own and we believe that to dominate or to enslave human beings like slaves is wrong. In the same way cannot we begin to believe that other species too are intrinsically valuable? Therefore, as argued, being

⁶⁰Callicott, J. Baird; (1995), *Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis*, The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.

⁶¹Norton, Bryan; (1992), *Epistemology and Environmental Value*, *Monist* 75: P. 208-26.

(Notes: Bryan Norton fairly asks why we should want a *distinct*, non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. There is the intellectual charm and challenge of creating something so novel. And that, combined with a passion for championing nature, is reason enough for me, a philosopher, to search for an adequate theory of intrinsic value in nature. But so personal, so self-indulgent a reason is hardly adequate. What can a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic *do* to defend nature against human insults that an anthropocentric ethic cannot?)

intrinsically valuable, destroying or harming other species is wrong. Destruction of nature is a risk of our own injury and for the future generations of human beings in many ways if we do not watchfully preserve other species. This shows that Callicott arrives at an approach that promotes non-anthropocentrism in a different way. For him, both self-love and sympathy are primitive human moral sentiments. Human sentiments are the results of human reactions to the world; they are results of the ways in which humans are affected by the surrounding world.

Callicott also put forward teleological argument for the existence of intrinsic value in nature.⁶²In *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, in fact, a similar kind of argument was found. For Aristotle human happiness is an end in itself. The argument can be produced as that the existence of means leads to the existence of ends which implies that one means may exist for the sake of another. For example, the train of means must, as Aristotle argued, terminate in an end which is not, in turn, a means to something else; an end-in-itself. Otherwise the train of means would be endless and unanchored. And since means are valued instrumentally and ends-in-themselves are valued intrinsically. Moreover, if ends-in-themselves exist then they must if means do. Again, if means exist then intrinsic value exists. However, Callicott's argument seems to be contradictory when he says that the *means* are instrumental to achieve *end-in-itself*. His concept of self-love and sympathy, the primitive human moral sentiments, may be considered a means to achieve the end i.e. pleasure (a view of ethical teleology). This argument somehow invites the doorstep of anthropocentrism as Callicott augments to say that primitive human sentiments are there in humans because experience shows that it gives a better survival chance in the environment.

3.2.7: Arne Naess's approach

Arne Naess took a strong stand questioning the esteemed German philosopher Immanuel Kant's insistence that human beings are never used *merely* as a means to an end. But why should this philosophy apply only to human beings? Are there no

⁶²Callicott, J. Baird; (1995), *Intrinsic Value in Nature: a Meta-ethical Analysis*, *The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, vol. 3, Spring, Presbyterian College.

other beings with intrinsic value? What about animals, plants, landscapes, and our very special old planet as a whole?

Arne Naess, a revolutionary environmentalist mentioned that there is existence of greatness in nature other than human. For him, “To meet a big, wild animal in its own territory may be frightening, but it gives us an opportunity to better understand who we are and our limits of control: the existence of greatness other than the human.”⁶³

Furthermore, Naess elaborated, in regard to environmental issues, that the process of so-called *identification* perhaps is more important than any other. We always have a tendency to see ourselves in everything alive. We try to identify ourselves with the death struggle of an insect the way a mature human beings experience spontaneously of their own death. We relate ourselves with sentiments in a way that the other animals and insects struggle for relieve from pain, and death. We react spontaneously to the pain of persons we love and try to identify with the person’s sentiments as if the reflection on pain is a good in itself. However, to philosophize “seeing oneself in others” is a difficult job. A complete report on the death struggle of an insect as some of us experience such an event must include the positive and negative values that are attached to the event as firmly as the duration, the movements, and the colors involved.⁶⁴ So, for him, there is a considerable majority that adheres to the ideas about the rights and value of life forms. And a strong conviction is established that *every life form has its place in nature* that we must respect. Naess, in the first of eight points charter what he coined as “the platform of deep ecology,” or rather, one formulation of such a platform stated that the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth has inherent value. And from the above he had successfully concluded that the value of nonhuman life forms is independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes.

⁶³Naess, A, (2005). The heart of the forest. In A. Drengson & H. Glasser (Eds.), *Selected Works of Arne Naess*, X, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, p. 551–553.

⁶⁴Naess, A, (1993), Intrinsic value: Will the defenders of nature please rise. In P. Reed & D. Rothenberg (Eds.), *Wisdom in the Open Air*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 70–82

In oppose to these views propagated by the philosophers as has been discussed so far, there are group of thinkers who have drawn a different line of thoughts in regard to the moral extension to non-human world.

3.2.8: Robert Elliot's approach

Robert Elliot, taking into account of consequentialist and deontologist position, claimed to conceive that if wild nature has intrinsic value, then there is an obligation to preserve it and to restore it. There is a connection between value and obligation. If wild nature has intrinsic value it is because it exemplifies value adding properties. Elliot's favourite candidates are naturalness and aesthetic value. The aesthetic value draws together various other suggested value-adding properties other than naturalness, such as diversity, stability, complexity, beauty, harmony, creativity, organization, intricacy, elegance and richness. Specially such properties might be value-adding in their own right, but additionally they might, in conjunction with other properties, constitute the property of being aesthetically valuable, which is likewise value-adding. In this context Elliot focuses on naturalness and considers some objections to naturalness and considers some objections to the claim that it is value-adding.⁶⁵

3.2.9: Bryan Norton's approach

Another advocate of this debate is Bryan Norton and for him nature functions spontaneously to produce a pool of raw materials and also as a dumping ground for our wastes. Human beings in most way fail to understand that nature deliver incalculable ecological services. Again we also fail conceive that nature is a source of aesthetic delight and spiritual stimulus. Norton argues, to support nature protection we need to act in accordance with the interests of future generations (as well as of present persons). Because of it the ecological services and psycho-spiritual resources received from nature are taken into account with great enthusiasm. Hence protection of nature is unavoidable even for the respect for human beings (or for human

⁶⁵ Elliot, Robert;(1992), *Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness*, The Monist, Vol. 75, No. 2, The Intrinsic Value of Nature, Oxford University Press,p. 138-160

interests). Thus, for Norton, there is no difference between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics in respect to its prescription in personal practices and public policies.⁶⁶

Let us turn to the second debate i.e. whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality. When we say that this human has intrinsic value, and this tree has intrinsic value, and this virtue has intrinsic value, and this owl has intrinsic value, etc., give way to feeling that the claim to accord moral worth to nature consists in two parts (i) plenty of entities have intrinsic value, and (ii) they have the same sort of intrinsic value with equal quantity. The second part is ambiguous because having the same property “*p*” might happen either “*p*” is equally applies to e.g. *x* and *y*, and “*p*” comes to *x* and *y* in degrees. The ambiguity concerns the issue whether intrinsic value is held equally by all intrinsically valuable entities. Some adopted the version of environmental egalitarianism and some other rejected it.

Aldo Leopold, Homes Rolston III, Arne Neass favour equal moral worth to all beings, whereas Moorean group is talking about degree of values. Again, Charles Cockell and some other debated that environmental policy has a size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals, hence they bear less “degree” of intrinsic value. The campaigns for the protection of endangered creatures almost always focus on those that are large and impressive. The list of species whose decline or abuse has caught the attention of environmentalists includes: Rhinos, elephants, tigers, whales, seals, lions, turtles, polar bears, many types of birds, domesticated animals, animals used for vivisection, and so on. Evident within the history of environmental ethics and environmental policy is the consistent importance of the size of organisms. Environmentalists do not often concern themselves with the decline of small rodents, insects, or crustaceans.⁶⁷ There are some notable exceptions.

⁶⁶Norton, Bryan; (1991), *Toward Unity Among Environmentalists*. New York: Oxford University Press.

⁶⁷Cockell, Charles S; (2008), *Environmental Ethics and Size*; *Ethics and the Environment*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring), Indiana University Press, p. 23-39

The protection of the monarch butterfly has been an on-going concern for the North American Butterfly Association, and it is an example of a small creature that has attracted the attention of environmentalists and policy makers. In the United States, each state has a symbolic state insect, illustrating that some small organisms have value (although it is not clear what sort of ‘value’ mascots and state insects have to the valuer. Is this a reflection of an instrumental value - some type of competitiveness by each state to have a distinctive insect - or an expression of a belief in the intrinsic value of insects?).

To move on to the third debate related to both welfarism as well as conservationism a massive contradiction between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is vividly acknowledged. Asking question like, “can we accept killing some wild beasts in order to maintain ecological balance?” has occupied a significant place in environmental ethics. Legally animals have no rights. Property rights are still the premier means of addressing the environment. But man centered approach towards environment is an illegitimate way of giving preference to human interest only. Specisism is discrimination on the basis of species only, without sufficient moral reason. Non-anthropocentrism helps to get rid of traditional attitude towards animals. The fact that it fails to mitigate the dichotomy between biotic and abiotic is mere abstraction and it leads to eco-centrism. Some sort of Anthropocentrism is unavoidable; a ‘perspectival’ anthropocentrism is objectionable. The main *objectionable* concern of Anthropocentrism is the human interest at the expense of non-human animals and non-inclusion of *intrinsic value* to non-human world. That only the human has reason, capacity of communication is factually incorrect. In this context a lot of examples like monkey and Rhinoceros can be provided. Even some non-anthropocentric approaches cannot go deep to the issues of endangered species and the ecosystem. Moral standing of the whole nature, including abiotic part is to be acknowledged. But at this juncture, we are in a pendulum of “The life boat ethics”, where ethics is on one side and development is on the other side. The reason why this dichotomy continues is as because the welfarists say, ‘no’ to any

damage to the non-human world and the conservationists permit keeping in view the integrity of the system.

3.3: Criterion for acknowledging Intrinsic Value in Nature

Now the question “what are the criteria of acknowledging intrinsic value in nature?” needs to be answered in the light to grasp the very idea of intrinsic value in nature. The criterion will perhaps serve the required demand for the debate related to the value ascription and subjective objective dichotomy, which fall under the debate of (iv) and (v).

Before proceeding to examine the epistemological status of attributions of independent value to natural objects, it is necessary to distinguish two importantly different theories regarding that value. Some advocates of independent value in nature believe that nature is valuable in the strong, “intrinsic” sense that natural objects have value entirely independent of human consciousness. According to this theory, the value in nature existed prior to human consciousness and it will continue to exist even after human consciousness disappears. Other theorists adopt a less heroic version of the hypothesis, accepting that valuing is a conscious activity and that value, therefore, will be only “inherent” in nature. According to the inherentists, nature has value that is independent of the values and goals of human valuers -it is not merely instrumental to human ends-but this value is attributed by conscious valuers, either human or otherwise.

Hence the intrinsic value question reflects a long-standing conflict between rival epistemologies, with realists and relativists squaring off in a new arena. For their part, neo-pragmatists adopt an anti-foundationalist stance: the moral and ontological status of nonhuman nature need not be settled - indeed cannot be settled - before engaging in collective action on behalf of the environment. Radical pluralism at the level of conceptual frameworks need not preclude a workable accord on policy. On this view, solutions to environmental problems what Norton called contextual

sensitivity which is different from metaphysical certainty.⁶⁸ In this context Norton assumed two concerns:

- i) The Epistemic Question: Can environmentalists claim that their goals and the value claims that support them are epistemically justifiable, that they are more than merely subjective preferences?
- ii) The Locational Question: Can environmentalists' values be located "out there" in the world itself, independent of human consciousness?

From the above two issues it can be understood that defenders of independent value in nature are incorporated by a commitment to a particular conception of objectivity. According to this conception: For any characteristic, can be objectively attributed to an object *x*, only if subject *S* "finds," or "locates," in *x*; both and must, that is, exist independently of human consciousness. Because they share this basic criteriological assumption, the positions of Callicott and Rolston fall in direct opposition to each other: Rolston believes, and Callicott denies, that it is possible to achieve "objectivity" for environmental values, according to this locational criterion. Callicott, for example, states the issue as follows: "the very sense of the hypothesis that inherent or intrinsic value exists in nature seems to be that value inheres in natural objects as an intrinsic characteristic, that is, as part of the constitution of things. To assert that something is inherently or intrinsically valuable seems, indeed, to entail that its value is objective." Callicott, however, believes that there are "insurmountable logical impediments to axiological objectivism."⁶⁹ Rolston, on the other hand, begins his essay, "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" with a quotation from William James with which Callicott would agree. It concludes: "Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may appear imbued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator's mind."⁷⁰ Rolston further states, "Nature, indeed, is infinitely beautiful, and she seems to wear her beauty as she wears colour

⁶⁸Nunez, Theodore W; (1999), Rolston, Lonergan, and the Intrinsic Value of Nature, *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring), Blackwell Publishing Ltd, p. 105-128

⁶⁹Callicott, J. B. (1989), *In Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays in Environmental Philosophy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), p. 159.

⁷⁰Rolston, Holmes III, (1986), *Philosophy Gone Wild*, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, p. 91.

or sound. Why then should her beauty belong to us rather than to her?"⁷¹ He goes on to note that science itself seems hard put to maintain "objectivity."

Ernest Partridge, an eminent British philosopher advocates, and so, perhaps the best approach to a justification of the intrinsic worth of wilderness may be through an account of the experience of wilderness. It should be an account detached, as much as possible, from second-hand reports of the experience, and based, as much as possible, upon the recollection of feelings evoked directly by that experience. To do this, one will call upon the nearest and most vivid source at his disposal: one's own experience. One needs to attempt, at the outset at least, to relate this experience with the least possible amount of preconception or post-analysis. Thus Partridge's approach is *phenomenological*. Following this exercise, phenomenological "brackets" has to be removed and attempt to be made to account for and qualify this experience. This is, of course, as Partridge said a thought- experiment that one might wish to try himself.⁷²

Let us turn to the second debate i.e. Whether to accord equal moral worth to all beings, or accept degrees of value? Some accept degrees; others say this is undue partiality.

Aldo Leopold, Homes Rolston III, Arne Neass are in favour of equal moral worth to all beings, whereas Moorean group is talking about degree of values. Again some other talks that decision on environmental issues are adhered according to the sizes of species belonging to nature. In the other way one can talk about the degrees of intrinsic value. According to Moore, to say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.⁷³ But we can talk more or less amount of intrinsic value only when we talk of more or less amount of intrinsic properties possessed by an object. Intrinsic property changes only when the constitution of the object changes. Also we cannot compare the intrinsic value of an object with intrinsic value of another object in the sense that we cannot claim that

⁷¹Ibid, p. 91.

⁷² Partridge, Ernest; (1970), *Meditations on Wilderness, The Wilderness Experience as Intrinsically Valuable* unpublished and unsubmitted in 1970.

⁷³Moore, G. E; (1922) *The Conception of Intrinsic Value; Philosophical Studies*, (Rutledge and Kegan Paul, London) , P 260- 266

intrinsic value of a particular object is higher or lower than that of another. Intrinsic properties are incommensurable.⁷⁴ So comparing the intrinsic value of an object with that of another object is possible only against the background of a theory which contains all the possible intrinsic properties of all the objects. And perhaps, this seems to be hardly possible to accomplish.

Environmental policy is also size bias. Small organisms, such as microorganisms, command less attention from environmentalists than larger organisms, such as birds and large mammals. Campaigns for the protection of endangered creatures almost always focus on those that are large and impressive. The list of species whose decline or abuse has caught the attention of environmentalists includes: elephants, tigers, whales, seals, lions, turtles, polar bears, many types of birds, domesticated animals, animals used for vivisection, and so on. Evident within the history of environmental ethics and environmental policy is the consistent importance of the size of organisms. Environmentalists do not often concern themselves with the decline of small rodents, insects, or crustaceans.⁷⁵ There are some notable exceptions. The protection of the monarch butterfly has been an on-going concern for the North American Butterfly Association, and it is an example of a small creature that has attracted the attention of environmentalists and policy makers. In the United States, each state has a symbolic state insect, illustrating that some small organisms have value (although it is not clear what sort of 'value' mascots and state insects have to the valuer. Is this a reflection of an instrumental value - some type of competitiveness by each state to have a distinctive insect - or an expression of a belief in the intrinsic value of insects?).

⁷⁴Chakraborty, N. N; (2004), In Defense of Intrinsic Value in Nature, New Age Publishers, Kolkata, p. 41-42

⁷⁵Cockell, Charles S; (2008), Environmental Ethics and Size; Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring), Indiana University Press, p. 23-39

3.4: Dimensions of the Debates

In the long run, the set of ethical virtues praised and the set of ethical prohibitions adopted by the ethic of specific societies will always reflect the conditions under which they must live and work in order to survive. The anthropocentric subjective argument already put forwarded may raise the environmental ethical issues within the framework of man's interest in nature. The varieties of anthropocentric arguments against the pollution, the use of gases harmful to ozone layer, the burning of fossil fuels, the destruction of forests, could be couched in terms of the harm of human health. The rise in sea level will wipe out the entire island nations such as the Maldives which is only a meter above the sea level. So it is obvious that there is value in preserving our environment even within a "human-centered moral framework". This is, hence, a kind of dimension that can be considered as "human-centered moral framework".

If examined thoroughly the debates related to intrinsic value in nature also leads us to think about the wilderness of nature that provides opportunities for recreation. It is assumed that future generation will also value wilderness for the same reasons as we value it today. Hence from ethical point of view economic growth is not more important than preservation of forests, etc. Wilderness is the source of greatest feelings of aesthetic appreciation, rising to an almost spirituality. It will do more to develop character than watching television for an equivalent time. It is for that reason that environmentalists are right to speak of a 'world heritage'. It is something that we have inherited from our ancestors, and that we must preserve for our descendants, if they are to have it at all. The appreciation of wilderness has never been higher than it is today. Wilderness is valued as something of immense beauty and is a reservoir of scientific knowledge still to be gained. We need to be understood that the virgin nature is the product of all the millions of years that have passed since the beginning of our planets. We may gain short term benefits, a luxury life style in a high rise sophisticated apartment by destroying our environment. But such boost may be futile in a fraction of second by a single jerk of earthquake. The recent such occurrences of earthquakes laughed at the human boost. This anthropocentric

approach, even though faced severe criticism from philosophers of other community, cannot be denied its significance even though within human centered framework. However, there are much more important issues which to be discussed considering its objective epistemic aspect.

We have already seen that it is arbitrary to hold that only human beings are intrinsically valuable. If we find value in human conscious experiences, we cannot deny that there is value at least some experiences of non-human beings. Although some debates about significant environmental issues can be conducted by appealing only to long term interests of our own species, in any serious exploration of environmental values a central issue will be the question of intrinsic value. If we go beyond the interest of human beings to the interest of all non-human will perhaps give us the answer to the question at issue. But there is fundamental moral disagreement; a disagreement about the kind of beings ought to be considered in our moral deliberation. However, to extend an ethic in a plausible way beyond sentient beings is a difficult task, because it might be thought that if we limit ourselves to living things, the answer is not difficult to find. But the attempts and approaches to ascribe intrinsic value in nature has opened up some new dimensions in the domain of environmental ethics. To talk about non-anthropocentrism leads us to the question of subjective/objective dichotomy, the question about mind independent existence of intrinsic value. And hence any theory that ascribes intrinsic value to nature makes two claims- 1) Nature is valuable because of what it is, not because of its relation with us. 2) The value in nature is objective in the sense that it is not a matter of individual taste or personal preference. The question is also incorporated about the satisfaction of certain requirements that constitute a consistent common moral norm. To say that if a thing/ state of affairs possess intrinsic value, then things/ state of affairs being similar to it in relevant aspects should be regarded as possessing intrinsic value. For example, since humans have intrinsic value and animals are regarded as similar to humans hence animals should possess intrinsic value or vice-versa.

Chapter-IV

Intrinsic Value in Nature: An Analysis from Indian Perspective

4.1: Introduction

One of the most important tasks of environmental philosophy is to construct a system of normative guidelines governing human's attitudes, behaviour, and action towards nature. Thus there are some fundamental questions to be asked are: how ought human, either as an individual or as a group, to behave, to act, toward nature? As we have discussed in the previous chapters by 'nature' we understand the nonhuman environment where human finds himself within. Questions like these presuppose the appropriateness of the application of moral, ethical concepts towards nature, viz., stones, fish, bears, trees, water, and so on. Any feasible environmental philosophy needs to provide adequate answers to these following three questions:

- What is the nature of nature?
- What is the nature of human?
- How should human relate to nature?

The complex of the problems constituting environmental crisis are environmental pollution, the aesthetic degradation of nature, human overpopulation, resource depletion, ecological destruction, and, now emerging as the most pressing and desperate of problems, abrupt, massive species extinction. These problems, which are essentially Western in nature, are not only tough and global but also they are peculiar as they appear to be resulted from both (1) a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of nature/environment and (2) an exclusion of nature/environment from moral concern or consideration in Western thought. Hence, to address environmental problems and eventually to ameliorate the environmental crisis requires the followings:

- (i) The metaphysical foundations must be brought into alignment with ecology- the principal basic science of the environment and
- (ii) An ethical theory must be enlarged so as to include within its purview both nonhuman natural entities and since the proposed metaphysical revision, most

generally conceived, subverts the concept of ontologically independent entities nature as a whole.

Thus, the theoretical project of environmental ethics on each of these two heads - the metaphysical and the axiological - has two basic phases, the first critical, the second is constructive.

In the history of Western thought, nature has been primarily appreciated as instrumentally valuable. In *Genesis*, it is said that God gives humankind 'dominion over the earth,' that is that natural things were created for the use and employment of man's happiness. In Platonic philosophy, from Plato to Plotinus, the created world is seen as instrumentally valuable for approaching an understanding of the formal good, and ultimately the Good. One might tend to think that nature was regarded as instrumentally good, but intrinsically bad by Platonic philosophers.

However, there is a tendency in Platonism and Neoplatonism, one which has a profound influence on subsequent Western philosophy, to regard nature as intrinsically good. Of course we understand such an idea under the rubric of providence. We can see the clues of these ideas in Plato's *Timaeus*, and explicit expressions of it in Plotinus' *Enneads*. This concept of providence holds a powerful influence over the thinking of all subsequent Western philosophy up to Enlightenment. To hold a belief in providence is to believe that the world is fundamentally good, that, being created by a good and benevolent deity, it could not possibly be bad. We can find in Leibniz, in 17th Century maintaining that this is "the best of all possible worlds." Despite the discontent caused by Leibniz's impersonal God, his belief in a providential world order is characteristic of that period of intellectual development that which we refer to as Enlightenment.

The initial criticism focused simplistically on the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition in Western philosophy. This criticism was primarily cosmological and metaphysical, but had clear moral implications which came under attack in the following manner.

1. God - the locus of the holy or sacred - transcends nature.

2. Nature is a profane artifact of a divine, craftsman-like creator. The essence of the natural world is informed matter: God divided and ordered an inert, plastic material-the void/waters/dust or clay.
3. Man exclusively is created in the image of God and thus is segregated, essentially, from the rest of nature.
4. Man is given dominion by God over nature.
5. God commands man to subdue nature and multiply himself.
6. The whole metaphysical structure of the Judeo-Christian world view is political and hierarchical: God over Man, Man over Nature-which results in a moral pecking order or power structure.
7. The image-of-God in Man is the ground of man's intrinsic value. Since nonhuman natural entities lack the divine image, they are morally disenfranchised. They have, at best, instrumental value.
8. This notion is compounded in the later Judeo-Christian tradition by Aristotelian - Thomistic teleology - rational life is the *telos* of nature and hence all the rest of nature exists as a means-a support system-for rational man.

An influential example which is essentially nonprofessional way of criticizing Western metaphysical and moral traditions from an environmental point of view was expressed by landscape architect Ian McHarg in the following paragraph:

"The great Western religions born of monotheism have been the major source of our moral attitudes. It is from them that we have developed the preoccupation with the uniqueness of man, with justice and compassion. On the subject of nature, however, the Biblical creation story of the first chapter of *Genesis*, source of the most generally accepted description of man's role and powers, only fails to correspond to reality as we observe it, but in its insistence dominion and subjugation of nature, encourages the most exploitative destructive instincts in man rather than those that are deferential and creative. Indeed, if one seeks license for those who would increase radioactivity, create canals and harbors with atomic bombs, employ poisons without constraint, or give consent to the bulldozer mentality, there could be no better injunction than this text. Here can be found the sanction and injunction to conquer nature-the enemy, the threat to Jehovah. The creation story in Judaism was absorbed unchanged into Christianity. It emphasized

the exclusive divinity of man, his God-given dominion over all things and licensed him to subdue the earth.”⁷⁶

Given this metaphysical and axiological conceptual composite at the core of the predominant and prevailing Western world view, the environmental crisis is the predictable, the inevitable, outcome. McHarg argued that:

“Our failure is that of the Western World and lies in prevailing values. Show me a man-oriented society in which it is believed that reality exists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos is a structure erected to support man on its pinnacle, that man exclusively is divine and given dominion over all things, indeed that God is made in the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their landscapes. I need not look far for we have seen them-the hot-dog stands, the neon shill, the tacky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined landscapes. This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropocentric man; he seeks not unity with nature but conquest”.⁷⁷

Thus, McHarg argued that to solve environmental crisis, it is necessary to construct or to adopt a different metaphysics and a different axiology. In the classic of early environmental ethics literature, Lynn White, Jr., makes the following remark:

“What we do about ecology [that is, the natural environment] depends on ideas of the man-nature relationship. More science and more technology going to get us out of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion, rethink our old one. The beatniks, who are the basic revolutionaries of our show a sound instinct in their affinity for Zen Buddhism, which conceives man-nature relationship as very nearly the mirror image of the Christian view”.⁷⁸

The views of Lynn White and several environmental philosophers argue that the Western worldview and religious traditions which encourage dominion and control over nature bear the responsibility for the tragic state of our world resources and ecology today. The extension of this position is that Asian traditions have the philosophical resources that constrain consumerism, encourage renunciation, and support eco-friendly traditions. If indeed Asian traditions in general and Hinduism in particular, have fundamentally eco-friendly philosophy and texts that encourage frugality, lack of possessions, and worldviews that include nature as continuous with

⁷⁶Ian L. McHarg,(1969), *Design With Nature Garden City*, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., p. 26.

⁷⁷*Ibid.* p.24

⁷⁸ Lynn White;(1967), ‘Historical Roots of Ecological Crisis’*Science*, Vol. 155, Issue-3767, p. 1203-1207.

human life, one may wonder why the countries in which these religions have been practiced have had a terrible record in ecological disasters and rampant industrialization. The answers are obviously complex.

There are several articles on environmental philosophy presuppose that there is a definite connection between worldviews and practice. While there is some justifications to the last statement (all Jains who believe in non-violence are usually vegetarians), we must acknowledge that there are competing forces that determine behaviour within the Hindu philosophy. Recent academic scholarship tends to blame Western thought and Western actions for the devastation of land in Third-World countries. J. B. Callicott suggested that Western intellectual colonization is responsible for the failures we see in Eastern and Southern Asia. This view is also advocated by some Indian authors. As Lance Nelson notes, Vandana Shiva, ‘an important voice of the ecology movement in India, focuses almost entirely on the West, and the Third World’s experience of colonialism, modernization, modernist developmentalism, and so on, as the root of her country’s environmental devastation. She thus tends to ignore the pre-colonial aspects of the problem. In particular, she tends to give romanticized readings of the environmental implications of certain aspects of Hindu thought’.⁷⁹

4.2: Distinctiveness of Value

There is a common belief, which is also reinforced by S. Radhakrishnan, that Indian tradition is in and out spiritual in nature. Indian tradition is disrespectful of material progress and affluence and all that matters is progress in the realm of consciousness and spirit and not in physical and the surrounding material/nature environment. There are two clear trends in our cultural tradition. They are *ātmavādi* (spiritualistic) and *anātmavādi* or *svabhāvavādi* (materialistic). The conception of the ultimate values or *summum bonum* of life does also bear out this contention. Four *puruṣārthas* or basic values depend on the nature of the philosophical system as how these values are ordered and priority accorded to them. Sri Aurobindo, the great sage

⁷⁹Narayanan, Vasudhara; (1997), “One Tree Is Equal to Ten Sons”: Hindu Responses to the Problems of Ecology, Population, and Consumption, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer, p.291-332.

and savant of modern India, very aptly remarks, “A true happiness in this world is the right terrestrial aim of man, and true happiness lies in the finding and maintenance of natural harmony of spirit, mind, and body. Culture is to be valued to the extent to which it has discovered the right key of this harmony and organized its expressive motives and movements. And a civilization must be judged by the manner in which all its principles, Ideas, form ways of living work to bring that harmony out, manage its rhythmic play and secure its continuance or the development of its motives.”⁸⁰

There are several definitions for values which as follows:-

- Value is that which satisfies human desire. This definition is not acceptable to learned persons because satisfaction of desire itself is not the aim of human life. It is needed for the preservation and development of life.
- Some thinkers define it as that which preserves and develops life, but this too is not acceptable, since it is the definition of biological values only.
- It is defined as that which is conducive to self-perfection. Most of the thinkers appreciate and accept this definition since it refers to the whole system of human value.

A value is a value because it speaks to our condition, answers to our need and completes some demand of our nature. And the moral, central and fundamental demand is the value attaching to its fulfillment. In fact value lacks universal definition. According to Rokeach “values are beliefs about how one ought or ought not to behave or about some state of existence worth or not worth attaining. Values are abstract ideals, positive or negative, that represents a person’s beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals”.⁸¹ A value is a standard to influence the values, attitude and actions of others; it is like a yardstick to measure the actions, attitudes, comparisons, evaluations and purifications of ourselves and others.

4.3: Intrinsic Value as a Guide to Action towards Nature

In philosophical analysis, the examination of intrinsic value and instrumental value are closely linked to ethics. But the philosophical examination of intrinsic value

⁸⁰Shastree, N. K, (2006), (edit.), Value Management in Professions, New Delhi, Concept publishing company, p. 54.

⁸¹ Gupta, N.L, (2002), *Human Values for the 21st Century* (New Delhi, Anmol Publications Pvt Ltd), p. 14.

and intrinsically valuing as distinct from ethics came of age in the mid-twentieth century in different ways in the pragmatic, analytic, and the phenomenological traditions. But if all the perspectives and meanings of intrinsic value and instrumental value relate, to the idea of choice, they also relate to ideas about what we ought to do. Intrinsic value in this sense give rise to general standards and ideals by which we judge our own and others conduct; also give rise to specific obligations.⁸² Generally, it is believed that it would be impossible to make choice without values. Purely factual analyses of any given situation can only ever tell us what might be the consequences of different course of action. But simply knowing the consequence would not help us to choose unless this has some means of determining this set of consequence to be preferable. And that is not a factual question but a matter of values. The vision in environmental philosophy is to create a stand on which everything in this planet is loved, valued and able to fulfill their potential.

As we have already discussed in Chapter-Two that values which are instrumental in achieving some end are known as instrumental values. For example a sacred thing has intrinsic value. Anything which serves as a means to growth has instrumental value. There is no clear cut division between the intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic value in a different context becomes instrumental and vice-versa. The intrinsic values as well as instrumental values are problematic. To regard them as settled and to pursue those with any certitude seem to invite trouble. One always sees these values changing in all culture, though their rapidity with which the change takes place differs from culture to culture. 'Values change in spite of its universal character. One has, therefore, not simply to adjust to the changing values but to understand the process to change and to establish new values in cooperation with the process of nature.'⁸³

We would like to point out what is distinctive about the Indian conception of intrinsic value. Since, according to the definition and we have already discussed in Chapter-Two that whatever is the means of satisfying any of the needs felt by human is an instrumental value; the number of such values becomes almost infinite. But a

⁸² Chris Beckett, Andrew Maynard; (2005), *Values and Ethics in Social work, An Introduction*(London; Sage Publications), p.11

⁸³Joshi, H. M;(1986),*Knowledge, Value and Other Essays*, (Naroda, Jaya Prakashan), p. 248.

little reflection will show that there is no certainty with regard to several among them that they will secure the end that is sought to be attained through them. What was successful once or in the case of one person may not be so at another time or in the case of another person. Secondly, even when the means prove successful, the satisfaction derived through them is only provisional in that it is sooner or later replaced by a desire for some other mode of satisfaction. Thus, as ordinarily known to us, the instrumental values are for the most part unwarranted and the intrinsic values are all unstable (*ariätyantika*).⁸⁴ That is the irony of life, and it makes us ask whether there are any values that are not vitiated by these defects. The Indian answer to this question, to state it very broadly, is that there are two such values, viz. *dharma* and *mokṣa*. The other values are all brought under the heads of *artha* and *kāma*. These are the four well-known *puruṣārthas* - *artha*, *kāma*, *dharma*, and *mokṣa*. We may call the former pair worldly values, and the latter spiritual. When it is said that Indian philosophy is one of values, it means that it primarily deals with these *puruṣārthas* and that the consideration of metaphysical questions comes in only as a matter of course. Thus *artha*, as generally understood, can only be a means while *mokṣa* is always conceived as an end.⁸⁵ However the conception of *dharma* is not to be considered as the means of achieving *mokṣa*. *Dharma* is the central point of Indian ethics which is to be dealt with in details.

4.4: Hindu Ethics, Intrinsic Value and Nature/Environment

Historically, the protection of nature and wildlife was an ardent article of faith, reflected in the daily lives of people, enshrined in myths, folklore, religion, arts, and culture. Some of the fundamental principles of nature/environment - the inter-relationship and interdependence of all life-were conceptualized in the Indian ethos and reflected in the ancient scriptural text, the *Isopaniṣad*, over 2000 years ago. According to *Isopaniṣad*, this universe is the creation of the Supreme Power meant

⁸⁴*Ariätyantika*, This list, though old and well-recognised, is not altogether satisfactory for instrumental values are located in it with intrinsic ones. Thus *artha*, as generally understood, can only be a means while *mokṣa* is always conceived as an end.

⁸⁵Hiriyanna, M;(1938), *The Indian Conception of Values*, Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 10-24

for the benefit of all his creation. Each individual life-form must, therefore, learn to enjoy its benefits by forming a part of the system in close relation with other species. No species in the planet earth are permitted to encroach upon the other's rights which justify the intrinsic values in nature in Indian tradition.

The oldest visual image of the human interest, love, and reverence for nature in Indian tradition can be found in the 10,000 year-old cave paintings at Bhimbetka in the Central parts of India depicting birds, animals, and human beings living in harmony. The Indus Valley Civilization provides evidences of human interests in wildlife, as seen in seals depicting images of rhino, elephant, bull, etc. Historically, conservation of nature and natural resources was an innate aspect of the Indian mind and faith, reflected in religious practices, folklore, art and culture permeating every aspect of the daily lives of people. Scriptures and preaching that exhort reverence for nature and relate to conservation can be found in most of the religions that have flourished in the Indian subcontinent. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, Islam; and others place great emphasis on the values, beliefs, and attitudes that relate to the cross-cultural universality of respect for nature and the elements that constitute the universe. The concept of sinning against nature existed in various religious systems. Classical Indian myth is replete with similes of human in unison with the nature/environment. Many of the rituals which to modern society may seem meaningless and superstitious were traditional strategies to preserve the intrinsic relationship between man and nature. The worship of trees, animals, forests, rivers, and the sun, and considering the earth itself as Mother Goddess, were part of the Indian tradition.

In spite of the depletion of forests in many parts of India, some sacred groves still remain intact as an oasis in deserts, conserving rich biological diversity. The maintenance of sacred groves can thus be considered to be an outstanding example of a traditional practice that has contributed to forest conservation, even though as a small measure. There are also examples of sacred ponds attached to temples in many parts of India. Some of these have been responsible for the protection of certain endangered species of turtles, crocodiles, and the rare fresh water sponge.

Many plants and animals have from historical times been considered sacred in India by various communities. The most outstanding examples are the peepal tree. The banyan trees and other trees have been traditionally revered and therefore never cut. There are a number of trees and plants considered sacred and grown in temple premises and are protected in other localities. More than a hundred such species of trees/plants in Indian society are considered sacred by various communities and religious faiths. These include the sandalwood tree, beetle nut, palm, *neem*, coconut, palm, *champā*, lotus, *tulsi*, and pepper, etc. Such traditional cultural attitudes, though based on religious faith, have made significant contribution in the protection and propagation of various species of trees and plants in India.

There are also other scriptures encourage planting of trees, condemned the destruction of plants and forests, prescribe that trees are like children. In this context, a passage from the *MatsyaPurāṇam* is instructive. The Goddess Parvati planted a sapling *Ashoka* tree and took good care of it. She watered it and took care of it, it grew well. The divine beings and sages came and told her: O [Goddess] ... almost everyone wants children. When people see their children grandchildren, they feel they have been successful. What do you by creating and rearing trees like sons...? Parvati replied: 'One who a well where there is little water lives in heaven for as many years as are drops of water in it. One son is like ten reservoirs and one tree is equal to ten sons (*daśasamodruma*). This is my standard and I will protect the universe guard it... (*Matsya Purāṇam*-154:506-512). The words of Parvati are relevant today. Trees offer more than aesthetic pleasure, shade, and fruits. They are vital to maintain our eco-system, planet, our well-being, and Parvati extols them by saying they are able to ten sons. The main *Purāṇas*, texts of myth and lore, composed approximately between the fifth and tenth centuries C.E. have wonderful passages on trees. The *VarāhaPurāṇa* says that one who plants five trees does not go to hell, and the (*Vishnu Dharmottara* 3.297.13) that one who plants a tree will never fall into hell. The *Puranas* differ in the number and description of the universe, and one may perhaps take the liberty of interpreting as symbolic of various levels of suffering, including a steamy planet we keep poking holes in the ozone layer. The *MatsyaPurāṇam* describes a celebration for planting trees and calls it the festival of trees. These

traditional cultural attitudes are the exposition of reverence for nature/environment and embodiment of sacredness and gratitude for life.

Many animals are considered sacred and worshipped by several Hindu and other communities, have received protection for centuries. The peafowl, sacred to lord *Kārttikeya* is never hunted and is protected. Even rodents are considered sacred and are allowed to breed in the famous temple of goddess *Karṇīmāta* in Rajasthan. The tiger and the cobra, though greatly feared, are afforded protection and respected on religious grounds.

Indian painting, sculpture, architectural ornamentation, and the decorative arts is replete with themes from nature and wildlife reflecting love and reverence, and therefore the ethics of conservation. A wide range of images of forests, plants, and animals are to be found in Indian miniature paintings and sculpture. The theme of the Hindu god Krishna's life depicted in miniature paintings underlines an appreciation of ecological balance. He is shown persuading people to worship the mountain in order to ensure rainfall. Krishna swallowing the forest fire also signifies a concern for the protection of forests and wildlife.

Innumerable examples of the status given to plants and animals can also be seen in the traditional sculptural art of India. The concept of *Vanadevatās* (tree goddesses), vehicles of Gods and Goddesses, sacred trees, tree and animal worship are depicted in stone and metal sculptures independently, or as part of temples, palaces, and historical buildings. In literature and scriptures too there has been considerable depiction of the appreciation and love for nature: *Mahākavi* Kalidasa, a prominent poet of the fourth century AD visualized, a cloud as a messenger in his *Meghadutam* and went into raptures when describing various seasons in his *Ritusamhāram*. Such an involvement with nature is reflected even in the visual arts which excel in their minute depiction of nature.

Indian literature effectively mirrors the ethos of its deep and sympathetic understanding of animals through innumerable stories. Even amongst these one could pertinently mention are the *Hitopadeśa*, the *Panchatantra* or the *Shuka-saptati* which abound in allegorical references to the animal world. The impact of the *Panchatantra* was so great that as early as the seventh century AD it was

translated into Arabic and has been very popular in the Arab and Persian world ever since. Though an interior form of life, animals have been endowed with ennobling qualities which provide lessons in morals relevant even to human beings.

We can find an extensive literature in Hindu philosophy on environmental Ethics in many of its scriptures. Along with the *Upaniṣads*, the *BhagavadGītā*s having more vital essences, which provide enough resources concerning environment. The general ethical framework and some specific passages from the above texts, however help us to reconstruct traditional views on certain issues like *ahimsā*, *dharma*, anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, question of value etc. By describing so, it is often necessary to make explicit what is implicit in order to show the importance of ethics towards environment. The consciousness of ethical principles can definitely bring out a new beginning towards nature. Hindu religious doctrines as a foundation for environmental ethics provide us with certain normative criteria for our attitude towards nature. We may begin with an overview of sources, methods and types of analysis in Hindu ethics. We may give our attention to certain discussions on scriptures in the Hindu tradition which expresses the sacredness of life and gratitude for life.

Hindu ethics uses the term *Dharma* to refer to what we call 'Ethics'. It is one among the goals of human life - the *Puruṣārthas* (*Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and *Mokṣa*). It is the root of other goals. It makes other goals possible. It gives life a purpose, design or *telos*. *Dharma* has been divided into two types: *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya*. *Dharmasūtras* and *Dharmasastra* texts give description of these two types of *Dharma*. *Viśeṣa* refers to conditional and relative duties with regard to castes, sex, stages of life, region, occupation and kinship. *Sāmānya* refers to generic moral principles (*sādharaṇa dharma*) and are twofold: sacredness of life and gratitude for life. There are four sources of *dharma* such as: *Śruti* (transcendent authority), *Smṛiti* (another category of scripture), *Sadāchāra* (the behaviour of good people), *Anubhava* (conscience or knowledge derived from personal experience). All these four sources are arranged in a descending order of authority. *Śruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Sadāchāra* and *Anubhava* are considered as foundations of Hindu Ethics. According to Klostermaier:

“*Dharma* presupposes a social order in which all functions and duties are assigned to separate classes whose smooth interaction guarantees the well-being of society as a whole and beyond this, maintains the harmony of the whole Universe”⁸⁶.

This means that *Dharma*, at least theoretically is its own justification: *dharma* does not depend on a personal authority that could also make exceptions and pardon transgressors. In its strictest and fullest sense, *dharma* coincides with Hindu moral philosophy. Though from an absolutist, *Vedāntist's* standpoint, good and evil are relative, the two sides of one coin as it were, the *Dharmaśāstra* tradition of India has laboured continuously to sharply separate *dharma* from *adharma* to spell out quite unambiguously what is meant by ‘righteousness’ and ‘unrighteousness’. Hindu moral philosophy however does an analysis of *sanātana dharma* (eternal *dharma*). They are universally and unconditionally binding on all humans. They are the foundation or precondition for all duties. Crawford observes:

“*Sanātana dharma* performs the role of watch-dog over parochial and provincial egoism.... the motivation behind *sādhāraṇa dharma* is twofold: the sacred and secular. *Sāmānya dharma* is impersonal and Trans-subjective for it transcends the illusory duality between self and other.”⁸⁷

The scope for interpretation of *dharma* brings out two facts:

- If a norm appears just once in *Śruti*, in as much as that idea becomes popular in later ages it can be legitimized
- Even ideas that never appear in *Śruti* can be introduced through one of the other foundations by arguing that they make explicit what is implicit in *Śruti*.

These two facts influence the order of listed values and can be changed depending on what seems relevant for a certain epoch. Therefore traditions cause elimination of undesired prescriptions from *Śruti* passages and elimination of values which do not seem relevant to the times. Bernard Gert⁸ asserts another type of analysis in Hindu ethics. He writes: Morality is a public system applying to all

⁸⁶Klostermaier, K. K.: *A Survey of Hinduism*, Quoted in Katherine K. Young, ‘Hindu Bioethics’, in Paul F. Camenisch (edit.): *Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics*, p.48-49.

⁸⁷Crawford, S.C.: *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals*, K. L. Mukhopadhyay (January 1, 1974)1974,p. 51.

⁸Gert, Bernard, *Morality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules*, Oxford University Press Inc, 1988, p. 6.

rational persons governing behaviour which affects others and which has the minimization of evil as its core. According to Bernard Gest, ten moral rules can be the core of human virtues. They are 'do not kill, do not cause pain, do not disable, do not deprive of freedom, do not deprive of pleasure, do not deceive, keep your promise, do not cheat, obey the law, do your duty'. These moral rules emphasize that prevention of evil is the most important goal of *Hindu dharma*. Gert thinks, the ultimate design (*telos*) of human life is to encourage spiritual development. In a better society it is less likely that a person will unjustifiably break moral rules. He analyses Hindu Ethics as a matter of morality, which is deontological. Gert confirms that according to the ancient Hindu thinkers, *Sāmānya dharma* is universal, public morality and it encourages by rewards and punishments. From this we can see a shift from a focus on injunctions and prohibitions in *Śruti* to a focus on virtues in *Śmṛiti*.

Virtues in *Śmṛiti* consider prevention of evil as their most important goal. The question of nonviolence arises in this virtue of prevention of evil. Non-violence (*ahimsā*) defines the moral 'bottom-line'. Other virtues on the lists identify common values. Young writes: 'Hindu moralists take into account the mundane goals of the individual's happiness and society's well-being as well as the supra mundane goal of spiritual liberation'.⁹ This type of analysis about dharma helps to ascertain the significance of Aristotelian method of analysis about dharma, even today, in the midst of elimination of undesired prescriptions from *Śruti* scriptures.

MacIntyre quotes Aristotle that: 'The virtues are precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve *eudemonia* and the lack of which will frustrate his movement toward that *telos*.... To act virtuously ... is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues'.¹⁰ This shows that the practice of virtues creates a stable and harmonious society by recognizing unity-indifference. Similarly, Hindu moral philosophy calls for benevolence and service to the world. Hindu virtues also encourage spiritual development, the ultimate *telos* or purpose of human life. Virtues can redeem and completes nature through human-

⁹Young, Catherine K., Hindu Bioethics, in Paul. F. Camenisch, edit., Religious Methods and Resources in Bioethics, p.13.

¹⁰MacIntyre, A: After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd. The Old Piano Factory, 1981, p. 139-149.

beings. In short we can see that Hindu moral philosophy is largely a kind of virtue ethics. This emphasizes the importance of righteousness and its analysis as a significant factor to define Hindu moral philosophy.

In Indian tradition, nature has been worshiped and respected as God and deity who have given a wide range of scope for considering nature having a sort of value in it. Compiling all these aspects a trend of conflicts still resisting so far as ascribing value in nature is concern. Classical texts of Hinduism enumerate the goals or matters of value of a human being. These are *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* - the circle of life and death. While *dharma*, wealth, sensual pleasure is usually seen as this-worldly, *mokṣa* is liberation from this world and the repeated rebirths of a soul. There are texts deal with *dharma*, wealth, sensual pleasure, and liberation. The multiple Hindu traditions do differ from other world religions in having this variety of goals and array of texts to go with them. What all this translates is that there are several competing conceptual systems, intersecting distinct, which inform human behaviour and thus making nature intrinsically valuable.

The texts that deal with *mokṣa* or liberation are generally concerned with three issues:

- The nature of reality, including the Supreme being the human soul
- The way to the supreme goal; and
- The nature supreme goal.

Generally, the nature of reality/supreme being is *taṭṭva*. These texts do not focus much on ethics or righteous behaviour world; that is the province of *dharma* texts. The theological texts that deal with *taṭṭva* focus on weaning a human being from earthly pursuit of happiness to what they consider to be the supreme of liberation (*mokṣa*) from this life. It is important to keep this taxonomy in mind, because theological doctrines do not necessarily trickle into *dhārmic* or ethical injunctions; in many Hindu traditions, in fact, is a disjunction between *dharma* and *mokṣa*.

One may say that there is a fundamental opposition between them: '*mokṣa* is a release from the entire realm which is governed by *dharma*... It stands, therefore, in opposition to *dharma*. *Mokṣa* however, is abandonment of the established order, not

in favor of anarchy, favor of a self-realization which is precluded in the realm of *dharma*. *Dharma* texts promote righteous behavior on earth, and *mokṣa* texts encourage one to be detached from such concerns. A few texts like the *Bhagavad Gitā* have tried to bridge *dharma* and *mokṣa* paradigms.

There are various religious sects in Hindu moral philosophy living in complete socio-cultural harmony. Reverence for nature and its creations is the unifying ethical principle in almost all religions of India. They have all kept nature above man. Our ancient people learnt to live with five elements of nature, the “earth”, “water”, “air”, “light” and “cosmos” and actually worshipped them in reality and symbolically. We have lot of information about the relationships between human and nature and human behaviour and indebtedness towards nature from the writing in the ancient Indian treaties and literatures, the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads* are all religions prevailing in Indian tradition.

Religious precepts are embedded in the respective scriptures of religions. They also seem to find their expression in the structured legal systems of various traditions and communities. The praxis-centered concepts influenced wide range of ethical thoughts in such a way that environmentalists support their demands and principles and thought it significant to look into these religious moorings. Environmental Ethics had developed as a response to failure of each ethical theories or incapability of ethical doctrines to deal with problems faced by mankind in understanding humans’ moral status *vis-à-vis* nature. It is an acknowledged fact that religions have not only determined the way we perceive the world but also set roles individuals play in nature.

Consequently, neither religion nor environmental ethics can survive in all times unless and until they are tied up with appropriate hermeneutics. It may be necessary that a moral science of environment and its underpinnings in theological doctrines have to have redefined and re-coordinated for a proper interdisciplinary articulation.

4.5: Concept of intrinsic value from Indian perspective

Many authors claim that certain Indian texts deny that nature has intrinsic value. If nature has value at all, it has means to *mokṣa* or liberation. This view is

unlikely as an understanding in Indian tradition that accepts the doctrines of *ahimsā* and *karma*. Christopher G. Framarin⁸⁸ argues that in Indian Philosophy, if nature has value at all, it has only instrumental value, as a means to *mokṣa* which he considered as an ‘instrumentalist interpretation’ and this is implausible as an interpretation of any Indian tradition that accepts the doctrines of *ahimsa* and *karma*. The proponent of this view must explain the connection between *ahimsa* and merit by citing the connection between *ahimsā* and *mokṣa*. He must say that *ahimsā* is valuable, and therefore produces merit, because *ahimsā* is instrumentally valuable as a means to *mokṣa*. *Ahimsā* is means to *mokṣa*, however, because it produces merit. Hence, the explanation is circular. Framarin also said that the instrumentalist interpretation entails that morality is strictly arbitrary - it might just as well be that *himsā* produces merit, *ahimsā* produces demerit. Hence the instrumentalist interpretation is implausible.⁸⁹

In order to avoid this consequence, something other than *moksha* has intrinsic value. One alternative is that the value of *ahimsa* derives from the intrinsic value of the unharmed entities⁹⁰. This view explains the connection between *ahimsā*, merit, and *mokṣa* straightforwardly. Since certain entities are intrinsically valuable, non-harm towards them is meritorious. Since non-harm towards these entities is meritorious, the agent accrues merit. And since the agent accrues merit, he moves closer to *mokṣa*. Hence, it can be argued that this interpretation is more plausible than another alternative, according to which the value of nature derives from this-worldly utility for humans. The basic instrumentalist interpretation is that there will be a tight connection between a tradition’s assessment of the value of nature, on the one hand, and a tradition’s rules governing the treatment of nature, on the other. Indeed, we should be able to infer the most basic moral guidelines that govern the treatment of nature from a tradition’s assessment of its value and vice versa. Hence, it might be thought that an inference can be drawn from certain Indian traditions’ explicit claims about the proper treatment of nature to a claim about the value of nature. Specifically,

⁸⁸ Christopher G. Framarin ;(2011)*The value of Nature in Indian (Hindu) Traditions* in *Religious Studies*, 47,3, p. 285-300

⁸⁹ Ibid; 285

⁹⁰ Ibid ;P. 285

one might argue that the moral principle of *ahimsā* entails that nature has intrinsic value - that its value is not derived exclusively from the value of further ends to which it is means.

The case for the intrinsic value of nature is not as simple as we think. According to B. K. Lal, the virtue of ahimsa can be explained in the following way. 'The Hindu recommendation to cultivate attitude [namely, ahimsa] toward animals is based not the animal as such but on considerations about how the attitude is part of the purificatory steps that bring men'⁹¹. For Lal, discourage harm to animals because animals are intrinsically valuable end of *mokṣa*. Both the attitude of *ahimsā*, then, and animals themselves, are only instrumentally valuable, as a means to the further end of *mokṣa*. Presumably Lal would also deny that other natural entities, like plants, have intrinsic value. Lance E. Nelson defends a similar interpretation of *Advaita* and the *Bhagavad Gitā* with regard to nature more generally. In the case of *Advaita*, Nelson concludes that 'all that is other than the *Ātman* [true self], including nature, is without intrinsic value'.⁹² Similarly, he argues that according to the *Bhagavadgitā*, '[i]t is the self (*ātman*) that is important, not nature'⁹³. If nature has any value at all, it is merely instrumental, as a means to attaining or realizing the *ātman*. Since the seeker attains or realizes the atman only if she attains or realizes *mokṣa*, Lal's and Nelson's views are roughly the same: only *mokṣa* has intrinsic value; if nature has value at all, it has instrumental value as a means to *mokṣa*. Nelson offers two distinct arguments for his conclusion.

1. The first argument might be called the 'argument from illusion'. Everything other than the atman is a product of *māyā*, and hence illusory. Anything that is illusory is devoid of intrinsic value. Hence everything other than the *ātman* is devoid of intrinsic value. Since nature is other than the *ātman*, nature is devoid of intrinsic value.

⁹¹Lal, Basant K, 'Hindu perspectives on the use of animals in science', in Tom Regan (ed.) *Animals and Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science* (Philadelphia PA: Temple University Press, 1986).

⁹² Nelson, Lance E. (2000) 'Reading the BhagavadGitā from an ecological perspective', in Chappel, C& Tucker *Hinduism and Ecology*.

⁹³ Nelson, Lance E; (2000), *Nature in Indian (Hindu) traditions* 287, p.140

2. The second argument might be called the ‘argument from pain’. It states that the world of *samsāra* (rebirth) and everything in it is inherently painful and unsatisfactory. If the world of *samsāra* and everything in it is inherently painful and unsatisfactory, then it has only negative value. If *samsāra* and everything in it has only negative value, then it lacks positive intrinsic value.

The instrumentalist interpretation requires further clarification. Within many Indian texts and traditions, morally praiseworthy and blameworthy actions are typically accompanied by merit and demerit, respectively. Instances of this claim are so widespread that they hardly need mention. *Manusmṛti* 5.52-53, for example, reads:

“No one else is a producer of demerit as much as the person who, outside of (acts of) worship to ancestors or gods, desires to increase his own meat by means of the meat of another. The one who performs the horse sacrifice every single year for 100 years and the one who will not eat meat are equal; the fruit (results) of the merit (meritorious actions) of these two is equal”.⁹⁴

For the person who eats meat indiscriminately, verse in the *Manusmṛti*-5.55, plays on a whose meat (*māṁsa*) I eat in this world, he this, the wise say, is the derivation of the thought is that by eating meat, an individual being eaten, or some equivalent pain, in another birth.⁹⁵ The *Mahābhārata* makes identical claims as follows:

“He, O King, who will not eat any meat for his entire life, he will attain a large place in heaven. In this [I have] no doubt. Those who eat the living flesh of beings are also eaten by those living beings. Of this, I have no doubt. Since he (*sa*) me (*mām*), therefore I will eat him as well. Let you know, O Bharata, this (is) the derivation of the word *māṁsa*”.

These passages make clear that both ahimsa and *himsā* have consequences in the form of merit and demerit, respectively. The punishment for harm is subjection to (at least) equivalent harm. One reward for non-harm is a lavish place in heaven.

⁹⁴Jha, Ganganath;(1999), (edit.) *Manusmṛti with the ‘Manubhāṣya’ of Medhātithi*, Delhi: MotilalBanarsidass, 5, P.52-53

⁹⁵Ibid

Furthermore, it is a platitude within the Indian traditions that demerit is counter-productive to the attainment or realization of *mokṣa*.

So, presumably part of what the proponents of the instrumentalist interpretation mean when they say that ahimsa is a means to *mokṣa* is that ahimsa is a means to avoiding the demerit that both arises as a result of *himsā* and postponements of *mokṣa*. Roy W. Perrett takes Lal to be making this point when he says that from an Indian point of view the reason one should avoid meat-eating and harm to animals more generally is not that it is immoral to eat meat, but that it is imprudent to do so, since it leads to one's further entanglement in the cycle of rebirth and suffering.⁹⁶ Harm to animals produces demerit, which prolongs *samsāra*, and hence postpones that which one attains when one escapes *samsāra* - namely *mokṣa*. It is because the postponement of moksha is of intrinsic disvalue that demerit has instrumental disvalue, and *himsā* has instrumental disvalue because it produces demerit. At the very least, *ahimsā* is a means to avoiding these consequences of *himsā*, and its value is at least partly explained by this. The benefits of *ahimsā* are not entirely negative, however. It is also a platitude within the Indian traditions that certain forms of merit are a condition of the eventual attainment or realization of *mokṣa*. Consider a straightforward argument for this claim: in order to be born a human being, one must have sufficient merit. In order to attain *mokṣa*, one must be born a human being. Hence in order to attain *mokṣa*, one must accrue sufficient merit. Hence *ahimsā* is a means to *mokṣa* at least in part because it is a means to merit.

O. P. Dwevedi in his essay *Dhārmic ecology*⁹⁷ mentioned about Eco-spirituality from four different angles. *VasudevaSarbam, vasudhaivakutambakam, sarva-bhuta-hita*. One of the main postulates of *Bhāgavad Gitā* is that the Supreme Being resides in all.⁹⁸ Chapter -7, verse - 9 of *Gitā* states,

Only after taking many births is a wise person able to comprehend the basic philosophy of creation; which is: whatever is, is *Vasudeva*. If anyone understands this fundamental, such a person is indeed a *Mahātma*.

⁹⁶Perrett, Roy W. (1993) 'Moral vegetarianism and the Indian tradition', in Ninian Smart & Shivesh Thakur (eds) *Ethical and Political Dilemmas of Modern India* (New York NY: St Martin's Press)

⁹⁷*Hinduism and Ecology*, 2000, edit. Christopher Key Chappel and Mary Evelyn Tucker, Harvard University Press. , p-5

⁹⁸*Bhāgavad Gitā*, 7:9.

In *Gītā*-13:13, lord Krishna says, “He resides in everywhere.” The same way of explanation being found in *ŚrīmadBhāgavadMahāpurāṇa*,⁹⁹ “ether, air, fire, water, earth, planets, all creatures, directions, trees and plants, rivers and seas, they all are organs of God’s body; remembering this, a devotee respects all species.” The basic concept is that the presence God in all and treating the creation in respect without harming and exploiting others. In the *Mahābhārata*,¹⁰⁰ it is claimed that all living beings have soul, and God resides as their inner soul: *sarbobhūtāmbhūtastho*. This means that no species will encroach upon the other rights without permission. This stipulation is also endorsed in another stanza in *Mahābhārata* which is as follows:

“The father of all creatures, made the sky. From sky He made water, and from water he made fire and air. From fire and water the earth came into existence. Actually mountains are his bones, earth is the flesh, sea is the blood, and sky is his abdomen. The sun and moon are his eyes. The upper part of the sky is his head, the earth is his feet. The directions are his hands.”¹⁰¹

This shows that the God and the nature are one and the same in Indian philosophical tradition. Hence if *Brahman* is being realized by *Atman* and *Brahman* exists in all and realization of *Brahman* is the ultimate liberation (*moṁṣa*) which is being considered having intrinsic value than all creations of *Brahman* too have the same value.

4.6: Scriptural importance of Hindu Environmental Ethics

Ethics in general can be confirmed with concerned theories. But religious ethics is always obligatory to their respective scriptures. Unless and until there is definitely a matured moral thinking, scripture of a religion cannot be explicable. Acceptance by a group or a sect is not the issue. The issue is how far the moral law is justifiable to scriptures. The salient features must be disciplined according to the scriptural text even if it is revealed in different times and situations. The value of

⁹⁹*SrīmadBhāgavad Mahāpurāṇa*, 2: 2- 41.

¹⁰⁰*Mahabharata, MakshadharmaParva*, Trns, Ganguly, Kishori Mohan 182: 20.

¹⁰¹*Mahabharata, MakshadharmaParva*, Trns, Ganguly, Kishori Mohan 182:14-19

language, whether it is sacred or ordinary, is not important while its significance lies in the concurrence to scripture.

Vedas contain justifications in value of nature and its intrinsic capacity. The *Rig*, *Yajur*, *Sāma* and *Atharva* explain the patterns of worship and its dignitaries. Each *Veda* has *mantra*, *Brāhmaṇa*, *Āraṇyaka* and *Upaniṣad*. *Mantras* are *Samhitās*. It gives order of rituals. *Brāhmaṇa* explains the *Prajāpati* as *Iśwara* or Almighty. *Āraṇyakas* are secret spiritual advices. *Upanishads* explain spiritual wisdom and noble paths to *mokṣa*. *Gītā* gives *Bhakti Mārga* significantly, in the midst of *Karma mārga* and *jñānamārga*. *Gītā* is the gospel for liberation from *ajñāna*. *Gītā* explains *bhakti mārga* as *Karma mārga*. We can summarize *Vedas* as exemplifying *Sādhāṇadharma* rather than *Viśeṣadharma*. But *Gītā* emphasizes *Viśeṣadharma* that gives responsibilities of *Brāhmin*, *Ṛṣatriyas*, *Vaiśyas* and *Śudras*, which are entirely different. Each category has each *Viśeṣadharma*. But every life has equal *āśramadharmas* - *Brahmacarya*, *Gārhasthya*, *Vānaprastha* and *Sanyāsa*.

The *Vedas* expresses concern for nature by providing a metaphysical union between the human and non-human beings, the adherence to which seems necessary for us to establish and sustain a proper relationship between the physical nature and us. In ecological terms the Vedic hymns provide us with a number of insights. *Vedas* speak of an inexplicable unity of creation and a mysterious interconnectedness of everything to everything else. Each thing has an interest and purpose to fulfill in the web of being. It is this that makes each and everything worthy of moral consideration.

A remarkable feature of the Hindu religious tradition pointed out by Billimoria, is that ethical ponderings from its very beginnings were closely related to the awareness of nature. The underlying principle is *Ṛta* or the cosmic order. According to the *Ṛta* the highest good is identified with the total harmony with the cosmic or natural order. Crawford writes:

“The ethical impact of *Ṛta* on the vedic mind is seen in the confidence it generated in respect to the goodness of life in the world - consciousness of *Ṛta* imported the feeling of being at home in the world. It offered solidarity and security. The world was not a place where blind, capricious forces held

sway, but was a benevolent habitat in which men could expect to enjoy all the good things of life - material and spiritual.”¹⁰²

We can find in *Atharva Veda* that *satya* is identified with *Dharma* which is the law that governs all beings, there by rendering the notion of *Ṛta* in a deeper ethical sense.

With the *Upaniṣads*, the early ritualism of *Vedas* gave way to metaphysical knowledge that contributed significantly in evolving a worldview that accorded the highest or transcendental prominence to the supreme principle called *Brahman*. *Brahman* was conceived as the ultimate reality that characterizes the Self of all beings. In fact *Brahman* as the indivisible, ultimate reality of which no greater can be conceived becomes the presupposition for all other thinking, be it intellectual, social or moral. This metaphysical view is called *Vedānta* philosophy. However in some dominant forms of *Vedānta*, the reality of the world and all things and relations within them is taken to be illusory, the only reality being *Brahman*. Thus, *AdvaitaVedānta* speaks of the world as *māyā*, as ultimately unreal.

Hinduism is a religious tradition where we can find the interconnected concepts of non-injury (*ahimsā*), the oneness of all living beings and self- realization. Environmental ethics acquires a vital significance in Hindu scriptures. According to Naess, all Hindu scriptures have become part of the vocabulary of environmental ethics. He interprets *Bhagavad Gitā* and other texts of Hinduism as supporting Deep Ecology. Verse 6:29 of *Bhagavad Gitā* is very significant to Environmental Ethics. It reads:

“*Sarvabhuta-sthamatmanamSarva-bhutamcatmaniiksate
yoga yuktatmasarvatraSamadarsanah*”.

This means, “He sees himself is yoked in discipline, and who sees the same everywhere.” It is but natural for any one with some knowledge of the religious traditions constituting Hinduism to find the interconnectedness between human and his environment, which provides universal harmony. Without self-realization, the above-mentioned harmony will be impracticable. However not all environmental

¹⁰²Crawford. S. C.: *The Evolution of Hindu Ethical Ideals*, Asian Studies Program, University of Hawaii, 1982, p. 14

thinkers would agree with the Hindu conception of discipline and the ideal of self-realization as necessary requirements for environmental ethics. Thus Jacobsen argues:

“Environmentalism teaches neither liberation from the world nor the ultimate value of the social order. On the contrary environmentalism has *samsāra*, the world of the natural processes of birth, flourishing of life, decay and death as its ultimate concern.”³²

If so, what is the relevance of the *Gītā* and how does it relate to ecosophy? Jacobsen investigates to tackle these hurdles through the commentaries of the *Gītā*. This helps us to acquire a coordinated concept, which forms a methodology in Hindu environmentalism. The *Gītā* comprises chapters -23 to 40 of the *Bhīṣmaparva* of the *Mahābhārata*, but it has been treated as a separate work. It recounts the dialogue between the God Krishna and one of the Pāṇḍava brothers, Arjuna, just before the beginning of the battle of Kurukṣetra between the Pāṇḍavas and Kauravas. Arjuna was a Kṣatriya and it was therefore his duty to fight battles.

At the beginning of the Kurukṣetra battle Arjuna suffers a breakdown and wants to withdraw from the battle because he feels that killing other humans would be wrong and would destroy social order or *dharma*. But Lord Krishna convinces Arjunathat there is a superior order for ahimsa and its *dharma* is the knowledge of the self. It transforms the material principles of *dharma* to a conception of *svadharma*.

This conception of *dharma* exhorts one to perform one’s duties by forgetting the results of one’s actions. The unique message of the *Gita* is that if one’s duties are performed without attachment to the fruits of action, that is, without egoism, one is not bound to the world of rebirth (*samsāra*). Discipline is more important than *ahimsā*. Self-realization is nevertheless an acknowledged fact of discipline. *Ahimsā* is only a distinguished reality of discipline. *Ahimsā* cannot survive the entire gamut of being. If *ahimsā* is taken into account in its entirety the systems of organic life will collapse. Brokington points out that “*Dharma* is incomplete, if it contemplates *ahimsā* alone.”¹⁰³

³² Jacobsen, Knut A. : *Bhagavadgita, Ecosophy T. and Deep Ecology* in *Inquiry*, Vol. 39, No.:2, June 96, p 233.

¹⁰³ Brockington, J. L, (1996), *The Sacred Thread: Hinduism in its Continuity and Diversity*, Quoted in Knut A. Jacobsen: *Bhagavadgita, Ecosophy T. and Deep Ecology* in *Inquiry*, vol. 39, No. 2, p.220.

Ramanuja gives a purely religious interpretation of *Bhagavad Gitā*. According to him the world is part of God and totally dependent on him, but it is a mistake to identify the self with the body and the natural processes. Inequality belongs to *Prkṛiti*. Living beings do not share one self, but the selves of beings are similar. Thus, when one knows one's own self, one knows that all other *ātman*s have the same form. Mādhva reads the import of Hindu texts not as espousing monism but as monotheism. He believed in a personal God (*paramēśvara*). God controls everything. However all these commentators accord the real identity of the self and its relationships as conducive to a genuine environmental ethics.

The contemporary thinkers like Gandhi and Radhakrishnan have played a major role that could creatively reinterpret Hinduism as supporting the deep ecology to a great extent. Monastic traditions defined Hinduism with a focus on the liberation from the world. Contemporary thinkers used the religious foundations of Hinduism as a tool to eradicate the social evils in Hindu society. This improvement gave new meanings to the concepts of dharma, self-realization and the unity of all beings. Modern Indian thinking is radical in interpreting *Bhagavad Gitā* as a science of salvation.

Arvind Sharma affirms the combination of ascetic and contemplative ideas of Gandhi and Radhakrishnan to a programme for political action.¹⁰⁴ Gandhi thought *Mokṣa* as inseparably related to one's social duty (*dharma*). He found the essence of the *Gitā* (18: 2-55 and 2-72). He calls them as the markings of a *satyāgrahi* (*sthita-prajña*). Naess notes: Gandhi recognised a basic common right to live and blossom to self-realisation applicable to any being having interests or needs. Gandhi made manifest the internal relation between self-realization, non-violence and what is sometimes called bio-spherical egalitarianism. Radhakrishnan comments on the *Bhagavad Gitā*, 6: 29, in the following way:

Though, in the process of attaining the vision of self, we had to retreat from outward things and separate the self from the world, when the vision is attained the world is drawn into the self. On the ethical plane, this means that there should grow a

¹⁰⁴ Sharma, Arvind, *The Hindu Gita: Ancient and classical interpretations of the Bhagvatgita*, Quoted in Knut A. Jacobsen, op.cit., p.226

detachment from the world and when it is attained, a return to it through love, suffering and sacrifice for it. The sense of a separate finite self with its hopes and fears, its likes and dislikes is destroyed.¹⁰⁵

Arne Naess' statement on Gandhi is also relevant to the above interpretation given by Radhakrishnan. From this discussion we can say, according to the philosophies of oneness, the path goes first inwards only to lead out again to everything. The path of action, *Karmamārga*, leads a *Karmayogi* into contact with all creatures. This path enables one to see the greater self everywhere.

4.7: *Ahimsā* and Environmental Ethics

Let us examine the role of *ahimsā* as the ethical principle and virtue par excellence. *Ahimsā* as a central concept of ethics, and virtue in particular, creates some moral dilemmas with regard to certain environmental paradoxes. *Ahimsā* can be defined as 'sanctity of life' in western parlance while it is 'non-injury' principle in the east. We can see religious-moral connotations of ahimsa in *ChhāndogyaUpaniṣad*, which speaks of non-injury, safety and protection. Ahimsa can be a universal moral principle, which keeps the ultimate goal of life as liberation. However, there are disputes on accepting ahimsa as moral principle because of its conditional, partial sense. Thus Young asks: 'Can *ahimsā* be called as a moral principle when it is conditional and partial in sense?'

But this issue is not very serious before modern ethical thinkers who encouraged *ahimsā* as an immediate tool to solve several ethical issues. Hindu concept of ahimsa states 'what ought to be done rather than what is useful to do'. Heterodox Hindu movements (Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism) also upheld the validity of ahimsa. The desire to live and the avoidance of death are common to all sentient beings. We can see several passages from *Mahābhārata*, which claims that one who is wise gives the gift of fearlessness (*abbaya*) to all beings. This improves our understandings about ethics and our environmental need. Our ethical life provides concentration in future security. Our violence is certainly reflective upon

¹⁰⁵Radhakrishnan, S,(1996),*TheBhagvatgita*, Quoted in Knut A. Jacobsen: Bhagavatgita, Ecosophy T, and Deep Ecology' in *Inquiry*, Vol 39, No: 2, p 230.

environmental ethics. The *Yajurveda* states ‘may all beings look at me with a friendly eye, may I do likewise and may we all look on each other with the eyes of a friend’ (*Yajurveda* 36: 18).

A benevolent world is not automatic. It is the responsibility of the people as upholders of cosmic order to uphold life itself by holding back fear and ensuring confidence. This confidence in one’s life creates truly donors of life to others. Protect ourselves through causing no harm to others.

Ahimsa, through environmentally sound ethical principles, is given exemplary significance in Jainism. According to Jainism ‘The virtue of protecting a single creature is greater than the charity of the whole earth, for life is dear to man so much so that even by receiving the whole earth in his sway he does not want to die’¹⁰⁶. At the core of Jainism lie the five vows that dictate the everyday lives of its adherents. These five vows are *ahimsā* (nonviolence), *satya* (truthfulness), *asteya* (not stealing), *brahmacharya* (sexual restraint) and *aparigraha* (non-possession). One undertakes these vows to ensure that no harm is brought to all possible life forms. For practicing Jainas, to hurt any being would result in the thickening of one’s Karma, which would hinder the progress towards liberation. As pointed out by Chappell, the worldview of the Jainas might be termed as ‘bio-cosmology’. The Jaina vows can be reinterpreted in an ecological sense as fostering an attitude of respect for all life forms¹⁰⁷.

Gandhian theory of non-violence has been a great influence in keeping social and political moral values sincerely. The practice of ahimsa is not at the level of an abstract, intellectual, plane but is an experiential fact that has significance throughout our life. *Mahābhārata* conceives non-violence with two terms – *abhayadanam* (the gift of fearlessness or security) and *sarvadanebhyahuttāman* (the noblest of all gifts). Gandhi realises that absence of wish or renunciation of the feeling of enmity is very much involved in implementation of non-violence principle. Gandhi does not exclude the nonhuman beings in the process of bringing harmony across the universe.

¹⁰⁶ Walli, K, *Conception of Ahimsa in Indian Thought* Bharata Manisha, 1974, p 61.

¹⁰⁷ Chapple, Christopher K. ‘Hinduism, Jainism, and Ecology’, Center for the Study of World Religions, 2000, p. 19-54.

Harmonious life is the life of life (*JivoJivasyaJivanam*). Gandhi gives a positive connotation to the notion of *ahimsā* by defining it as ‘love’. This active love or non-violence is not a cloistered virtue to be practiced by the individual for his peace and final salvation, but a rule of conduct for society if it is to live consistently with human dignity. Gandhi makes non-violence as an obligatory discipline to all. It is a religion, which transforms all human relationship as a way of life. Gandhi sees *ahimsa* as an ocean of compassion. *Ahimsa* ruled out all forms of selfishness including ‘blind attachment’ to life. Gandhi affirms the doctrine of non-violence in such a way that preservation of life is not to convince others about the moral duty to protect life, particularly when one’s life itself is uncertain. It is my conscience that judges at the end of my life if it permits harmony and non-violence.

4.8: *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* on environment

The root of environmental issues can be traced back to the days of *Vedic* and *Upaniṣadic* period of Indian Philosophy. Contemporary Indian thoughts also ignited these issues time to time. A study of Indian Philosophical texts shows that there is no specific independent ethical branch in Indian Philosophy which makes a spectacle elaboration on environmental ethics like western philosophers do. More clearly, plugs on intrinsic values were rarely discussed in *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads*. However, environmental issues were cornered from different metaphysical entities.

Thousands of years ago, *Vedas* were written. That the *Vedas* are likened to the great Himalayas is an emphasis of dealing with environmental issues. Kālidasa in the first *śloka* of the *Kumārasambhavam* has a beautiful description of the Himalayas, standing like a great measuring rod by which alone the depth and the grandeur of human history and civilization can be measured. The *Vedas* are like the Himalayas because in the same way that the life-giving streams come down from the Himalayas to irrigate the land below, so also our great scriptures have flown down to the present day. And if the *Vedas* are like the Himalayas, then the *Upaniṣads* are like those great

peaks bathed in the eternal sunshine of wisdom that you see if you are flying parallel to the Himalayas¹⁰⁸.

The *Upaniṣads*, therefore, signify in some ways the high inscription of our cultural, spiritual and environmental tradition. The *Upaniṣadic* thoughts are the representations of different dialogues between the guru and the *śiṣya*, the sage and his disciples and hence *Upanishads* are not monolithic commands issued by some invisible deity as believed in western tradition. And the dialogues deal with the great questions of human existence, of why we are here, what is our goal in life, what is the meaning of everything around us, what is the power that energizes all of us, our minds, our hearts, our bodies and which saturates the entire universe and most importantly our place in the universe and our relation to it. This gives us spectacular glimpse of our relation and responsibility to nature and the uniqueness of it which can be augmented for the argument to establish that there is an entity in nature which can be considered as intrinsic.

The Upanishads are known as Vedanta because they come chronologically at the end of the Vedic collection. At the end of the Vedic collections is the *Jñanakanda*, the way of wisdom, the Upanishads, the high watermark of knowledge. Traditionally there were supposed to be 108 Upanishads. The important ones that have come down to us upon which AdiShanakaracharya has written his great luminous commentaries are ten: the *Isha*, the *Kena*, the *Katha*, the *Prashna*, the *Mundaka*, the *Mandukya*, *Taittiriya*, *Aitereya*, *Chandogya*, *Brihadaranyaka*. These ten and the *Shwetashwatara* represent the major Upanishads. They range from cryptic texts like the *Mandukya* which has only 12 verses, the *Ishavasyopanishad* which has 18 verses, to much larger texts like the *Brihadaranyaka* and the *Chandogya* with hundreds of verses.

Now the Upanishads are so vast and varied that it is difficult even to begin to try and condense them. But one important cardinal concept of Upanishads must have highlighted what represents the very concept of environment and nature. This will

¹⁰⁸Karan Singh, (2001), Source: India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, RELOCATING IDENTITIES (MONSOON), India International Centre, p.100-108

also show that the teachings of the Vedanta are in fact becoming more and more relevant and important as we hurtle headlong into the 21st century.

The most important cardinal concept of *Vedanta* is of the all-pervasive *Brahman*: the power, the light that pervades this entire universe; not only this tiny speck of dust that we call the planet earth, but the billions upon billions of galaxies in the endless universe around us, *Ananta kotibrahmanda*. Everything in this magnificent universe is the *Brahman*. Everything that has manifested, and everything that will be manifested, is illuminated by the same spiritual power. The concept of the *Brahman* in the Upanishads is as it were the spiritual correlate of the unified field theory to explain the multifarious phenomenon around us. So the first basic concept of the Upanishads is the concept of the all-pervasive *Brahman*.

Another important concept of Upanishad is the concept of Atman, the Self; the realization not of God but of the self. This is not about the false self, not the ego that accompanies us every day with self-importance, but the deepest self which is in the inner recesses of our being, of our consciousness - that is known as the Atman. It is this Atman which is present in every creature and every being. As we move up the ladder of evolution to come to the human race, the Atman there becomes self-consciousness. As Shri Aurobinda points out, for the first time with the advent of the human race we have a creature capable of self-consciousness and self-realization. The Upanishads have a marvelous term for the human race, *amritasyaputrah*: the 'children of immortality'. The *Atman* is the divine spark encapsulated by the very fact that we are human in our consciousness. It is fanning this spark of divinity within us into the blazing fire of spiritual realization that is the true goal of human existence: the joining of the *Atman* and the *Brahman*.¹⁰⁹

Indeed, the rise of the Advaita philosophy may be traced to the realization that human beings live in a more than human world, characterized by mutual interdependence and more importantly, that any alienation of the two spheres could spell doom for the earth. In the *TaittiriyaBrahmana*, we are told that "the same divine milk that circulates through creatures here on earth lights the suns - all the suns of the

¹⁰⁹ Karan Singh, (2001), India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, RELOCATING IDENTITIES (MONSOON), p. 100-108

galaxy. It condenses also into the forms of the clouds. It pours down as rain and feeds the earth, the vegetation and the animals. The individual with the awareness of this secret cannot be avaricious for any portion of the abundant food that may come to him. He will share it willingly with his companions. He will not wish to break the circuit by hoarding the substance to himself.... His food avails him nothing: when he eats, eats his own death”¹¹⁰. Those aphoristic words from Aruni to his son “That thou art” (*Tat tvamasi*) sum up the entire Vedic conception of reality including the nonhuman sphere. *Tat tvamasi* enjoins one to be aware of the identity of one’s core essence with the hidden substance of all and everything, and not to be alienated from the nonhuman world.

The *Upanishads* thus had exhibited the place of human in this cosmos and their duties towards nature even though they do not directly tell us about the intrinsic value of nature. But in analyzing these cardinal concepts also make us aware that the spiritual attachment of human beings with nature is a kind of attachment with something permanent entity having a sort of intrinsicness.

4.9: Nature in the *Brahmanas* and *Aranyakas* ***Brahmanas***

The *Brahmanas* are texts written in Sanskrit prose that deals with detailed description of sacrifices and other rituals. They give proper rules for the conduct of *yajnas* in which *Vedic* mantras are used in order to propitiate Gods like Indra, Agni, Soma etc. In addition to the ritualistic material, the *Brahmanas* also contain religious philosophy, stories etc. which support the *yajna* mode of worship. Each *Veda* has its own *Brahmana*. Some scholars include *Brahmanas* also under the title of *Veda*. The *Brahmana* portions are traditionally followed by *Aranyakas* and *Upanisads*. The *Aranyakas* explain the various forms of *Upasana* and the *Upanisads* are philosophical treatises. The authors of the *Brahmanas* understood that Sun is actually nothing else than fire. Rituals were done to praise the Vedic deities who in turn protected the living beings and fulfilled their desires. Rain was essential for a prosperous life. The

¹¹⁰Radhakrishnan S. (1989), *The Principal Upanishads*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. P. 525-563

Vedic people knew that rain is produced from clouds, clouds from smoke, smoke from fire. At the same time they recognize that fire and water has mutual enmity.

Importance of rainy season is that it has the capacity of the fulfilling of one's desires. Plants are the result of the swelling of waters. Because the plant grow whenever the water swells. According to the *Brahmanas* is the womb of waters. The waters have their own light. *Satapatha Brahmanas* says that lightning is the light of water.

Aranyakas

The authors of these texts believe that the water is born of fire. Water is the nectar. Cosmic waters are the rains. This entire world is established in cosmic waters. Clouds, lightning, thunders and rains are the four forms of water. Cosmic waters are there in all directions. Herbs are produced from earth.

According to *Aranyaka* Agni is the nourisher, Agni is the abode of waters and Agni is the sun. Agni is verily, the lord of food grains. Water is born of fire. Agni is the lightning. As is the sun in the heaven so is the eye in the head. Lightning is placed in the sun. Sun is the soul of movable and immovable world. Sky is established on the earth and everything is installed in the sky. Earth came out of water. Herbs grow on earth and the clouds satisfy the earth. The earth was born from water. The earth is honey to all beings. Of all created beings earth is the essence and from the earth the herbs are produced. The importance of water and plants to live on earth is being taught in the *Upanisads*.

In *Aitareyopanisad*, Vayu is the deity that never sets. From ether was born air. This prana is vayu. The air entered into the nostrils assuming the form of breath. The *Upanisad's* injunction with regard to kala (time) is "Do not decry the seasons", Time, nature, necessity, chance, the elements and the Purusa should be regarded as the causes. These must be pondered upon. The month verily is Prajapati. Its dark half is indeed food or matter.

4.10: The Concept of Nature in *Ramayana*

The author of *Ramayana*, Valmiki was a son of nature. According to the

legend Valmiki was a hunter in his early life. He turned to asceticism advised by the saptarsis and lived in the forest in his Asramas and he became a great sage. In his *Ramayana*, which is the first kavya, it is no wonder that nature is a main subject of description. The inspiration for Valmiki's writing of *Ramayana* was given from a tragic experience he had accidentally in the forest. In the morning while he was on the banks of the Tamasa River, a hunter came there and killed one of the Kraunca bird couples. The cry of the he-bird at the death of his mate deeply disturbed Valmiki's mind. He felt compassion towards the bird and anger towards the hunter. At that time from his sorrowful mind the first poetry was produced.

*Maa Nishada Pratistham Tvamagamahsāsvati Samaa
YatKraunchamithunaadekamAvadhiKaamamohitam*

This verse is indeed a caution against the greed of humans who interfere in the forest and destroy its living beings. Valmiki's attitude towards nature is clearly visible in his first poem. In *Ramayana* most part of the story is taking part in the forest. Valmiki gives the first forest experience to Rama and Laksmana when they were young boys. Visvamitra comes to the palace of Dasaratha and requests to send Rama and Laksmana and they went to Visvamitra's hermitage which was far away from Ayodhya. On the way they had to cross rivers, forests and valleys by foot. They had to first cross the Sarayu on the banks of which Ayodhya existed. They watched the place where Sarayu meets Jahnavi.

Rama, Laksmana and Visvamitra spent the day on the banks of the sona river. The sona river joined Jahnavi the holy river worshipped by ascetics. Having seen that sona river furnished with sacred water and frequented by swans and cranes, Rama and Laksmana were very delighted and they took up their quarters on the bank of that river. Where the two holy rivers become one, there they spent that night. Next morning they were crossing the river then they heard a thunderous noise. Then the sage told the story about the cause of that noise. Brahma once created out of his mind a lake, which is named Manasa Sarovara. This river Sarayu comes out of it and flows all along the edge of Ayodhya city. In this spot Sarayu blends with the golden water of the river Ganga.

After a while they reached a dark forest. No light from the Sun could filter into the forest. So thickly was the tree branches intertwined. There the beetles were making shrill music and the wild animals were roaring and making their characteristic noises. Even the birds seemed to cry harshly and there was no music emanating from their throats. Thus the forest was so dark to see anything.

Visvamitra was pleased with the natural curiosity of the young brothers. Then he told the story of that forest. Once that forest was a country named Malada and Karusa. There lived a terrible demoness Tataka by name. She was ugly, horrible to look at and cruel by nature. This demoness had occupied the place of entrance to the countries and no human beings dared to enter there. She was extremely fond of human flesh. Thus that country became a horrible forest and it is known as Tatakavana.

Birds and deer dwelling in Siddhasrama followed the high souled Visvamitra having asceticism for wealth. On the way to Mithila they entered the hermitage of Gautama. There Ahalya who was turned to a rock by Gautama's curse was waiting for the touch of Rama's blessed feet to purify her and to sanctify the ashrama. After liberating her from the curse Rama and Laksmana saluted her and flowers rained from the heavens on them. On their way to Mithila they spent that night on the banks of sona river. In the morning the music of the birds and the rustling of the river woke them up. After morning ceremonies they walked fast towards the north. They saw the sacred river Gargi. They were thrilled at the sight of the river with swans and lotuses floating on its surface. Then Rama wants to hear the story of the sacred river Ganga, How the Ganga was flowing in three directions and embracing the three worlds, falls into the lord of streams and rivers. Visvamitra started the story, 'There is a mountain by name Himavan. Himavan is the lord of all mountains and he had two daughters

4.11: Conclusive Remarks

In this chapter we have examined the eco-aesthetic concern of ancient literature in Sanskrit. The pantheism of the Vedas reflects the intimate relation between men and deified natural forces. *Agni, Indra, Varuna* and other Vedic deities clearly shows that they are personified natural forces. They were most powerful. In the *Brahmanas* there is a desire to subjugate nature by magical powers. During this

time the external nature were studied extensively and the ancient science like Ayurveda began to flourish. After the Vedic period the yajna cult became weak and the worship of personal Gods became popular. In *Valmiki's Ramayana* the description of nature is given importance. Nature is presented as a coherent and harmonious system of existence. The seers in the *tapovanas* are portrayed as examples of the natural life. *Ramayana* is always supplied with the energy of nature and Sita is the true daughter of nature. When compare to *Mahabharata*, *Ramayana* is friendlier towards forests. The two epics together draws an ecological map of India from Himalayas to Srilanka. Kalidasa has followed the style of Valmiki in describing nature and human life.

Before we conclude we must note one clear difference between Hindu ethics and Environmentalism. Hindu ethics upholds the freedom from samsara but on the other hand environmentalism upholds the preservation of samsara. However Hindu ethics and Environmentalism do not neglect the need of universal harmony, which we can confirm from the above mentioned findings. Environmentalism once more disagrees with Hindu ethics in the self-realization methodology. In Hindu ethics, particularly in Advaita, self-realization stands for the negation of plurality between beings while environmentalism defines self-realization as realization of the non-difference of oneself and the processes of the natural world without sacrificing plurality.

Environmentalism is capable of a theory, which gives unity al beings but does not mean that all beings share the same self as that of Hindu theology. From the above, we can observe the importance of nature and how it becomes an organic form with man as its head. When man becomes a Buddha (an enlightened one) one begins to attend to the need of protecting nature and hence the beginnings of a proper Environmental Ethics. Man is the custodian, guardian and overseer, but he cannot escape from his confirmed positions throughout the daily routine of nature.

From the above discussions we may note that Semitic and non-Semitic religious teachings have contributed significantly to environmental ethics. East-West hermeneutics helped Environmental Ethics to a greater extent in the midst of limitations of any one paradigm. As seen from our discussions on the religious ethical

teachings, we note that both anthropocentrism and ecocentrism have their roots in various religious doctrines. Thus in the next two chapters we take up these perspectives for a critical appraisal.

One theme within contemporary environmentalist discourse concerns the idea that the way in which people treat their natural environment can be related to their religious beliefs and practices. While the majority of studies have tended to emphasize instances where religion is believed to have played a positive and beneficial role in environmental conservation, religion can also act against the interest of environmental protection (Nelson the Judaeo-Christian tradition is often “environmental crisis” because of humanity and nature. Nature deals with this area of religious traditions as inherently. In particular, it is argued that religious traditions teach that the earth is significant (it has “intrinsic value”) because recognition of this “bio-divinity” environment and to be careful in their treatment of the natural world. While “bio-divinity” has been a feature of many religious-cultural traditions throughout history, it is, however, important to distinguish this from what we have called “religious environmental-ism”, which involves the conscious application of religious ideas to contemporary concerns about an environmental crisis.

Chapter-V

Conclusion

In the previous chapters, as we have discussed, the concept about intrinsic value and its ascription to nature that has been acknowledged from normative perspectives, leads us to a situation where multiple options have been queued for further examination- both in western and Indian traditions. However, our limitation, when perused to investigate the debates and dimensions of intrinsic value in nature, is only to find out these multiple options from where more research works may be undertaken. These multifaceted outcomes will have a positive imprint and has notable impact in the philosophical arena especially in environmental ethical theories.

The debates began with the theoretical analysis of the terminology starting from G. E. Moore. We have already discussed how philosophers try to clarify the concept of intrinsic value- from consequentialists' perception and deontologists' perception as well. Being a consequentialist, as already been discussed, Moore's argument is to distinguish "good" from "duties" and "right" and "duties" and "right" are reducible to "good" – to a higher value which has been considered as intrinsic value. Furthermore, we have also examined Moore's argument that "duties" and moral rules are not direct matter of intuition rather they are objects of empirical investigation such that intuition does not reveal rightness and badness of specific actions, it only reveals what is good in themselves or as *ends to be perused*. The conception of good as intrinsic, therefore, is misunderstood such as the kind of impression that good is having some sense of right or wrong or some sense of aesthetic feeling like beauty or ugly which are subjective in nature. When Moore talks about the sense of intrinsic value he makes it clear that intrinsic nature is different from intrinsic properties and that intrinsic nature is objective. Moore's status regarding the intrinsic nature of a thing is ontological, that intrinsic value is trans-worldly valid and he is handling the problem directly without much emphasis on epistemic and linguistic antiquity. However, there are varieties of senses of the

conception of intrinsic value as Neill has introduced.¹¹¹ These senses of intrinsic value are used interchangeably and because of this, environmental ethics suffer from a conflation from these varieties of senses. We will concern here only the sense of intrinsic value that means having a sort of intrinsic properties. This means that value is used to refer to the value of an object which has merely because of its intrinsic properties. This concept is developed by G. E. Moore. The question about non-relational properties of intrinsic value may be undertaken in two different ways i.e. (i) the non-relational properties of an object are those that continue to be exist regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects. This view is considered as a concept of weak interpretation. (ii) The non-relational properties are those that can be characterized without reference to other objects and this is a concept of strong interpretation. Without humans the world might have some, but only insignificant value and hence Moore falls under the category of weak interpretation.¹¹² Again, to be 'objective' does not mean not subjective, in fact, people tend to argue for objectivity from the intrinsic nature, of those properties. Intrinsic nature, the '*internality*' as Moore coined, is something unique what distinguishes it from intrinsic properties, however, what is that something need to be elaborated to clarify the conception of intrinsic value in which Moore perhaps failed. When we talk about the intrinsic properties belonging to an object, we talk about the instrumental value of the object and this is significantly different from the intrinsic nature.

In the line of Moore, with certain differences, Chisholm defined intrinsic value in terms of *qualification* that makes value intrinsic. The bearers of intrinsic value, as Chisholm holds, are states of affairs, which qualify something as intrinsic. The state of affairs reflects all the good and evil that there is in the possible world. To say, *p* is intrinsically good is to say that *p*'s goodness does not require that there be some other good state of affair which neither includes *p* nor is included within *p*. Chisholm holds that the state of affairs is not "intrinsic nature" or "intrinsic properties", it is the possible world in which "intrinsic value states" reflect. What makes Chisholm treatment different from Moore is that 1) intrinsic value is relative to

¹¹¹ Neill, O' John, (1992), The Varieties of Intrinsic Value; The Monist, Vol. 75, No. 2; Oxford University Press, p. 119-137

¹¹² Moore, G. E, (1903), Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p 28.

a particular world and he restricts intrinsic value to the limits of possible world only
 2) intrinsic value reflects all good and evil in a possible world. So sum total of all good and evil are manifested in the *intrinsic value states* not in the transcendental world.

To examine the traditional approaches towards intrinsic value, as discussed so far, Lemos, in clarifying the concept of intrinsic value, criticizes that both Moore and Chisholm adopt an “isolation approach”¹¹³, even though they differ in some vital issues. Chisholm approach may be called as “intentionally isolationist” because it stresses the intentional attitude (*ethically fitting attitude of love, hate and preferability*) of considering and preparing state of affairs as such, in isolation from the inspection and ranking of other, wider states of affairs. We may contrast this form of isolation approach with what we may call “deontological isolation”¹¹⁴. Along with W. D. Ross, Moore suggests that “by calling a thing intrinsically good we mean that it would be good even if nothing else existed.”¹¹⁵ Lemos rejects this type of isolationism as adopted by Moore because there are certain sorts of things that are intrinsically good but simply could not be the only thing that exists. For example, Dhrupad is happy and that is intrinsically good. If there are certain abstract entities such as numbers or properties or states of affairs that necessarily exist, it would be impossible for Dhrupad’s being happy to be the only thing that exists. More important, though, is the fact that Dhrupad’s being happy could not exist without Dhrupad’s existence. At the same time it may be that Dhrupad’s having certain pleasures and certain desires satisfied and his having certain beliefs to the effect that he had those pleasures and that his desires were satisfied. It is to be noted, in spite of different approaches, that both Chisholm and Moore hold that if a thing has certain intrinsic value, then it must have that value whenever it occurs. As such Moore’s and Chisholm’s definitions of intrinsic value imply the thesis of universality. It would be penetrating to say that the definitions of intrinsic value as Moore and Chisholm have adopted, have the thesis of universality in terms of logical explication. If P’s being intrinsically better than Q is a

¹¹³Lemos, Noah M,(1994), *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 10

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 10

¹¹⁵ Moore, G. E, (1930), *Ethics*, p. 38; W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford University Press), p.73

matter of P and Q necessarily such that the inspection of both requires one to prefer P to Q, then P would be intrinsically better than Q whenever P and Q occur. Hence for both Dhrupad's being pleased is intrinsically better than Angshruta's being suffering, and the former will be always better than the latter whenever the two occur. This thesis of universality, however, has been challenged in many ways and we will consider this in the latter part of this chapter. Lemos, therefore, considers that intrinsic goodness and badness, and other related value concepts are explicated in terms of the notion of "ethical requirement."¹¹⁶ For him we can explicate intrinsic goodness and intrinsic badness, and other related value concepts, in terms of such concepts "being intrinsically worthy of love" and "being intrinsically worthy of hate." So being intrinsically good may be understood in terms of its being correct or fitting to love or like that thing in and so far itself for its own sake. It means, if a fact is intrinsically good, then the scrutiny of just that obtaining state of affairs requires that one not hate it in and for itself. To say that something is to be intrinsically good or intrinsically bad requires ethical attitudes like love, hate or preference. This explication leads Lemos to defend Chisholm's definition of intrinsic value and also defends that facts or states of affairs are the bearers of intrinsic value and at the same time rejects Moore's intrinsic properties. For Lemos, Moore's explication is such that there are intrinsic properties but do not exemplified in the possible world. For example "x is a property" and "it is possible that there is something that exemplifies x." This means that there are no properties that cannot be exemplified. Thus, although there is a property of being round and square, there is no property of being round and square together. However, there are also properties which can be the objects of certain intentional attitudes, which can be conceived, considered and attributed. There are also states of affairs, that exists but do not obtain, there are states of affairs that necessarily obtain and that necessarily do not obtain, there are states of affairs that is impossible, there is fact as a state of affairs that obtains and lastly there are states of affairs that can be the intentional attitudes.

¹¹⁶Lemos, Noah M,(1994), *Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant*, DePauw University , Cambridge university press, P. 12

To speak on Lemos reasonably, we find a serious problem when we consider intrinsic goodness or badness in terms of “ethically fitting” or “correct emotion.” Lemos suggests that intrinsic value, in the sense of something being valuable in and of itself, be explicated in terms of ethically “fitting” or “required” emotional attitudes of love, hate and preference. Lemos has taken this concept of intrinsic value from Brentano, Broad, Ewing and Chisholm. But a question arises, what is it about the “ethical fittingness” of love, hate or preference that makes something as intrinsic? While we may reasonably grant that emotional attitudes of love, hate and preference enable us to focus upon the intrinsic, it does not demonstrate us why intrinsically valuable “in and of itself”, is valuable. What makes that intrinsically valuable, valuable? It seems that we are given the tools to distill the intrinsically valuable from the instrumentally valuable from a set items that we know to have value, but we are left without the way to differentiate, from a group of items whose value status is unknown, which, if any, are intrinsically valuable. If something is intrinsically valuable in the sense of being valuable “in and of itself”, then by its very nature, its value cannot be explicated by reference to any relationship, let alone any attitudinal relationships- that it may have with persons. Central to the notion of something being intrinsically valuable “in and of itself” is that its value is thoroughly independent of any personal connections. Ethically fittingness explication leads us to a situation where we have only ordinary understanding of intrinsic value without making any difference it from instrumental value. To make it clear let’s refer again to instrumental value that we have discussed in the second chapter. We characterize instrumental value as that value an object has in virtue of its service to us. In a nutshell, an object has positive value or good, if it serves what we desire, and has negative value, or is bad, if it thwarts our desire. It is the service of the object that makes it valuable. This is why we have no difficulty of conceiving intrinsic value, different from instrumental value, that is, value as an end- as valuable, for it is simply that which satisfies or frustrates our desire for nothing other than itself. It is also unlikely that Emotivists’ conception of intrinsic value can be accepted as it inducts only human beings having it and also being subjective. In the same way, objectivists’ position is also questionable if it accepted such that evaluative properties of objects

are real properties of objects - evaluative properties exist independently of the evaluations of evaluators (humans). In this case, perhaps, Neill perception is clear and sound if embodied in the strong sense of intrinsic value i.e. the evaluative properties of objects can be characterized without reference to evaluating agents. Or we can say a real property is that which can be characterized without reference to the experiences of an individual. As per Neill analysis Moore's sense of intrinsic value cannot attribute intrinsic value to wilderness, because it commits a fallacy of equivocation. Neill's contention is strong in the when he states that an emotivist can express his joyous mood in saying "Wilderness exist after the extinction of human species". By this way, in fact, subjectivism can establish non-anthropocentrism by attributing intrinsic value to nature.

Jonathan O'Neill has isolated three distinct definitions of intrinsic value (O'Neill, 1992) while Dale Jamieson has isolated four in chapter three of his book "Ethics and the Environment: An Introduction" (Jamieson, 2008). For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I will address the three varieties of intrinsic value discussed by Sandler¹¹⁷. In formulating an environmental ethical theory one must be sensitive to these distinctions and be prepared to apply their preferred definition consistently. O'Neill identifies three senses of intrinsic value which are different from Sandler's. They are (1) "non-instrumental value", (2) "non-relational (Moorean) value" and (3) "objective value". O'Neill's second sense of intrinsic value, non-relational (Moorean) value defines intrinsic value as, value an object has solely in virtue of its 'intrinsic properties'. G.E. Moore believed that intrinsic properties were non-relational. (see O'Neill, 1992, p. 123). These properties come from the intrinsic nature of the object in question. The link between the thing's intrinsic value and its intrinsic property (ies) is immediate and does not depend on any relations between that entity and other things outside of it. Such relations might be, for example, those between the psychological states of valuers and the thing being valued. That is, this value can be characterized without reference to other objects and any of their states.

¹¹⁷Sandler, Ronald, (2012), "Intrinsic Value, Ecology, and Conservation", *Nature Education Knowledge*, 3: p.4.

Being the turning point of environmental ethics, the debates between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism is more crucial which dilutes the subjective-objective dichotomy. These debates are basically debates of Kantian and Moorean approaches towards environment, debates between *means* and *ends*. These tend us to whether nature should be preserved for *its own sake* or whether it is a pseudoscientific approach if they are applied to natural phenomena. The debates also enlarge from anthropogenic to biocentric or ecocentric forms. But so far as intrinsic value is concerned, even though they have their own status, all differ ontologically as well as epistemologically. Moore's argument is sound enough ontologically but without epistemic concern. Most of the philosophers who fall under biocentric and ecocentric domain maintain an egalitarian approach, adhering that nature needs to attribute intrinsic value to the flourishing of life in all its richness and complexity, having an obligation to protect nonhuman, having engagement with and care for nonhuman and others, and sometimes even to go beyond and grant universal moral consideration. Except to grant universal moral consideration, remaining views are more or less accepted here and there, universal moral consideration may create practical challenges. If we turn into the epistemic concern then perhaps Partridge argument is worthy when he says that justification of intrinsic worth of wilderness may be of the experiences of wilderness. When the debates about anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are gearing up, it has been stated that the central point of this bifurcation is because of the subjective/objective concern of intrinsic value. Anthropocentrism advocates subjective as well objective approaches and non-anthropocentrism advocates objective approaches. Any theory ascribing intrinsic value makes two claims as has been discussed so far i.e. (i) Nature is valuable because of what it is, not because of its relation to us. (ii) The value of nature is objective in the sense that it is not a matter of individual taste or personal preference.

To answer the question about epistemic concerns let us look into an epistemological aspect related to the objectivity of intrinsic value. When we say "how things are", we pursue a kind of objectivity and hereby tread on controversial

philosophical ground. There are three forms of realism which dwells on this issue.¹¹⁸ The Moderate Realism admits that something exists objectively, that is, logically and causally independent of someone's conceiving that thing. The Ordinary Realism advocates that the token of most ordinary psychological and physical types exist objectively. And the Scientific Realism proposes that the tokens of most scientific types exist objectively. Our concern in this context is the logical and causal independence of someone's conceiving a particular thing. This argument can help us in establishing that intrinsic value is objective without depending logically and causally on someone's conceiving of. To put bluntly about objectivity of intrinsic value, let us just talk of how that value is independently of what any conceiver takes to be. Some opponents of talk of objectivity of intrinsic value have overlooked an important distinction between (i) the conceiving dependence of one's conceiving of something, and (ii) the conceiving dependence of what one's conceiving represents. For example one's conceiving that 'X is wet' plainly represents 'X' is wet. It follows that one's conceiving of 'X is wet' depends on conceiving, but it does not follow that 'X is wet' depends on someone's conceiving. The same is applied in case of objectivity of intrinsic value. Some philosophers have questioned the intelligibility of any notion of objectivity of intrinsic value relying on a concept "how intrinsic value really is" or "how intrinsic value is independently conceived of". This group of philosophers often speaks on that the sterility of attempts to give sense to phrases like 'the world in itself' is completely unspecified and unspecifiable. For them conceiving existence of independent intrinsic value makes no sense. But the objectivity of intrinsic value is more than conceiving of. The epistemologists' concern basically is not the truth of objectivity of intrinsic value rather the kind of epistemic support available for it.

Most of our fundamental beliefs about intrinsic value are in direct conflict with the anticipated changes in environment/nature. This, in fact, is a big challenge in any discussion on intrinsic value. Thus, the debates on the concept and warrant of intrinsic value go right from the consequentialists' form to the deontologists'

¹¹⁸Moser, K Paul; (1999), Realism, Objectivity, Skepticism, *The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology*; Edited, Greco, J and Sora, E; Blackwell Publishers Inc, Malden, Massachusetts, p.71

structure that leads to the root of our basic thinking. In Environmental ethics ethicists have tendency to substitute our anthropocentric thinking with ecocentric thinking. Anthropocentric philosophy considers everything from the point of view of mankind, and the absolute right to pursue his fortune as he sees fit. The egocentric person thinks only of himself in a social context as opposed to an ecocentric philosophy, which advocates respect for all nature and all creatures' basic rights. This issue is at the very heart of philosophy and religious beliefs. European philosophy and Christianity is founded on anthropocentric concepts. However, philosophically speaking this is the anthropocentric thinking which was the driving force of the approach to life. There was little concern for nature and other creatures as equal partners. This is seconded in European philosophy by our Greek heritage. This started with the sophistic thinking, which took its starting point in the human being and his ability to think as opposed to a competing concept of the human being in an all-embracing cosmos. From this developed the roots of logic and scientific thinking. In this regard, environmentalists in particular are antagonistic to Descartes, for his statement: "Cogito ergo sum". Everything starts with man and his ability to think. All values, all concepts are derived from man. It is thought provoking that the most basic and scientifically fundamental considerations of the renaissance were devoted to something as "useless" as astronomy. Galileo Galilei proved that the earth circled the sun and not the other way around and was condemned by the Church. He introduced experiments and applied mathematics, further developed by Isaac Newton, Pierre de Fermat, G. W. Leibniz and many others to follow. Science became one of the pillars in European philosophy and formed the basis for the industrial revolution of the last century. In this context, the result was the western concept to conquer the world-not only the world in a geographical sense, but also in the sense of mastering the universe. Man can shape his own destiny without constraints. This anthropocentric attitude is quite understandable in view of what has been achieved. But that becomes one sided doctrine and has equally (rather more strongly) been criticized. The antipode to anthropocentric thinking is frequently associated with philosophers like Arne Neass, Homes Rolstom III and many others which have already discussed in chapter three. In Indian philosophy, man is intermingled with nature and must live in

harmony with it. The spirits are the nature in all forms. However, in both the theories it is assumed that environmental ethics is grounded by intrinsic value.

Now the prime question of importance in environmental ethics is whether intrinsic value can be ascribed beyond sentient beings that too in equal degree? In this context what I try to forward the idea of Peter Singer about the moral disagreement referring to the kinds of beings ought to be considered in our moral deliberations. To extent an ethic beyond sentient beings is a difficult task. Sentient creatures have wants and desires. In reaching moral decisions affecting sentient creatures, we can attempt to add up the different actions on all the sentient creatures affected by the alternative actions open to us. This will provide us at least some guidelines to take a moral decision like what might be the right thing to do. But there is nothing that corresponds to what it is like to be a tree dying because its roots have been flooded. Once we abandon the interests of the sentient creatures as our source of value, where do we find value? What is good or bad for non-sentient creatures, and why does it matter? Therefore, limiting ourselves only to living things is not too difficult to answer.

Some may argue, however, that a person can still believe that they have moral obligations to protect the environment for anthropocentrically-oriented utilitarian reasons. But many environmentalists think that utilitarian reasons of that kind are not enough of a warrant for real moral obligations to protect the environment. For instance, a biocentrist thinks that *all* living organisms are due moral consideration. But since at least some organisms do not appear to have any substantial utilitarian value for human beings, most biocentrists think that anthropocentric utilitarian concerns aren't enough of a warrant for the protection of all of life either. However, should it turn out that *all* living organisms have at least some utilitarian value; an instrumentalist could claim that we would have an obligation to protect them as one would protect a useful instrument. Under those conditions a person could embrace an instrumentalist take on value and also be a biocentrist.

Arguments have also been produced that there is something "flourishing as good in itself", we may refer to Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor's 'reverence of life' and 'pursuing its own good in its own unique way' respectively. To defend both

Schweitzer and Taylor is difficult in the sense that rather arguing literally, they use metaphorical language. It seems, therefore, that the way they arguing is spiritual than epistemic. It is, of course possible to give a physical explanation of what is happening about tree, rivers etc. in absence of their consciousness and we may have respect towards wilderness or the ecosystem but at the same time it is also argued that they will not be equally treated having value as such sentient beings have.

To absorb the debates whether intrinsic value in nature depends on human's perspective or it is independent of human judgment, ethicists have diverse opinions as has been discussed so far. Broadly speaking non-anthropocentrism has two basic forms i.e. ecocentrism and biocentricism. These two forms focus many questions of environmental issues. Non-anthropocentrism in ethics is basically the claim that there are things beside human beings and their states such as living organisms, species, or ecosystems that have intrinsic value.

There are two basic positions within biocentrism, (1) Biocentric individualism and (2) Biocentric Holism. Biocentric individualism claims that *individual living organisms* are directly morally considerable. Biocentric holism, on the other hand, claims that groups of individual organisms, most notably *species*, are the objects of direct moral consideration. A species is a collective unit of individual living organisms that typically are reproductively isolated.¹¹⁹

A biocentrist could embrace individualism, holism or both. An ecocentrist claims that entities above and beyond mere individual biological organisms and species have value. For the ecocentrist, the domain of value should encompass ecosystems, communities, and habitats, etc. A community is an association of different species of individual organisms that usually inhabit a common location or habitat. A habitat includes both biotic *and* abiotic factors which vary on the basis of things like soil type, vegetation type, salinity, altitude, availability of water, climate, temperature, etc. Another somewhat perplexing aspect of the distinction between biocentrism and ecocentrism lies in differences over what it means for something to be "alive". For many ecocentrists the land, habitats and ecosystems themselves simply

¹¹⁹B.G.Norton *The Preservation of Species: The Value of Biological Diversity*, 1986, Princeton University Press.

are alive just as much as individual organisms are. This claim, however, is quite controversial and not universally accepted.

Given that specific habitats are often home to specific organisms, most biocentrists have an interest in habitat protection as well. They do not see biological interests as being all that separate from ecological or ecosystem-level interests.¹²⁰ Respect for the organism means respecting its habitat and surroundings. Also, the dividing line between biocentrism and ecocentrism is not precisely clear cut. An individual animal can also serve as a host to a number of other species that live either in it or on it. So, is the animal in question an ecosystem? Or is it a single biological organism?¹²¹ A deep ecologist stress human's place in an interconnected web of ecological relations and of human's oneness with nature.¹²² Gaia theorists think that the Earth itself is one living organism with perhaps its own consciousness and one of the key figures in Gaia theory is James Lovelock.¹²³

Environmentalists are concerned with what *kind* of value that living organisms, species, and ecosystems possess. Many of them maintain that the kind of value they have is *intrinsic*. Biocentrists, for example believe that life has intrinsic value while many ecocentrists believe that ecosystems have such value. Some may even go so far as to claim that the universe as a whole is an object of value.¹²⁴ Also, Mark Lupisella, a NASA scientist, has argued that the cosmocentric perspective might also serve us well in the endeavor to communicate with extraterrestrial life forms. Both humans and extraterrestrials could communicate over something they value in common, namely our "ultimate shared cosmic origins".¹²⁵

¹²⁰To that end see, Philip Carafo's discussion of the connection between the preservation of species and preservation of habitat or communities in "For a Grounded Conception of Wilderness and More Wilderness on the Ground", *Ethics and the Environment*, 2001, 6:1-17

¹²¹For this view see Aldo Leopold's "The Land Ethic" in *A Sand County Almanac*. Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess and George Sessions also hold this view.

¹²²The term "Deep Ecology" was first coined by Arne Naess (1973) in "The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movement", *Inquiry*, 16:95-100.

¹²³ For an interesting discussion on the connection between Gaia theory and environmental ethics see Anthony Weston's (1987) "Forms of Gaian Ethics", *Environmental Ethics*, 9:217-230.

¹²⁴ Frank Lunger defends the intrinsic moral value of the cosmos in "Anthropocentrism vs. Cosmocentrism: Groping Towards a Paradigm Shift", *The Newsletter of the Philosophical Discussion Group of British Mensa*, 2000, 102, (<http://theotodman.com/c10208.htm>).

¹²⁵See M.L. Lupisella, "Cosmocentrism and the Active Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence", *Astrobiology Science Conference*, 2010.

One of the motivating reasons for the biocentrist's endorsement of the claim that living organisms have intrinsic value is that they feel that a proper attitude of respect for nature should move us away from construing things such as non-human living organisms as being only instrumentally valuable for human purposes. Thinking that nature has such value also encourages movement away from radically subjectivist notions of what has value ("I know that *you* think that butterflies are non-instrumentally valuable, but that's just your opinion from your perspective!"). Embracing nature's intrinsic value moves us towards an attitude of evaluation that considers nature and the objects found in nature as morally valuable regardless of how useful or instrumental they might be for us and regardless of whether they happens to be valued merely on the basis some individual's personal opinion. Intrinsic value is usually put in contrast with either radically subjective views of value or strictly instrumentalist value for human beings. Environmentalists think that we should move away from thinking that the natural world only has these kinds of value. First, environmentalists think that if we continue to believe that nonhumans, species or ecosystems only have instrumental value then we will not have the proper attitude about the environment that we should. Instead of regarding nature as a mere collection of useful instruments, we should regard it as being good in itself. For example, the biocentrist thinks that *all* organisms are valuable, not just the ones that happen to be useful to *Homo sapiens*. They think that a person who believes that all nonhuman moral value is merely instrumental doesn't really have any good reason (apart from those instrumental values themselves) to adequately respect living things that aren't useful for us.

Second, many environmentalists want to avoid radically subjective views about the value of the natural world. They think that if environmental value should turn out to be just a matter of personal preference or opinion, then there wouldn't be any objectively right or wrong answer as to what our moral obligations are towards nature. For instance, should a person choose to regard the red-cockaded woodpecker to be without moral value (as a result of her own personal taste) then that person isn't necessarily committing any moral oversight by having that preference or of thinking

that she had no moral obligations toward that species or an individual of that species. Consequently such a person's ethical view cannot be criticized as inadequate. Her view of the moral status of the bird is simply different from, but not inferior to, the biocentrist's view. And since no one preference is inherently better than any other, a preference for non-biocentrism isn't necessarily wrong or inferior to biocentrism according to this type of subjectivism. Holmes Rolston III, a significant contributor to environmental ethics, has argued that this kind of subjectivity in environmental ethics must be challenged. He writes, "With the environmental turn, so surprising and pressing in the final quarter of our century, [this] subjectivism in values needs review..."¹²⁶ Rolston is wary about the prospect that subjectivism may hold for an environmental ethic. He believes "value is (in part) provided objectively in nature". But he also holds that "value arises only as a product of subjective experience, albeit relationally in nature..."¹²⁷ Rolston claims that the objective properties in nature bring about in a perceiver the (admittedly) subjective experience of morally valuing the thing perceived. While some environmental philosophers may want to claim that this view is ultimately a form of value subjectivism, Rolston maintains that it can still avoid a subjectivist meta-ethic.

Some may argue, however, that a person can still believe that they have moral obligations to protect the environment for anthropocentrically-oriented utilitarian reasons. But many environmentalists think that utilitarian reasons of that kind are not enough of a warrant for real moral obligations to protect the environment. For instance, a biocentrist thinks that *all* living organisms are due moral consideration. But since at least some organisms do not appear to have any substantial utilitarian value for human beings, most biocentrists think that anthropocentric utilitarian concerns aren't enough of a warrant for the protection of all of life either. However, should it turn out that *all* living organisms have at least some utilitarian value, an instrumentalist could claim that we would have an obligation to protect them as one would protect a useful instrument. Under those conditions a person could embrace an instrumentalist take on value and also be a biocentrism.

¹²⁶Rolston, Holmes III (1982). "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" *Environmental Ethics*, 4: 125-151, p. 126.

¹²⁷Ibid, p. 144).

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