WORLD, MIND AND LANGUAGE-A WITTGENSTEINIAN STUDY

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis entitled **"World, Mind and Language- A Wittgensteinian**

Study" is an original research work carried out by Nazneen Ahmed for the degree of Doctor

of Philosophy under my supervision and guidance in Gauhati University. The thesis has not

been submitted to any university or institution for the award of any degree or diploma.

The candidate has fulfilled all the requirements for submission of Ph.D. thesis as laid down in

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DECLARATION

I, Nazneen Ahmed, bearing Enrolment No. Phil/01/14, dated 30-04-2014, solemnly declare that the subject matter of the thesis entitled 'World, Mind and Language- A Wittgensteinian Study' is the outcome of my own research work which has been carried out under the supervision of Professor Begum Bilkis Banu, Department of Philosophy, Gauhati University. I further declare that this thesis as a whole or any part thereof has not been submitted to any university or any institution for the award of any degree or diploma to the best of my knowledge.

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CONTENTS

1.1 AN OVERIEW OF WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY:

Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria. He dominates the analytic philosophy of the Twentieth century. Analytic philosophy is essentially connected with linguistic analysis. Philosophical problems are solved by looking into the workings of our language and this view is known as the linguistic turn. Linguistic turn can be divided into two phases. The first phase is related with analysis of language which is called Formal language. It consists of symbolic or Logically Perfect Language. The second phase is related with analysis of ordinary or natural language. It is our everyday language. Considering this two phases of language, philosophers are also divided into two groups. The first group which deals with formal language is followed by philosophers like Russell, Frege, early Wittgenstein, and many other logical positivists such as Schlick, Carnap etc. The other group which deals with ordinary languages includes philosophers like later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Strawson, Austin etc. Let us have a glimpse of Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy in the discussion below.

1.2 WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY:

Wittgenstein as an analytic philosopher put emphasis on philosophy of language. He completed two great works which seems opposite to each other. They are *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and *Philosophical Investigations*. Although these two works were different in their view still we can find certain similarities between them. In his early philosophy, Wittgenstein has completed *Tractatus* in 1921. At that time Wittgenstein's main concern was with representation of language, nature of thought and logic. However,

Tractatus also has the background of the inexpressible, the mystical, and the transcendental. It has a central thesis which is mainly dedicated to language and world. However, this book occupies a very little space for the disciplines like ethics, aesthetics, and religion. There are also few hints about solipsism, realism, idealism etc. These are the important issues of philosophy. Though these issues were not discussed in details yet the views which Wittgenstein shared about them speaks in volumes in *Tractatus*.

LOGICAL ATOMISM:

Logical atomism was a leading movement in the 20th century. Both Wittgenstein and Russell developed the view of logical atomism. Though both the views were different yet there were certain similarities between them. Russell's view of logical atomism is to be found in his work, *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (1956). Though Wittgenstein never used the term 'logical atomism' but still his views were atomist in spirit. His views are being found in *Tractatus* which are as follows:

1. "Every proposition has unique final analysis which reveals it to be a truth function of elementary propositions." (TLP 3.25, 4.221, 4.51, and 5)

2. "These elementary proposition asserts the existence of atomic states of affairs." (TLP 3.25, 4.21)

3. "Elementary propositions are mutually independent- each one can be true or false independently of truth or falsity of the others." (TLP 4.211, 5.134)

4. "Elementary propositions are immediate combinations of semantically simple symbols or names."(TLP 4.221)

5. "Names refer to items wholly devoid of complexity, so called objects." (TLP 2.02, 3.22)

6. "Atomic states of affairs are combinations of these objects." (TLP 2.011)

These are some of the example of Logical Atomism present in the *Tractatus*. Though these statements appear to be atomist in spirit yet Wittgenstein never called it to be of "Logical Atomism". It was Russell who introduced "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" as being concerned with explaining certain ideas which he has learnt from his friend and former pupil Wittgenstein. After his statement logical atomism was eventually got connected with Wittgenstein. However, Wittgenstein also believed in this theory as we can see from the above examples, and also advocated logical analysis of complex into ultimate simples.

LOGICALLY PERFECT LANGUAGE:

His early philosophy is closely connected with a 'Logically Perfect Language'. Wittgenstein did not advocate 'Logically Perfect Language'. Instead for him, ordinary language has ability to picture the world. However, ordinary language must be governed by logical syntax to picture the world perfectly. If one glance through *Tractatus* from its very first section to the last section of the book then it appears that the book is almost devoted to show the articulateness of proposition, their varieties, forms, contents etc. However, Wittgenstein's idea of propositions or language was found through the idea of the world which lies outside of the propositions. It can be seen in the very first statement of the *Tractatus* "The world is all that is the case."[1] Thus, Wittgenstein's approach to the philosophy of language is clearly depended upon his philosophy of world. Wittgensteinian world is regarded to be a transcendental presupposition of language. We cannot know the essential features of language unless we understand the essential features of the world. Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* was also concerned with essence of language.

3

He believed that language mirrors or represents the world and there is a logical form shared by both language and world which is the essence of language. However, in our ordinary language this essence is hidden. Therefore, our everyday language or language which we use in our daily life must be made clear so that its essence may become visible. In the *Philosophical Remarks* also Wittgenstein wrote,

"The essence of language is the picture of the essence of the world"[2].

It is the essence of language which can only picture the essence of the world.

Many of the ideas in the *Tractatus* were influenced from the philosopher-scientist Boltzmann and Hertz. Hertz talked about his views of analytic dissolution of conceptual confusion. Wittgenstein acquired the idea of philosophical elimination of pseudo problems from him. Many ideas of Boltzmann also influenced Wittgenstein. Boltzmann wrote,

"if …philosophy were to succeed in creating a system such that in all cases mentioned it stood out clearly when a question is not justified so that the drive towards asking it would gradually die away, we should at one stroke have resolved the most obscure riddles and philosophy would become worthy of the name of queen of sciences."[3]

This thought is reflected in *Tractatus* at the section 4.003, Wittgenstein wrote,

"Most of the propositions and questions found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to the questions of this kind but can only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from failure to understand the logic of our language."[4]

Thus, many ideas of *Tractatus* were reflections of the ideas of Hertz and Boltzmann. Through these ideas, Wittgenstein tried to show that philosophical questions are strictly nonsensical and we only have to concentrate on the logical structure of any possible language.

Wittgenstein was also influenced by Frege and Russell's view of 'Logically Perfect Language'. Frege did not believe in the traditional logic of natural language with the subject-predicate grammar; therefore he invented modern function theoretic logic. But he was not interested in analysis of natural language instead he tried to create 'Logically Perfect Language' which would replace them. Frege thought that he can beat the defects of natural language by his improved language which he called 'Concept Script'. He discarded natural language because it is logically rigorous and vague. Therefore, he moved to 'Concept Script'. Wittgenstein was attracted by this theory of Frege. Like Frege, Russell also had a similar goal but with a wider view and philosophical interest. His 'Theory of Description' tried to show the line between deceptive grammar form and logical form. The 'Theory of Description' put emphasis upon analysis of ideas on strict logical basis. Wittgenstein was attracted by what Russell calls 'the chief part of philosophical logic'[5] namely the discussions of the indefinable. His interest focused on the nature of symbolism of new logic what corresponds to natural languages on the one hand and the world on the other.

PHILOSOPHY AND ILLUSION:

In the preface of *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein made clear that the main aim of *Tractatus* is that it deals with "the problems of philosophy"[6]. He tried to explain the reason that the problems of philosophy occur due to misunderstanding the logic of our language.

However, once we understand the logic of our language the problem will disappeared because they are not genuine problems but they are only the product of illusion. Wittgenstein wrote in section 4.002 in *Tractatus,*

> "Language disguises thought so much so that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of thought beneath it, because the outward form of clothing is not design to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purpose."[7]

According to Wittgenstein, it is very difficult to understand what logic is underlying beneath our everyday language as the ordinary language does not reveal its logical structure. We may not know that we are not using the proper structure of language inspite of our ability to speak. "This makes every sort of illusion and confusion possible."[8]

According to Wittgenstein, it is the gap between the appearance and the reality that creates problems of philosophy. However, we can have the clarity through the use of an adequate sign language governed by logical syntax. The language we find in the philosophy of Russell and Frege were such languages. However, Wittgenstein believed such conditions must be fulfilled by any language because every language is and must be logically perfect. Natural language has the capacity of expressing every sense. For this reason, Wittgenstein regarded language to picture the world. He never avoided the natural language instead tried to analyze the natural language and tried to unravel the logic beneath it.

However, Wittgenstein never made clear what specific philosophical error arises out of the misleading surface of language and is to be removed by a proper conceptual notation. Philosophy is full of fundamental confusion. There are certain questions which cannot be

answered and if we try to answer such question then we fall into the trap of nonsense. In other words, most of the questions, which arise in philosophy, are nonsense and any attempt to answer to those questions is nonsense too. This is because of our failure to understand the logic of our language. These pseudo-questions are similar to the question, "Is the good more or less identical than the beautiful?" According to Wittgenstein, the aim of philosophy is not to answer such questions but to show that it is nonsense.

PHILOSOPHY IS A CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE:

According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is a critique of language. Its task is not to describe the general truth about the world; it is the task of physics. Its task is also not to study the human mind which is the task of psychology. The aim of philosophy is not to find new knowledge but to guide or to show the true logical point which is there in philosophy itself.

According to Wittgenstein, a critique is an investigation into the limits of a subject. He holds that, there is a limit of what can be thought which can be represented in language. However, what lies beyond those limits cannot be talked of or thought of. Wittgenstein wrote,

"To set a limit to thought, or rather- not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)."[9]

According to Wittgenstein, the limits of what can be thought of are set in language, the totality of true propositions constitute the thinkable. Natural science is believed to be the whole of true propositions. However, philosophy in trying to show the limit of language sets limits to the sphere of possible knowledge. Moreover, there are questions in ethics

and aesthetics which lie beyond the boundary of language, for example, the questions like "Does God exist?" Or "Does we possess soul?" According to Wittgenstein, such questions can be answered only if the totality of propositions encompasses any proposition about God and soul. He believed that knowledge has no room for silence. The description of limit of language lies beyond the realm of what can be said. He holds that, philosophy propounds no doctrines, constructs no theories, attain no knowledge. He regarded philosophy as an activity of logical clarification and its task is to eliminate misunderstandings, resolves unclarities and dissolves philosophical problem arising out of ordinary language through analysis.

THE METAPHYSIC OF TRACTATUS: WORLD, LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT:

The metaphysic of the *Tractatus* involves the relation between world, language and thought. Wittgenstein tried to analyze the relation between them and tried to show how they are connected. He regarded the world to be totality of facts. There is nothing in the world which can be outside of facts. Every factis independent of each other. The totality of facts constitutes the world on one hand and the totality of all propositions constitutes language on the other. Wittgenstein holds that there is an isomorphic relation between language and world. In other words, according to Wittgenstein, language mirrors the world.

Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* also holds that thinking and language are the same. He regarded thought to be just like a proposition. In a letter to Russell in 1919, Wittgenstein states that, "a thought is a fact". It does not consist of words but of psychical constituents which corresponds to words and have the same sort of relation to world as words. But what these constituents are, he wrote," he does not know."[10] Thus, in the metaphysics of Wittgenstein

world, language, and thought, stand in the same line and all the three are equivalent to each other. In the *Investigations* also he quoted the same, he wrote, "Proposition, language, thought and world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each other"[11]

ETHICS AND AESTHETICS:

Ethics and Aesthetics were developed in the last section of the *Tractatus*. It has very small part in the *Tractatus*, they appeared as scattered remarks on various disconnected topics.

Wittgenstein has talked about the concept of the World as Will or the Willing Subject. The qualities like goodness and badness belong to the willing subject. The Willing Subject is not the part of the world, in fact, it presupposes the world. The Ethics in the *Tractatus* is rather simple, "What good and evil is essentially the I, not the World" But the question arises what is 'good' and 'evil' mean according to Wittgenstein. In the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein wrote, "Simply the happy life is good, the unhappy bad" or "I am either happy or unhappy that is all". For Wittgenstein, good or evil does not exist. There is one categorical imperative "Live happily".

The good is happiness. This concept of happiness is influenced by Schopenhauerian ideas. Wittgenstein wrote,

> "In order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that is what being happy means".

Wittgenstein believes that the world of happiness is different from the world of unhappiness. Wittgenstein developed a tautological theory of reward and punishment as the first law of Ethical theory.

> "There must be indeed some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment; they must reside in the action itself." (Tractatus Logico Philosophical sec6.422)

The reward, according Wittgenstein, is something good or pleasant and punishment is something evil or unpleasant. Sin is its own punishment; likewise, merit is its own reward. Since the only sin is to be unhappy, the sinner is punished by its sin. The sinner lives in an unhappy world as a result of his own action.

In the verse 6.421 of the *Tractatus* it is stated that "Ethics and Aesthetics are one". There is a very little difference between Ethics and Aesthetic in *Tractatus*. It is said that Ethics is the theory that how man's life should be conducted. A person should live a happy life and look at the world with a happy eye. It is because the world cannot be changed one must be change his attitude and try to adapt with the world. This is exactly the role of art: "Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, which it looks at the world with a happy eye?" Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the end of art is beautiful and beautiful is what makes happy. In this way Wittgenstein tried to show that Ethics and Aesthetics are same.

1.3 THE MIDDLE PERIOD: THE TRANSITION:

The middle period is considered to be that stage of Wittgenstein philosophy where his views have gone through a drastic change. It is between 1929 and 1933, Wittgenstein's ideas have gone through many modifications and the result was a new conception of language and also new philosophy. During this period, many ideas of the *Tractatus* were

employed but they were used in a different and modified context. The middle period is important for interpreting the later work, especially the *Philosophical Investigations* because some of the major ideas found in his later philosophy were developed during this period.

The initial phase where Wittgenstein showed dissatisfaction with his logical atomism found in *Tractatus* emerged during 1929 in the article *Some Remarks on Logical Form*. However, in 1933, he disowned it with a letter to the journal *Mind.* The Second phase of dismantling logical atomism appears to be more important because it was dismantling with his conception of logical analysis which was an important tool in the *Tractatus*. He regarded the fundamental error of *Tractatus* was as being that of dogmatism. In the *Tractatus,* the task of logical analysis had been to uncover logical form hidden by natural language. Wittgenstein offered some of the views regarding his ideas about logical analysis.

> "Formerly, I myself spoke of a 'complete analysis' and I used to believe that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of propositions so as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all possibilities of misunderstanding. I spoke as if there was a calculus in which such a dissection would be possible. I vaguely had in mind something like the definition that Russell had given for the definite article…"[12]

He began to question his own conception of logical analysis. One side of his criticism may be that he had carried his concept of logical analysis far enough provided the idea that it was possible to specify things that were not yet known. Thus, Wittgenstein came to question his own views in *Tractatus*.

His major works which has influence upon *Philosophical Investigations* were *Philosophical Remarks* (1929), *Philosophical Grammar* (1931), *The Blue and The Brown Books* (1933-1936). All these works were to be found in the middle period. Ideas of these works were reflected in *Philosophical Investigations*.

The *Philosophical Remarks* was composed from a number of typescripts of Wittgenstein. The *Big Typescript* 1933 was a masterpiece which is based upon some of the manuscript of Wittgenstein. It is composed of 768 pages with an annotated table of contents. This work reflects his later views on philosophy of language, meaning and intentionality. The *Philosophical Grammar* was also composed from the sections of the *Big Typescript* and Wittgenstein's first two revision of it. Wittgenstein's view was almost changed by the time the *Big Typescript* was composed. However, as soon as it was finished Wittgenstein became dissatisfied with its views and again tried to revise it. The final revision of the *Big Typescript* has many similarities with the *Blue* and the *Brown books*. It also has similar views with the *Investigations*; more than 200 of its views were there in the *Investigations*. *The Blue and the Brown books* were the notes which Wittgenstein dictated to five of his students in Cambridge in 1933-34 and 1934-36 respectively. This was the important stage in the development of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and also regarded to be a new start in the philosophy of mind which later became one of the major topics of his philosophy.

1.4   WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY:

After revising the views of *Tractatus* Wittgenstein tried to focus on a new conception of language, of linguistic meaning and on a new relationship between the world and language. However, in his later philosophy, the view of linguistic meaning is also related with ideas of understanding, intending, thinking etc. Wittgenstein tried to develop a new

method to explain these ideas. His new method also led to a new philosophy which is different from his earlier philosophy advocated in *Tractatus*.

His efforts were successful in composing a book with his new ideas as a basis in the development of *Philosophical Investigations*. The book consists of two parts. The part I of the book was completed in 1945-6. The part II also consists of an interesting series of fragmentary observations written down after the main part of the work in 1947-9. The whole book is considered to be a masterpiece of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Although there is some continuity of ideas with that of his earlier views yet it has a huge contrast with the *Tractatus*. P.M.S Hacker comparing *Tractatus* and *Investigations* states that,

> "Where Tractatus strove for a sublime insight into the language independent essences of things; the Investigations proceeded by a quiet weighing of linguistic facts in order to disentangle knots in our understanding. The Tractatus was possessed by a vision of the crystalline purity of the logical forms of thought, language, and the world, the Investigations was imbued with a sharpened awareness of the motley of language, the deceptive forms of which lead us into confusion. The Tractatus advocated conceptual geology, hoping to disclose the ineffable essences of things by depth analysis of language; the Investigations practiced conceptual topography, aiming to dissolve philosophical problems by a patient description of familiar linguistic facts. The Tractatus was the culmination of a tradition in Western philosophy. The Investigations is virtually without precedent in the history of thought."[13]

Thus, his transition from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations* we can see many developments from searching for essence of language in *Tractatus* into the clarification of conceptual confusion through the grammar of language in the *Investigations*.

LANGUAGE GAMES: AN ACTIVITY AND PRACTICE:

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language has gone through a many transformations. He no longer believes in the ultimate calculus of language or language has any hidden essence to be revealed. He believed that language is misinterpreted to be conceived as calculus of rules. It is instead a variety of language games. Language is governed by rules just like games are governed by rules. Using different sentences in language is similar to making moves in different games. Language can be compared to games because the use of language is connected with the lives, activities and practices of the user and it constitute a part in their form of life. In a language games all our actions are involved in using language therefore a language game embodies a form of activity or form of life. A form of language represents a form of behaviour. It also represents certain conventions which follow from certain behaviour. Language is nothing but motley of language games with multidimensional forms. Wittgenstein wrote,

> "Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses"[14]

According to Wittgenstein, language consists to be in a continuous evolution. Language changes with time and therefore we do not have a fixed form of our language. New language games come into being in course of time and sometimes old language games

gets obsolete. Thus language, according to Wittgenstein, is a social phenomenon. It is concerned with life and activity of human beings. It is as natural as other activities like walking, eating, drinking etc. Wittgenstein wrote, "Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting are as much as part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing."[15] Thus, language is present in the very life of human beings just as other activities. It the life of human beings, which stands as the ultimate ground that gives language its unity and significance.

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND:

Wittgenstein challenged the traditional conception of mind as inner which can be known only by introspections, he also challenged the various ideas: the idea that to say how things are with us inwardly is a kind of self knowledge, the idea that voluntary actions are caused by the act of will, idea that human behaviour are just bodily movements, and at last Cartesian views of the self which led us to think that psychological expressions are names of inner process or states. Wittgenstein tried to clarify these ideas and give us a proper understanding of their categorical differentiation and uses in language.

Wittgenstein does not regard the psychological expression to be the names of entities which are observable only by the subject or the avowals of the inner are not descriptions of something visible only to the subject privately. Wittgenstein advocated 'the private-language argument' to show these misconceptions. The notion of privacy which is related to Cartesian and empiricist concept of the mind is also, according to Wittgenstein, misconceived. Wittgenstein through various examples and illustrations tried to figure out all these misconceptions.

15

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR:

Wittgenstein argued that thought and knowledge can only be ascribable to a creature which can express it through behaviour. Wittgenstein believes that the limits of thought and knowledge are the limits of possible expressions of thought and knowledge. It is only sensible to ascribe thought, knowledge, memory, belief etc only to the creature which can express them into its behaviour. It is the behaviour of a creature which constitutes the criteria for such ascriptions. We cannot ascribe knowledge or belief to the behaviour of a dog involving a determinate temporal reference because the behaviour of a dog cannot constitute such criteria. For example: A dog can expect the arrival of its owner but a dog cannot expect its owner to come on Monday. It is the linguistic behaviour, involving the use of language of temporal reference, which forms the important criteria for ascribing to a creature knowledge, thought, belief, memory etc. of past, present or future.

The possession of language helps the intellect to think not only about here and now but also now and thus and so and of an indefinite variety. However, we can ascribe to higher animals "thinking" or "thought". We can also try to explain certain animal's behaviour by attributing to it a reason for its actions. But we cannot go further than that. Even if we try to say that the animal had a reason for thinking such and such, but a large part of the essential role of reasons for thinking and believing cannot be fulfilled in case of non-language using animals. Therefore, it is in case of human beings only we can apply reason for its thinking and believing.

Thus, the linguistic behaviour of human beings are understood and interpreted in a way in which behaviors of inanimate nature and much of animal behaviour cannot do so. The

language of man has meaning which is to be understood by reference to the rules of language.

ETHICS AND AESTHETICS:

Wittgenstein's Ethics can be seen in his views relating to culture. For Wittgenstein, culture is something which includes moralities and decorum of the society. It comprises of religion, ethics, language and its rules with that of the world. For Wittgenstein, 'culture' and 'ethics' are inseparable. He believes that culture is a whole where each part has a specific role and its role is evaluated on the ground of its contribution to complete the whole. Regarding 'culture' and 'civilization' Wittgenstein says,

"A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise...I realize then that disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this value…"

Thus, Wittgenstein's notion of 'culture' includes the different aspects i.e. ethics, religion, language, values, and world and so on.

Wittgenstein regarded 'culture' as its 'ethics'. Values for Wittgenstein, has a transcendental significance. He believes that values live inside and outside of the world at the same time. Wittgenstein wrote, "What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up to my ethics. Only something supernatural can express the supernatural." He also relates 'ethics' with 'religion' and 'aesthetic' and added a different notion to values. He believes that though values have transcendental significance still it is regarded to be a part of the society or the world. However, Wittgenstein did not regard values to

17

be absolute instead he regarded it to be relative and instrumental. In his *Lectures on Ethics* Wittgenstein compares various instrumental and relative values and states there are only relative good and relative value concerning fact stating proposition. As such, there is no sense of talking about the absoluteness of values because it will imply that such values will be necessary and binding like statements of science.

Ethics, for Wittgenstein, is not an enquiry into the good; it is rather an enquiry into the meaning of life. Wittgenstein goes against the traditional absolutism and brought ethics into the reality of life. According to him, through misuse of language, we can see that the elements in 'ethics' and 'religion' to be totally nonsensical claims about life and beyond. Wittgenstein holds that, language games come to define what approach we should take into consideration while understanding the reality around us. Language games are the major contribution of Wittgenstein towards philosophy of language; they are to be regarded as the tools through which various perspectives upon reality can be made. Language games depicts various forms of life which are nothing but varied activities performed by people of different community throughout their life which can be apprehended by their practice of different language games. Within Language games of ethics, the basic building blocks are values. These values are also relative to other constituents of that language game. However, outside the language game these values have transcendental existence. Although these are not, used in other discipline, still these do not lose the ontological reality on that account. Through language game, Wittgenstein also tried to maintained simultaneous, relative and transcendental aspect of values.

The inexpressibility, thus, implies that it is not possible to define values with respect to objective facts which are there in the world. Values, like language can only be shown and cannot be said. For this reason, Wittgenstein kept on stating in *Tractatus* that, "What

cannot be said must pass over to silence". Ethics is something which cannot be spoken

directly like science. It can at best provide metaphors or similes which can point to higher

truths but those cannot be analyzed like the scientific facts.

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CHAPTER II

WORLD AND LANGUAGE IN TRACTATUS

2.1   INTRODUTION:

Wittgenstein played a central role in 20th century Analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's philosophy has influence upon many areas like 'logic and language', 'perception and intention', 'ethic and religion', 'aesthetics and culture'. However, his primary concern in his early philosophy was logic language and its relation to the world. In *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein attempted to apply logic to metaphysics through language. He attempted to show that there is a relation between thought, language and reality. According to him," there is a common essence underlying all languages." But in his later philosophy which is mainly recognized with his book *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein criticized all of his earlier views regarding the entire conclusion which he found in *Tractatus*. Though, Wittgenstein himself criticizes his ideas of *Tractatus* in his later philosophy, yet it has not lost its importance.

Wittgenstein always regarded philosophy as the "critique of language"[1] and tries to relate all philosophical problems with "our failure to understand the logic of our language"[2]. It can therefore be said that, any development in his view of the world and mind is ultimately to be traceable from the developments in his view of language. Therefore, it is through language we can achieve clarified understanding of the ideas of world and mind.

2.2 TRACTATUS LOGICO PHILOSOPHICUS:

Wittgenstein early philosophy is to be found in his book *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*. The book *Tractatus* not only tries to explain the central point of philosophy which deals with the world, thought and language, but also attempts to provide answer to the questions that are grounded in logic and in the nature of representation. When there is a careful look into the book itself, then it is to be found that, Wittgenstein has integrated the logical system, which he acquired from Frege and Russell, with the spiritual understanding of the life of Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer. It also has the reflection of mysticism found in Vedanta and Buddhism. The system of philosophy in the *Tractatus* also has many similarities with that of Plato, Kant and Schopenhauer, both in its analytic rigour and spiritual depth. The unique mixture of logic and reason within the limits of language, with that of the mysticism and transcendental ideas which is beyond the limits of language, marks the genius of the *Tractatus*.

However, Joachim Schulte, in his book *Wittgenstein*, has pointed out that, Wittgenstein was himself aware of the fact that his book was not easy for readers. Wittgenstein wrote Russell a letter in august 19, 1919 that, "Frege did not understand a word"[3]. He also added that, "it would be very hard not to be understood by a single soul"[4]. And still he claims that "the purpose of the book is to give pleasure to the reader"[5] in the third sentence of his Preface of *Tractatus*. In spite of being aware of the tough interpretations of *Tractatus*, Schulte believes that Wittgenstein wanted to influence the reader's personal attitude, winning over and obtaining his consent over certain matters which are

not open to meaningful discussion. Therefore, Wittgenstein's aim was to seek aesthetic pleasure that cannot be articulated in words.

The earliest versions of the *Tractatus* are to be found in *Notebooks* and *Prototractatus.* These works contains the preliminary version of it. There is only a little change or no changes regarding many of the views about logic, language and metaphysics found in *Tractatus*.

2.3   WORLD IN *TRACTATUS*:

Wittgenstein is one of the few philosophers who brought the question of the relationship of language and world into the focus of the philosophical discourse. In the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein develops a metaphysical system from the consideration of language and meaning. Wittgenstein view on the *Tractatus* is that our understanding of the world or reality is possible only through linguistic analysis. In the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein gives us a conception of the world but the world he talks about is not an empirical world because his study of the world is not an empirical study. He attempts to develop a conception of the world which is a logically possible world. He uses different concepts through which he builds up the conception of the world.

The *Tractatus* starts with a statement about the world: "The world is everything that is the case."[6] Wittgenstein further tries to explain the concept of world and states that, "The world is totality of facts not of things."[7] These first two proposition of the *Tractatus* defines what Wittgenstein meant by "the world". "The world is totality of facts and not of things" through this statement Wittgenstein tries to mean that a complete description of the world is not given by a complete catalogue of all the things in it, but by the complete catalogue of all the facts that hold of it. This point of

Wittgenstein is explained by George Pitcher, in his book *Philosophy of Wittgenstein,* by an example. According to Pitcher, "Wittgenstein believed that if the world is the sum total of all objects then it would follow that from a complete list of objects it would be possible for us to say what the world is like or to give a complete description of the world. One cannot form an idea about the world by the complete list of objects that are there in the world. For example, to describe a room is not simply to give a list of objects that are there in the room. Simply from the list of objects that are there in the room one cannot form an idea of a room. To describe a room one has to say, for example, how big the room is, that is the length and the breadth of the room, what are the things that are there in the room, how they are like and how are they arranged in the room. With this information we can form the idea about the room. Here the description of the room includes not the list of the things but how they are arranged. It is listing of facts not of objects. Again, from a list of objects that a room contains one cannot make a number of models of that room by combining and arranging the objects in any possible way. Likewise, it is the fact that is the arrangement of objects that determines the world and not the objects that determines the world, the actual world. Depending on the number of possible arrangement of facts we can take of any number of possible worlds. As there are so many possibilities of combining and arranging these objects and so many qualities these objects might have so it would be impossible to state anything about the actual world. But it can be done if one were given the list of the facts about the room. Therefore, it is the fact that constitutes the world not the object, which can uniquely determine the actual world as distinguished from other possible world. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, this world is not composed of things or objects, but it is composed facts. It is a well arranged world or orderly world which

can be broken down into facts [like the pencil was on the table, or the flowers were behind curtains (1.2)"[8]

However, a question may be raised "what does Wittgenstein mean by fact?" Wittgenstein believes fact to be a complex entity existing in the world as being a group of things arranged or combined in a certain way. For example, the fact that, "the cat is on the mat" is a complex consisting of the cat and the mat, arranged so that former is on the later. For Wittgenstein, the world which is spread out in space and time is a configuration of objects which are simple. These simple objects, Wittgenstein believes, made up the substance of the world. However, this configuration of objects goes on changing. Objects change their configuration as a result there is a change in time to time. Objects do not exist independently of any other objects. It has to exist in some configuration with other objects and these configurations of objects are not static or fixed but changing. These configuration of objects is, what called by Wittgenstein, facts. The objects to which Wittgenstein arrives at are simple. These simple objects are called simple because they do not consist of any parts. They never undergo any change. They do not exist in state, but exist in logical space. The things that Wittgenstein meant by object cannot exist apart from facts. Therefore, it is fact alone that can exist independently of anything else. Thus, for Wittgenstein, "facts are there to be pictured and described by language"[9]

It may be noted that Wittgenstein's view of facts and things can be compared to Russell's view of facts and things. As Wittgenstein have many similarities with Russell's view. Russell said:

"I want to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of things is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like 'Socrates'… we expresses a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a 'fact'" [10]

In the above quotation Russell's view comes very close to the view of Wittgenstein. Russell held the following view, which Wittgenstein also would believed,

"For any true sentence S, there is some entity, or entities, which makes S true"

In the above quote if S is correct then it follows from this principle that facts, in addition to things, are real. Thus, Wittgenstein's view of facts is similar to Russell's view of fact. It is so because both of them together founded Logical Atomism.

If we look into Wittgenstein's study of the world, we will find that it is not a scientific study of the world but a philosophical study of the world. He stated, "Something to be or not to be the case while everything else remains the same"[11]. The above statement shows that the world is not of causal description. The facts of the world are not dependent or linked to one another by causal description; it is not a world in space or time. The space that is referred to by Wittgenstein is not a physical space but a logical space, "The facts in logical space are the world."[12] Fact, according to Wittgenstein, exists in logical space. Logical space is the realm of everything that is logically possible. Logical space is not identical with the empirical space of sensory experience.

Wittgenstein also holds that "the world is a totality of reality."[13] Reality, for him, is the existence and non existence of states of affairs; states of affairs are combinations of objects. However, we find a distinction between fact and states of affair. A state of affair is not a fact; it is combination of objects which exists in a fact. A fact is: that thing behaves in a certain manner- that certain state of affairs exists.

Wittgenstein himself had not given any example anywhere of facts, states of affair etc. Anthony Kenny, in his book *Wittgenstein,* gave an example of chessboard to explain the notion of facts, states of affair etc. He wrote,

"Imagine that the objects of the world are chess pieces and the squares of the chess board. Then the states of affairs will be the relations between the pieces and squares. That a certain piece is not on a certain square will be a positive or a negative fact. The world that is the case will be the position of the board at any given time. In order to represent the indestructibility of the *Tractatus* objects we must imagine the rules of the chess altered so that it is not permitted to take pieces. This will be as *Tractatus* says the totality of facts not things (it is the position, not just the board plus pieces). Logical space will be chess-space i.e. the set of possibilities allowed by the rules of chess (TLP 1.13). It is essential to the chess piece that they should be possible holders of the position of the board and to the squares that they should be possible positions for the chess pieces. In the rules nothing is accidental: If a piece can occur in a state of affairs (for example if a particular bishop can stand on a block square) then this is written in to the rules for its use, (TLP2.0.12). The logical rules for the positioning of the pieces give their logical form; pieces may differ in logical form (a knight

from a rook) or be merely numerically different (two pawns). The internal properties of pieces may be contrasted with their external ones. A king away from the board and the other pieces is unimaginable; chess pieces cannot be thought of away from the rules and game. The chess pieces are simple: of course actual chess pieces are made of wood or ivory and have shapes and parts; but so far as the rule goes their composition is accidental and hard atoms would do as well."[14]

Thus, in this way, Wittgenstein had showed the difference between facts and state of affairs.

Wittgenstein believes that the world divides into facts. Most facts are highly complex facts and some are less complex facts. These in turn are composed of still less complex facts and so on. The facts which cannot be further reduced are the ultimate simples. These simple facts are called atomic facts. They are the ultimate building blocks of the world. They are simplest thing and self subsistent. They can exist by themselves in isolation. However, Wittgenstein has not arrived at atomic facts by direct investigation of complex facts. He arrived at the atomic facts by investigating language. He believed that certain considerations about language require that there must be certain facts which are the atomic facts. Though the atomic facts are simple but it has parts which are the objects. These objects correspond to elementary propositions in language. Wittgenstein believes that our understanding of the structure of reality is possible only through our understanding of the structure of language i.e. through an analysis of the logical structure of language. The structure of world and the structure of language correspond to each other. In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein wrote,

"The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition asserts the existence of a state of affairs."[15]

'To assert the existence of a state of affair is to assert an atomic fact.'

A distinction can be drawn between Wittgenstein and Russell regarding the conception of atomic facts. As it has been already stated, according to Wittgenstein, a fact contains state of affairs and a state of affair is a combination of objects. But Russell thought that every fact contains at least one universal; but Wittgenstein did not say anything about properties. He only expresses a thought which indicates that states of affairs contain only objects, not properties. Wittgenstein wrote,

"In state of affair objects fit into one another like the links of a chain."[16]

Objects are combined with one another like the links of chain and it is due to their nature or internal properties of the object that determine the possibility of being combined with other objects. Thus, it is the internal properties that link one object with another. Wittgenstein states "in a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another"[17].

According to Wittgenstein, state of affairs contains elementary proposition. He regarded elementary proposition to be "the simplest proposition, the elementary proposition, asserts the existence of an atomic fact."[18] According to him, elementary proposition cannot be further analyzed. It has components but these components are not propositions. He regarded them to be a class of basic proposition which cannot be further analyzed. According to Wittgenstein, in analyzing the sense of any proposition one must ultimately arrive at nothing but elementary propositions. The sense of any

proposition can thus be stated completely by means of elementary propositions and propositional connectives alone, so that if one had a list of all possible elementary propositions, plus certain propositional connectives, he could say anything that is sayable by simply making selection from that list. Non elementary propositions are just combination of molecular propositions which are structures, ultimately, of nothing but atomic or elementary propositions. This is what called logical atomism. Though Wittgenstein's view were that of logical atomism but Wittgenstein himself did not used the term. It was introduced by Russell.

However, a question may arise, what kind or kinds of structure do molecular proposition have? In what way or ways are elementary propositions combined in order to form molecular proposition? Wittgenstein states that, they are combined by truth functional connectives alone so that all molecular propositions are truth functional compounds of elementary propositions. This is one of the central doctrines of *Tractatus*. "A proposition is a truth function of elementary propositions."[19]

But what are truth functional connectives and truth functions? A compound proposition compounded of the proposition p, q, r…s is a truth functional compound of p, q, r…s if and only if its truth or falsity is uniquely determined by the truth values of p, q, r…s. A connective is a truth functional one if it compounds propositions into truth functional compounds. On these definition 'and' is a truth functional connective; for if we know the truth- values of each of the propositions "Smith is in town" and "Jones is in town" then we know the truth value of the complex proposition. "Smith is in town and Jones is in town". If either one or both the proposition is false then the complex proposition is also false; if both are true then the complex proposition is also

true. All propositions Wittgenstein says are truth functions of elementary propositions. Wittgenstein believes that if all the elementary propositions are stated, which were true and which false, then it would be possible to know everything there is to be known, because the truth value of any other proposition is entirely determined by the truth values of its component elementary propositions. However, it would be difficult to know at once the truth value of a given molecular propositions, for we cannot know which elementary proposition are its components nor precisely how they are truth functionally connected. Nevertheless, the whole truth about the world is determined solely by the truth values of elementary proposition.

Wittgenstein holds that "it is a sign of an elementary proposition that no elementary proposition can contradict it".[20] Wittgenstein stated that elementary propositions do not contain any logical particles like "or", "not" etc. They are simples and hence no deduction is possible. "An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus a concatenation, of names."[21] They are combinations, linking of names. But these names are not like those names those which are used in everyday life. They are "primitive signs" as Wittgenstein believed.[22] According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of the "primitive signs" can be explained through elucidations. They can be understood only when their meaning is already known. "A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign."[23]

Wittgenstein does not regard such terms as "square" and "cow" as names, because such terms has a definition. Ordinary proper names like "Socrates", "John" are also not regarded to be names by Wittgenstein because he believed that their meaning can be analyzed by stating certain essential facts about the person or thing to whom the

name belong. According to Wittgenstein, in order for a term to be a name, there must be no possibility whatever of defining it or analyzing it rather there must be no way of defining it in any purely verbal way. If it names something which can be observed then it could define in another way namely by pointing to whatever it denotes by saying "the word '___' means this." This kind of definition is called ostensive definition; the only possible way of defining a name is by ostensive definition and that possibility exists only in case the name denotes something observable.

From this, it follows that; a name must denote something simple which does not contain any part. If it denotes something complex then it could be defined in terms of its constituents and their structure and hence would not be a name. Thus, for Wittgenstein, a name can only denote an object. Wittgenstein uses the term object to mean something simple.

"The name means the object. The object is its meaning"[24]

Wittgenstein view of meaning is somewhat familiar to Frege, in the sense of that to which the expression refers. According to Wittgenstein, in order to understand "primitive sign", we must know how they are used. We must recognize the sample proposition to which they refer. The object to which primitive signs refer, are simple, they form the substance (fixed form) of the world, and they contain the possibility of state of affairs. Though Wittgenstein has given different interpretations of object, but that which might be the exact interpretation is that object has no independent existence, their nature has to be understood by the expression designates them.

According to Wittgenstein, it is not possible to understand the logic of language; therefore, there must be an instrument to help to analyze it. Thus, the sign language is the instrument which is governed by "logical syntax" and "logical grammar" which helps to avoid language related mistakes.

> "In order to avoid errors we must make use of assign language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and not using superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar- by logical syntax."[25]

Many philosophers including Rudolf Carnap, are influenced by Wittgenstein's conception of "logical syntax". But Carnap disagreed with Wittgenstein in so far as he used it as a tool for explaining picture theory of meaning.

Names have a significant role to play in "logical syntax" in the *Tractatus*. They stand for objects and that is their whole essence. Thus, the study of the names is a logical necessity for the understanding of the overall syntax of language. Wittgenstein wrote:

> "In a proposition a name is the representative of an object" [26]

The above statement means that the names are the signs that signify the objects. They are nothing without signifying the objects. According to Wittgenstein, picturing cannot take place unless names stand for an object. Wittgenstein further wrote:

> "The simple signs employed in proposition are called names" [27]

> "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that the sense be determinate"[28]

Thus, the names have multiple functions in that they play the role of simple signs and also they make the sense of the propositions determinate. They are regarded to be primitive yet they make semantic contribution towards the determination of sense. Wittgenstein states:

> "Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does name have meaning" [29]

Thus, the main essence of name is signifying its object or it can be said that the main essence of name is naming its object. And for this reason the name has to depend on a proposition.

However, a question may arise, if names are depended on propositions for its existence then how can it function? R.C Pradhan, in his book *The Great mirror: An Essay on Wittgenstein Tractatus* supports Wittgenstein and explains that "though names are depended on propositions yet they have existence of their own so far as they name objects. Naming the object is the function of a name. There is no external reason why names refer to objects. Proposition provides context for the recognition of the fact that names stand for objects but they do not provide any rationale for that"[30]. Wittgenstein wrote:

> "(Names are like points; propositions are like arrows-they have senses)"[31]

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, names are different from proposition while name signifies object proposition expresses sense.

However, this point becomes a matter of controversy. It states that, it is difficult to find examples of *Tractarian* names in natural language. As stated above, even simple singular terms such as 'Socrates', 'London', 'cow' etc will not be regarded as names by the strict view of the *Tractatus*, for we can analyze them and can give description of them . Whether in *Tractatus* the term 'name' refers to simple symbols referring to particulars, or whether the term 'name' refers to simple symbols of all kinds seems controversial. Since, objects are just the referents of names, this issue goes side by side with the question whether objects are one referring to all particulars or whether they include properties and relations. Erik Stenius, an eminent commentator of *Tractatus*, maintains that they include particulars simple properties and relation. However, the former view was defended by Irving Copi and Elizabeth Anscombe. It is supported by *Tractatus* 2.0231 which states that "Material properties are first presented by propositions- first formed by the configuration of objects" this suggests that simple properties are not objects but rather arise from combining or configuration of objects. The Copi-Anscombe interpretation can be supported by *Tractatus* 3.1432:

We must not say, "the complex sign '*aRb*' says 'a stands in relation R to b;''' but we must say ''that 'a' stands in certain relation to 'b' says that *aRb*''[32]

This has suggested to some commentators that relations are not nameable, and so not *Tractarian* objects It may, however, be stated that instead simply to bring out the point that *Tractarian* names are not confined to particulars; so this consideration is less compelling.

2.4 WORLD, LANGUAGE AND PICTURE:

Language plays an important part in Wittgenstein's philosophy; there is mostly discussion of language. For him, there must be an investigation in details the actual ways in which the key words involved in "philosophical puzzlements are used". These puzzles occur because of misinterpretation of "forms of speech"; because of wrong and over simplified view of the way language works. Such puzzles are resolved in seeing how words actually do work, what their uses really are. With a careful look we find that there are some changes in Wittgenstein's view point between his two books *'Tractatus'* and *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein was aware of the fact that there is a world which philosophy must accept as real and intelligible structure which can be only be known through the use of language. Wittgenstein's picture theory is also based on this idea that the world has a rational and logical structure.

> "The theory of logical portrayal by means of language says- quite generally-: In order for it to be possible that a proposition should be true or false- agree with reality or not- for this to be possible something in the proposition must be identical with reality"[33]

Language is first and foremost a representational system. It is with language that "we make ourselves to pictures of fact."[34] Wittgenstein holds that picturing is an activity of representing the world by means of language that is making a copy of the latter in its logical aspects. It is not as if the world is actually reproduced in language which is impossible, as language and the world are distinct entities. Nonetheless, the world is logically mirrored in language in the sense that the logical structure of the world is

perfectly shown in the structure of language. In the above discussion, Wittgenstein wanted to show this point, that a proposition in order to be true must agree with reality. According to him, there is a perfect match between the world and language; it is because of this perfect fit between language and the world that the truth and falsity as semantic relations are possible. Wittgenstein's picture theory provides a new metaphysics of the world especially in the view of the fact that language is a picture of the world. The idea of description enters in the very conception of the world-picture.

According to Wittgenstein, pictures are facts. This brings us to the notion of the names. The name stands for objects. As the objects are linked in the world to form facts, the names are linked in the language to form propositions. Wittgenstein holds that, a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is a fact which corresponds to a possible fact in the world; it is true if it corresponds to an actual fact. This is Wittgenstein 'Picture Theory of Language'. For Wittgenstein, proposition are pictures. Language is used to make these pictures. And it is not accidental that he uses the term 'picture', for Wittgenstein's theory of meaning is one which draws on the visual analogy precisely because the propositions are themselves facts and not mental representational. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein gives us a theory that proposition is a picture of reality. Apart from paintings, drawings and photographs, Wittgenstein counts maps, sculptures, three dimensional models as well as musical scores and gramophone records as pictures. All of them are representation of something. They represent something. Any representation can be either accurate or inaccurate and it can be either true or false in the sense that it can be true representation or false representation i.e. it can be true picture or a false picture of what it represents. These are two things that are connected with any representation-

(a) What is a representation of e.g. what a particular piece of painting represents and (b) whether it represents what it represents accurately or inaccurately when in case of proposition? Wittgenstein states that, a proposition is picture of reality he means that a proposition represents reality or it is a representation of reality. Like any other representation a proposition of representation may also be true or false. If the representation is accurate, then the proposition is true and false if it is inaccurate. Thus, corresponding to these two features of representation concerning a proposition, these are two related things that can be said about the proposition, that is, what the proposition means and whether what it means is true or false i.e. sense and truth value.

Wittgenstein believed that every proposition of the world say something about the world and at the same time shows that the world after all has a certain logical form which is an important feature and it is presupposed in the actual structure of the world. But the logical form of the world cannot be described it can only be shown in the structure of language itself. This brings us to the 'saying and showing' distinction. The saying and showing distinction is forced on the theory of forms. The forms being underlying presupposition of saying cannot themselves be described. Description requires a descriptive language and so it is the task of descriptive language to represent what the described objects themselves are. But for such a descriptive language to be possible there must have been certain logical features inherent in the language itself. These features are so fundamental that they cannot be described in the same language or in another. Hence, they must be shown in language in which they are properties.

> "In order that you should have a language which can express or say everything
> that can be said, this language must have certain properties; and when this is the

case, that it has them can no longer be said in that language or any other language"

35

Thus, the logical form of language must be reflected in the language itself, otherwise the language would be meaningless. The distinction between saying and showing is that showing is the more fundamental feature of language than saying. Language says what the world actually is but shows what the logical form of the world is. A question may arise: why is the logical form of the world necessary? Why can we not describe the world without the logical form of the world? The answer is that in describing the world we are presupposing the logical form of the world. Besides this form is not different from the logical form of language, so if the logical form of the world is not known. The logical form of the language is also not known. Thus, there would be a total collapse of the descriptive language if the logical forms are not taken into account. Therefore, logical forms have to be accorded primacy in a logical theory. Wittgenstein's theory of form is meant to show that the logical form of language mirrors the logical form of the world.

There is a Kantian angle to the question regarding the logical structure of the world- is there an a priori structure of the world? The a priori has its roots in the Kantian method of discovering the pre-experiential structure of the categories that make up the grammar of our language. The central thesis of Kant's theory of the a priori proposition is that there is a synthetically necessary proposition in the language of mathematics and science that brings out the logical structure of the world. The world is given to this a priori proposition such a way that logic can map it out as the domain of the necessary structures representable in language. Wittgenstein obviously has no concern for the so- called synthetic a priori propositions as they have little to do with the logical propositions, he is searching for. The logical propositions for him are all synthetic in character and are

analytic. There is no need of a priori institution of space and time which are at best creations of our language rather than absolute realities.

The Kantian inquiry rested on the fact that logic and mathematics are different in so far as they have different modes of operations: logic is formal in that it rests on the forms of thought whereas mathematics rests on the form of intuition, which is fundamentally different from the forms of thought. The forms of intuition are a priori but are given as parts of the human subjectivity. But Wittgenstein looks at the matter in a different way, he finds that both logic and mathematics are formally related to the world and both describe only the formal properties of the world. According to Wittgenstein, the relation of logic to the world is one pervading it in the sense that every part of the world could be given a place in the logical map of the world. Therefore, there is a transparent isomorphism between logic and the world. The proposition of logic presents a map in which mirror image of the world is fully manifested. This makes logic transcendental in that it presents the essential structure of the world a priori in the most transparent manner.

Wittgenstein's transcendental logic has in it the spirit of Kant's transcendental logic without its content, as Wittgenstein differs from Kant with regard to whether logic can ensure synthetic a priori truths.

Wittgenstein's book *Tractatus* was primarily concerned with the logical analysis of language. The picture theory of meaning lay at the core of the book and was detailed treatment of the prerequisites of symbolic representation in general. Wittgenstein stated:

"The picture is the model of reality"[36]

Wittgenstein had learned about the practice of representing traffic accidents in Parisian law courts through using models and this was when the pictorial nature of proposition first occurred to him. Wittgenstein gives an example to make clear the statement. He held that "in law courts in Paris motor car accidents were reconstructed by means of toys and dolls. A real collision between a lorry and a pram would be represented by means of toys shown as between toy lorry and toy pram. This word gives a picture or a model of the accident. This pictorial relationship to be possible the toy pram must go proxy for the real pram and the toy lorry must go proxy for the real lorry. The elements of the model must stand in for the elements of the situation to be represented. This is the pictorial relationship which makes the picture a picture," [37]. The elements of the model to be a picture of reality must be related to each other in a certain spatial relation. It is the spatial relationship between the 'toy pram' and the 'toy lorry' which represents the spatial relationship between the 'real pram' and 'real lorry'. Wittgenstein calls "a picture is a fact" because the elements of that are related in the way they are is itself a fact. The "picture theory" may also be regarded as a theory of language that proposes that language is a picture of reality such that it models the reality in its own structure. The picture talked of here is a "logical picture" in the sense that only in a logical sense language acts as a picture of the world. Picturing in the context is a model building as language presents a model of the world in its own structure.

He thought that essence of language lies in the representation of how things are. Representation is possible through agreement in form between what represents and what is being represented. Any picture consists of a multiplicity of elements that together constitute the picture. Since, "a state of affair is a possible combination of objects"[38] and "each element in a picture represents an object, the combination of objects in a

picture represents a state of affair."[39] The structure of a picture is how the elements in it must be arranged in order for it to represent how the objects in a state of affair are combined, and "the structure is determined by convention."[40] The possibility of having a logical form is called the "pictorial form" by Wittgenstein. The "pictorial form" of the picture represents a certain state of affair. The elements of the picture are arranged such that it mirrors the combination of objects in the state of affair. The form of the one representation differs from the form of other representations, that is to say different representations have different form. The "pictorial form" which is formed by the combination of the elements of the picture is same as the form of the state of affair. The picture and state of affair must share the same pictorial form. Wittgenstein holds that a picture could be more or less abstract or have a greater or lesser resemblance to what it represents. The logical form must be shared by the picture and state of affair for the picture even to be an incorrect representation. Without the same logical form representation is not possible. According to Wittgenstein, if the form of representation is a logical form, then the picture is called logical picture. "Every picture is also a logical picture."[41] Thus, Tractatus analyses how pictures may be compared with reality.

> The "picture theory" consists of two sub theories namely – 'the theory of proposition' and 'the theory of sense'. These two are conjoined to provide the broad structure of 'the picture theory'. The 'theory of proposition' brings out the structure of the picture of propositional symbols and the rules governing the logical syntax. It takes into account the nature of simple as well as compound sentences and thereby fixes the truth functional limits of the nature of propositions. 'The theory of sense' on the other hand, makes room for the use of proposition in making representation of the world. According to Wittgenstein a

proposition represented a possible state of affairs and its sense, was determinate. "No proposition will itself show whether it is true or false because for this the proposition has to compare with reality."[42]

"Every picture represents possible states of affair that may be termed as its sense"[43]

If a proposition is true it represented a state of affair which existed. This portion about representation allowed Wittgenstein, to explain how it is possible for a proposition to be false. A false proposition represented a state of affair which did not existed. Wittgenstein raised questions about "the creativity of language; such how it was possible to understand sentences which were not heard previously."[44] The solution which he gave for these problems rested on the picture of language. Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, the sense of the proposition is the situation it depicts or represents. But, there is an issue related to this view: what to do with false proposition? If the sense of a proposition is the situation it depicts then either all false proposition have no sense since they describe no existent situation, or there must be nonexistent situation which they describe or represent. The first alternative is unacceptable, in view of the fact that we can understand false propositions. Hence, the second alternative is forced upon us.

Glock in "A Wittgenstein Dictionary" explaining this point stated that, "The strength of picture theory of meaning lies in the fact that it explains the possibility of falsehood, or how propositions can be false and still be meaningful. When propositions are true, they correspond to reality, but when they are false, this does not invalidate their meaningfulness despite the fact that they do not correspond to reality. He further stated

that whereas Russell's dual relation theory of judgment had failed to solve this problem, Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning' succeeded in doing so. His solution was that propositions depict possibilities of such a combination assured by the components of the propositions mirroring the things they go proxy for and not by an additional logical form."

Wittgenstein tried to explain the notion of truth and falsity with an example of a black spot on a white paper. We can describe the situation either by stating that a point on the paper is black or white. Corresponding to the description that a point is black we have positive fact and corresponding to the description that the point is white we have a negative fact. "Truth stands for positive fact and falsity stands for a negative fact."[46] But, the fact remains truth and falsity both presupposes that there is sense that is independent of truth or falsity of sentences. But, here is the possibility of the analogy breaking down because if a sentence is without sense we cannot call it true or false whereas we can still identify the point on the white paper without knowing what the point is without knowing any colour. Wittgenstein writes:

> "Now the point where the simile breaks down in this: we can indicate a point on
> the paper even if we do not know what black and white are, but if a proposition
> has no sense, nothing corresponds to it, since it does not designate a thing (a
> truth-value) which might have the properties called "false" or "true". The verb
> of a proposition is not 'is true' or 'is false', as Frege thought; rather, that which
> 'is true' must already contain the verb." [47]

Thus, there is reason to believe that truth and falsity are much more fundamental properties of sentence than we could imagine because without them we cannot imagine what a proposition could be. A sentence without truth-value is no sentence a tall.

Wittgenstein further developed his conception of pictorial aspect of proposition. The projection of the world into language depends upon the pictorial form of language. The pictorial form is the logical form in which language pictures the world.

> "Let us call this connexion of its element the structure of the picture and let us call the possibility of this structure, the pictorial form of the picture" [48]

"Pictorial form" is, thus, the possibility of the structure of the picture in which case we have to admit the picture has the elements organized in certain way. The pictorial character of a proposition was comprised by its structural connection to the state of affair it represented. Thus there are two aspects of the pictorial form- the one which is represented by the elements of the picture as a whole and the other in which the element of the pictures themselves are related. While the former tells us how the picture is related with the world, the latter tells how picture as a fact is possible. Pictorial form is the possibility that the elements of the picture show how the things in the world stand.

> "Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture." [49]

The pictorial form is the minimum common element between the picture and the world such that the reality could be grasped and represented in the form of picture itself. If therefore the form of picture is known then the form of reality is also known. This

minimum common element can be called the essence of reality. The essence is not another reality but it is characterized as the logical form.

> "What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it- correctly or incorrectly- in the way it does, its pictorial form".[50]

The grammar of the 'pictorial form' is such that it merges in to the grammar of 'logical form'. It disappears into the form of reality. This is a major grammatical shift which demonstrates the fact that ultimately what counts is logical form which is the form of both language and reality. Thus, Wittgenstein uses the term 'logico-pictorial form': "A picture has a logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts."[51]. This states that the "pictorial form" and the form of reality have merged into one another into the "logical form" which means that the language and the world have a common logical stage. The common logical stage is the heart of 'picture theory of language'.

Wittgenstein realizes that we cannot ascribe reality any form that is hidden to language and its categories. Unlike Kant, thing-in-itself that has hidden forms, because in that case we cannot talk about it at all. There is a wide gap between classical thinking including Kant's as it is maintained that thought can represent reality only from a distance. Wittgenstein abolished this distance and opted for a seamless relation between language including thought and reality. Reality is identical with language in its form and so the distance between the two vanishes.

The 'picture theory' lays down the necessary conditions- that how the signs function in the world and that how the world is projected as a matter of pictorial relationship. It lays down that the elements in the propositional structure must be linked with the

corresponding elements in the structure of facts. There is, therefore, a matching relation between the signs in language and the objects in the world.

> "In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation that it represents"[52]

The matching multiplicity must be logically articulate such that the pictorial relationship is established easily. This is, of course, left to language itself which does its own work autonomously. "Language must take care of itself' as logic (logic must take care of itself)"[53]. The semantic arrangement of the simple signs, on the one hand, and of the objects on the other, is logically put in vivid counterparts. This could be called the matching of the world with the object. Wittgenstein says:

> "One name stands for one thing, another for another thing; they are combined with one another. In this way the whole group like a *tableau vivant*- presents a state of affairs." [54]

Thus, the picture emerges a system of names functioning in a network, and that explains how a proposition becomes a picture of a fact which itself is a combination of objects. This illuminates Wittgenstein's remark that "In a proposition a situation is, as it were, assembled by way of experiment."[55] He was claiming that a proposition put together a state of affair which was then tested against reality (thus the idea of experiment) to see if it is matched. "Logical analysis indicated that proposition were pictorial in the sense that a proposition had to have an identical number of distinct elements to the state of affair it represented."[56] A consequence of this is that for a proposition to represent there

had to be a one to one correlation between its names and the objects in the state of affairs it represented.

Rush Rhees in his book *Discussion of Wittgenstein* pointed out that, "How does one know there is such a picturing. Proposition is not just a jumble of words therefore it can be understood but it is not that there is a definite arrangement of words. It is an arrangement which says something. What we start with is it just says something. We do not start by recognizing between it and something else. And this makes it rather like recognizing something as a picture (not just jumble of marks) we may understand a picture when we do not know the scene from which it was taken. He asked to think of a 'still life', for instance. It is a picture of what is in it. We may see this without noticing its similarity to anything outside it." [57]

We can say what is pictured and conversely we can make a picture of what is said. Does this amount to say something more than: we can say in one language what we can say also in another? Wittgenstein would agree that this does show something about reality and about language too. It does show something about 'saying something', if we show that you can sometimes draw it. Then the point is that the picturing is something they both do. Neither gets you any nearer than the other to 'what it really is'.

2.5 WORLD, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE:

In *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein held that thought in the form of language that can directly reflect the world but it is to be pointed that the language that philosophers are concerned with is the language of our everyday life. It is the one we are familiar with and also the one we are naturally endowed with. According to Wittgenstein, instead searching for an

ideal language one should in fact look into the natural language which has the ability to represent the world. Wittgenstein wrote:

"Everyday language is a part of human organism and no less complicated than it" [58]

Language to be a part of human organism shows that it is natural as the organism itself and is given a part of the natural history of man.

Wittgenstein agrees with Frege on the need for a 'logical syntax' for making the structure of language and meaning clear. But while Frege turned to logic for a 'logically perfect language', Wittgenstein turned to the 'logical syntax' of our natural language to get rid of the errors incidental to ordinary grammar. But, where as Frege's logical language is a threat to natural language, Wittgenstein's logical syntax takes into account the logical structure of the latter, thus, showing that it is logical grammar that is the aim of philosophical analysis, and not replacement of the ordinary language by something pure and exotic.

"In order to avoid such errors we must make use of sign- language that excludes them by not using same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar signs that have different modes of signification: a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar- by logical syntax." [59]

The sign language avoids all grammatical errors that were present in natural language because of the wrong use of symbols. The errors occurs mostly because of the symbols are not used properly or they are not used according to rules. Sign language rectifies the logical errors, it also does not change the meaning of the symbols concerned.

Wittgenstein was concerned with the inner structure of language and thought so far as it is relevant to the meaning of language. Language and thought are logically connected in the sense that thoughts are the contents of linguistic expressions. That is, thoughts are the contents which underlie the meaning of the expression concerned. But, these inner contents are not easily understood from the surface appearance of the linguistic expressions. Wittgenstein wrote:

> "Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward from the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward from the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." [60]

Wittgenstein believes that ordinary language as it is given conceals thought more often than not because it is not meant to make everything clear to the undiscerning eyes. That is the reason why he says "language disguises thought."[61] This means that no thought is as transparent as it is believed to be. Every thought or proposition is clothed in a linguistic garb that makes it difficult for the ordinary readers to decipher it.

According to Wittgenstein, there is no thought that is not expressed in language. The 'logical form' of thought is transparent because as soon as one understands a thought, one understands its logical form but in case of language it needs some effort to seize the 'logical form'.

There is much similarity between Wittgenstein and Frege in so far as the nature of thought is concerned. Both of them believes that thought are objectively real and are logical. According to Wittgenstein, each thought occupies a place in the system of thought such that the totality of thoughts constitutes the picture of the world.

"A logical picture of facts is a thought "[62]

"The totality of true thought is the picture of the world." [63]

Like a proposition a thought is a picture. Like any other picture the thought somehow depicts or represents state of affairs of which it is a thought. By identifying a thought with a logical picture, Wittgenstein asserts that a thought is a picture the 'pictorial form' of which is 'logical form' (TLP 2.181). Thus, thought have to have a logical structure in as much as they are a representation of the world. And being a representation they need to partake of a 'logical form'.

We have seen that thoughts are the pictures of possible states of affairs. But what role do thought play in Wittgenstein *Tractatus*? What purpose the notion of thought serves in Tractatus? Christopher Gilbert, in his article, *The Role of Thought in Wittgenstein Tractatus,* argued that, '"thought actually played a crucial role in Wittgenstein theory: thought mediate the relation between language and the world, and are therefore necessary for proposition for having sense. At 3.1 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein states that, "in a proposition thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the sense". We should take 'proposition' here to mean 'propositional sign' or 'sentence' since it is spoken or written sentences that are 'perceptible'. So sentences expresses thought according to Anthony Kenny sentences are not the only perceptible expression of thoughts; citing 4.014, he asserts that "a painting, a sculpture, a musical score would all be expressions of thoughts". Whether or not thoughts are expressed exclusively by sentences, the fact that they are expressed by sentences at all is significant"" [64]

Thus, Wittgenstein regarded the relation between language and thought as a kind of non contingent. Because thoughts have to be expressed in language. They are necessarily expressed in language through propositions.

> "In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by our senses." [65]

Thoughts and propositions are inseparable because Wittgenstein regarded "thought to be the contents of propositions". Both of them constitute language. Thoughts are like home to propositions or language.

The main aim of *Tractatus* is to show that language and thought have same 'logical form' which they share with 'logical form' of the world. Wittgenstein also believes that there is a logical isomorphism between thought language and the world. The 'picture theory' also suggests that the world is logically based on thought and language. The 'logical form' of and language is the 'logical form' of the world.

Wittgenstein, in *Tractatus,* has given importance to signs that can express thought. Signs can be regarded as the vehicle of thought that can alone express thought. He explains this as follows:

> ""We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written) as a projection of a possible situation."

> "The method of projection is to think of the sense of a proposition"

"I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation with the world"" [66]

The propositional signs are regarded by Wittgenstein as the signs which express thoughts, which are about the world being projection of the possible situation in the world. Apart from proposition thoughts cannot be expressed. They are nonexistent if not expressed in proposition.

According to Wittgenstein, thoughts are constituted by the signs which are the projection of the world. Thought therefore is the projection or representation of the world. Being a picture of the world thought is therefore true or false. In this lies their semantic worth since true thoughts have a major role to play in language.

Wittgenstein, unlike Frege, holds that, thoughts have to be found in language and that too in the very logical structure of language. This makes it evident that the so called 'Platonic existence of thoughts' is a misnomer. The platonic thoughts threaten to disrupt the necessary relation between language and thought because if thoughts could exist independently of language, they would not need a language. But, Wittgenstein finds this Fregean argument untenable. Therefore, he provides a linguistic theory of thought.

However, Christopher Gilbert pointed out that, "Wittgenstein avoids giving any detailed account of thought because he considers that such discussion will relate to epistemological issues. Wittgenstein thought that it is better not to "entangle in unessential psychological investigations" as did the philosophers of the past. The true purpose of philosophy, he claims, is not to explain thought-process but to give "logical clarification" of thought which are otherwise "cloudy and indistinct" (4.112). In other

words, Wittgenstein would clarify the obscurity of thoughts by ignoring them altogether, focusing instead on how language itself relates to the world it describes. As Anscombe observes, Wittgenstein and Frege both "avoid making theory of knowledge the cardinal theory of philosophy by cutting it dead."[67]

2.6 CRITICISMS:

From the above discussion, it can be stated that *Tractatus* presents a very influential theoretical system of language and world yet there are many difficulties related with the views of *Tractatus*.

In his later book *Philosophical Investigation* Wittgenstein came to questioned some of the views which he held in *Tractatus,* as his earlier views were not satisfactory for him. *The Philosophical Investigation* begins with a quote from Augustine's *Confessions* which states that there is an essence of language, this view of essence ,is also based on the idea that "the words in language name objects", and that "sentences are combinations of such names."[68] These views were held by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus*. The *Philosophical Investigation* criticizes these views by criticizing St. Augustine's quotation held in *Confessions*. The quotation points at the following views:

(i)   Language is actually learned through ostensive definition

(ii)   Language consist of names

(iii)   There are private mental occurrences which are expressed by language.

All these views were rejected by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*. According to Wittgenstein, Augustine believes that, "language contains names and there is a name to every corresponding object", "a name means an object. The object is its meaning", which was also held by him. In *Philosophical Investigation* he finds it too basic. It is a

fact that some words in language are names, but that does not mean that all words are names. Name-object relation is only one part or it is only one aspect of language. However, language has many more aspect other than this. It is believed to be like an old center of linguistic town, however, just like a real city has many suburbs, and as such language has many different uses other than the naming function. In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein has shown language can be used in a variety of activity.

Wittgenstein further criticized his point that "objects are simple"; "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate". Later this view is rejected in *Philosophical Investigations* by Wittgenstein in very strong terms. He argued that "what are the simple parts of which reality is composed of? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? - The bits of woods of which it is made? Or the molecules or the atoms? "Simple" means not composite. And here the point is in what sense composite? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the simple parts of a chair".

Wittgenstein himself was not satisfied with view that language is a picture of world. He later realized that picture theory was a mistaken concept with a misunderstanding of language. He wrote, "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (PI, sect115). The idea of language being a picture is such a captivating model about language and the universe. R C Pradhan in *Wittgenstein*: *The Great Mirror* has pointed out that, this model about language being picture of the world has much assumption which appears to be questionable. These assumptions are as follows:

1. "Language has a logical structure which can be seen when we have analysis of it"
2. "This logical structure or form lies under the surface of language"

3. "The logical structure of language can be identified with the structure of the world."

The later Wittgenstein also questioned these assumptions regarding picture theory. His criticism of the assumption (1) is that the idea of analysis in the *Tractatus* is misconception. There are many contexts in which sentences are used and therefore one cannot impose only one kind of analytic framework on language. The assumption (2) is logically followed by the assumption (1) because the notion of analysis is connected with the idea that language has one and only one logical structure which needs to be dug out from beneath the surface-grammar. This seems to be the most unacceptable thesis in the *Tractatus* according to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein wrote, "But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our form of language, and so a single completely resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalyzed; as if there were something in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved (PI, sect 91)"

Thus, the reduction of language to representation is not the whole of language. Furthermore, this picture of language is at the base of the whole of traditional philosophy, but, for Wittgenstein, it is to be showed in favor of a new way of looking at the relationship between language and world. The *Philosophical Investigation* proceeds to offer the new way of looking at language and world which will yield the view of philosophy as therapy.

Apart from his own criticism of his views in *Tractatus* different philosophers have also criticized his earlier position. Some of them are as follows:

Matthew B Ostrow in his book, *Wittgenstein's Tractatus* : *A Dialectic Interpretation* pointed out that, in *Tractatus* there is always a shifting meaning or sense of the term "world". According to Wittgenstein, the world is identified with the totality of existent atomic fact. Thus, we understand by the world with all that is the case, is the totality of facts. The totality of existent atomic facts constitutes the limits of the world. But there is a subsequent introduction of the term "reality"; this term in fact has a wider extension than the term "world". Then, again, Wittgenstein stated that, "the existence and non existence of the atomic fact is reality". Is Wittgenstein imagining atomic facts that lie outside of the world? The idea is in itself strange enough and we are not left with any proper explanation with it.

Wittgenstein position seems more puzzling when we are provided with further clarification by 2.063, "The totality of reality is world". The introduction of the distinction between the reality and world is now apparently denied or in some sense overcome. The *Tractatus* would seem both to propose existence of fact outside the world and to imply that such an idea make no sense. But what is the status of "negative fact" as Wittgenstein refers to the nonexistent atomic fact? It would seem some version of the ancient problem of the nature of "what it is not" that confronts us at the close of the question." Thus, in this way Ostrow was not satisfied with Wittgenstein view of world.

The logical atomism of *Tractatus* is one of its critical elements. Logical atomism is the view that the world can be analyzed into fundamentally simple, unanalysable, indivisible, and mutually independent objects of facts. Wittgenstein inherited this position from Russell and it is a feature of logical analysis. If we can analyze a proposition into simpler parts and analyze those parts into even simpler parts, where does this analysis ends? Either

it has to go forever which is problematic for a number of reasons, or it would have to reach the definite terminus. Wittgenstein draws this terminus at object, which are logical form without content and states of affair which are simple mutually independent facts that constitutes all reality.

Wittgenstein provides very little argument in favor but simply assumes the world must consist of such atomic elements. This was one of the first aspects of the *Tractatus* that Wittgenstein abandoned upon his return to philosophy in 1929 and it was by pulling on hi thread that he gradually dismantled the entire work.

A.C Grayling in *Wittgenstein-Past Master* series holds that, logical atomism is not at all tenable because it leads to nowhere. According to Grayling, Wittgenstein only spoke about simples but had not given a clear description of it. Graying questioned "what are the 'names' and 'objects'?" She holds that Wittgenstein has not provided any strong argument in favor of them. She holds that "In the absence of any indication it is impossible to know whether the picture theory of the relation between language and the world is even half-way plausible, yet this is the centerpiece of the Tractatus theory." [69]

Graying further states that, according to Wittgenstein the 'problems of philosophy' will disappear when one concerns properly to the uses of language. However, majority of contemporary analytic philosophers does not agree with this claim. They are more attracted by the philosophical legacy of Frege and Russell than by accepting Wittgenstein's view. (P. 112) for these philosophers "to say that all philosophical perplexity arises from linguistic misunderstanding is to overstate matters." However, it is fact that language is an instrument and it is capable of precise use. When it is so used properly many philosophical difficulties can be expressed and investigated clearly.

Grayling further states that, "The vividness of Wittgenstein's metaphors, the unexpected examples and turns of thought, generate the sense that something profound is being expressed in his writing. Wittgenstein is in some ways a poet. Once one has shifted his texts and has ceased to be dazzled by the brilliance of metaphor and the poetic quality, one finds much less argument, and very much less definiteness in the crucial conceptions, that is expected in and demanded from philosophical inquiry". (P. 119)[70]

According to Wittgenstein, logic is not a body of propositions nor is it an axiomatic system. Logic represents the architectural structure of reality. Logic in itself does not say anything about the world. Rather it determines the form taken by the objects in the world. Proposition can represent facts and facts can represent propositions, because they share a common logical form. The salient feature of Wittgenstein's conception of logic as consisting of form rather than contents in that logic itself cannot be explained we do not need laws or proposition to tell us how logic works because the workings of logic makes themselves manifest in everything we say and we experience.

John Cook, in *Wittgenstein's metaphysics,* pointed out that, Wittgenstein view of logic seems to be somewhat controversial. Cook states that, Wittgenstein asserts that he had found the solution to all philosophical problems. However, this claim will be valid only if Wittgenstein could show that how he can settle philosophical disputes over logical form. Cook further states that, the truth about *Tractatus* is that, Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* argues that there must be a sign language to solve philosophical problem, however, he fails to demonstrate that "the propositions of everyday language actually fulfill these conditions. If they were found not be analyzable in the anticipated way. Wittgenstein would have to conclude that they do not describe possible state of affairs at all."

In the second last stanza of the *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein asks us that if we are able to understand him, then "we will understand that the propositions of the Tractatus as nonsense." According to Wittgenstein, propositions of the *Tractatus* are like "a ladder that climbed; we can now safely throw away." Wittgenstein, in the last part of *Tractatus* , is now telling us to reconsider everything we have just read. We cannot, now, accept that "the world is all that is the case or that the world is the totality of facts not things." We now have to see these claims "as subversive pieces of nonsense, leading us towards proper understanding of logic, language, and the world." These remarks have generated a great deal of controversy as to how they are to be interpreted. In this regard, A.J Ayer stated that "the job of a philosopher in Wittgenstein view is that of a policeman who does not allow you to do certain things. But what about Wittgenstein's own assertions about philosophy? He was very consistent in this respect and declared that his own assertions are nonsensical. Wittgenstein is seen as offering no argument about the limits of thought at all in the *Tractatus* , for 'he does not take himself to have put forward a series of propositions, true or false. His own sentences, his 'elucidations', are 'nonsense' that is, they are 'wholly nonsensical' by this is meant that there is nothing about them that even approximates to sense."[71]

Peter Hacker tried to recover propositions of *Tractatus* by calling it illuminating nonsense. He talked of different kinds of nonsense such as gibberish nonsense and illuminating nonsense. However, Cora Diamondholds that, "nonsense is nonsense. Nonsense has no division of nonsense for her." She believes that when Wittgenstein regards something as nonsensical he implies that it has really and truly got no articulable content. But if *Tractarian* remarks are nonsense, how then are we to understand at all what we are to reject? According to Diamond, though Wittgenstein regarded *Tractatus*

to be nonsense yet has it, 'a particular kind of imaginative activity, the imaginative taking of what is nonsense for sense'.[72] According to Diamond, Wittgenstein did not wrote the *Tractatus* to end up just by saying that it is all gibberish. However, he also did not see *Tractarian* propositions as nonsense which illuminates ineffable metaphysical truth.

Whereas on Diamond's view, the notion of ineffable truths about reality is 'to be used only with the awareness that it itself belongs with what has to be thrown away'. According to Peter Hacker, "ineffable truths about reality are the only thing 'one is left holding on to ... after one has thrown away the ladder'. On this reading, Wittgenstein believed that there were such things as metaphysical truths, things that cannot be put into words, but make themselves manifest (6.522), and the *Tractatus* is an attempt to articulate these truths, and in doing so 'transgressed the bounds of sense itself, attempted to say what, by its own lights, can only be shown' (1996A 218-9). The following is Hacker's reading of *Tractarian* nonsense and *Tractarian* 'propositions."[73]

According to the *Tractatus*, there are in fact metaphysical truths, which Wittgenstein also mentioned in his book. However, he believes that any attempt to state them, including that of the *Tractatus*, is to cross the boundary of sense. Hence the propositions of the *Tractatus* are nonsense, because *Tractatus* also violates the boundaries of sense.(TLP 6.54). Thus, Hacker tried to revive the *Tractarian* propositions from this position, he tried is to distinguish them from nonsense that is mere gibberish from illuminating nonsense. Hacker believes that, it because *Tractarian* propositions violates the boundary of sense they are called are nonsensical by Wittgenstein and not because they are mere gibberish, however, "their nonsensicality nevertheless differs from mere gibberish in that they illuminate or guide us to the apprehension of essential, necessary truths which cannot be

said, but only show themselves in well-formed, empirical propositions or propositions of natural science."

"We are naturally inclined to say that it is impossible to see sounds or hear colours ... that it is a necessary truth that one cannot see sounds or hear colours. If challenged to explain the nature of this necessity, a philosopher would be inclined to assert that it is a metaphysical necessity ..., [i.e.] that it lies in the nature of things. Wittgenstein had succumbed to this style of thought when he wrote the *Tractatus* , and modeled his ontology accordingly. Subsequently, he came to think it deeply misleading'. In fact, there is no mention of violations of bounds of sense in this entry; only of 'nonsensical'".[74]

It may be pointed out that the *Tractatus* is largely a response to the logical philosophy of Frege and Russell. While Wittgenstein attacks these philosophers on a number of points, we can draw out several major themes. Foremost is their assumption that logic consists of proposition that is deduced from, self-evident axioms. Wittgenstein objects, first, to the idea that logic should be hierarchical, and some truths to be more fundamental than others; and second, to the idea that the certainty of logic should ultimately rest on nothing more than self-evidence. He also criticizes their failure to distinguish between what he calls formal concepts, and concepts proper. That is, they treat "x is a horse" and "x is a number" as being concept of the same form. His "fundamental idea" (4.0312) also contains a criticism of Frege and Russell: logical objects that are used to define the logical structure of a proposition cannot themselves be representative of any kind of object. The element of a proposition should hold together on own strength, and not on the strength of these so-called logical "objects."

Wittgenstein's difference from Frege and Russell is well expressed in a letter he wrote to Russell in1912, asserting: "logic must turn out to be a totally different kind than any other science." While Frege and Russell had tried to develop logic as a supremely general body of propositions, Wittgenstein insisted that logic cannot be considered a body of propositions or of knowledge at all.

According to Hintikka's interpretation of *Tractatus* doctrines, "many important discussions of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* more or less are directly derived from Frege and Russell tradition in logic and philosophy of language. The picture theory can also be considered to be little or more than a dramatization of certain Fregean ideas which later Tarski built into his truth-conditions for atomic propositions" [75] But in support of Wittgenstein, he further states that, "Wittgenstein throughout his philosophical career is a philosopher of immediate experience and in that senses a phenomenologist. The objects he postulated in the *Tractatus* were objects of immediate experience not unlike their historical precedent, Russellian objects of acquaintance. Furthermore the language postulated in the *Tractatus* was a phenomenological language in that its primitive terms (names) refer to objects of immediate experience". [76] In the same spirit H. Sluga asserts that, "in the large part of it (*Tractatus*) can certainly be read as an attempt to reconcile Russellian atomism with Fregean apriorism" [77]

Throughout the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein draws a sharp distinction between things that "can be said and things that can be shown". Anything that can be said must be expressed in language in a form of proposition containing sense and a proposition with sense tells only facts about things in the world. However, anything which does not concern about the world cannot be said, but they can only be shown. According to Wittgenstein, among the

different kind of things which we cannot say are the propositions concerning "ethics, aesthetics, the meaning of life, the immortality of the soul, the nature of language, the nature of logic, the nature of mathematics and the fundamental structure of the world". Wittgenstein believes that these things show themselves in the ways we can and cannot talk about the world, and the ways in which our discourse is structured. The distinction between saying and showing effectively sweeps away what had hitherto been thought of as philosophy. What philosophers try to say, Wittgenstein argues, "cannot be said, and is therefore nonsense".

2.7   CONCLUSION:

In the conclusion, it may be stated that, while examining Wittgenstein *Tractatus* it is necessary to point out the positive contribution of Wittgenstein in this sphere. A significant advanced he made over Frege and Russell is that he was able to see that it was not name which is the unit constituting meaning but it has to be a sentence. For Wittgenstein, the correspondence of a sign with an object has significance only within the framework of a proposition. This position has led him to advocate a holistic view of language in *Philosophical Investigations.* On the other hand, since for Russell "names" designate concrete particulars, their meaning depends only on "ostensive definition". Moreover, Russell's "atomic propositions" logically exclude the possibility of false "atomic proposition". Whereas, Wittgenstein elementary propositions are constituted out of names and thus takes into account the concept of false proposition. As opposed to Russell position Wittgenstein held that object exist in logical space. It is in this context that he developed further the logic of Russell and Frege. Again, Wittgenstein's acceptance of natural language has made an advance on Frege. Frege admits that thoughts have to be expressed in language because there is no other way through which it can be expressed

supported further, less complex structures. Finally, just above the earth are the least complex structures possible- elementary propositions. This consists of elements- names which are directly supported by simple things on earth- Wittgenstein's objects. It is just here and only here, with names and objects that the connection between language and reality is made, that language "hooks on" to reality."[78] Thus, we may not be able to see simple objects, nor the complexes of them (i.e the state of affairs), but they must be there to provide the ultimate foundation of the edifice of language.

We find that Wittgenstein is carrying the classical philosophical tradition namely reducing complex into simples. Such concepts may be found in the philosophies of different classical philosophers. Thales, the first known western philosopher, who attempted it when he argued all things can be reduced to water. Again Descartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hume etc also attempted the same. Descartes talked about methods through which complex can be reduced to simples. Leibnitz talked about primitive concepts. Locke and Hume also talked about simple ideas. But for the view of language which is essential identical with Wittgenstein, we have to go back to Plato's Theaetatus. Wittgenstein wrote in *Philosophical Investigations*:

What lies in the idea that name really signifies simples?- Socrates says in the Theaetatus: "if I make no mistake , I have heard some people say this: there is no definition of the primary elements- to speak- out of which we and everything else are composed; for everything that exists in its own right can only be named, no other determination is possible, neither that it is nor that it is not….but what exist in its own right has to be… named without any other determination. In consequence it is impossible to give an account of any primary element; for it, nothing is possible but the bare name; its name is

all it has. But just as what consists of these primary elements is itself complex, so the names of the elements become descriptive language by being compounded together. For the essence of speech is the composition of names." [79]

"Both Russell's individuals and my objects (TLP) were such primary elements" (PI sect 46)

Thus, unlikely as it may seem, we find in the *Tractatus* yet another extended "footnote to Plato"

Another important controversy of *Tractatus* is "ethics". Wittgenstein scarcely mentions "ethics" in the *Tractatus* and he does so only in telling us the ethics cannot be put into words. On the other hand, in a letter to his publisher he wrote that "the book's point is ethical." It is important to understand that Wittgenstein remains silent about ethics, not because he sees ethics as unnecessary, but because he feels any talk about it can only cheapen it. Ethics, according to the *Tractatus*, is not a body of knowledge, nor is it a set of maxims that we can live by. Ethics represents a general outlook on life, and because we can make no general claims about the nature of the world, we can say nothing about ethics. Ethics, in effect, makes itself manifest in the way that we deal with the world. In this sense, we could say, our ethical outlook defines the world we inhabit. Thus, for Wittgenstein, ethics is of supreme importance, but for precisely this reason, it cannot be put into words.

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein rejected the views which he held in *Tractatus* he became aware of the fact that language as such need not to be perfect in order to be about the world. There is no necessity of making language appear more than what it is. That is, it is not really the case that language has a deep structure which is hidden and cannot be

known through the ordinary understanding. There is a deep illusion that thought is hidden underneath language. Wittgenstein wrote, "Other illusions come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to us the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each"(…The language-game in which they are to be applied in missing.)(PI, sect, 96)

Thus, Wittgenstein finds it unacceptable to take language as a picture of reality in the sense that language is inherently constituted as a picture independent of our requirement of it. According to him, there is no warrant for such a view when language functions normally and when there is no illusion regarding the language-games we play in language.

Although Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, never came back to the picture theory yet he believed that language is always connected to the world not as a picture, but as a totality of representations concerning reality. Wittgenstein believed language to be a field where we can establish our contact with the world. We can understand the world only through language since in language alone we can make necessary moves regarding the world.

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CHAPTER III
LANGUAGE AND WORLD IN
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

3.1   INTRODUCTION:

Philosophical Investigations concerns about the practical uses of language. It may be regarded as an examination into the relation between meaning and the different uses of language. Wittgenstein explains how vague and unclear uses of language may be the source of philosophical problem; he tries to describe how proper uses of language can solve the problems arising in philosophy.

Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* also abandons the rigidly structured world of *Tractatus* which was of less original and more complex world that resists any simple articulation. Though, there is a vast difference in both his early and later philosophy yet significant similarities still remains.

3.2   WORLD IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS:

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein has rejected two intimately related theses of the world in *Tractatus* . They are- (a) "the world divides not into things but into facts and ultimately into the set of atomic facts"[1] and (b) "that each proposition ultimately resolves itself, by analysis into one uniquely determined truth function of elementary proposition"[2]. That is to say, each proposition has one and only one final analysis. According to this view of early Wittgenstein, the ultimate constituents of things are fixed in the very nature of things. But, the later Wittgenstein came to realize that this view is absurd. For example, if one is comparing the chair of the same design but made of

different materials, it might seem most appropriate to think of each chair as being composed of its design and its material; on the other hand if one of the chairs is being considered alone, it might seem most appropriate to think of it as being composed of legs, seat, back, and so on. Thus, every account is equally appropriate. One account might be better for some point of view, another account might be more appropriate for some other point of view.

Therefore, the early Wittgenstein was wrong in saying that the world divides into facts and not into things. One can also say the world divides into objects or into events or that it divides into some other way and so on. These are the equally valid alternative ways of dividing up the world. One of them might be more convenient for some purpose and others for the other purposes.

Moreover, Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, also rejected his notion of analysis. According to him, analysis is certainly not the only way or even the most important way of telling us what a given forms of words really means as he had assumed in *Tractatus* . Gordon Hunnings in his book, *The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy* holds that, "one of the most misleading ideas suggested by logical analysis was that, according to Wittgenstein, there was 'something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely resolved forms of every expression.'(PI91). As it was put in the *Tractatus ,* a proposition has one and one only complete analysis. This view led two further mistakes; such that process of analysis was search for great exactness in our expressions, as though there were a state of complete exactness; and so if this were the real goal of our investigations.' Secondly, the supposition that 'the essence language – its function, its structure' lay hidden 'beneath the surface … and which an analysis digs out' (PI 92)."[3] Hunnings stated that, "both the goal and method of philosophical

investigations are implicit in this view of language are decisively rejected. The proper role for philosophy is that of grammatical investigations directed to clearing away linguistic misconstruction and misunderstandings." Hunnings further stated that, "this type of analysis is called substitution analysis which is different from logical analysis. Logical analysis attempts to dig for hidden forms and structures where as substitutional analysis surveys and rearranges what is already on the surface and open to view. Grammatical surveying replaces logical excavation as a method of philosophical investigation".[4]

With the concept of analysis, is closely related the assumption which Wittgenstein made in *Tractatus* that the simple and the complex is the absolute one – that a thing is, in itself, and apart from all consideration of anything outside it, either simple or complex, and that is the end of the matter. What analysis does it was thought, is to reduce the complex situation to the absolutely simplest proposition i.e. elementary proposition which describes the absolutely simplest situation- states of affairs. To be sure, neither elementary proposition nor states of affairs thought to be absolutely simple, since they both consists of parts. Moreover, it was assumed that almost any complex proposition consists of words which denote complex things, but when it is completely analyzed, the resulting elementary propositions all consists of names which denote absolutely simple thing- Wittgensteinian objects. The correlative notions of absolute complexity and simplicity were shown by the later Wittgenstein to be groundless. According to him, nothing in itself is absolutely simple. In a certain context or from a certain point of view or when compared with something else a thing may appear simple. In other context, the same thing has to be called composite. Thus, whether a thing is simple or complex depends on the context on which the thing is being considered. Simplicity and complexity

are not absolute qualities inhering in the thing itself. And if we try to isolate a thing from all possible contexts, then there cannot be any question of whether it is simple or complex. Wittgenstein wrote,

"If I tell someone without any further explanation: "what I see before me now is composite" he will have the right to ask: "what do you mean by 'composite'? For there are all sorts of things that can mean!"- the question "is what you see composite?" makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity- that is, which particular use of the word is in question.." [5]

Thus, ultimately Wittgenstein has freed himself from the long following tradition of seeking absolute simples. This tradition has led by generation of philosophers including even the best ones like Descartes, Locke, Leibnitz, and Hume and so on.

Irwin.C. Lieb in his journal, *Wittgenstein's Investigations* tried to explain this point. He tried to show that the idea of logically simple objects has no sense. According to Lieb, Wittgenstein asks what meanings there are for 'simple' and 'composite,' and he answers that all sorts of things could be meant by the terms. He concludes that the question whether a thing is complex makes sense only "if it is already established what kind of complexity that is, what particular use of the word is in question?" (P.I47). Lieb stated that according to Wittgenstein, "when a philosopher asks if complexes are not ultimately compounded of simple objects, the kind of complexity that is in issue has not been settled: the question has not been given a sense. He therefore supposes that the correct answer to the question is that depends on what you understand by 'composite.' This answer will seem ineffective to many philosophers. One has to explain what is meant by simple and composite elements of the world."[6] Wittgenstein believes, according to Lieb that, "this

has not and cannot be done because such questions about elements are philosophical ones."

Thus, the world of *Investigations* is different from that of *Tractatus* . Here the structure of the world does not depend upon mere simple or atomic facts or objects as he claimed in *Tractatus* . In *Philosophical Investigations* the world is more depends upon the public language. Here, the world is wholly depended upon the rules or the grammar of our everyday language. This point may be cleared if we try to investigate language or what Wittgenstein meant by meaning of words which constitutes language.

3.3 LANGUAGE AND MEANING:

Wittgenstein, in his in early philosophy, believes that language and world are inseparably tied with each other. According to him, without world, language is of no use and, the world can only be described in language. Therefore, both are equally important to understand each other. In *Philosophical Investigations* also he retained the same belief, but here, he has modified his idea of language. He rectifies the mistake of regarding language as a picture of the world; language is now viewed more as a reality rather than representation of reality. Jaakko Hintikka in his book, *Investigating Wittgenstein* stated that in the *Tractatus* language was assumed as a language of immediate experience. But in the turning point of Wittgenstein's philosophical development which took place in 1929 "there *was the replacement of phenomenological language by an everyday physicalistic language* or *everyday public language*, as his operative language". Hintikka also quoted some of the instances where Wittgenstein asserted it himself. "The first book length exposition of his views that he wrote in Philosophical Remarks. In the very first section of that book Wittgenstein Wrote,

79

""I do not now have phenomenological language or 'primary language' as I used to call it, in mind as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary."

"Similar statements are found in the formulation used in F. Waismann, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna circle," p.45.

"I used to believe that there was everyday language that we usually spoke and a primary language that expressed that we really knew, namely phenomena. I also spoke of a first system and a second system. Now I wish to explain why I do not adhere to that conception anymore. I think that essentially we have only one language, everyday language."

"Wittgenstein has discarded his earlier views and here approach is more practical than phenomenal. Thus the relation between language and world is depended on the usage of this everyday language""" [7]

In order to understand the world in *Philosophical Investigations,* we must understand what Wittgenstein meant by language. PMS Hacker points out that, in the *Tractatus* the structure of language or thought provided the insight into the structure of reality. In the *Investigations* the structure of language is still the subject of investigation. Moreover, it is still isomorphic with the structure of reality not because language must mirror the logical form of the universe, but because the apparent 'structure of reality' is merely the shadow of grammar. Hacker in his book *Wittgenstein: connections and controversies* also stated that, "the philosophy of language of the Investigations has a destructive and a constructive aspect. Its destructive aspect is connected with undermining the concept of analysis that had informed the *Tractatus* and more remotely, has characterized the philosophy at least since the Cartesian and empiricist programs of analysis into simple natures and into simple ideas respectively. It aims to destroy the conception of a language

as a calculus of meaning rules and the ideas that the meaning or sense of a sentence is composed of the meanings of its constituent words and derivable from them, given their mode of combination. Hence, too, it combats the ideal of determinacy of sense, and the thought that all expressions are either definable by analytic definition, conceived of as linking language with reality and laying the foundations of language in simple objects given in experience".[8] Hacker points out that, concepts of simple and complex are relative. Whether a thing is complex or simple has to determine by reference to criteria of simplicity and complexity laid down only if there are such criteria. But we often get confuse because of the absence of such criteria. We are prone to think that an expression is complex if it is defined by analytic definition and simple if it is explained by ostension. However, Hacker states that analytic and ostensive definitions are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Words can also be explained by contextual paraphrase, contrastive paraphrase, exemplification, by a series of examples together with similarity rider, gesture and so on. Therefore, meaning of a word in not the object for which a word stands or of which it is name. Rather, it is what given by explanation of meaning; and an explanation of meaning is the rule for the use of the explanadum. Thus, Wittgenstein in *Investigations* no longer believes that the meaning of the name is the thing it denotes which he held in *Tractatus* . In fact he strongly criticized this view. Wittgenstein wrote,

"That a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. - i.e. the meaning of the word is the object to which it refers."

Wittgenstein in section 1 of *Philosophical Investigations* bring the quotation from Augustine's *Confession* to show that the words, according to Augustine, give us a particular picture of the essence of language, i.e. the individual words in language names objects-sentences are combinations of such names. Wittgenstein in the same section

explains with the example of the purchaser and shopkeeper to show the defects in Augustine's theory. The purchaser when goes for shopping to the shop with a slip written 'five red apples', one can see that corresponding to the word apples one may find apples but corresponding to the word red and five there are no such objects. One can know five and red only if one knows how the word five and red is used. Thus, meaning of a word is not the object for which the word stands the word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound "the meaning; of a name with the bearer of the name" [9]

He also criticizes the view that the names of the absolutely simple objects are the only genuine proper names that are there. Wittgenstein wrote, It is a misuse of the word 'meaning' to be use to signify the thing that corresponds to the name. What corresponds to the name is its bearer, not its meaning of the name. This confusion may be seen from the following consideration. Let us suppose that Mr. N.N is a person, when Mr. N.N dies, it is correct to suppose that the bearer of the name 'N.N' dies. But it is absurd to say the meaning of the name 'N.N' dies. Moreover if the name 'N.N' really did lose its meaning when its bearer, Mr. N.N, goes out of existence (which would be the case if the meaning of the name is the object it denotes), then it would follow that it make no sense to say Mr. N.N no longer exists or Mr. N.N is dead. "As a matter of fact a man's name does not lose its meaning when he is destroyed."[10] Therefore 'bearer of name is one thing and meaning of name is another'. According to Wittgenstein the meaning of the name is given by various descriptions which apply the bearer of the name and enable one to identify it.

Thus, with the doctrine that 'the meaning of a name is whatever it denotes' Wittgenstein's view that there must be elements of reality which are indestructible, that if a name denotes an object the objects endure forever, is also abolished. "A name can have meaning even

though nothing corresponds to it." Moreover, it is obvious that without the foundation of *Tractatus* the picture theory of meaning has to be abandoned. It makes no sense to speak of absolutely simple, indestructible elements of reality, i.e. the Objects of Tractatus . Hence, one cannot speak of arrangements of such objects, i.e., states of affairs. With no absolutely simple objects, there can be no words which do nothing apart from naming the objects and hence there cannot be any elementary propositions.

Moreover, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein also criticizes his earlier assumptions about the mental act of meaning or intending. In his early philosophy, the main problem of Wittgenstein faced was that of explaining how a correlation is made between the word and the object it denotes, between the sentence and the situation, between the language and world. His answer was that the correlation is made by the mental act of intending or meaning. A person speaks or writes the propositional sign and in addition, performs the mental act of intending the different words to stand for specific objects, of intending the propositional signs to describe one specific situation and no other. This way of looking at the matter is perfectly natural. There is a great difference between, on the one hand, saying something and meaning it and on the other hand just by saying the same words without meaning anything by them. The difference consists in the fact that in the former case, something must be there in the speaker's mind while uttering the words. For example- when P says that "Jack is coming today" and Q asks the question "Is it Jack Smith or Jack Spratt? P replies "It is Jack Smith." P while uttering the statement "Jack is coming today" is performing at the same time a mental act of meaning or intending the word "Jack" to stand for "Jack Smith" and no one else. Thus, Wittgenstein believed in his early philosophy that a mental act of meaning or intending is performed when one

writes or speaks something. And in this performance of the mental act a connection between one's word and the world is made.

But, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein realized that the entire concept of meaning which he held in *Tractatus* was wrong. According to him, it is wrong to believe that there is any sort of mental act involve in meaning something. If the act of meaning something by one's word is a different one from the act of saying them, and is a mental act accompanied by the physical act of producing the sounds then we must be able to mean something by any arbitrary series of mark or sound. For example we must be able to say "a-b-c=d" and have the mental act to mean "the weather is fine" Wittgenstein wrote, "Make the following experiment: "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here." Can you do it?-And what are you doing as you do it? And is there only one way of doing it?"[11]

Moreover, if the act of meaning something by certain words is a different act from speaking them, then we may be able to perform it without saying anything. Wittgenstein talked about a thought experiment which is as follows-:

"Make the following experiment: say and mean a sentence, e.g.: "it will probably rain tomorrow" now think the same thought again, mean what you just meant but without saying anything. (Either aloud or to yourself). If thinking that it will rain tomorrow accompanied saying that it will rain tomorrow, then just do the first activity and leave out the second – if thinking and speaking stood in the relation of the words and the melody of a song, we could leave out the speaking and do the thinking just as we can sing the tune without the words"[12]

In the above suggested thought experiments there is a sort absurdity involved. They must not be absurd according to the mental act of meaning. But such an absurdity shows that the concept of the mental act of meaning is misguided.

3.4 FAMILY RESEMBLANCE:

Wittgenstein has always looked for multiplicity and differences. Wittgenstein sets to show that early philosophers were mistaken in looking for sameness and unity. Indeed he once remarked to a friend that he had considered using as a motto for the Investigations a line from King Lear- "I'll teach you differences." According to Wittgenstein, one has only to examine, for example, the various individual to which a given general term applies, to see that there is nothing which they all have in common. As a plain matter of fact, they do not share a common essence. If we look at all games we will not find some characteristics that they all have in virtue of which we call them by that name. Wittgenstein said that,

"Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games" I mean board-games, card-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is common to them all?-don't say: "there must be something common, or they would not be called 'game' " " [13]

These words can come as a revelation. Whereas, one had always quite uncritically, and most likely also unconsciously, taken it for granted that all things called by a general term had something- an essence in common, he sees now that it is not necessarily so. At one stroke, that assumption has been revealed and destroyed. As it falls away, one's entire view of language, and indeed of the word, is quite altered.

Judith Genova states that, according to Wittgenstein, "family resemblance is the resemblance between concepts, connections that criss-cross the conceptual domain. It resists faulty generalizations and theoretical musts, discovering differences, not essences. Above all, it refuses what is hidden and supposedly more fundamental. It demands what we consider what is open to view."[14] This is a concept which shares us to each other as well as the world. Genova also pointed out that "the *Tractatus* always insisted upon keeping logic and applications apart whereas in Philosophical Investigations through these concepts Wittgenstein proceeds by doing just the opposite."[15]

We must not, however, rush from one extreme to the other; we must not infer from the fact that there is no essence of games, that each is nothing more motley, disconnected group of things which are arbitrarily called by the same name. There is no warrant for thinking that the denial of essence leaves no reason whatever why a range of different things are all named by a single general term. Although they have no common essence, they have certain "family resemblances" Wittgenstein wrote,

"I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblance"; for the various resemblance between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and crisscross in the same way- And I shall say: 'games' form a family."[16]

"And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a 'number'? Well, perhaps because it has a-direct-relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call by the same name. And we extend our concept of

number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that someone fibre runs through its whole length, but the in the overlapping of many fibres."[17]

Wittgenstein had compared the similarities of different games with the similarities of the members of a family. Just as the members of a family has certain resemblance in respect of their way of talking, walking, colour of their eyes, gait, complexion etc. similarly different games resemblances one another. We do not find any common essence between them instead we find a vast overlapping and crisscrossing similarities.

Wittgenstein's point can be generalized if we look at the matter not, as we have been doing, from the side of the things to which words apply but rather from the side of the words. Looked at from the side of the things, his point is that there is not characteristic or set of characteristics, which all things named by a given general terms have in common- there is no essence which they all share. "Looked at from side of the world his point may be put as follows: no general term has a unitary meaning. As I use the term 'unitary', a word has a unitary meaning when its meaning constitutes an indissoluble whole. That is, the statement or formulation of its meaning refers to certain definite characteristics and something must have all of them for the word to be properly applicable to it. The notion of unitary meaning is thus distinct of having a single meaning. If the word does not have single meaning it has two or more meaning; and each of these meaning may or may not be unitary. For some special purpose, we can of course make the meaning of a general term unitary by stipulating well defined limits. We might lay it down for example that nothing shall be called a 'game' unless a score can be kept and unless the prayers receive no money for their performance, and unless

there is official set of rules. The resulting concept will not, however, be the concept of a game, but only some part of it which we have chosen to mark off for our own special purposes."[18]

Here, Wittgenstein wanted to generalize the point about words. He wanted to show not only such 'family' words as 'game' and 'number' but most and perhaps all general term have no unitary meaning. Why can we say that term 'game' has no unitary meaning? Let us examine this point. "There is a group of characteristics C_1, C_2, C_3,.....C_n which games typically have. Among these characteristics the following: C_1, there are rules which govern the activity; C_2 there is the possibility of winning; C_3 it is the pleasant diversion; C_4, the players needs to exercise certain skills and so on. if all the games had these characteristics, and only games did, then the word 'game' would have a unitary meaning; the statement of its meaning would consists of a statement of the characteristics. One game may have only C_1, C_2 and C_7; another may have only C_1, C_3, C_6 and C_7; yet another only C_2, C_5 and C_6; and so on. All that is required in order for something to be a game is that it may have some of the cluster of game characteristics from C_1 to C_n; not that it has all of them." Not every combination of game-characteristics will do, of course: for example, it is not enough that something have only characteristics C_2 (the possibility of winning) in order to qualify for 'gamehood'. In wars and duels and debates, there is possibility of winning, but none is a game. There is no way of specifying ahead of time and abstract just how much enough ; it would be absurd to suggest, for instance, that in order for an activity to be properly counted as a game, it is necessary and sufficient condition that the activity have some combination of four or more of the n game characteristics. It might well be that some activities which have only

three game characteristics are without doubts games, and that others which have five or not.

The forms and uses of language are flexible and numerous it may be added that words are used in various ways. Therefore there is no set of definite rules, no one pattern to be laid, and no single explanation to be given.

It is misconceived that since they are all uses of language there must be something in common. Wittgenstein, in *Blue Book,* speaks of our craving for generality which is generated because of our tendency to look for something common to all the entities which we commonly assume under a general term. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein suggested a solution which is made explicit in his use of example of games. We are led to think that there is something in common to all games and this common property is the justification for applying the general term 'game' to many kinds of games. There is a matter of fact, some likeness or similarity, some common features which they all share.

He talked about games like board games, card games, ball games, Olympic Games and so on. It would be superfluous to say that there is something in common in them or they would not be called games. There is nothing in common to them but similarities and relationships by virtue of which they are all termed as games. If one looks carefully at board games or card games one finds many correspondences but many points eliminated and others added. There are games in which there is no amusement but lot of patience and concentration is needed. There is not always winning or losing in a game when a child throws a ball and catches it again. There is a great deal of ingenuity and luck in games like chess but there is difference between ingenuity in chess and that in tennis.

Games like ring-a-ring-a-roses and talking an instance from our Indian context of a game like flying a kite where there is an element of amusement but still a lot of concentration is required.

If one takes the example of books and tries to find out the common features they share on will fail. A given set of books may not be on the same subject or written by the same author or published by the same firm and yet they are all called books. It is not because what one is looking for lies deeply hidden, but because it is too obvious to be seen.

Wittgenstein maintains that there is no better expression to describe these characteristics than 'family resemblance'. There are various resemblances between the members of a family: build, gait, features, colour of eyes, eyebrows, temperament etc and these points overlap and criss-cross in the same way as features of games. This can be compared to the idea that properties are ingredients of the things which have the properties for example that beauty is an ingredient of all beautiful objects as milk is of butter and cheese.

The nominalist talks of resemblances until he acknowledges that resemblances is unintelligible except as resemblance in a respect and to specify the respect in which objects resemble one another it to indicate a quality or property. The realist talks of properties and qualities and points to the resemblances between the objects that are characterized by such and such a property or quality.

Wittgenstein is neither a realist nor a nominalist. He affirms at one and the same time the realist claim that there is an objective justification for the application of the word 'game' to games and the nominalist claim that there is no element that is common to all

games. Furthermore the question if resemblances or properties are the ultimate is a perverse question if it is meant to have a simple single answer.

Thus, language is safeguard from the craving for generality which occurs because of the misconception that there is something common to all the entities which we associate with a general term.

It is also misunderstood that language is something unique isolated and quite on its own. Making use of language is not among the ordinary things we do like eating, drinking, playing, walking etc. to think of language is to think of a form of life, so the understanding of language must bring in to something non-linguistic. One must take into account as to what people are, they want to do. For example, there is no such thing as giving and obeying orders. The orders have to be about something, they have meaning within a social context and this is a form of life.

In sec 65 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, in the course if introducing the idea of family resemblance Wittgenstein wrote:

"Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use same word for all,- but that they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all 'language'."[19]

The notion of family resemblance was introduced by Wittgenstein in his later philosophy by using the words- "you take the way out". He imagines of someone as complaining that he has gone on and on about language games but has never said what

a language game is. He has therefore yet to explain the unity of language. Thus he introduced the concept of family resemblance.

Wittgenstein's first illustration concerns games themselves. Now instead of deciding in advance that there must be something common to all games in virtue to which they are all games, Wittgenstein recommends that you look and see. If you do:

"You will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!" [20]

Here, Wittgenstein makes a straightforward statement of facts: if we examine those things we call games, we will not find any single property in virtue of which they are called games, and instead we find that they are grouped together with a whole series of overlapping and crisscrossing similarities.

3.5   MEANING AS USE:

In order to know what Wittgenstein meant by language, we must know what is word according to him. Wittgenstein explains how vague and unclear uses of language may be the source of philosophical problems. He also states that proper use of language can resolve philosophical problems. According to Wittgenstein, words are instruments of language which may have varying uses, according to the purpose of which language may be used. The varying ways in which language may be used help to structure the concept of the world. A. Pampapathy Rao stated that, "according to Wittgenstein words function within a language. As language is a system, words belong to a system. A word or sentence gets its meaning from the system of signs, from the language to which it belongs." Thus

understanding a sentence means understanding a language. Rao also gives a quotation of Wittgenstein from *The Brown Book*,

"As a part of system….. the sentence has life" [21]

According to him, Wittgenstein believed that the meaning of any word are fixed or determined by the rules of a system of which it is constituent. The rules of a system are its grammar. Thus grammar includes both syntactical and semantical rules. The grammar of a language is its structure. It constitutes the mode of representation with which the reality is projected into that language. It is the form of language corresponds to the form of reality. As there can be many modes of projection and many ways of representation there can be many grammatical systems and therefore many languages. Every language is complete in 'itself- complete as a system of human communication.' There are countless kinds of grammatical systems. And as language is a dynamic social institution, the multiplicity of grammatical systems cannot be fixed. "New systems can come into existence and existing systems may get obsolete. There is nothing like the necessary structure of language. That is why it is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and the way they are used…with what logicians have said about the structure of language."[13] Thus, Rao holds that in *Philosophical Investigations* "words are regarded to be the ultimate instrument of language which has different uses and that meaning of every words are determine by the grammar." He also stated that "there is a correspondence between structure of world and the structure of language. The structure of language is its grammar; however, there is no necessary structure of language as it was there in *Tractatus* ."

In *Philosophical Investigations* the meaning of the word is determined by its use. In the section 43, Wittgenstein says,

"For a large class of cases-things not for all- in which we employ the word meaning it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language"[22]

Wittgenstein tried to show the different ways in which word functions and also tried to make us aware of ambiguous nature of spoken and written words. To the question what Wittgenstein mean by use of a word or how a word as an element of language can be used? Word contents a certain kind of language-using activity such as obeying an order, describing an object telling jokes etc. it is like a more general notion of use, and Wittgenstein sometimes speaks of this notion of use as *kinds of use*.[23]Wittgenstein also tried to explain that the same word can have different kinds of uses. For example, the word *fire* can be used for a command, an exclamation description etc, for e.g. In a battle if the commander ordered 'FIRE' or if someone sees a house burning and exclaimed 'FIRE', here "the same word is used in two different circumstances. Likewise, many different kinds of words also can have similar uses."[24]

According to Wittgenstein, if we attempt to classify uses in terms of levels of generality, they will always be more or less arbitrary. There is no generality among these uses of words instead there too many overlapping and crisscrossing. According to Wittgenstein, "Frege, also hold this view when he said that a word has meaning only as a part of sentence."[25] But there is an important difference between Frege's dictum and that of Wittgenstein's. Frege's thesis seems to be refuted by the use of personal names to call people, by a 'cry of Fire!' or a label 'Poison'. These cases are not counter example and do not need explanations when confronted with Wittgenstein's thesis. For the word

belongs to an activity i.e. language using activity; they have the possibilities in tying with other words even if they are not so actually tied. But Frege's account failed to note this point.

In *Philosophical Investigation*, Wittgenstein has given two leading metaphors of words, they are *tools* and *games.* "Words are compared to tools and also to games." Wittgenstein wrote,

"Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw- driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws- The functions of the words are diverse as the functions of those objects" [26]

"When one shews someone the king in chess and says "this is the king in chess and says: 'This is the king', this does not tell him the use of this piece- unless he already knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king. You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game without ever having been shown an actual piece."[27]

These two metaphors runs side by side, the first suggests that words are something like "built in capacities". It means that words have the ability to perform different functions. On the other the second metaphor means that these abilities can be used in larger kinds of activities. For example, as we cannot use a saw for a hammer, except with the greatest difficulty similarly we cannot use the word *pain* as we use the word *red.* Tools are always used for certain purpose but this purpose is incomplete if not part of larger activity. "The game metaphor suggests an activity as self contained, and it is this aspect of them which seems to be of interest of Wittgenstein. Language in the way Wittgenstein is concerned with it, cannot be explained by something other than itself, since it has no further purpose."[28]

Wittgenstein also believes language is, in one part, an activity of giving names to object, or attaching a label to a thing. But it is not the whole language. It is just only one part. There is various language using activities. Giving names is just a part of the vast activity. For example a builder may instruct an assistant as to what type of stone is needed for the construction of a building by saying "slab" or "block" or "pillar" or " beam" according to the order in which the building-stones are needed, so that the assistant can bring correct type of stone for the construction of the building. But it is to be noted that naming of an object is only a preparation for an anticipated move in the language game. Linguistic movement occurs when a sentence is constructed, such as "bring me a slab", or "bring me a beam". Therefore, Wittgenstein describes language as a game because here, words may be used in a multiplicity of ways: for example to describe things, to ask questions, to report events, to give commands etc and to perform other acts of communication.

It may be pointed out that in his later philosophy Wittgenstein there is a transition from a referential-structural to a use-activity conception of meaning. It involves a new way of thinking about names. With this transition it is no longer to think that names as fastening language to the world through meaning simple objects. There is no longer need such a role of names. Rather Wittgenstein can now say that the word name is a "way of characterizing different kind of uses"[29] Instead of names being the basis of all use, the term name is away of grouping a number of different kinds of uses.

However, in the *Tractatus* we can use words because they signify, or as Wittgenstein puts it use mirrors signifying. In the *Investigations,* on the other hand, different kind of uses involves different ways of signifying. Colors, shapes, numbers and relations for

example are not to be thought of as ontologically distinguishable, but as different kinds of things which are done and can be done with language.

In the *Investigation,* Wittgenstein has no objection in speaking of a "proper name, the name of a color, the name of a material, a numeral, the name of a point of a compass, and so on" [30] as he had in *Tractatus* . And he does not object in saying that all of these can be ostensively defined, he states that, "An ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case"[31]. With this in his later philosophy the "core" names which established the inner structural identities between language and the world, required by the pictorial way of thinking about language, have disappeared.

P.M.S Hacker also states that, Wittgenstein in his later philosophy came to believe that it is fallacy to think that only simple concepts are ostensively defined. Ostensive definition can also be misinterpreted. Moreover, ostensive definition does not provide the foundation of language or link between language and world. Understanding ostensive definition presupposes a tacit grasp of the type of expression defined (colour-word or shaped-word). According to Hacker, the characteristics accompanying ostensive are not what meaning the colour and the shape, etc., consists in. hence understanding ostensive definition is a matter of knowing, nor recapitulating, the accompany experience of the person giving the definition. Hacker states that, "according to Augustinian picture, ostensive definition correlate names with objects, a name has meaning in virtue of standing for an object. Consequently, if name lost its correlated object it would be meaningless. This idea generates pressure to restrict real names to expressions standing for what cannot fail to exist, i.e., logically proper names. But Hacker pointed out that, Wittgenstein in the sections 37-45 of *Philosophical*

Investigations, give the rationale for the introduction of logically proper name; criticize identifying the meaning of name with its bearer. In section 43 first introduces the slogan 'the meaning of the word is its use in the language.'[32]

According to Wittgenstein, an ostensive definition explains the meaning of a word only on the condition that the grammar of the word is already known. He stated that, "So one might say that the ostensive definition explains the use-the-meaning- of the word when the overall role of the word in language is clear" [33] Just to point that 'what the word mean' will not accomplish anything unless we already known what sort of an object is being pointed at, for example a color, a shape, a thing etc. when Wittgenstein asked the question, "What does one have to know in order to be capable of asking a thing's name?" [34]The answer is that we have to know what kind of a thing we are asking for the name of, not in the sense that what kind of species it is, but in the sense of what philosophical grammatical category it belongs to. This is not the question of the classification of the thing, but of something like the 'forms of meaning'.

The *Philosophical Investigations* opens with St. Augustine's description of learning language as a matter of learning names and then immediately contrasts this with Wittgenstein's conception of language as sets of activities as shown by someone going to a store to buy "five red apples." Here are three different kind of language using activities involved, which is connected with counting, color samples and identifying a kind of fruit, all integrated in to a kind of activity of shopping. Wittgenstein wants to show us that calling these three words names does not bring out what is involved in their having meaning. It is the "doings" involved in that are important and the way the doings is fused in other activities, or forms of life.

Wittgenstein believes that meaning in language has to be practice in everyday world. He began his early philosophy with language and world integrated together. And in the later philosophy he had to begin with language, world and action integrated together, this concept makes his meaning as a use theory accomplished where meaning intrinsically an action which is performed in our everyday world. Henry Le Roy Finch, in his book *Wittgenstein- the Later Philosophy,* makes use of two words. They were *Gebrauch* and *Verwendung,* he wrote,

*"*These two pair of words represents the two aspect of Wittgenstein's thought about use- use as facts and use as acts, or actual use and possible use. For Wittgenstein imaginary uses (PI 6), metaphysical uses (PI 116), Figurative uses (PI p.215) are all cases of *Verwendung.* Terms like *sentences, question, order, report, formulae, concept, description* etc are connected to *Verwendung.* On the other hand what are learnt (PI 6), practiced (PI9), and defined (PI 30) are all cases of *Gebrauch.* Terms which are used in connection with *Gebrauch* are *words, numerals, names, signs* etc. this contrast points out that there is a distinction between usage (Gebrauch) and utilizing (Verwendung). According to Wittgenstein, while it is possible that a usage and a utilizing coincide, so that we may use it in some other way, for all kinds of special uses are possible, and beyond this, new language-games are constantly coming into existence."[35]

Finch pointed out that, "though Wittgenstein integrated meaning and use together yet he does not regard the meaning of a word to be its use only. He does not want to restrict the term meaning. He also links meaning with explanation." In the Investigation he stated that, "The meaning of a word is what is explanation of the meaning." i.e. if you want to understand the use of the word "meaning" look for what are called 'explanations

of meanings.' Wittgenstein held that names can be explained by pointing or by demonstrative expression or by describing examples. In these cases grammars and language-games are implicit and taken for granted. Explanations work because they work within these frameworks. Explanations, therefore, we might say are internal to language, they belong to the actual workings of the language."[36]

3.6   LANGUAGE GAME:

Wittgenstein idea of meaning and use can be explained only in the view of language games. Wittgenstein believes Language games is the network of linguistic activities and certain non linguistic activities. It is the practices which human beings undertake to interact with the world. Thus world can be describe within the framework of language game.

A. Pampapathy Rao, in his book, *Survey of Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning* states that,

"In the Investigations the validity of the picture theory is not questioned. What is maintained in the *Tractatus* is true as far as the particular use of the function of the picture is concerned. But representing facts according to the later Wittgenstein is not the only function of language. It is one of its functions. According to *Tractatus* , the form of a language depends upon the mode of projection with which reality is projected into that language. In *Some Remarks on Logical Forms,* it is maintained that innumerable modes of projections are possible. Hence, there can be innumerable forms of language representing the forms of reality or standing in a projective relation to it. What is maintained in the Investigations is a logical corollary to this. If the form of reality can be projected into language in many ways, it is not absolutely necessary to

follow a particular way, for any other way can be followed. The selection of a mode of projection is arbitrary. The selection is a game. So it follows that there can be many language games. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein shows how the idea that there is a necessary form of language leads to many philosophical perplexities. He aims at dissolution of this idea that of language which holds us captive. The method of which follows to show this is that of observation of, rather than reflection or language-forms. He looks at, and not thinks of, language-forms as used as instrument or tools to function variously and to meet various needs." [37]

Wittgenstein wanted to clarify 'meaning' and at the same time also wanted to distinguish between 'sense and nonsense'. In trying to determine the sense of a sentence in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein we have to bring the use of the sentence in connection with a particular language using activity. According to Wittgenstein, same sentence may have quite different uses depending on what we are doing with it. However, the question arises what does Wittgenstein mean by the term language game? We find at least four different meaning of language games as understood by Wittgenstein.

He wrote the following:

1. " I… will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language game"

2. "…..those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these language games…"

3. " And the processes of naming the stones and repeating words after someone might also be called language games"

4. " I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the language game"

The key term here is the word 'primitive'. What does the word 'primitive' mean here? Wittgenstein wrote,

"…language is meant to serve for a communication between a builder A and assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call- Conceive this as a complete primitive language." (PI 2)

The word primitive meant by Wittgenstein as a simplified language, more simple than we find in actual use, but this is immediately connected with actual language by referring to it as the kind of language by which children learn their native tongues. In the very beginning of the Investigations we find St Augustine's simultaneous description of the nature of language and the way children learn language. Wittgenstein then immediately describes St. Augustine's conception as "a primitive idea of the way language functions"[38] Then he speaks of the advantage of studying "the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of use" and couples it with "a child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk".[39]

This repeated connecting of language games with the way children learn language is of great importance because it establishes that language games are not merely devices for describing language, but appears also in the actual practice of language. We are not to think of language,-games as the 'essence of language' or even as 'ideal simplification' and we are not to go in the *Brown Book* direction of seeing in them an apriori system. They are 'simplifications' and 'explanations', but also 'training':

"A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training."[40]

Thus, in the later development of his ideas Wittgenstein seems to question the earlier view of the uniformity of language which made words more rigid and limited in its use. However, in his later philosophy, he came to think of language to be flexible, subtle and multiform. This view of the multiformity of language is discussed in detail in the Brown Book by Wittgenstein in 1934-35. He gave the example of the builder and the Assistant. The Builder was playing a kind of language game with his Assistant. The builder utters the word 'slab' and his assistant brings him the object that is needed. In this kind of language game there is great deal of training is involved. To understand a certain word on hearing, one is to carry out a certain task. It also similar to the language games where a child learns the use of words on the basis of demonstrative teaching by his or her elders. In the language game of the builder and the assistant there is sort of rapport is established between them with such phrases as 'five bricks', 'that slab', 'first slab', 'ten brick' etc.

A counter example can be given of shooting a movie where the director gives command to his team in the following manner, "LIGHT", "CAMERA" and "ACTION".

Here, the director is commanding to his team to follow his orders. Here, we do not find any static reflection of things in words. Instead we find a total dynamic pattern of words and actions. Here, "light", "camera", "action" is not any kind of description but it is a command or order or an appeal to his team to carry out the shooting of the movie in a particular which they practice regularly. Likewise, in the example of the Builder and

Assistant in the section 2 of the *Investigations*, 'Brick' is not a description, but an order or an appeal to the Assistant by the Builder, to bring him the particular thing. It is in the way that language game that Wittgenstein put forward in this later work and that forms a critique of the logical period.

In the early philosophy, it was language itself which was understood as a measure of the world. Here in the later philosophy language no longer measures the world, but we measure language and the try to describe the world within language games. Language games may be regarded as particular kind of simplifying scheme which can be employed to bring out the similarities and dissimilarities in the functioning of language to prevent us from being misled by apparent similarities and dissimilarities. Language games help us to isolate kind of use and in this way to avoid puzzles generated by putting together what does not belong together.

Language games are fundamental in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. They are the absolute starting point. This means that they can neither be explained nor justified. The idea of trying to account for them in psychological, social, epistemological or metaphysical terms has to be given up, for any such accounts will themselves be additional language activities, already themselves presupposing what they are supposed to be explaining. Language games are the primary thing coming before any experience, feeling and imagined reality.

Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a "proto-phenomenon". That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played. The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our experience, but of noting a language game. Wittgenstein stated that,

". . . Look on the language-game as the primary thing. And on the feelings, etc. as you look on a way of regarding the language game, as interpretation." [41]

When we feel that there is something outside of language and which is beyond language game and when we try to make this meaningful, then we will be always within language games. What is supposed to be accessible beyond the language game always involves some other language games. Since language games provide all ways of speaking, there is no way of making sense outside of them. However Anthony Kenny in his book *Wittgenstein* states that,

"According to Wittgenstein the most common form of philosophical nonsense arise not when a word is used outside any language game at all, but when it is used in a language game other than the one appropriate to it (it is not possible to use word outside of language game). So it is clearly important to be able to know where one language game ends and another begins" [42]

It may be pointed out that Wittgenstein concept of language game is wholly a new concept. But it may be sometimes questioned why Wittgenstein has chosen the metaphor of game. Why does he not use the term language activities instead of games? Wittgenstein, in his book *Philosophical Grammar,* states the following:

"The explanation of a meaning is no experiential proposition and no causal explanation; but a rule, an agreement."[43]

As we know that games always has completeness. It has a beginning and an end. It has certain rules. It is played correctly or incorrectly. It also allows failure and success. In addition games are so various that they have no common essence or no fixed boundaries.

In other words all games has certain rule but these rules are different in different games i.e. every games has a rule of their own, they do not have any common essence. In order to play a game there must be a commitment to a pattern which preexist the actual playing. This is the reason Wittgenstein compares language using activities to games. He believed that different languages have different rules which are crisscrossing and overlapping. Wittgenstein stated that he is interested in language as phenomena and not as a means to particular end. He is not interested in how we bend language to our will but rather what language itself does and can do.

Wittgenstein was not successful in giving a complete list of language games although he gave some of the examples in the section 23 of the *Investigations* but nowhere in the book had he regarded it to be a complete list. Examination shows that the list is constructed with very great care. His list of language games are as follows:

""Giving orders, and obeying them"

"Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements"

"Constructing objects from a description (a drawing)"

"Reporting an event"

"Speculating about an event"

"Forming and testing a hypothesis"

"Presenting the results of an experiments in tables and diagrams"

"Making up a story; and reading it"

"Play-acting"

"Singing catches"

"Guessing riddles"

"Making a joke; telling it"

"Solving a problem in practical arithmetic"

"Translating from one language into another"

"Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying"[44]

All these games are connected with each other. Wittgenstein appears to have chosen the most ordinary examples rather than the simpler ones which might have come to mind. It is games in practice that he is interested in here, rather than artificially simplified ones.

Moreover, Anthony Kenny pointed out that, language games are also invented by Wittgenstein as models for philosophical theories e.g. for Plato's account of naming in the Theaetatus, and for Russell's theory of descriptions as used in the *Tractatus* . Here Wittgenstein has contrasted what he had said in the *Tractatus* about the structure of language with the multiplicity of different language games. For example, if it is asked how many kinds of sentences are there- assertion, questions and command? The answer will be there are countless kinds of sentences: countless different kinds of use. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of languages, new language games as we may say come into existence and others becomes obsolete and get forgotten. We may remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language games because of the clothing of our language makes everything alike.

3.7 WORLD AND FORMS OF LIFE:

Wittgenstein believes that meaning in language has to be practice in everyday world. Hebegan hisearly philosophy with language and world integrated together. And in the

later philosophy he had to begin with language, world and action integrated together, this concept makes his meaning as a use theory accomplished where meaning intrinsically an action which is performed in our everyday world. Wittgenstein wrote

> "…it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language game"

In Wittgenstein later philosophy language and forms of life are integrated together. According to him speaking language is a part of forms of life or it may be said that language cannot be imagined apart from a form of life. Wittgenstein even says that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. If for example we try to imagine an actual occurrence of the language game of giving orders we have to imagine it in connection with some activity. There is no such thing as such giving and obeying orders as it were in general. The orders have to be about something; they have to have a setting in some activity and this is a form of life.

However, it is one of the important concepts in Wittgenstein's philosophy because it reflects what Wittgenstein tries to explain about the world in *Philosophical Investigations*, he regarded forms of life as a way of living. Here Wittgenstein conception of the world is more practical than metaphysical. J. F. M Hunter in his article "Forms of Life" in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* has given four interpretation of form of life. They are

1. ""A form of life is the same as a language game and calling a language game a form of life is saying that it is something formalized or standardized in our life; that is one of life's form."

2. "A form of life is a sort of package of mutually related tendencies to behave in various ways: to have certain facial expression, to make certain gestures, to do certain things like count apples or help people and to say certain things."

3. "To say that something is a form of life is to say that it is a way of life, or a mode, a manner, fashion or style of life: that it has something important to do with the class structure, the values, the religion, the type of industry and commerce and of recreation that characterize a group of people."

4. "….the sense I am suggesting is more like something typical of a living being: typical in the sense of being very the same class as the growth or nutrition of living organisms or as the organic complexity which enables them to propel themselves about, or to react in complicated ways to their environment.""[45]

All these views of Wittgenstein are taken from *Philosophical Investigations*. In all these instances Wittgenstein has mentioned form of life and language together. This shows how form of life is interwoven with language. Hunter points out that, what Wittgenstein meant by forms of life from the above paragraphs is that language apart from form of life cannot be imagined. If we imagine any occurrence of any sort of language game we have to imagine it in connections to some form of life. In case of Wittgenstein's example of shopping for five red apples, for example, we have one meaningful activity or form of life carried out by means of three different language games- in this case counting, identifying colors and picking out objects. The three games are unified into one meaningful pattern of action. It is easy to imagine the three games functioning in terms of other quite different forms of life; as awarding five red apples, painting a picture of five red apples, teaching arithmetic by means of five red apples etc. However, it must be noted that a form of life cannot be a language game because same language game

may be used in connection with different forms of life, as conversely different language game can be united in a single form of life. In the case of Wittgenstein's example of shopping for five red apples, for example, we have one meaningful activity or form of life carried out by means of three different languages-games- in this case counting, identifying colors and picking out objects. The three games are unified into one meaningful pattern of action. "it is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle- or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. and innumerable others- and to imagine a language means to imagine a forms of life."[46]

For example, we try to imagine an actual occurrence of the language game of giving orders we have to imagine it in connection with some activity. There is no such thing as such giving and obeying orders as it were in general. The orders have to be about something; they have to have a setting in some activity and this is a form of life.

The idea of "forms of life" reflects what Wittgenstein tries to explain about the world in *Philosophical Investigations*, he regarded forms of life as a way of living. Here, Wittgenstein conception of the world is more practical than metaphysical.

Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations* also mentions about the phenomena or activity of hope in relation to a form of life. He states that, "Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a characteristic of human handwriting, it has no application to beings who do not write.) Hoping is expressed in things which people do (awaiting someone, writing letters inquiring about them, going to certain places etc.) these are the phenomena of hope.

Wittgenstein says that that they are only possible "for those who have mastered the use of a language".[46] But then he indicates that this only means that the concept of hope has no application except for those who do have language.

We can here distinguish between the activities which are connected with hoping or express hope and the language which makes uses of the word hope in which people speak about their hopes. It is the former which Wittgenstein calls "this complicated form of life"- various patterns of activities which might be called hoping behaviour. This kind of behaviour is only possible for people who have language amounts to saying, not that there is a factual connection here, but rather that we simply do not apply the word hope to creature who do not have language.

Wittgenstein also regarded the forms of life as the actions which are established as belonging to a group and which has a common meaning shared in by the members of that group. Wittgenstein considers another example of a case where we would not be able to learn a language because we would not be able to see how it fitted into people activities. He imagines of visiting a strange country. He states,

> "Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the usual human activities and in the course of them employed, apparently, an articulate language. If we watch their behavior, we find it intelligible, it seems 'logical.' but when we try to learn their language, we find it impossible to do so."[47].

Here it is imagined that the people "carried on the usual human activities"- that is, they do things that look like our forms of life. But we do not know what these activities mean to them because we cannot figure out how what they say is connected with them and in addition we cannot even figure out what they are saying because we cannot; see what it

has to do with what they are doing. We cannot know their form of life. Their form of life is different from us. Even if we try to learn their language we cannot learn their form of life. The way of saying and doing which are fused together in every forms of life are different. Every group of beings has their own form of life where they live and grow up. Every group of people belonging to different community has their own forms of life. Even every group of people working in different jobs has different 'forms of life', for example, a form of life of a doctor is different from a teacher, and a form of life of a cook is different from a form of life of a carpenter. Every religious group also has different forms of life or every people belonging to different culture have different form of life

Every group of people belonging to different community has their own forms of life. Even animals may have their own forms of life which cannot be understood by us. Wittgenstein stated that,

"If lion could talk we cannot understand them."[48]

Wittgenstein states that we can know certain habits of animals like their sleeping, eating, hunger anger etc. but we cannot learn their form of life. It is so because their form of life is different from human beings. Therefore, Wittgenstein claims that even if a lion could talk we cannot understand him. Thus every form of living has their own forms of life and a way of living. Every form of life is represented within language. Thus every way of living is represented within language.

Therefore the question of whether animal there are forms of life among animals runs head-on into the question of what point of the word understanding no longer applies. Thus every form of living has their own forms of life. Every form of life is represented within language. Thus every way of living is represented within language.

Gordon Hunnings states that "in *Tractatus* Wittgenstein believes that it is the reality that gives language its determinate logical structure but in the later philosophy Wittgenstein denies that it is reality that shapes grammar."[47] The main reason behind this belief, according to Hunnings, is that in the later philosophy "Wittgenstein does not regard language to be a mirror of a fixed determinate world but reflects our forms of life in the world and as such, is intention orientated. Its representational standpoints, its methods of projection, its applications and grammars are reflection of our life style, uses, needs and purposes. We shape language in accordance with variety of different aims and activities such that the grammar of a language game forms a part. For example, arithmetic derives its structures and point from the activities of counting. Even in the case of our use of colour words where reality or the laws of physics seems to fix the concepts for us a question such as 'are there three or four primary colour?' is a grammatical rather than empirical one Much of the analysis of colour concepts has nothing to do with physics, physiology or psychology but on the other hand some 'sentences are often used on the borderline between logic and empirical, so that their meaning changes back and forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as expressions of experience. As a result of this oscillation between logic and the empirical we generate various species of grammatical fictions. Thus it seems that grammar reflects our forms of life as though the two were separate and distinct. Wittgenstein states, 'Would it be correct to say our concepts reflect our life?' They stand in the middle of it. The rule governed nature of our language permeates our life."[49]

Wittgenstein does not attempt to explain the connection between language and regular activities or common practices, the connection which has been of so much interest to social philosophers during the past few decades. The attempt to find "something in

113

common" between language and social customs and behaviors (something which might account for their common meaningfulness") has been a central theme of a number of different social theories. Wittgenstein does not look for such views because it would lead us back in the direction of essentialism. It is just the mistake of some Wittgenstein-oriented social philosophers as well as contemporary schools of social thoughts.

3.8   CRITICISMS:

Language and the world stand in mutual relation in Wittgenstein later philosophy. Language was in fact the medium through which Wittgenstein bonded the mind and the world. By use of theory of meanings and the notions of language games, Wittgenstein embeds language in the world itself, and thus brings out a stronger bond between the two. While in the *Tractatus* , the bond between language and the world is purely formal and syntactical; in the *Philosophical Investigations,* it is more social and semantic. However, different philosophers have critically discussed Wittgenstein's idea of world and language which is to be found in his later philosophy. Some of these are the following:

1. Gordon Hunnings points out that "the important weakness which is to be found in Tractatus and also has its counterparts in Investigations also. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein was in search of logical form shared by world and language for which he took semantic route to ontology, which he later criticized."[50] However, in his later philosophy we find the same objection between the world and grammar. The point is made clear by Wittgenstein own remark, "if I want to tell someone what colour some material is to be I send him a sample, and obviously that sample belongs to language; and the equally the memory or image of a colour that I conjure by a word belongs to language. The memory and the reality

must be in one space. I could also say: the image and the reality are in one space…I will count any fact whose obtaining is a presentation of a proposition's making sense as belonging to language."[51]

This decision to categorize as language what others would count as non-linguistic facts of reality is the key to understanding many of the remarks of Wittgenstein on grammar and the world. It places in perspective and lessens the shock-value of such remarks as, 'how do I know that this colour is red?' It would be an answer to say, "I have learnt English"'[52] In the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* although the boundaries of language are differently drawn; both are prescriptions resulting from two different views of language function. In the earlier work features of language are attributed to the world and in the later work features of the world are attributed to language.

The recognition of the elasticity of the notion of the picture in the Tractatus led to the realization that a picturing relation where anything can be a picture of anything is of little value in elucidating the sense of language. Coupled with this recognition of elasticity is Wittgenstein's rejection of generality as exemplified in his own attempts to find the general form of propositions, the Russellian 'all', the assimilation of the grammars of finite and infinite series and universalizing of particular paradigms. This rejection of generality is crucial for Wittgenstein's method of analyzing concepts by meticulous examination of particular instances and their differentiation in ways that dispel the persuasiveness of the generality invoked by philosophers. The skilful deployment of these methods and the sharpness of the questions philosophy itself trades upon a new variety of

generality whose elasticity is as problematical as the earlier concepts of representation proved to be. This relates to Wittgenstein concept of grammar.

Hunnings further states that, "it is partly because Wittgenstein has prescribed the inclusion in language of facts which determine the sense of a proposition and partly because of the expanding boundaries of the concept of grammar that it becomes impossible to demarcate sharply between the world and language. As he has been noted, for Wittgenstein there is no uniform logic of colour words which reflects the structure of reality because he has chosen to incorporate the facts about colour patches into the grammar of language-games about colour." The convolutions that the maintenance of this viewpoint entails are clearly manifest *Remarkson Colour*. Take, for example, this passage:

"What are there in favour of saying that green are a primary colour and not a mixture of blue and yellow? Is it correct to answer: 'You can only know it directly, by looking at the colors'? But how do I know that I mean the same by the words 'primary colors' as someone else who is also inclined to call green a primary colour? No, here there are language-games that decide this questions."[53]

One of the reasons for incorporating colour samples into the language games using colour words was due to the conviction that "an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case".[54] The success with which children learn through ostensive definition to correlate names and objects does not demand the postulation of a primitive proto-language to show what station in grammar a name occupies. The proto-phenomenon simply is the ostensive definition itself; it is not the grammar. One might echo Wittgenstein's own words in another

connection and say that ostensive definition is a form of life under normal circumstances enables us to connect words and nonlinguistic entities. The treatment of colour samples as a part of grammar is unnecessary and, in many ways, misleading.

According to Hunnings, Wittgenstein stated that, "it is not only ostensive definition that may be variously interpreted in every case but also methods of projection, correlation and rules. This is consistent with his rejection of generality but, it might be argued, seems to be at variance with the common agreement compromising the normal practice of projecting, correlating and following a rule."[55]

These considerations call in question the role of grammar in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. To deny the incorporation of colour samples into language is to undermine the view that reality does not shape grammar. To resist the assimilation of mental events like memory –images with language is to construe such grammar and puts phenomenalism back on agenda. To reassert the external (vertical) relation of world and thought with respect to language instead of Wittgenstein proposed internal (horizontal) relation would be rehabilitate ostensive definition as a vehicle of ontology. To maintain a logical distinction between words and actions would be drive a wedge into their assimilation in the concept of language game.

Adopting any or all these proposals does not arise from the desire to put the clock back but from disquiet about the generality of Wittgenstein's concept of grammar and the suspicion of circularity about his argument. So broad category

of grammar is not the result of his *Philosophical Investigations,* but a requirement for them.

A thinker as acute as Wittgenstein could hardly have been unaware of the possibility of this kind of objection. Hence, his insist that the objects of his investigations is only to describe and not to explain language. According to him, the temptation to which philosophers are prone is to offer explanations of language-functions that only mythologies grammar and impede a clear view of language actually at work.

"Mere description is so difficult because one believes that one needs to fill out facts in order to understand them. It is as if one saw a screen with scattered colour patches, and said: the way they are here, they are unintelligible; they only make sense when one completes them into shape- 'Whereas I want to say: Here is the whole. (if you complete it you falsity it.).'"[56]

Wittgenstein cannot have it both ways. If our Forms of life are embedded in the grammar of our language-games then the possibility of neutral theory- free description is ruled out. In Wittgenstein's investigations of language what purports to be descriptions turns out to be explanation; i.e. the facts filled out by the concept of grammar. The incorporation into language of activities associated with language games, colour samples, mental events and the analogies of methods of projection, games, tools and the later picture-theory of meaning all pertain to the apparatus of explanation rather than description of language. Wittgenstein's special and elaborate vocabulary of grammar transcends the facts just as much as any other philosophy of language which he claimed only falsified

language. "The assertion that (his) philosophy only demolishes house of cards and in no way interferes with language but leaves everything as it is, at best tendentious and at worst nonsense" (PI 118,124).[57] The replacement of analogies of propositional picture and logical calculus by the grammatical analogies of the later philosophies is the replacement of one house of cards by another. Grammar as conceived by Wittgenstein does not give us the facts but another interpretation of the facts. Although so much that he discusses is illuminated by his incandescent intelligence Wittgenstein once again fall victim to his own generality and lifelong impulse to put an end to philosophy. Nevertheless, for those who understand philosophy, the erection of not one but two such impressive house of cards is a considerable achievement and not wholly inappropriate monument to Wittgenstein's genius.

Thus, Wittgenstein in the *Investigations,* defines the nature of world within the framework of language and grammar. For him the metaphysical structure of the world also is a grammatical decision. Since, for Wittgenstein, grammar determines the structure of the world the limits of grammar are also co-extensive with the limits of the world. In this respect the statement of P.M.S Hacker seems significant. "In the Investigations the structure of language is still the subject of investigation. Moreover, it is still isomorphic with the structure of reality, not because language must mirror the logical form of the universe, but because the apparent 'structure of reality' is merely the shadow of grammar."

Here, Hacker seems to mean "shadows of grammar" that "the structure of the world has no ontological basis but is ultimately based on grammar. But, the

shadow of the so-called is not an illusion, since the structure of the world is as real as that of language. Therefore, the structure of the world is ultimately a decision of grammar."[58]

The question of ontological foundations of the grammatical forms leads philosophers, sometimes, beyond language in the expectation that there may be grounds in reality for such foundations. But ultimately such efforts are in vain because we cannot go beyond language.

2. Wittgenstein has often been criticized for regarding Forms of Life to be the meeting point of language and world. RC Pradhan in his book *Language, Reality, and Transcendence* points out that, Wittgenstein in his later philosophy, realized that language has no fixed logical form and that language is basically a form of human life and action. Therefore, he came to believe that language cannot determine the structure of reality as he did in *Tractatus* . It can be determine only with the forms of language i.e language games as they are demonstrated in our everyday language. We thus confront the world in our language and forms of life. That is to say now language and reality have common meeting point that is in our forms of life i.e. the field of our action (However it is correct to say that he has rejected the logical world of *Tractatus* but it is not correct to say that he has given up the transcendental framework itself wherein language determines the structure of the world and lays down the necessary condition of our intelligible experience. P.M.S Hacker has rightly pointed out the Kantian framework is retained in his later writings, but he seems to believe that there is thorough-going historicism in Wittgenstein's metaphysical framework. He writes,

"The Kantian flavor which marked the *Tractatus* as a work of critical philosophy is preserved in Wittgenstein's later work. But it is deprived of its rationalist, historical features. To be sure, the mind forms nature, but the forms it imposes is not the reflections of the necessary structure of the mind, of any discursive intelligence."[59]

This is to mean that our language which imposes its own structure on reality has no definite fundamental forms and therefore, it cannot provide any necessary forms of knowledge of reality.

Pradhan furthers states that, the alleged historicity of our conceptual framework cannot be accepted, if we take our forms of life and thought to be quite fundamental to us. "Our forms of life and thinking are not mere changing modalities which are in a constant flux, but are something fundamental to our being human at all. Our forms of life have also a transcendental dimension then they reflect the necessary feature of thought. In that sense the forms of life will remain a historical from the transcendental point of view. If this can be proved than we can claim that the early transcendental metaphysics has reappeared in Wittgenstein's later philosophy."[60]

We have seen that logic had been the foundation of his early metaphysics. After logic has been replaced by the ordinary language and the forms of life, the foundation of metaphysics has to be sought somewhere in the later, i.e., in our forms of life. The problem now is: how can life be the foundation of any possible metaphysics of the world? The answer to this question can be made easy if we clarify the connotation of the concept 'life'. By this term 'life' Wittgenstein means

our subjectivity which is the source of all our forms of language and concept for organizing our experience of the world. These later forms can be called 'forms of life' which condition all our conceptual as well as linguistic activities. However, life does not mean anything other than the linguistic continuum in the universal sense and therefore, it is nothing absurd to say that life supplies the grounds of the necessary condition of our knowledge and of reality and thus is the foundation of metaphysics of the world.

Wittgenstein had recognized the metaphysical dimensions of life when he had written in the *Tractatus* : "world and life are one" he had meant thereby that life and world have the same limits, since the world is 'my world'. But in the *Tractatus* this could not be expressed but was only shown. Life in the transcendental sense remained outside the world as the limit of our language and logically structured world. It was ultimate metaphysical ground of the world. In his later thought Wittgenstein has continued to emphasize life as the foundation of our language and the world. But life is no more inexpressible in language; it is prominent in the very forms of our language and action. It constitutes our natural history. The early transcendental subjectivity has been transformed into the continuum of our forms of life. These forms of life as expressible in multifarious linguistic activities shape the nature of reality on which we act through our language. Referring to this C.A. van Peursen states,

"Once point where he agrees with his earlier position is in talking of altering and enlarging the limits of the world, but this is not now confined to what is metaphysical in the sense of what cannot be expressed but properly belongs to the methods of mathematics, and indeed to every arrangements of experience, from

jigsaw puzzles and bricklayer's talk to the language of higher mathematics and the theory of man"[61]

Thus, the emphasis on our forms of language as the forms of organization of our experience of the world reasserts the view that our world is subjective transcendental sense. In the widest sense it can be said that the limits of our life are the limits of the world we know in language. This is implicit in his later philosophy, though Wittgenstein does not expressly put the forms of life on a transcendental status. But when we analyze the depth-dimensions of our forms of life we find how the latter contain in themselves the transcendental 'I' in the form of the language using 'we', and how the transcendental framework has been kept intact, though its contour have been reshaped. Every attempt to interpret the forms of life as conventional phenomena in language-use is to forget the depth-rootedness of our language and their universal import. If universality of life is something to be reckoned with, then it can supply the necessary grounds of our linguistic behaviour and thus provides the necessary forms of experience formation.

The metaphysical solution in Wittgenstein's later philosophy thus outlined shows that his later philosophy continues the transcendental framework from his early thought and also that the resultant metaphysics in the later philosophy has opened new vistas, within the transcendental framework, in the outlining of the nature of the world, i.e., reality. What remains for us is to show the solution of the latter problem, i.e., "the outlining of the nature of reality in his later thought."[62]

3. Wittgenstein is often been criticized for the naming in his later philosophy which is not by itself a use of words. In one place he says it is something like hanging a label on a thing, and this by itself has no linguistic significance, since the label per se does not even tell us what is being labeled, and indeed, unless it does something more than just as well have blown there. Calling naming a use of words is like calling a tool-box a tool. There is nothing in the world which can be just labeled, or which is presented to us as an object which corresponds to nothing more than a label.

Even in the *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein's view was that there is no mere naming or mere referring since even the simplest names refers to objects that have forms (or possibilities of combinations with other objects) as part of their intrinsic natures. Sheer existence was not nameable. Or as Wittgenstein would have agreed at both stages of his philosophy the way the word name is used does not cover "the kind of use which the word this has"[63]

We cannot in Wittgenstein's philosophy get what nominalist wants-names fastened to particulars in such a way that the name stands for just this one unique thing. This may seem to deny the possibility of proper names until we ask ourselves just what proper names name and how they are used. We then recall that we cannot even apply proper names unless we have ways of identifying, "so that even in this case it is not the unique particularity which is being named, but rather some assemblage of different recognizable features. Even proper names must have senses or must have uses (PI79, 87)"[64]

4. The use theory of Wittgenstein has to face fundamental problem of determining the proper sense of the term 'use". Meaning for Wittgenstein is use. But there certain type meaning of words which does not have anything to do with its use.

It leads to many philosophers like Paul Ziff question this point of Wittgenstein. Ziff pointed out that 'it is wrong to say the meaning is determined by its use in language, for use of a word is based on many factors. Some of which has nothing to do with the questions of meaning. Gilbert Ryle points out that in what sense we should regard the word 'use'. Is it 'usage' or 'utility'? In what terms the meaning of 'use' is to be applied. According to Ryle, in searching the meaning of a word the utility or the facts in which a word is used, that is, its usage of words are not enquired. Instead the standard use to which a particular word is applied becomes matter of enquiry. The standard use, according to Ryle, is such that there is a need of explanation of meaning of the particular word. Ryle says "usage is a custom, practice, fashion, vogue…there cannot be miscustom or misvogue."

Anthony Kenny also points out that, there are two difficulties related in understanding the use of an expression. "First does 'use' mean 'usage' or 'utility'? Does a word have a use provided that it can fit into acceptable sentences, or does its use have to make some difference in the world? Wittgenstein's two favourite similes point in opposite directions. A game, like chess, has only syntactical rules; what goes on in chess has no effect on the world except indirectly through the consequences of winning and losing. On the other hand, tools are instruments for operating on the world and altering it in various ways. Secondly, is the theory of meaning as use to be applied primarily to words or the whole sentence? Here words seem unlike tools, because tools work on the world in isolation, whereas in

general we have to put words together into sentences to affect the world in any way: it looks as if it would be a more helpful metaphor to say that in the complete sentence that seems to be the move in the game Sentences are made, rather than used, once one has got beyond the phrase-book stage of learning a language."[65]

5.   Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, believed that to speak is to behave in certain ways. But here an objection can be raised. George Pitcher pointed out that, "he makes too much of behaviour. Admittedly, words are often used in the context of practical activity, in situations in which non linguistic behaviour plays an essential part- that is, in what were called impure language games. Wittgenstein focuses his attention on such languages- games. But words are also- and perhaps most often- used in pure language games: we commonly use words in mere conversations. What sort of non linguistic behaviour is supposed to relevant in these cases? There isn't any full stop the words that are used undoubtedly have meaning, and yet they are not woven into any pattern of non-linguistic behaviour." So it would seem that Wittgenstein account is just inapplicable to the use of words in pure language game and hence is of only limited interest. "This objection is based on far too restricted a conception of behaviour; it confines behaviour to non linguistic behaviour. But Wittgenstein would not certainly do so, and there seems to be no justification for doing so."[66]

3.9   CONCLUSION:

Wittgenstein's later philosophy has notably given up the logical syntax of the *Tractatus* and the logical method of understanding the world. However, the accent is still on language as the source of the intelligibility of the world of experience. But as it is amply

evidenced in wittgenstein's later writings, language is not conceived of as a logical syntax, i.e., logical calculus but is now thought as a multitude of language game, i.e. , forms of language. As a consequence, the world s not conditioned by logic, but by the forms of language as occurring in actual practice. That is, the logical method of understanding the world has been transformed into method of understanding through grammar as embodying the forms and conditions of all language use. Thus now the essence of the world is not determined by logic, but by the grammar of our language.

Even in this changed perspective, Wittgenstein does not accept the experience as a method of understanding of the world, since, according to him, experience is itself determined by our interpretation of the world through language. Now, according to him, the forms of language which function as language-games lay down the conditions of our intelligible discourse and also the conditions of the possibility of our experience of the world. This affirms Wittgenstein's early method which aimed at an understanding of the world. But, in the new method with its accent on grammar as consisting of the rules of uses of language, our experience of the world becomes a function of our language through which we act and think, i.e., which represents our forms of life. However, this emphasis on the actuality of language does not take away the grounds of the apriori explanation of the world, because language still provides the apriori conditions of the possibility of our experience.

No doubt, Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, breaks away from a tradition which had influenced him earlier, e.g., the logical tradition of Frege and Russell. However, in spite of the of the acceptance of their logical system, Wittgenstein had already broken away from them in *Tractatus* , by transforming logic into method of understanding of the world; for him logic was a means, i.e. a device for a transcendental understanding of the world.

The breaking away has been complete in the *Investigations*, as Wittgenstein has thrown away the logical calculus as such as a method. Now he has taken language and its grammar as a method of explanation of the world. Therefore, what has undergone a change in the new philosophy is only the method, but the aim is still to understand the world. Thereby, however, Wittgenstein has not given up logic as such, but he has redefined it now as a part of grammar; that is to say; now "everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic". In this new perspective, logic can still be called a method of demonstration of the forms of language and necessary formal connection underlying it. In that sense logic can also be called method of understanding the world since it subscribed the conditions of the possibility of experience by specifying the forms of all world-representation in language.

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CHAPTER IV
MIND AND LANGUAGE IN
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

4.1 REJECTION OF CARTESIAN VIEW OF MIND:

The conception of the mind is studied in a branch of philosophy called 'Philosophy of Mind'. Here, 'mind' has been discussed to show how Wittgenstein has rejected the traditional conception of mind. Wittgenstein did not regard mind to be mysterious or private. Like Descartes, to accept the privacy of mind is to accept private language. Such a view goes against the view of a language which is practiced in a social setting and also the view which is held by Wittgenstein that speaking of a language involves a form of life which belongs to a social reality.

Rene Descartes' Dualism in the 17th century is one of the major schools of thought that tried to determine the mind-body problem. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is regarded to believe that mental phenomena are in some respect non-physical or that the mind and body are not identical. Thus, it come across a set of views about the relationship between mind and body and is contrasted with other position such as physicalism, in the mind-body problem.

If we look into Descartes' dualism we find that mind is a non-physical substance. He clearly identified the mind with consciousness and self-awareness. Descartes developed a theory of mind which is regarded to immaterial, non- extended substance that engages in various activities or undergoes various states such as rational, thought, imagining, feeling and willing. Matter or extended substance, conforms to law of Physics in

mechanistic fashion, with the important exception of the human body, which Descartes believed is causally produces certain mental events. He also believes that mind is something different and also distinguished it from the brain. The brain is regarded to be the seat of intelligence which is very different from. It was Descartes who was known to be the first philosopher to formulate the mind- body problem in the form in which it exists today. Descartes regarded mind and body to be separate entities, and hence can exist without the each other. But he also believes there are bodies that like stones, lake; mountains etc do exist without minds. According to him, animals (other than man) were also examples of bodies without minds. These are just bodies and do not contain mind. Likewise, he also believes that mind can also exist without the bodies. It can exist when bodies perished in death. Mind is regarded by him to be immortal. However, there is a great deal of controversy regarding his belief that mind could exist without bodies. But still Descartes was firm with his view that mind were immortal, that they continue to exist as disembodied minds after the body perished in death.

According to dualism, physical entities have physical properties like density, velocity, charge, temperature, mass, and most fundamentally spatial occupancy, and nonphysical entities have non-physical properties. The non-physical properties are however difficult to specify according to dualism. The non-physical entities have conscious states and also exercise volition. A human being, according to the dualism, has both physical body and non-physical mind. Descartes believed both these entities interact in a special place in the brain called the pineal gland. This theory of Descartes is called Interactionism. Descartes hold that,

"I am present to my body not merely in the way a seaman is present to his ship, but….I am tightly joined and so, to speak, mingled together with it, so much so that I make up one single thing with it."

The place where this joining was believed by Descartes was the pineal gland- it is the seat of the soul. Thus, Descartes held to be a form of Interactionism, believing that mental events can sometimes cause bodily events, and bodily events can sometimes cause mental events.

However, there are various difficulties which are related dualism and this have led the analytical philosophers to doubt whether dualism is viable theory at all. For this reason many philosophers have chosen different alternatives. The most profoundly subscribed alternatives have all been physicalistic. They are Behaviorism, Identity theory, Functionalism etc.

Behaviorism may be regarded to be an approach to psychology. According to it, everything can be behaviorally defined. There is no such thing called mind neither there is any feeling nor thoughts etc, what we have to consider is only behaviour. In another sense behaviourism may also be regard as philosophical behaviourism which is attributed to Gilbert Ryle. Ryle did not consider himself to be a behaviorist but still *The Concept of Mind* is regarded as one of the most influential exposition of philosophical behaviorism. Ryle believes that there is no such thing as a non-physical mind. When we refer to someone's mental states, for example, when we refer to a person's beliefs or thoughts, we often refers to the immaterial states of a nonphysical mind. There is indeed no such thing as a nonphysical mind according to him. There is, Ryle says, no 'ghost within the machine' contrasting to what Descartes said. A person is a complicated- physical

organism, who is capable of doing the many remarkable sorts of things. When we try to attribute a so called mental state to a person, we are in fact attributing to him or her propensity or disposition to act or behave in a certain way.

Another physicalistic philosophy of mind is the identity theory. According to the identity theory, so called mental phenomena are actually all physical phenomena within the brain and central nervous system. A thought, for example in the Identity theory, is in fact some sort of occurrence within the brain or central nervous system, though we do not yet know enough about the brain or the central nervous system to stipulate which particular occurrence it is. Among the many adherents of Identity theory is the Australian philosopher J.J.C Smart.

Functionalism is another physicalistic theory of mind. According to this theory a mental state is defined not by some arrangement of physical matter but by its function: what it causes and caused by in the network of sensory stimuli, behavior, and mental states. According to this view, although it is true that nothing non-physical happens in your brain when you have a belief or hear a musical note or think about your mother, it is misleading to suppose these things are "nothing but" brain states.

These are the various theories which tried to explain the mental states in various ways. However, Wittgenstein view of mind is also related to the physicalistic view of mind. He denied the dualist view. He was very close to behaviorism but Wittgenstein does not regard himself to be a behaviorist.

4.2   WITTGENSTEINIAN MIND:

 In the philosophy of Wittgenstein we get a very different idea of mind as compared to Descartes. Wittgenstein has not given a clear idea of mind. He never directly spoke about

137

mind. However, from his different thoughts and writing his view of mind can be taken into consideration. Mind is not an entity as it has been held by Descartes. It is not something inner or private or subjective. For Wittgenstein, it is grammatical mistake. We are to see grammar of the word mind in the same sense that how the mind or mind related concepts are used in language. Wittgenstein argues that the philosophical understanding of the nature of mind does not require the denial or affirmation of the language game involving mind. We are already playing the language game involving mind. However, it is not the case that the language game brings mind into existence.

4.3 MIND AND BEHAVIOUR:

Wittgenstein did not reject the concept of mind altogether, however, he rejected the Cartesian concept of mind. He also has not maintained the Cartesian distinction between the mind and the body, according to which, mind is a private entity which exist even after the demise of the body. Wittgenstein regarded human behaviour as something which provide necessary criterion for mental predicates. His view of mind can be figured out through his quotation,

"An inner process stands in need of outer criteria" (PI 580).

In this quotation, Wittgenstein means that the inner process can be explain through the overt behaviour. The inner process, which he means by sensations like pain, stands in need of the outward criteria or overt behaviour. Wittgenstein has denied Cartesian the concept of the mind as something hidden, private that can be known only by the possessor of mind but not by other, it is something mysterious. However, though Wittgenstein denies the existence of mind as an entity yet he must not to be taken as behaviourist. He does not reduce mind or mental states to behaviour or modes of behaviour. According to

him, mental processes need outward criteria in order to be identified as such. The outward behaviour connected with pain in the sense that mental state of pain or feeling of pain, are connected with the behaviour of the person who is having pain. Pain behaviour is necessarily connected with pain. Natural expressions of pain like crying, moaning etc are necessarily connected with the sensation of pain. These natural expressions of pain are replaced by behaviour of pain which is a conventional behaviour of pain. As when one says, "I am having pain in my knees" is not a statement but avowals. According to Wittgenstein, if these have been the natural expressions of pain then the word pain would not have been there in language.

Wittgenstein is concerned with human behaviour because every thought of human being are expressed in behaviour. Human behaviour is the best expression of human mind. He claimed that "the human body is the best picture of the human soul" [2]. However, Wittgenstein never claimed himself to be a behaviourist. But his philosophical psychology shares significant features with behaviourism. In philosophy, there are different forms of behaviourism- namely logical behaviourism, psychological behaviourism, and methodological behaviourism.

Methodological Behaviourism claims that psychology should concern itself with the behaviour of living organisms (human and nonhuman animals). It also claims for scientific conduct in psychology. It tries to discuss the mental states in terms of science. Methodological psychology is a dominant theme in writings of James Watson.

Logical Behaviourism is another kind of Behaviourism, which claims that mental idea or concept can be explained in terms of behavioral dispositions. It is also called analytical behaviourism. It can be found in the works of Gilbert Ryle.

Another kind of Behaviourism is Psychological Behaviourism. It is kind of research program within psychology. It purports to explain human and animal behaviour in terms of external physical stimuli, responses etc. it is present in the works of Ivan Pavlov, Edward Thorndike as well as Watson. It can also be found in the works of B.F Skinner. Among the above different types of behaviourism Wittgenstein may be called a type of Logical Behaviourist. Wittgenstein has not denied the existence of mental predicates; he simply meant that it can be expressed in human behaviour. When he used the sentenced the inner process is in need of outward criteria' here he meant that there is an inner process but it can only be expressed in outward behaviour. This shows that Wittgenstein does not rejected the innerness of mind altogether.

4.4 MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING:

Meaning is always thought to be a mental act. It is often thought that when someone says something or when means something; a conscious mental process runs concurrently along with the process of speaking. However, when one is asked to state the alleged mental process which is going on while a person is speaking or what is that takes places in mind whenever someone meant something; one becomes perplexed or always fails to give a plausible account. It seems that when one person says something and means it, he says something to himself inwardly. While when a person says something and does not means it, he says nothing to himself inwardly. However, according to Wittgenstein, when a person means what he says, it can be seen in his behaviour, it can be seen in his tone of voice or in his facial expression or bodily gestures. But it cannot be supposed that something goes on in a person's mind when he speaks.

Thus, Wittgenstein tries to make two things clear regarding "meaning". According to him, there is no such unique experience or mental process that happens when someone means something and secondly, when a person means what he says depends very much on his behaviour, like, how he uses the word and to the nature and context of the situation and its surroundings. Wittgenstein stresses the importance of nature and context of the situation. He admits that there are certain characteristic experiences which often although by no means always accompany a person's saying something when he means something by a word or phrase which he uses- e.g. having the image of the thing. But he insisted that none of these experiences ever actually constitutes, in itself and in isolation, a person's act of meaning of the thing. It is the nature and context of the situation in which he speaks that it is important and determines whether he mean the thing or something else. Wittgenstein wrote,

"It is seems that there are certain definite mental processes bound up with the workings of language, processes through which language alone can function. I mean the processes of understanding and meaning. The signs of our language seem dead without these mental processes: and it might seem that only function of signs is to induce such processes, and these are the thing we ought to be interested"[3]

According to Wittgenstein, words are dead or lifeless in themselves and so it appears like there is something in addition which gives them life or meaning. However Wittgenstein believed that it a 'general disease' to search for mental states in the process of meaning or understanding. Wittgenstein wrote,

"there is a general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our actions springs as from a reservoir" [4]

141

Meaning and understanding are not determined by what goes on in a speaker's or hearer's mind, it in fact can be determined by the use of the word in language. Certain terms like "thinking" and "understanding" are used in such a way that it is impossible to avoid assumptions that it designates a parallel mental process as 'speaking" designates parallel physical process. Wittgenstein argues that 'meaning' and 'understanding' are the two words which are used in a variety of situations and in many different circumstances. These two words explain that it is false to suggest that there is only one circumstance i.e. the occurrence of an act or process in a person's mind. Instead there are varieties of situations in which these two terms are applied. And understanding are the concepts whose interconnections are the focus of Investigations. Each of them required a separate scrutiny and also the network of relationships between them with the concepts of mind needs to be shown.

However, many a time, understanding seems to be a mental phenomenon. For instance we cannot observe understanding of a person unless we observe his behaviour. It is only the behaviour of an individual through which understanding can be manifested. Wittgenstein wrote,

" it would quite misleading, in this last case, for instance, to call the words a "description of a mental state"-one might rather call them a 'signal'; and we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he goes on to do" [5]

Wittgenstein tries to explain that the words used when someone understands something cannot be regarded to be a description of a mental state instead they are like signals which shows whether they are used correctly or incorrectly. In the process of understanding the hearer must not only listen to what a speaker says but he must also be attentive and try to

142

grasp it carefully. Hence understanding is often thought to be mental phenomena in which behaviour of the person is a symptom; because only the person who has been referred really knows whether he understands or not. For our access to his understanding is only by inductive or analogical inference.

There is another manifestation of understanding that is a sudden understanding. It is like a "flash of understanding". We are often familiar with this kind of understanding. A matter may be cleared suddenly by someone and he claims, 'now I understand'. But there are no mental phenomena involved here although it seems to be so. Again, there is a distinction between understanding and not understanding. When overhearing a foreign language one does not know or partially knows is different from following a lecture or a conversation one does understands. Likewise, when one reads an obscure text parrot-wise what one lacks is the mental activity which seems to be present.

However, Wittgenstein was against the view that understanding involves a mental state. Mental states, according to Wittgenstein, have two distinct qualities. They have some amount of temporal duration and can be predicated of the individual at the time they occur. Thus we can say of someone that "he was depressed" or "he was in pain". To point out the mental state we can say that "he was depressed the whole day" or "he was in pain since yesterday." But Wittgenstein argues that understanding a word is like knowing to play chess. It is more a state than a process. Even calling it a state will also be misleading. It is not like depression or pain or excitement. Such states last over periods and can be continuous or interrupted. But one cannot uninterruptedly understand what a word means.

Wittgenstein argues that, our grammatical use of the verb to know and to understands fool us into thinking that they are used to denote mental state. For example, A writes a series

of number and B claims he knows how to go and continue the series. It seems to us that the discovery of B of A's formula involves a momentary sensation. It appears that understanding and knowledge are mental processes with some amount of temporal duration. But Wittgenstein states that understanding and knowledge rely upon the particular circumstances in which they are being demonstrated. Rather than be misled by the grammar of these verbs, we should inquire into the circumstances which provide the justification for our concluding that we know how to go on. The circumstances which provide justifications are the criteria for asserting that how B can go are certain behavioral characteristics like B's familiarity with algebra and decimal numbers which helps him to solve the formula. Thus B's understanding involves the criteria and circumstances not mental process to solve A's formula. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, "understanding is not a mental process but there are mental processes which are characteristic of understanding. Wittgenstein wrote,

"Try not to think understanding as a 'mental process' at all- For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, "Now I know how to go on," when, that is, the formula has occurred to me?- in the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process"[6]

Thus, in this way, Wittgenstein refuses to accept meaning and understanding to be mental processes.

4.5 PRIVACY AND SENSATION:

According to Cartesian view, there is a fundamental ontological duality between a physical world and a mental world when we look into our experiences and objects. The

physical world is regarded to be made up of matter. It consists of objects which exist in space and time. They interact with each other in physical processes and events. On the other hand the mental world is thought to be distinct from the outer world. It is something like an inner world. It consists of self-impression, imaginations, sensations, moods, feelings, wish etc. For Wittgenstein,

"If we succumb to this philosophical picture of the mental as a world, we will be prone to populate it with others, states events and processes, only immaterial or ethereal" [7]

Moreover, it is also regarded that the physical world belongs to a public realm and can be perceived by everyone. The objects of the physical world have independent existence. They can also be owned, shared by different owner, or also exist unowned. However the object of mental world cannot exist apart from an owner, they are essentially owned. A 'pain', 'mood' or 'wish' cannot exist independently without an owner. A sensation is therefore impossible to exist without a sentient being. It is also held that a person's inner world is metaphysically his private world. It cannot be shared or transferred to any other being.

It is argued that, if the inner world is a private world, then it is supposed that only the owner has privileged access to it and can know the processes, objects and states which it consists. Then, there must be a certainty in the inner world. It must be a transparent world to its owner because one cannot doubt that one has sense impressions or a particular feeling and so on.

Wittgenstein tried to demystify the mind and also tried to avoid the Cartesian concept. According to Wittgenstein, mind is not something inner (in the sense hidden) or

subjective. The concept of the something inner arises because we misuse the grammar of our language where we talk about the mental processes and activities. Wittgenstein wrote,

"In what sense are my sensations private? Well only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it……" (PI 246)

Wittgenstein raises one question regarding the privacy of sensations. He asks a question "in what sense are my sensations private?"-

1. Because only I know whether I am in pain

2. Because another person cannot know my pain, he can only surmise it.

Wittgenstein holds that in one way it is false and in another way it is nonsense. According to him, in our day to day life when we use the word 'know' we always contrast it with the words 'doubt', 'believe' etc. we use the word 'know' only in case where no doubt is possible. Since regarding the occurrence of sensations, feeling etc in one's own case, one cannot have any doubt, therefore it logically implies that one cannot use the word 'know' regarding one's sensation like pain , itches etc. Since others can sometimes doubt regarding whether 'I am in pain', therefore, when others have no doubt that I am in pain he can say that 'I know he is in pain'. According to Wittgenstein, Cartesian view that, 'I know that I am in pain' is wrong because I can never doubt whether I am in pain. Since I can never doubt that whether 'I am in pain', therefore it logically follows that I can never say 'I know that I am in pain'. All I can say meaningfully is 'I have pain', or 'I am in pain'. He raises the question regarding the Cartesian view regarding the essential privacy of sensations. He tries to show that the Cartesian view that 'only from one's own case' one knows how to use the sensation words like pain, itches etc is nonsensical. For Wittgenstein, the sensation words like 'pain', 'itch', etc. are connected with some

146

primitive natural expressions of pain and these sensation words are used in their place. When a child has hurt himself and cries (as the child cannot use the word pain) the adult talks to him and says, "Is it paining? It will be alright after some time". From this the child learns that the sensation he is having is called 'pain'. 'Crying', 'moaning' etc are natural behaviour of pain and these natural behaviour of pain are nothing but exclamations which are later replaced by sentences like 'I am in pain', 'it is paining' etc. the adult teaches the child exclamations like 'pain' and later on these exclamations are replaced by sensation words such as when someone says, 'I am in pain' it is not a statement of report but actually a pain behaviour. Wittgenstein wrote,

"How do words refers to sensations?-there doesn't seem to…………a child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him exclamations and later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour." (PI 244)[8]

Thus, for Wittgenstein, Cartesian view was not tenable. According to him one of the main factors for the misconception of mental and physical world to be distinct lies in the idea that sensations are essentially private to the owner therefore another person cannot have my experience, "you cannot have my headache" or "You cannot feel my anger". They belong to the inner object of its owner's world. Two people can have the same pain, for example, a throbbing headache in the temples. But it is supposed the pain cannot be identical. The pain can be exactly alike but not identical because it is logically impossible for one person to feel another person's pain. The pain must be numerically different but they can be qualitatively alike. They cannot be shared or transferred to any person other than its owner. Therefore every person has their own subjective world which is distinct from any other person.

Wittgenstein regarded this kind of arguments as different language being crossed. He stated that the expression, 'a pain in leg' has a quite a different grammar from 'a pin in the leg'. According to Wittgenstein, "you cannot perceive pain in my leg cannot see the pin e.g., as indeed, you cannot see the pin in the closed pin-box, the pain is not in my leg is in the same sense. Even though you open up my leg, you will not find pain inside it. It cannot be extracted or removed (any more than can a cut in my leg), and although it can be made to go away by an analgesic, when it goes away, it does not go elsewhere". Therefore, it can be said that there is no exact location of pain neither pain has any shape. Thus, Wittgenstein believed that the criteria for the location of pain lies in the person's pointing the place or saying where he is having the sensation of pain. It is the rule of grammar that a person's pain is where he indicates, avows, etc., not a truth of metaphysics that pains are in bodies. But the behavioral regularities which give point to our grammatical convention that a person's identification of the location of his pain is authoritative, that is, a criterion for the location of his pain, consist in the fact that he assuages his injured limb, clutches the part of his body that hurts, and so on.

However, a question may arise that, 'Is having a pain a matter standing in a relationship to an object?' Wittgenstein states that feeling a pain is not a form of perception. To have a pain is to be in pain, it does not mean anything more than to suffer in pain. There is nothing to be own. Pain is a sensation and it cannot be own. According to Wittgenstein, it does not make any sense to wonder whether the pain belongs to me or to someone else. Two people with pain may suffer in exactly the same way but it makes no sense to say that the pains are numerically different or qualitatively similar.

Wittgenstein denied the traditional picture of self-knowledge. He stated that, it is nonsense to say that "I know I have pain". He is against the empiricist, rationalist and

even the Kantian inner sense of self knowledge. The statement, "I know that I have pain" cannot be an epistemic claim; it is just a grammatical assertion. The view that I can only have the access to myself or see within me is nothing but absurd or nonsense according Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein main aim was to draw our attention to the rules of grammar. He wanted to illustrate how we mistakenly understand grammatical connection or grammatical exclusion for an empirical one regarding nature of the mental. It makes sense to say that a person knows such and such is the case only if it also makes sense to deny that he does. For example, 'A knows that p' is meant to be empirical epistemic proposition, and hence to exclude an alternative. But if there is no such thing as 'A's being ignorant of p', i.e. if it unintelligible that p should be the case, yet A does not know it, then 'A knows that p' says nothing about A's knowledge. So if the form of words 'A was in pain but he did not know it' is ruled out, i.e. if it does not describe a specific possibility, then 'A was in pain and he knew it' is likewise excluded. So, 'I know I am in pain' can only be conceived as an epistemic utterance if 'I do not know whether I am in pain' is held to be intelligible. But there is no such thing as being ignorant of whether one is in pain; someone who said 'May be I am in agony but I do not know whether I am' would not be understood. There is no room for intermediacy.

Thus, in the above discussion, Wittgenstein tried to reject the Cartesian as well as the traditional view which regarded sensations to be essentially private.

4.6 PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT:

Wittgenstein tries to show that the mind is not a private entity. It is not something in which mental objects reside and can be known only through introspection. Wittgenstein has put forward the most celebrated private language argument in order to attack the

149

traditional conception of the inner. The traditional concept goes back to Descartes, which he holds that the identity conditions of every sensation are purely introspective. Every individual knows their sensation word only through their own experience. A person knows 'pain' by his own experience. Sensations are individuated in a way that is entirely independent of any links of external circumstances on behaviour. Sensation words get their meaning by introspection of owns own sensation therefore every person knows one's own sensation and not anyone else's sensation. However, Wittgenstein denies this view, he wrote;

"Such a language does not allow enough criteria for the meanings of its words and lack of such criteria results in that the words do not mean anything and can mean anything"[9]

The idea of essential privacy of sensation is an illusion. He persists private language argument and thereby rejects the whole idea that state of consciousness is essentially private There is a notion of private language in the sense that only the speaker can speak it, though the language could be taught to others in any of the various normal ways. We have of teaching a new language to someone who does not know it already example code language. Wittgenstein does not mean by private language, the code language. According to Wittgenstein,

> "The individual words of this language refer to what can only be known by person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language" (PI sec 243)

Wittgenstein tries to show the impossibility of such private language. It is believed that the view which he challenged goes back to Descartes and British empiricist philosophers. Sensations, feelings etc cause certain behaviour and are contingently connected with

behaviour of the person who has those sensations, feeling etc. Therefore it is possible to believe that if the behaviour and circumstances which we normally associate with toothache are different our concept of toothache could remain the same.

Now, in order to see, what is meant by saying that there is only contingent connection between manifest behaviour of toothache and the actual toothache. We take an example given by OR Jones. According to Jones, it is a contingent fact that rats happen to occupy the particular position they do occupy at a particular time. But if we can imagine that they happen to occupy a different position, this would make no difference to our concepts of rat. Because of their change of position we would not stop calling them rats. 'Rat' is defined as rodent and rodent is defined as an animal having incisor teeth. Rat is defined as an animal having incisor teeth. Rat's incisor teeth are a public property and it can be observed by others. However the property that rats occupy a particular position at a particular time is not the essential feature of rat. Because even if rats do not occupy that position at a particular time they will still be called rats. This property of rats is an accidental property. So it is a contingent fact that they happen to change their position in a process of time.

Likewise, according to Cartesian view, there are certain behaviour like inclined to giving a complaint of toothache is associate with toothache is only contingent no matter how the sufferer behaves at various time. Toothache or any other similar sensation or feeling need ever be associated with public feature. Manifestations of ache are purely contingent. Thus for Cartesianian everything that is essential to toothache, everything that makes a tooth a toothache is assumed to be private.

Wittgenstein has put forward the most celebrated 'Private Language Argument' in order to attack this traditional conception of Descartes, which he holds that the identity conditions of every sensation are purely introspective. Every individual knows sensation word only through their own experience. A person knows 'pain' from his own experience of pain. Sensations are individuated in a way that is entirely independent of any links of external circumstances of behaviour. Sensation words get their meaning by introspection of one's own sensation therefore every person knows one's own sensation and not anyone else.

Wittgenstein believes that private language fails to establish the genuine standard of correctness. In such language there is no question of correctness because whatever is right to me is right. Wittgenstein wrote,

"Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar every day…." (PI 258)

Wittgenstein has given an example where we are to suppose that someone keeps a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation and associate it with a sign S. whenever there is the sensation he writes down on the calendar every day. He speaks or writes down the sensation and at the same time concentrates his attention inwardly. But how could he distinguish that sensation from other sensation; as he has no criterion for correctness. Whatever seems right to one is regarded to be right as it is non- accessible to others. This is the only mean and so we cannot talk about correctness. Wittgenstein states that, it is not always possible to remember particular sensation and attending to the right sensation

because memory often deceives us. Thus, he states that, it is better to get rid of private object as "it is constantly changes as your memory deceives you."[10] (PI sec 207)

Wittgenstein came across the 'Private Language Argument' while discussing his concept of rule- following. Wittgenstein tried to show that the concept of rule following only make sense to talk of following a rule in the context of practice- a behavioral regularity- informed by normative activities (e.g. as a standard of correctness, rectifying mistakes, justifying action by reference to a rule). According to Wittgenstein, such practices are learnt in social context although some may also be created for one's private use. Language is learnt mostly from other speakers and is an important fact regarding the origin of linguistic ability. But it does not enter into the grammatical characterization of ability. Ability is always characterized by what it is an ability to do. According to Wittgenstein, the criteria for speaking do not require the production of a school or a parental certificate but it may be said as a practice which is done in a social setting.

Wittgenstein does not aim to prove that rule following can only be possible in social group. But he believes that it is not possible to follow a rule privately. Wittgenstein wrote,

"And hence obeying a rule is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be same thing as obeying it." [11]

Similarly, Wittgenstein also wanted to establish the point that one person alone independently of social setting and without previous training in a social group, could not talk of his own sensation and experiences. The view that different people cannot have identical sensation and that sensations are private is not accepted by Wittgenstein. It is not possible for a person to use a language to talk in solitude about his sensation unless

he has acquired the language in a social setting. A language concerned with sensation is possible only if it is shared by a community. Wittgenstein's main concern in this argument is not that whether a person alone could or could not talk of his experiences in a language which is unsharable, but whether every person in a normal social setting can conceive to be following rules constituted by mental objects or private ostensive definitions. Private ostensive definitions, according to Wittgenstein, are like rules which are not accessible to other people. It is such rules which are the foundation of our common public language.

Wittgenstein tried to explain this point with the example of the word "pain". According to him, we have learned the uses of these types of words through certain instinctive types of behaviour. For example, a child hurt himself and cries and then the adults teach him exclamations and later on sentences to describe his sensations. They teach the child new pain behaviour. The child behaves in a particular way when it injures oneself and when it on the basis of this behaviour, taught to say that it is pain. Thus the verbal element is added to the behaviour and the settings out from his primary utterances like, "it hurts" to other more utterances are added later on in his life. However Wittgenstein does not accepted crude behaviourism. This becomes evident in his quotation,

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"- on the contrary: verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it."12

Thus, Wittgenstein does not regard the mind to be something mysterious. Whenever we talk of mind we claim of something which is inner. But according to Wittgenstein mind is not something hidden inside our body and contains objects like sensation which are private and inaccessible. He rejects the idea that one can know or learn sensation only from one's own case or I can know or learn what pain is, I know only from my own case

which is regarded to be essentially private. Wittgenstein argues against this view by introducing a famous analogy 'the beetle in the box'. Wittgenstein wrote,

"Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle, - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing, - But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language- game at all; not even as a something: for the box even be empty.- No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is"   (PI 293)

Wittgenstein asked us to suppose that everyone has box that only they can see into. No one can see into anyone else box. Each describes what he or she sees in the box as a 'beetle'. I know what a beetle is from my own examination of what is in my box, you from yours. Wittgenstein points out that while we all talk about our beetles, there might be different things in everyone's boxes, or perhaps nothing at all in some of them. The thing in the box could be changing all the time. Wittgenstein through this example tries to show that in our language game the thing inside the box is irrelevant. The thing inside the box has no part to play in our language game. Whatever it is, he maintains that, it cannot have a part in the 'language game'. Likewise, it is to say that one knows what 'pain' means from one's own case which means in our language game of pain, the nature of sensation pain is irrelevant though we cannot feel another person's pain and can never experience it yet like the word 'beetle' we play language game with the word 'pain'. Wittgenstein tries to establish the point that even though we can never feel another person's pain yet we can play language game with the word 'pain'. What follows from

155

this is that the sensation of pain is irrelevant in our language game of pain. He does not deny the sensation pain but holds that the way we feel pain hardly matters in language game of pain.

Saul Kripke also supported Wittgenstein's view of 'Private Language Argument'. But, his interpretation is quite different. He believed that rejection of private language does not only involve in individual personal sensations but in fact it was started right from Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following. The main point is that private language is used by a speaker who applies linguistic expression like Robinson Crusoe language, which is isolated from any linguistic community. Kripke calls it rule following problem. Kripke's skeptical argument regarding the use of language expression consisted in at the present moment, "when I use the sign '+' in the expression '2+2', I find myself in trouble regarding the question: what kind of meaning should I ascribe to the sign? It might seem that plus, the arithmetical function of addition must be considered as the meaning of the sign. But the point is that because of the finiteness of my cognitive experience, I cannot grasp the function entirely. On this account we may consider the following epistemological situation to be possible. In a particular case I may use '+' to denote some other function, say, 'quus' which is different from plus with regarding to argument larger then 1000, but here with regard to argument less than 1000, the function coincides with plus. A radical ambiguity arises in this particular application of '+' my use of the expression falls under at least two rules at once and I have nothing in my consciousness that could be resolved the trouble." According to Kripke, Robinson Crusoe could avoid this predicament. It required a linguistic community. A linguistic community is indeed able to generate and support the illusion of constancy of meaning that is so necessary for the successful use of language. The illusion of constancy is generated in a person by

shared linguistic practice with other speakers in a community. In the process of communication, a speaker gets approval for his linguistics acts from other persons of the community and these facts reinforce his confidence in the correctness and consistency of interpretation of rules of application of linguistic expressions in different speech situation. Thus, according to Kripke, community agreement fulfills this important task.

Thus, when we use a word, we do not grasp its meaning. The only thing that we can use is some illusion of meaning constancy, an impression that we understand what our words mean. In Kripke's opinion, an isolated Robinson Crusoe who uses language in solitude is not capable of producing and supporting the illusion. He will constantly be in a situation of radical indeterminacy of choice between alternative rules of application of his own linguistic expressions.

On this account, private language is not at all possible. The necessary condition of the functioning of language is not realized in it, for even the illusion of constancy is absent. However, Kripke was later criticized by Baker and Hacker regarding his Robinson Crusoe language in a social setting.

Thus, from all the above discussion we find the gist is that since private language is not possible, therefore, the idea of essentially private entity which one can know from one's own introspection is not all meaningful.

4.7. MENTAL PROCESSES:

We often talk of thought processes as mysterious and complicated processes in the mind. We suppose that there are hidden mental mechanisms which can be known only through introspection of one's own mind. We regard thinking to be a process which is always accompanied by something inner. Wittgenstein did not deny that thinking involves a

variety of things that cross one's mind like words phrases, mental images etc. However, he is denying the "misleading picture of an inner (incorporeal) process that goes with the idea of thinking"[13].

'Thinking is a mental process.' When we think we think in language. Therefore, there is a strong bond between language and thought and also between language and mind. As mental process, thinking is expressed through language. According to Wittgenstein, mind is a part of the world where language games takes place. There are different forms of lives in this world but question of consciousness arise only in case of human being. And it is only human being who has the ability to think. Mental states are ascribed only to human beings. Wittgenstein wrote:

"Can one think without speaking? And what is thinking? Well don't you ever think? Can't you observe yourself and see what is going on? I should be quite simple. You do not have to wait for it as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make your observation in a hurry."[14]

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, speaking language is another name of thinking. The rationality of thinking is the outcome of mind which results in language. Thus mind and language are inseparable. "Human is considered to be minded beings that has the ability to speak language. Other animal do not have mind and thus are refrained from the ability to speak. However, when one is told that a person is thinking about, over, or up something or other, one does not and need not to have the faintest idea of what is going on his brain or what images or jumbled words flit across his mind. Rather, what one knows is what is aimed at viz. a solution, answer, plan, and project. And if one is told what, after due reflection, he thought, one knows his conclusion, opinion or considered judgment."[15]

Though, Wittgenstein does not accept hidden inner process which is present in thinking yet he has not rejected the concept of mental process. According to him, thinking and remembering involves a mental process. He wrote,

"Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But there mental process of remembering…' means nothing more than I have just remembered…'to deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering, to deny that anyone ever remembers anything."[16]

Memory is a mental process, according to Wittgenstein, to deny a mental process is to deny remembering. In the process of remembering, thinking is also involved. When we are to remember something we have to correlate our action from the past. In the he correlation of action a process of thinking is also involved.

There is a common idea that inner sensations are identified through memory. Memory is a means of recognizing a sensation. However, according to Wittgenstein, memory cannot be the criterion of identity which helps to recognize sensation from the past to present because memory often deceives us. There are various errors which are related to memory. This were called by Wittgenstein as 'a false picture of the process called 'recognizing' ; "as if recognizing always consisted in comparing two impression in one another."[17] Memory, according to him, is like an agent which allows us to look into the past. However, memory fails to provide us with the criterion of identity. Wittgenstein wrote,

"It is not so much as if I were comparing the objects with a picture set beside it, but as if the object coincided with the picture. So I see only one thing, not two."[18]

This point was explained by Wittgenstein with an example,

"What if someone were to say in order to be able to sing a tune from memory one has to hear it in one's mind and sing from that?"[19]

Thus with this Wittgenstein tries to point out that the term memory can be used correctly when there is no comparison at all.

Wittgenstein rejected the inner experience regarding the concept of memory as in the conception of pain. Remembering is not an inner perception or experience. However, the ways of using it may conjure up this picture. Wittgenstein wrote,

"But you surely cannot deny that for example, in remembering an inner process take place"-what gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says "Still an inner process does take place here"- one wants to go on: "after all, you see it" And it is this inner process that one means by the word "remembering"- the impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the "inner process". What we deny is that the picture of the "inner process" gives s the correct idea of the use of the word "to remember" we say that "this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is." [20]

The picture of remembering a an "inner experience" leads to the notion that we can inwardly examine a memory and distinguish different features such as "present sense datum" and "a past event which refers to" or distinguish "a memory which is occurring now" from "a feeling of pastness" and "the actual occurrence referred to". We imagine we see these different features in the memory itself. The distinctions can be made, but they are made in connection with the way we use the concept of memory. "The memory itself comes to expression as pain comes to expression as sui generis and the ways of talking about it unfold from this."[21]

Thus, Wittgenstein tries to make it clear that though remembering involves a mental process, yet it is not an experience like a pain is not an experience. But in each case there is a grammatical point involved. They are not based on inner observation. The concept of inner observation is a misleading picture.

Wittgenstein conception of process in mind can be reduced to the following points

1. The diversity and heterogeneity of psychological concepts:
Wittgenstein replaces the notion of psychological facts and phenomena with the notion of psychological concepts. According to him the instrument of grammar and linguistic games is a means to interpret such concepts by reducing the description of inner states to the description of the use of the words that depicts them.

Wittgenstein interested in psychological concepts because philosophical problems about the mind arises from the confusion over the use of the psychological vocabulary. According to him, there is a superficial unity among such concepts which conceals the grammatical diversity. However, Wittgenstein points out the difference between them. The grammar words for sensation, emotion, thoughts, images intentions etc are very much different from each other. However, there is a conceptual confusion of the grammar related to these psychological words. These conceptual confusions further lead to the dilemma of mind- body problem. But, Wittgenstein tend to reject the mind- body problem because he believes that such problem arises due to over thinking and trying to develop a theory to explain the relationship between them in terms of how they interact and direction of influence between them.

According to Wittgenstein, there needs to be, "an ordering of the psychological concepts helps in the treatment of all".[22] He compared and contrasted psychological concepts and

attempted to rearrange them into perspicuous representation or rearrangement. He uses provisions that the concepts are vague and elastic: hence his metaphor of family resemblances.

Wittgenstein considered   the surface grammar of the psychological verbs and nouns to be misleading, as they all appear to be same. He considers that the only way to avoid being misled is by looking at language games, and by looking at the behaviour and the occasion in which such concepts are used.

2. The illusion of the privacy of the states of consciousness:

Going back to Descartes, consciousness was thought to be the one indubitable that can never be shaken. Consciousness was identified as the basis of human knowledge. 'I cannot doubt that I am conscious' because to doubt anything 'I must be conscious'. Therefore, according to Descartes, I must know indubitably that I am conscious. Descartes classified between two types of world – physical world and the world of consciousness. The state and nature of consciousness are regarded to be mysterious. Thinking is regarded to be the essence of it. Each of us is regarded to be the witness of one's own consciousness. Therefore, it seems that the world of consciousness is indeed my world and sometimes it seems to be the world.

When consciousness is conceived as a private realm which populated by private experience, one is bound to be puzzled by its evolutionary emergence. Consciousness is attributed to higher animals. It cannot be attributed to plants or amoeba. "A very complex biological substratum, a highly evolved nervous system, is a characteristic feature of conscious creatures."[23] However, the picture of consciousness as something inner and mysterious, has created a lot of confusions. The first step towards clarity is that only living

human beings or what resembles or behave like a living human being can be said to be conscious or unconscious. Consciousness cannot be attributed to stones, trees or machine because they are not living creatures that behave like humans in circumstances where consciousness can be attributed. The idea that the brain of human being is conscious is also misconceived. "Consciousness is attributed to an organism as a whole, not its parts, no matter how complex it is. And it is attributable to the organism on the ground of its behaviour, its exercise of its perceptual faculties, its susceptibility to sensation and its voluntary action."[24]

The human beings and higher animals are conscious creatures are not an empirical truth but a grammatical one. One can pretend to be unconscious, as one can pretend to be in pain, but there is no such thing as pretending to be conscious. The assertion that human beings are conscious is the assertion that human beings see, feel, hear, only has a grammatical use as a proposition. However, according to Wittgenstein, consciousness is not something private. One is said to be conscious of something, i.e., pain in one's leg when one's attention is caught by a thing. But, there is no such thing as being conscious of one's consciousness, for being conscious is neither an experience nor an object of experience. It is just a state. One may be conscious of feeling, mood, sensations but not consciousness itself. It is not an object of attention or experience. It is not something mysterious. We all are conscious of something. We all know what being in pain is or feeling happiness is. If someone is suffering from pain, we all know what pain means because we also have suffered from such kind of pain more or less in our lifetime. From person's behaviour or expression we know what kind of pain a person is suffering because we also use same expression when we are in pain. Thus, consciousness is not something private it is just an illusion which appears to be something hidden or mysterious.

3. The nature and basis of mental representation of intentionality:

The aim of investigations is to show that it is not right to conceive thinking as activities of the brain which underlies thoughtful speech. Wittgenstein here attempted to clarify the concept of thought and language within the constraint set by the autonomy of grammar. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein gave his most concise and vivid arguments about intentionality. It shows how thought can concern the world outside the mind, particularly the real things not only the representations of them, how sign which are intrinsically dead can come to have significance, how our wishes and thoughts satisfy them and how we can think about people and things which are not there. One might tempted to think that the thought to catch reality in its net, object of thought has to be actually related with the thought. But how is it possible that I can think about someone who doesn't exist? Similarly, wishes and proposition seem 'determine' what fulfills them or make them true, and this determining looks like a relation but how can there be such a thing if fulfillment does not yet occurred. Wittgenstein tried to solve the problem of intentionality by using various kinds of grammatical investigations. According to Wittgenstein, any expectation is an expectation of something. However, the expectation and what we expect are different things. But the question arises: How then our expectations are related to what we expect? Wittgenstein clarifies that it is a misconception to think that our expectation already contain what we expect in some sort of mysterious ways. Wittgenstein stated that instead there is some kind of agreement between the expectation and what occurred. What satisfies our expectation is the event itself. The satisfaction of the expectation is not given by any feeling. The words 'I expect he'll come in' can be used as an expression of the expectation, and by containing the sentence 'he'll come in', they contain a description of what fulfills the expectation. It is in the language that an expectation and fulfillment

makes contact. We should not think of something extra linguistic reality between them. We find the contact between expectation and fulfillment in the use of the words as an expression of what we expect and a description which fulfills it. If we look at how our language works the puzzle will be solved.

Thus, the above discussion shows Wittgenstein views of the different process in his study of philosophy of mind.

4.8   CRITICISMS:

Thus, according to Wittgenstein, mind is not something which is different from the human body. It is not a separate entity which is private or mysterious. Mind is not something hidden which can be found only through introspection into ourselves. According to Wittgenstein, there are mental predicates that can be felt in human language and behaviour. Wittgenstein extensively uses the word 'pain' to help us to understand more vividly. According to him, the word pain is not inner mental states. The grammar of the word 'pain' shows that pain is not an object in mind. It is a word which is used in our everyday life. It signifies a form of life. According to Wittgenstein, we understand the sensation words because it is already in present our language games. The word 'pain' represents pain behaviour; it means to act in a certain way in a certain circumstance. There is nothing mysterious about pain and as such there is nothing mysterious about mind. We play language game with 'mind' and it is possible to talk about 'other mind' also. Mind is real in the sense we are playing language game with it. Had it would not been real then it would not be possible to talk about mind. Therefore, Wittgenstein believes that mental states are real and they are logically connected to mind.

However Wittgenstein's view of mind was criticized by various philosopher specially his private language argument

G.P. Baker and P.M.S Hacker attacked the 'Private Language Argument' of Wittgenstein. According to them, a Robinson Crusoe language is possible, that the idea of a person who follows his own rules in an asocial context is intelligible.

In the second volume of their 'An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations',* they made an attempt to analyze different aspects of the rule-following practice and the successful functioning of language. They have discussed the concept of following a rule with the concept of regularity, not with the concept of the community of rule –followers.

Their discussion is about regularity of actions on different occasions. They are not discussing about multiple agents. According to them rule can be followed without a community or without the presence of multiple agents. What matters is that following a rule in recurrent action in appropriate context. This kind of action can be counts as following the rule. According to Baker and Hackers, "A speaker does not need any community for the identification of rules and the following of rules. He needs a regularity taken as a norm of a behavior, repetition of his action, and this is a necessary condition for the successful functioning of his language. when the linguistic acts of a Crusoe are regular, when he uses certain linguistic expressions to refer to certain things, facts, events, when this use is a custom for him then we have no reason to doubt, first, the constancy of Crusoe's language use and, second, the fact that he understands the meaning of his words, i.e. the rule application of the words which he uses. The personal regularity of linguistic acts will discipline a Crusoe. He will be able to compare his

present uses of words with past ones and estimate as correct more regular uses that he treats as standards correctness."[25]

Another Important argument against the community view, in Baker and Hacker's opinion is that a rule and what accords with it must be internally related whereas the community view presents this as external relation. They have stated that,

"The pivotal point in Wittgenstein's remarks on following is that a rule is internally related to acts which accord with it. The rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct. This idea is incompatible with defining "correct" in terms of what is normal of standard practice in a community to take the behavior of the majority to be the criterion of correctness in applying rules is to abrogate the internal relation of a rule to acts in accord with it"[26]

"Adoption of community agreement as a criterion of correctness for the application of rules means adopting something independent in the process of using of linguistic expressions reference to which a speaker may orient himself in his linguistic acts. This is different from appealing to Platonic ideas because community agreement does not exist in an independent metaphysical world but in finite worlds of linguistic communities only. Nevertheless it still has features which are similar to platonic universals. Namely, it is constant, independent of personal experience, abstract in the sense that it is unconnected with any particular case of a concrete speech act and general in as much it covers each particular communicative situation in a linguistic group."[27]Thus, for both Baker and Hacker, private language argument of Wittgenstein is not satisfactory because for them Robinson Crusoe language is possible without a social setting.

Robert Fogelin does not agree with Wittgenstein argument that private language of sensation is impossible. Fogelin put stress on Wittgenstein claim that, it is "impossible to obey a rule privately; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be same thing as obeying."[28] According to Fogelin, Wittgenstein argument in this regard is completely unsatisfactory. It exploits the distinction between 'seems' and 'is' and argues that there is no way to determine whether the application of a word is in fact correct or only seems to be. Since it appears to rest on nothing more than only general failure of implication from 'seems' to 'is', the argument, if successful, would show not just impossibility of a special "private language" of sensation, but of any language at all, even a language about public material objects. Fogelin argues that, from the fact that an application of a particular word to a material objects seem to a person to be correct it does not follow that it is correct, even if it also seems to one that everyone else regards it as correct. "No special conclusion about only a particular from of language or only a restricted range of facts can be derived from such a general skeptical argument."[29]

Jaokko Hintikka and Merill Hintikka states in this regard that, "what is likely to be agreed on is that Wittgenstein the language we use of sensation has to rely on a public language-game. What is controversial is what follows from this fact for the privacy of one's sensations. Does the need of a public framework imply that these experiences themselves, be they object, events, or whatever, and are not private? This has been taken to follow by a large number of philosophers, perhaps most notably by G.E.M. Anscombe. On one occasion she writes: 'if a word stands for a private object, it must have a private ostensive definition.' Since private ostensive definitions are impossible, there presumably cannot be any private objects, according to this view. It is not hard to see that the implication fails however."

They further states that, "we cannot say in language that sensations and their ilk are private, according to Wittgenstein. But this is not the problem. It is only one of the consequences of the ineffability of semantics." The real question is: are those philosophers right who say that there are no private experiences according to Wittgenstein?

"The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible- though unverifiable- that one section of mankind had one sensation of red, another section another." [30]

However, according to Hintikka and Hintikka, for Wittgenstein, private experience are indeed real experience and private, but the opponents may defend their position by saying that, by a rejected private object is something that is logically impossible for others to witness. Hintikka and Hintikka further points out that, "suppose it was logically impossible for others to see a person's beetle in his box, but that he could not compare it with public beetle outside the box. Why could he not then speak of his beetle and also of yours? We can in fact speak of the private beetle in a way intelligible to others. For Wittgenstein, the crucial question is not whether it is logically impossible for someone to witness another person's beetle, but whether it is publically impossible for a person to relate his beetle to publically accessible objects of comparison. If so, the indispensability of a public framework (needed to enable us to speak of beetles) does not entailed that these beetles have to be public. In other words it is compatible to Wittgenstein's idea to imagine(along the lines of PI, I sec293) a situation in which each person has access only to his or her own beetle, but the beetle owners can nevertheless

happily converse with each other about their pets by relating their own beetle to suitable public object of comparison." [31]

According to them "it is important to notice that the inaccessibility of my beetle to others does not imply that it is impossible for me to compare my private beetle with public ones or for you to test my comparisons. There are public ways of checking my skill and veracity in making such comparisons, such as testing my eyesight, calling character witnesses, administrating lie detector tests etc." [32]

One may ask by way of criticizing Wittgenstein, why one cannot be systematically wrong about one's pains. According to Hintikka and Hintikka, "Wittgenstein's answer is that one cannot drive a wedge in language between pain and pain- expression. But, if so, the same situation could in principle obtain in other cases, e.g., in colour ascriptions. Given suitable background assumptions, my ascriptions of colour to my private beetle could be as spontaneous (and as corrigible) as my pain-expressions." [33]

To put the same point in another way, "Once a suitable language game has been established in a public domain, it can in special (and admittedly parasitic) cases be extended to private objects. Notice that there is in principle no problem of teaching and learning a language game of the kind we have envisaged, even though that can have happen only after one has first learned the corresponding game as played solely with public objects."[34]

Hintikka and Hintikka further states that, "It is indeed quite obvious that Wittgenstein himself countenances such secondary language-games as we have described, played with private objects and events, e.g., with sensations. For instances, in Zettle, sec. 75-7,

81-3, he is clearly assuming that I can attend to my sensations(pains, auditory impression, etc.) and even use a stop watch to determine their duration unlike the duration of the knowledge, ability, understanding. Such a determination need not be any more difficult than the determination of an observable physical process. It is the precise analogue of my looking at my private beetle in my box and e.g., timing its activities. Whether other can or cannot attend to my sensation does not make any difference to this possibility. It is amply clear furthermore that by timing a sensation Wittgenstein does not mean timing its natural expression (moaning, scratching)" [35]

What follows from the above discussion: Wittgenstein philosophy of language by Hintikka and Hintikka is not that about are there any private objects or we cannot speak of such objects. All that follows is that we can use language to name them, to describe them, etc., only by means of a public framework, but from the public character of this framework it does not follow that the experiences themselves are not completely private.

Hence, there is no reason for thinking that we cannot, according to Wittgenstein, have private experiences in a Cartesian sense. The whole problem is how we are talk about them. Sensations (pains, itches, hot flushes, twinges of pleasure, etc.) do not admit of private ostensive definitions. I cannot refer to them without enabling you to do likewise. However, from the public nature of the framework needed to do so it does not follow that the experiences themselves are public; or that they do not play any role in public language games.

Norman Malcolm also supported Wittgenstein in his view about mind and private language. Malcolm observed that it is involved with our knowledge of the other minds. A problem arises if we suppose that in case of our sensation our language is a private

language then it follows that pain is known only by one's own case. I know what is meant by pain. I experience only my own pains. But if the meaning of pain is known to me only from my own case, from my own private exemplar then it becomes a mystery as to how anybody else can understand me when I use the language of pains. Only I can experience my pains. Likewise, when other speaks of their pain they are also referring to their own exemplars which are not accessible to me. Thus, "I can only know that they are referring to nothing at all. By private language Wittgenstein meant that kind of language which could not be understood by anyone apart from the speaker. It is a language in which there could be no criteria for distinguishing the correct from the incorrect use of language. However public language or our own language provides such criteria. The criteria for correct application of words for sensation are taught and learned in many kinds of public situations. When we try to imagine such learning situations, it becomes apparent that the private exemplar is not needed at all."[36]

 According to Henry Loy Finch, Wittgenstein's position is that our inner sensations, states and feelings are not private objects known only to the person who has them. This is not, of course, to deny the reality of these inner sensations, states and feelings. Nor is it to maintain that they are only real if they are public. It is only to insist that the words object and know are misused in this case and give rise to (and produced by) a thoroughly misleading picture. "The 'inner façade' which I alone observe is, for Wittgenstein an illusion. But this is not to say that there are no inner sensations or inner states, for these terms do not lose their usefulness for being thought in a different way. It is the private object and the picture of the inner process which Wittgenstein wishes to dissolve and not the reality or importance of the inner life" [37]

4.9   CONCLUSION:

In the conclusion, it may be said that, though there are different opinions from different philosophers regarding the privacy of mind in Wittgenstein's view, however, it is to be noted that, Wittgenstein never attempted to answer the mind-body questions, nor does he advance any theses for the existence of the soul or meaning of consciousness. By contrast, Wittgenstein aim is clarification. He seeks for better understanding of how our concepts work, by eliminating conceptual confusions. According to him, to avoid such confusion Language games must be played within the rules governed by grammar. He believed that the actual application of language is part of the projective connections between language and world. For, even rule or ostension can perhaps be private but language games cannot be. If what one has to witness in order to understand a word is not merely its ostensive definition or a rule for its use, but the entire language game which is its logical home, hence, the language in which that word play a role cannot be private. He believed that language games are conceptually prior to their rules. For if language games were not prior conceptually to their rules, one could perfectly well define private languages by specifying their private rules. It is only when the entire language game, with the variety of different modes of behavior it involves, becomes the highest court of semantical appeal that the true basis of all semantic must be public.

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Although Wittgenstein's work is divided into two phases early and later yet it is said that there is an implicit unity in them. Some philosophers regarded that it is an extreme misconception to believe that these two phases are mutually contradictory. A careful study of the two phases shows that they are in fact interrelated and supplementary to each other. A. Pampapathy Rao states that Wittgenstein himself suggested a comparative study of his two great works. Rao wrote "He himself suggests a comparative study of the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* to avoid any misunderstanding; and suggested that such a study is necessary to understand that the two phases of his thoughts are interlinked and each of them is supplementary to the other. He makes this suggestion as he was aware of the real unity which lies concealed behind the apparent disconnectedness."1 Hence, Wittgenstein was aware of the interconnection between *Tractatus* and *Investigations*. The view of world, language and mind occupies a very important space in both Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. It can also be said that these three are the most important concepts which are discussed variously in Wittgenstein's philosophy. If we look into these concepts more carefully then we find that there are certain differences as well as similarities in his early and later views. Therefore, we can say that there is a unique unity between his two books *Tractatus* and *Investigations* which were written in his early and later stages respectively. Both the books are inseparable to each other.

However, despite of the unity, if we compare the view of world in *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* then it appears to be two different views. The former view which Wittgenstein held in *Tractatus* was more metaphysical. He regarded the world to

be a "totality of facts." He was concerned with the logical structure of the world. He gave more emphasis on how the world and language are related to one another. How the logical structure of the language mirrors the structure of the world.

In *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein was influenced mostly by different views of Frege and Russell. As a result *Tractatus* may be regarded to be a simultaneous development against the works of Frege and Russell regarding language and logic. Wittgenstein tried to develop certain ideas of Frege and Russell which he was interested in. Their basic aim was to reduce complex concept into simple elements through the employment of logical analysis. Therefore, in *Tractatus* also we find the same method. Wittgenstein also adopted a similar method and thereby tried to explain the complex structure of the world by breaking it into the ultimate simple through logical analysis. Wittgenstein tried to analyze the world and found that the world is divided into various facts. The facts are further classified into state of affairs and states of affairs are further divided into objects. Hence, in this way Wittgenstein regarded the world to be composed of facts.

However, there are a number of issues related to the conception of the world in *Tractatus* . It was argued that Wittgenstein did not provide any example of either facts or objects. The objects of *Tractatus* also raised a number of questions. Marks Addis wrote,

"The claim that objects are simple is that they are wholly devoid of complexity. In the book, Wittgenstein provided no guidance about how to identify an object. The issue of whether and in what ways he thought that such objects could be recognized in complex. Evidence from the *Notebooks* 1914-1916 suggests Wittgenstein held that it was possible in principle to specify objects provided logical analysis was carried far enough. For example, he observed that it seemed to him 'perfectly possible that patches in our visual

field are simple objects, in that we do not perceive any single point of patch separately; the visual appearance of stars even seem correctly to be so', here 'patches in our visual field' means sections with the visual field with no noticeable parts. The claim here was that certain entities would either count as objects or would turn out to be so. In the *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein had not resolved these questions or decided upon what would be regarded as an instance of simple object. Later he remarked that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter! It seems evident that Wittgenstein's anti-psychologism which sought to ensure that generally the objects of judgment were wholly independent from the concerns of psychology was a major contributory factor in his inability to identify the objects of the *Tractatus* . Arguably, he thought that the sort of analysis required to determine what they were more properly came under the province of psychology."[2].

Thus, Wittgenstein tried to analyze the constituent of the world yet failed to give a clear specification of them. This was his major drawback in *Tractatus* regarding his view of the world.

 In *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein tried to provide a more practical view of world with his conception of forms of life. He regarded form of life to be a way in which human being lives as a linguistic being. Forms of life are regarded to be nothing other than the different aspects of lives and social reality of the world. Language games, for Wittgenstein, are a part of form of life. Each language is a part of form of life and is also expressions of human action. Wittgenstein regarded language not only the medium of communication but also that through which world can be expressed. Each language games depict a distinct form of life through which it depicts the world or social reality in turn.

With this view of form of life Wittgenstein has adapted to practical view of the world which was missing in his earlier philosophy. But in later philosophy also Wittgenstein's main aim was to show the relation between world and language. He believes that it is essential because without language world cannot be accessed at all.

However, the 'World' in *Philosophical Investigations* is not metaphysical or logical possible world like that of *Tractatus* . Wittgenstein's idea of forms of life depicts the social reality or the world we are living in. He put forward the view of forms of life to mean the realm of social reality. Language is social in nature and meanings of words are constructed because of the social interactions of the people. By rejecting the notion of private language, Wittgenstein tried to show that language does not belong to the isolated regions in a speaker's mind but it is in fact belongs to a social reality. Meanings are constantly brought into being and are also discarded by the community of speakers. Meanings are not constructed in the mind of the speakers in isolation to everything in the world. They are also not constructed to refer anything which belong to outside of reality because there are many instances where there is no objective reference but still certain words have meaning like 'unicorn' or 'Santa clause'. Thus, for Wittgenstein meaning of the words are in the use of how they are put in different language games practice in social reality or social world.

Language is a social phenomenon. It is used by different people in a society. All aspects of life are learned and taught through language only. Man cannot live in isolation, without belonging to other members of the community or society, and language (including certain non-linguistic activities) is the only medium of his communication with the other members of the community, thus language becomes a bridge which links man to the world. Language is, therefore, essentially embedded in the world. How this relationship

is carried out is explained by Wittgenstein by the idea of language games and forms of life.

Wittgenstein believes that it is essential because without language world cannot be known or accessed at all. He tried to show a different view of language and world with his concept of language games and forms of life integrated together. Wittgenstein came to realize language is not an abstract system but a social practice. Understanding language requires us to focus on how it is used by members of linguistic community. He regarded language and meaning to be primarily public which are embedded in our social practice. Henry Loy Finch, in book, *Wittgenstein: the later philosophy,* stated that, the view of forms of life in Wittgenstein philosophy does not only show the relation between language games and its meaning but it has a wider context of our everyday life and everyday certainties. Wittgenstein has also discussed in details about forms of life and our everyday certainties in his book "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology", Wittgenstein wrote,

"…the fact that we act such and such ways, e.g., punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts……….are facts of living" (RPP I, 630)

According to Finch, these facts of living discussed by Wittgenstein can only be followed in a society or in a social setting. This social setting and our forms of living in this setting creates a world. This world is different from the world of *Tractatus* which was thought to be logically possible. This world is our everyday world with all our everyday certainties.

The main theme around which the whole *Tractatus* centers is about language and how it is connected with the world. How language functions with its names and proposition which has equivalents with the world containing objects and states of affairs and things

and situations. In *Philosophical Investigations* also Wittgenstein maintained the same theme but here he has modified his concept of the connection between language and the world. Here, Wittgenstein used the concept of language games which binds language with the world. However, in his early philosophy, he used the concept of picture theory of meaning to show the relation between world and language. This theory is that in which the very essence of *Tractatus* is reflected. Thus, there is a shift from *Tractatus* to *Investigations* of viewing the world as a fixed structured to a fluid structured which is bound up by our everyday practices and forms of life.

In the preface of the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein says that his new thoughts can be understood only by contrast with the thoughts of the *Tractatus*, and that the *Tractatus* contains many grave mistakes. However, Wittgenstein never discussed in what way his new thoughts should contrasted with his earlier one and he also never told what were the grave mistakes that he made in *Tractatus* .

Many commentators believed that they can be successfully find out the mistakes by the help of the hints given in the *Investigations* and elsewhere in Wittgenstein's later writings. And most of them thought that the picture theory of meaning was the prime mistake Wittgenstein was talking about. Some of them have even contended that Wittgenstein's rejection of the picture theory forms the demarcation line between Wittgenstein's later and early philosophy.

However, there is a debate between different commentators that whether Wittgenstein has completely rejected the picture theory of meaning or whether he carried out his later philosophy on the base of his early philosophy. That Wittgenstein rejected the picture theory was claimed by many philosophers among them is George Pitcher. Pitcher's book,

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, is one of the important books on Wittgenstein. It is also considered to be a joint treatment of both *Tractatus* and *Investigations*. Pitcher says that as a result of Wittgenstein's later criticisms "the picture theory is dissolved into nothingness. It vanishes without a trace." Peter Hacker and James Bogen and many other philosophers also argued in a similar way like Pitcher on the same view. However, Anthony Kenny had listed a great number of statements which shows that Wittgenstein had not rejected the picture theory of meaning completely. However, it is also true that from Wittgenstein's various remarks in his later writing it suggest that he found the theory to be problematic, but it cannot be said that he considered it to be one of the fundamental error in his book. Erik Stenius in his paper, "A picture theory and Wittgenstein's later attitude to it", argued in this regard. Stenius believed that Wittgenstein has not completely abandoned the picture theory of meaning. In many of the sections in the *Investigations* shows that Wittgenstein still gave importance to Picture theory of meaning, for example in the section 522 of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein states that a comparison of a sentence to a picture has a point. Stenius on the same paper also argued that Wittgenstein later became dissatisfied with the picture theory for giving it too much attention for explaining how language functions. But it does not mean that he has completely rejected the picture theory of meaning.

 R.C Pradhan, regarding 'Picture Theory of Meaning', states that, "Wittgenstein was not intended to construct a theory in the strict sense of the term in the *Tractatus*. As Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher his main emphasis was to analyze language. When language is analyzed one is bound to encounter propositions as the constituents of language. Wittgenstein always believed that language and world are interrelated. Therefore, he believed that these constituents of propositions are representations of the

facts in the world. And as such picture theory was formed. But later Wittgenstein realized his mistakes in the picture theory and tried to rectify it in the *Investigations*. In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein believed that the metaphysics of the essence of the world must be founded on logic that discloses the essence of language."[3] However, in his later period, Wittgenstein realizes that his earlier view demanded that language and world be viewed from a standpoint that has little to do with the actual language we speak and the actual world we live in. He came to realize that his earlier view has limited the nature of language and confined language only to one function that is to uncover its essence. Moreover, he also questions the whole idea inherited from Frege and Russell. He discarded the very idea logical form is concealed in our language and that it needs philosophical penetration to be unearthened. Logical form in this sense is something which logic alone can provide. It is the very idea that regards logic to be something which is devoid of vagueness, which is truly pure and is beyond space and time. This led Wittgenstein to state in *Tractatus* that, "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world. Logic is transcendental."[4] This kind of thinking has led Wittgenstein in his early philosophy to vest logic with the metaphysical task of providing a mirror image of the world. This makes logic a "transcendental project" of bringing out the logical essence of the world. R.C Pradhan further holds that, "according to Wittgenstein the whole transcendental project was misguided because logic has no competence to discover the logical structure of the world."[5]

Thus, it is difficult to say that whether or not Wittgenstein has completely rejected the picture theory of proposition, however, from various discussion in *Investigations* it is to be certain that Wittgenstein never went back to his early philosophy instead he tried to move forward with a new vision and a new version of the relation between man, language

and world. However, it may also be said that, many trends of the picture theory is found in his later philosophy. It also seems that Wittgenstein did not give up the basic idea of the picture theory in his later writings.

Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* attempts to establish an isomorphic relation between language and the world. There is a denotational theory of meaning involved in *Tractatus*. According to this theory, the meaning of an expression is its referent. However, in *Tractatus* there are two sides of this denotational theory. The first is denotational theory of meaning of a word and the other is the denotational theory of the meaning of a sentence. The first denotational theory states that the meaning of a word is the object it denotes and the other denotational theory states that the meaning of a sentence is the situation which pictures. Thus, we have two denotational theories one is referent theory in regard to meaning of a word and picture theory in regard to the meaning of sentence.

Regarding the first denotational theory that is the meaning of the word is the object it denotes, "object" also occupies an important place in it. Wittgenstein believes that objects stands in combinations with one another in a state of affair. It is objects which forms the substance of reality. Objects are the base of the world, they are changeless but the change in their configuration is the change which is to be found in the world. Wittgenstein's view of object comes very close to Kantian view. Like Kant, Wittgenstein holds that there is a notion of space-time involved in the view of object. The world is regarded to be totality of facts, therefore it is within the configuration of space and time, and hence there cannot be anything outside of it. Therefore objects also are one or many component of it. As objects have extensions therefore they cannot be imagined without space and time. However, Wittgenstein's view also differs from that Kant, in the respect that space and time to be forms of object because for Wittgenstein it is not logically possible to think

otherwise. On the other hand, Kant rejects this view of Wittgenstein, because according to him, intuition is the possibility of all experience and it is which gives the principles knowledge. Therefore, space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition and not just forms of object. Wittgenstein regarded space and time to be forms of object. This view is clear from his quotation, "Time and colour (colouredness) are forms of object."6 However, Wittgenstein has not drawn any distinction between object and properties. Here, he differs from Russell. Russell has drawn such distinction on the epistemological level. But, for Wittgenstein, if we cannot draw any logical and ontological distinction between them therefore an epistemological distinction also cannot be drawn. Wittgenstein also differs from Russell in regards to the simplicity of objects. Wittgenstein regards objects to be logically simple but not in a phenomenological sense. However, according to Russell, objects are those which are designated to language by demonstrative pronoun which according to him are logical proper names. He also holds that demonstrative pronouns like 'this', 'that' are used to refer sense data. Thus, the objects according to Russell are simple in phenomenological or epistemological sense. Wittgenstein regarded objects to be distinguishable not because of its perceptibility or imperceptibility but because of its individuality. Wittgenstein uses the term 'object' in a technical sense. He does not mean by objects to be house, mat, table or desks only, however it also takes into account all of such things. Objects form the substance of the world but they can be known only through the facts in which they occur. If there are two objects then there must be one atomic fact because objects required fact to occur. It is objects internal property. Objects like things-in-themselves are logical. The difference between things-in-themselves and things- as they appear is similar to the difference between objects and atomic facts. Things- in themselves are the substance of the world

but they are known only through things as they appear. Thus, Wittgensteinian objects in *Tractatus* are similar to the Kantian things-in-themselves in the Critique of Pure Reason.

According to Wittgenstein, objects correspond to names in propositions, which combine to form language. Name refers to the objects of which they are names in a sentence. Names have no sense but will have sense when present in a sentence. Names cannot be understood like sentence can be understood. To understand the meaning of a name denotation is required. Wittgenstein was influenced by Frege's distinguishing sense from reference. However, there is a debate regarding the meaning of a name. Most commentators believe that, according to Wittgenstein, meaning of a name is the object it denotes. According to them, "name means an object; the object is its meaning."[7] However, some commentators believe that Wittgenstein was wrongly interpreted. The words involved in the quotation are 'mean' and 'meaning'. According to them, these were not understood correctly. What Wittgenstein actually meant was very different. The word which misunderstood by different commentators were, 'bedeutet' and 'bedeutung' which were translated into English as 'means' and 'meaning' respectively. However, if we have a careful look into the words used by Wittgenstein then it can be seen that the meaning of the word bedeutet also mean 'refers', 'signify' or 'stand for'. Again, the meaning of the term 'bedeutung' in German language is also meant as referent, signified etc. however, these commentators also believes that it is not the case of wrong translation because 'mean' and 'meaning' also use as 'refer' and 'referent' in English language, it is just that Wittgenstein had used these words in different sense. Thus, if we look at the quotation 3.203 we find – "A name refers an object, the object is its referent" [8]by this Wittgenstein meant that every name must have a referent and the referent is the object. The object is not meaning of the name it denotes but rather the name stands for an object. A name

cannot be defined, because it is simple and it only stands for an object. However, it is to be noted that the reason for all this confusion is that Wittgenstein has used many of the terms ambiguously in *Tractatus*. He has used a particular term in different sense in different occasion of the book which required clarifications. But Wittgenstein never put effort to give any clarification.

Thus, it may be said that names have meaning by their denoting ability. A name can be meaningful when it denotes something other than itself. However, before knowing the meaning of a name we must know the thing by ostension to which the name denotes. Thus naming and knowing are always taken together in *Tractatus* and it also marks the beginning of the *Investigations*.

On the other hand, in *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein main emphasis was on grammar. Language functions under the strict rules of grammar. Grammar is regarded to be a tool which enables language to function properly. However, it to be noted that grammar in his later philosophy is like what logic was in his early philosophy. In the *Investigations* grammar replaces logic for all practical purposes in to rules of language. But, it does not mean that Wittgenstein in his later philosophy has less concern about logic. It is only that Wittgenstein has adopted a new approach regarding the treatment of logic and language.

Wittgenstein in his later philosophy can be seen to move forward from his early metaphysics into a more practical view. Here, he regards language to be a practice. His notion of grammar is also based on the rules of language which believes that language is a practice. These rules made language an institution with repeatable application. It is based on the view that these rules guide the use of language. Wittgenstein in

Philosophical Investigation has come with theory called the 'use theory'. Language is just a jumble of sounds. It only becomes meaningful when articulated by a speaker to hearer. This interaction between the speaker and the hearer has to be occurred in a life situation. Thus, a sign becomes meaningful only when it is actually used or employed. It is like the pieces in a chess game, the role of pieces determines its function similarly a word can be understood by its function or use. Wittgenstein also compares the words with tools in a tool box. He compared tools with toolbox to show the divergent function of words like different tools in a tool box. He wrote,

"Think of words as instruments characterized by their use…."

""Think of the tools in a tool box, there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue pot, glue, nails & screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.""9

Thus, Wittgenstein compares words in language with the tool in toolbox to show that there is no function common between the tools similarly words also do not have one function instead they have multiplicity of function.

Wittgenstein also put forwarded the view of language game in *Philosophical Investigations.* Words are pieces in language game like the pieces in chess board where the importance of a particular piece is known by the role of the piece in the game. Similarly the meaning of a particular word can be known by its place in the language game. According to Wittgenstein, a word or an expression has its meaning from the modes of behaviour. Malcolm also states the same, "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life."10 here what Malcolm and Wittgenstein meant that there are no

common or general use for word or expression; instead they have a particular use. And their use can only be determined by their place in language game or forms of life.

Language game is also regarded by Wittgenstein to constitute the basic relation between the world and language. In *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein already said about this projective relation between world and language. But Wittgenstein could not properly explain this relation in Tractatus . During the period 1929-35 he was occupied in trying to understand the relation, his paper *Some Remarks on Logical Form* stands as a proof for his pre-occupation during that period. There is other writing which also shows his concern about the relation between world and language in the middle period. Thus, he reached the concept of language game which is regarded to be the link between name-object relations. It is language game which connects words and sentences in the language, to objects and facts of the world. There are certain rule governed human activities which help us to understand the connection between the expressions of our language with that of the world. J. Hintikka and M. Hintikka states that, "The learning of language does not consist, St Augustine and the author of the Tractatus notwithstanding, in a series of acquisitions of sundry names for different entities. It consists in learning those language game that serve to mediate world object relations. The teaching of these games is logically speaking more like training the learner in a new skill than conveying to him definitions of words and expressions, no matter whether or not these definitions are verbal."[11]

 In his later philosophy, he regarded 'language games to be the measure of all things'. In Philosophical Investigations language games plays much important role than rules. It is not only logic of rules but also logic of language games. Language games are regarded to be prior to the role played by rules in Philosophical Investigations. Hintikka and Hintikka hold that "Language games does not replace name-object relation found in *Tractatus* , it

190

in fact constitute the relation. Although the notion of rules also played an important part in his later philosophy, but language games are given more importance by Wittgenstein. The notion of rules is called the notion of criterion. It is also most widely discussed topic in his later philosophy. Criterion and rule are used by Wittgenstein almost very closely in the writings of his middle period. A criterion for a phenomenon seems to provide the speaker with a rule for the use of a word referring to this phenomenon, and a rule for the use of an expression apparently yields a criterion for its correct use."[12]

It can be said that the words "language games' and "criterion" are co-relative terms. To need for criteria for the use of a word is mean to need for a public language game where the word plays a role. The occurrence of the word "criteria" is found in the discussion of rule-following part in the *Philosophical Investigations*. But it cannot be said that the whole part of rule following is based on criteria because it is the language games which determines whether or not a rule is followed. Thus language games are not learned by learning criteria; in fact they are taught or learned by training and practices in day to day activities.

Thus, language games occupy a supreme place in Wittgenstein later philosophy. Wittgenstein also brought up the concept of family resemblance in *Philosophical Investigations* to explain the similarity between different language games. These language games have various similarities but they do not have any common essence. In *Tractatus ,* Wittgenstein believes that there is a common essence of language which lies underneath the surface and we need needs to decipher it by analysis. But, in *Philosophical Investigations,* there is no common essence of language games because language games are intrinsically connected with human activities and behaviour, our practical affairs, our personal and public activities, our relationship with the world, in other words it may be

said that language games are connected with the diverse forms of life and we form these forms of life by living in it as social beings. Thus, these language games have resemblance among them like the members of a family. Every member of a family is itself independent still has certain similarity in their nature, behaviour or in their looks. Likewise every language game is different still they have certain similarities among them.

Thus, Wittgenstein main emphasis in both his early and later philosophy is on language. According to him, philosophical problem mostly arises because of misuse of language. Wittgenstein states that, "Philosophical problem arises when language goes on a holiday"[13]. According to him, philosophical problem may be solved by looking into the working of our language. Philosophy also helps us recognize those working of our language, despite of an urge to misunderstand them. He asserts that "the problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known"[14]

In *Tractatus ,* Wittgenstein talked about the self. He tried to reconcile the transcendental nature of self to the world. Wittgenstein also tried to draw a distinction between the empirical self and the transcendental self. His concept of self can be traced back from the *Notebooks* (1914-16) where this distinction can be found. The empirical self-according to Wittgenstein is not a real self. He regarded the empirical self as a psycho-physical self which is present in the world itself. It is the human beings which are not the real self. A real self is that which is beyond the world and also beyond experience. It is the self which cannot be grasped by the facts of the world. Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* regarded the self to be limit of the world. Therefore, the self must transcends the world. It cannot be the object of the world. Wittgenstein wrote, "The 'I' is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the 'I'. So there really is a way in which there can and must be

mention of the 'I' in a non-psychological sense in philosophy. The 'I' makes its appearance in philosophy through the world's being my world." [15]

Wittgenstein tried to tackle the problems of the first person pronoun which give rise to the questions of 'the ego' or 'the self'. He tried to answer these questions which are found in his writings in the *Notebook*. In *Tractatus*, also we found some of the reflections of the discussions in the section 5.6 of the book. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein's idea of the self has some familiarity with that of the ideas found in the history of philosophy. However, his concept of self was primarily influenced by Schopenhauer's book, *The World as Will and Representation.* Schopenhauer's philosophy is a version of transcendental idealism which also has some similarities with that of Kant. Like Kant, he also was critical of Descartes view of the "self as the 'knowing subject' as the self-subsistent immaterial substance and 'of the external world' consisting of material substance set over against the subject as the object of possible knowledge."[16] According to Schopenhauer, the knowing self is indeed the presupposition of the possibility of experience and knowledge. However, the knowing self cannot be the object of the world as we experience it –the world as representation. It is transcendental, it transcends the phenomenal world. Its relation to the world is like the eye and the visual field. "The eye sees everything except itself."[17] Similarly, the world as we experience is not independent of the experience of it. It is, like Kant says phenomenally real and transcendentally ideal. The world as representation is there in space and time and which are regarded to be the forms of intuition. The perceiving subject is out there in the world like the object which are said to be the constituents of the world but the subject which is beyond the world, Kant called it noumena or things in itself. However, according to Kant, it is unknown to us but for Schopenhauer it is not unknowable. It helps us to access our inner

consciousness through the path which is called 'Will' by him. The Will is said to be the noumenal world which underlies the phenomenal world. The Will is not just one will among many other will, it is The Will as the World Will. Our subjective intentional actions are conducted by the objectified Will.

The early Wittgenstein was influenced by this concept of Will of Schopenhauer. He believed that the world as representation can only represented in language. The World as Will is beyond the phenomenal world. The Will is regarded to be the moral agent who has moral influence upon the world. However, the influence is also limited because it can only influence the meaning of the world but not the facts. Facts always remain what or how they are only the meaning changes according to the will whether the will is good or bad. Wittgenstein wrote,

""If the good or bad exercise of the will alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts of the world what can be expressed by means of language."

"In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and a wane as a whole.""[18]

Thus, the Will or the transcendental self is just a helpless spectator of the world because it can never change the facts of the world. Thus, the world is indifferent to the transcendental self and its will.

Wittgenstein concept of self, in *Tractatus ,* is different from Descartes. Wittgenstein does not regard the self to be the part of the world as Descartes did. The fact that the metaphysical self is the limit of the world points out the anti-substantial notion of the self. Descartes regarded the self to be a substance. However, Wittgenstein also made clear that we cannot think of the world apart from this metaphysical self. The empirical self which

is part of the world presupposes the transcendental self. The transcendental self-cast a shadow over the empirical self and also regulates its actions in the world.

Wittgenstein concept self also differs from the Humean concept of self. Hume reduced the self to just a bundle sensations. But for Wittgenstein self is real. The transcendental self is different from the thinking and experiencing subject. Hume does not even accept thinking and experiencing self. Wittgenstein even regarded the self to be the bearer of ethics. It is the bearer of good and evil in his early philosophy.

R.C Pradhan states that, "Wittgenstein's account of self in his early philosophy leaves many question answered. First of all, what is the relation between the self and the world? Secondly what is the role of self in language and world? And lastly, is the self a substance or just a shadow- a vanishing shadow? All these questions tend to throw doubt on the transcendental view of self. Wittgenstein is undeterred by the fact that the self cannot be talked about in language like the not-self or the world. He, therefore, keeps the self at the limit of the world and says a little about it. All this may sounds as if he has a mystic silence on the subject. One may wonder if the self can have any relation with the world at all except being in the limit of the latter. But is the limit a relation at all? It may imply the cancellation of all relations. That is why the transcendental self cannot play the role of a causal agent to the world. That is, it cannot causally influence the states of affairs in the world."[19]

However, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein tried to get rid of the Schopenhauer's transcendentalism concept of the self. He also tried to get rid of the 'I' in philosophical usage. In *Tractatus* also Wittgenstein tried to approach the problems of the logical analysis of the first person propositions through investigations of the believe sentences.

195

In the sentences 'A believes that p' and 'I believes that p', it appears as if such proposition describes a relation between an object and a proposition. However in the proposition 'I believe that p' 'I' is not a logical proper name signifying an object or an empirical soul or substance. There are indeed psychic facts, some of which constitutes representations of how things are in the world, they have psychic constituents, but there is no soul substance or any object that owns this psychic element. Therefore, in *Investigations,* he holds that, the 'I' can be eliminated from language. He stated that instead of 'I think' we should say 'It thinks'. According to him, the use of the word 'I' is regarded to be one of the most misleading representational techniques in our language for immediate experience. These traditional problems can be solved only when we try to investigate the use of the first person pronoun.

According to P.M.S Hacker, Wittgenstein tried to solve the problems of nature mind as well as the self during the period 1930s. The problems left us with three alternatives-

(i)   "Cartesian doctrine of the mind or soul which is connected to the body, and also which we use referring the word I".(ii) "Humean theories which refer to an inner self".(iii) "Kantian account which indicates a moral self which is transcendental".

(ii)   Wittgenstein also took his own transcendentalism into consideration. However, in the *Notebooks* 1914-16 and his theory of 'no ownership' in *Philosophical Remarks* regarded all these to be the symptoms of grammatical misunderstandings.

Wittgenstein also agreed with Descartes that, the 'I' word does not only refer to the body. We do not always recognize a person by its bodily characteristics but it does not imply

that there is something residing in the body i.e., mind or soul. According to Hacker, what Wittgenstein meant, is that the word 'I' only is one symbol which has a practical use, it does not refer to a body, soul or not even a person. Wittgenstein believes that 'I' does not differ from person –referring expressions (e.g. N.N, he) as a hammer from a mallet but as a hammer from nail. This claim implies to a paradoxical concept of the word 'I'. Hacker tried to make the point clear by stating,

"When I claim that 'I have pain' or 'I think that such and such', or is about to go, I am manifesting my pain, giving opinion, drawing my attention to myself, or expressing my intention. I do so by using the first person pronoun, but in so using it I do not pick out one person from among others. One might object that just as when I assert 'he is in pain' or 'N.N thinks such and such', so here too I know that I am in pain- although that is not because my evidence is slender. I do not know by being in pain that someone else does not have the same pain. 'I know' prefixed to an avowal, unlike 'I know' prefixed to a corresponding third person sentence, does not signify an item of knowledge. Furthermore, a whole battery of epistemic terms- e.g. 'I doubt', 'I wonder', 'I suspect', 'I guess'- either cannot intelligibly be prefixed to first-person present –tense psychological sentences or, if they can, they function quite differently from cases where they are prefixed to third-person sentences. These differences too earmark the distinctive role of the first-person pronoun over this part of its range of use, a role which fundamentally misleading to treat it as being on the same level as person referring expressions." [20]

Wittgenstein thought that teaching differences is one of the methods for dissolving philosophical problems. According to him, these problems arise because of the assimilation of various expressions which resembles one another. But, according to him, these expressions belongs to a family of distinct but overlapping paradigm, therefore, they

cannot be brought under one simple paradigm to determine a certain kind of speech function. The history of the philosophical reflection of 'the self' is one example which shows the misunderstandings which give rise to these problems. Another example is the world 'I' which is thought to refer to something to a mental entity, to a thinking self which is connected with a substance. But according to Wittgenstein there are difference between the word I and proper names, descriptions, other personal pronouns, differences in function, in identification of the bearer, in grammatical combination with other expression, verification etc.

Thus, Wittgenstein has denied that, there is any separate and a private substance called 'mind' or 'thinking self'. Though he does not denied mental predicates but he denied the concept of mind as a substance. According to him, mental predicates do not refer to any entity which is private and cannot be introspected. Mental states are nothing but particular patterns of behaviour. For Wittgenstein it is grammatical mistakes to hold mind is a private entity. It is only the word 'mind' which has its place in the language game which does imply that there is a real substance called mind.

Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, discussed about the different mental concepts. He regarded memory and remembering to be mental concepts. However, he does not regard meaning and understanding to be mental concepts. Wittgenstein states that it is a general disease to believe meaning and understanding to be mental states. According to him, words in themselves are lifeless; therefore, there is a need to add meaning to these words in order to make them understandable. However, many a times a mental activity is thought to be responsible to add meaning to these words. But, Wittgenstein believes that, it is incorrect to assume any such mental activities instead it is the use of the words which makes them meaningful. "Meaning is a flow of life that only can make an expression

significant." Meaning and understanding, according to Wittgenstein, does not determined by what is going on in a speaker's or a hearer's mind. It is only use of the word which makes them lively. Wittgenstein holds that understanding is also closely related with the grammar of the word 'to know'. Understanding is not a state like pain, depression etc. 'To know how to go on' may mean different things in different situations therefore understanding is also not a mental state or process.

Wittgenstein also does not regarded thought to be an inner process. According to him, the concept of inner is a grammatical fiction. The concept of the inner presents a misleading picture of the mind. It arises because of our misuse of grammar concerning the words about mental activities. According to Wittgenstein, statements which express mental activities for example, 'I am in pain' is different from the statement 'I have a hand'. The statements about mental activities are not descriptive statement. They are avowal of mental activities. They are first person present tense which expresses statement about the mind avowals.

Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, also put forward the private language argument. Wittgenstein's discussion of the argument was actually an attack on Cartesian concept of mind. According to him, private language is that where only the speaker can understand it referring to his immediate experience and which cannot be known by anyone else. According to Wittgenstein, such language is not possible. Language is a way of communication which contain within it different activities, rules, systems etc which are necessarily public. These characteristics cannot be held in private language. Language is essentially public; therefore, it has certain rules to follow. Since, private language can only be known by the speaker, therefore there is no means of verifying himself whether or not he is correct while using it. He has also provided many thought experiments like the

'beetle analogy' and the 'diary argument' to prove his point. However, there is huge debate among different philosophers regarding this 'Private Language Argument'. Many commentators on Wittgenstein, like Baker and Hacker, argued that, such a language is possible. But, there are philosophers who also supported Wittgenstein, like Malcolm. According to them, such a language lacks verification and it is far from possible because such a language cannot be a proper language. Language is a social activity. Such a characteristic is missing in private language. Thus Wittgenstein concept of 'Private Language Argument' is a variously discussed topic and it also occupies an important place in Western Philosophy even today.

Thus, from the above discussion, we may conclude that both his early and later philosophy were significant in their own place. Wittgenstein in both the stages always tried to show how language helps us to understand different aspects of life. His main focus was upon the relationship shared between language and world. He tried hard to make us clear about the relation between world and language. Wittgenstein, in both his stages of philosophy, he never tried to solve problems like mind or body or soul. His only aim was clarification. In both in his early and later philosophy, Wittgenstein tried clarify our use of language so that we do not "fall into trap of misleading appearance of the ordinary language". He tried to eliminate conceptual confusions for a better understanding of how our language works. His later view where he gave importance to language games goes against that of logical positivist's view that gave importance to Formal language. Wittgenstein regarded ordinary language to be more real than Formal language. According to him, 'Formal language' creates confusion in everyday life. In his earlier method he tried to analyze the hidden logical structure of language. On the other hand, in his later philosophy, he tried to solve philosophical problems by clarifying the use of the

grammar of language and to show how words are applied to language games which are governed by the grammar. Thus, in *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein focused on the ontological explanation of language, and in the *Investigations,* Wittgenstein focused on the ordinary language where he regarded language to be a form of life.

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WORLD, MIND AND LANGUAGE-A WITTGENSTEINIAN STUDY

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Although Wittgenstein's work is divided into two phases early and later yet it is said that there is an implicit unity in them. Some philosophers regarded that it is an extreme misconception to believe that these two phases are mutually contradictory. A careful study of the two phases shows that they are in fact interrelated and supplementary to each other. A. Pampapathy Rao states that Wittgenstein himself suggested a comparative study of his two great works. Rao wrote "He himself suggests a comparative study of the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* to avoid any misunderstanding; and suggested that such a study is necessary to understand that the two phases of his thoughts are interlinked and each of them is supplementary to the other. He makes this suggestion as he was aware of the real unity which lies concealed behind the apparent disconnectedness."1 Hence, Wittgenstein was aware of the interconnection between *Tractatus* and *Investigations*. The view of world, language and mind occupies a very important space in both Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. It can also be said that these three are the most important concepts which are discussed variously in Wittgenstein's philosophy. If we look into these concepts more carefully then we find that there are certain differences as well as similarities in his early and later views. Therefore, we can say that there is a unique unity between his two books *Tractatus* and *Investigations* which were written in his early and later stages respectively. Both the books are inseparable to each other.

However, despite of the unity, if we compare the view of world in *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations* then it appears to be two different views. The former view which Wittgenstein held in *Tractatus* was more metaphysical. He regarded the world to

be a "totality of facts." He was concerned with the logical structure of the world. He gave more emphasis on how the world and language are related to one another. How the logical structure of the language mirrors the structure of the world.

In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein was influenced mostly by different views of Frege and Russell. As a result *Tractatus* may be regarded to be a simultaneous development against the works of Frege and Russell regarding language and logic. Wittgenstein tried to develop certain ideas of Frege and Russell which he was interested in. Their basic aim was to reduce complex concept into simple elements through the employment of logical analysis. Therefore, in *Tractatus* also we find the same method. Wittgenstein also adopted a similar method and thereby tried to explain the complex structure of the world by breaking it into the ultimate simple through logical analysis. Wittgenstein tried to analyze the world and found that the world is divided into various facts. The facts are further classified into state of affairs and states of affairs are further divided into objects. Hence, in this way Wittgenstein regarded the world to be composed of facts.

However, there are a number of issues related to the conception of the world in *Tractatus*. It was argued that Wittgenstein did not provide any example of either facts or objects. The objects of *Tractatus* also raised a number of questions. Marks Addis wrote,

"The claim that objects are simple is that they are wholly devoid of complexity. In the book, Wittgenstein provided no guidance about how to identify an object. The issue of whether and in what ways he thought that such objects could be recognized in complex. Evidence from the *Notebooks* 1914-1916 suggests Wittgenstein held that it was possible in principle to specify objects provided logical analysis was carried far enough. For example, he observed that it seemed to him 'perfectly possible that patches in our visual

field are simple objects, in that we do not perceive any single point of patch separately; the visual appearance of stars even seem correctly to be so', here 'patches in our visual field' means sections with the visual field with no noticeable parts. The claim here was that certain entities would either count as objects or would turn out to be so. In the *Tractatus* , Wittgenstein had not resolved these questions or decided upon what would be regarded as an instance of simple object. Later he remarked that at the time his thought had been that he was a logician; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter! It seems evident that Wittgenstein's anti-psychologism which sought to ensure that generally the objects of judgment were wholly independent from the concerns of psychology was a major contributory factor in his inability to identify the objects of the *Tractatus* . Arguably, he thought that the sort of analysis required to determine what they were more properly came under the province of psychology."[2].

Thus, Wittgenstein tried to analyze the constituent of the world yet failed to give a clear specification of them. This was his major drawback in *Tractatus* regarding his view of the world.

 In *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein tried to provide a more practical view of world with his conception of forms of life. He regarded form of life to be a way in which human being lives as a linguistic being. Forms of life are regarded to be nothing other than the different aspects of lives and social reality of the world. Language games, for Wittgenstein, are a part of form of life. Each language is a part of form of life and is also expressions of human action. Wittgenstein regarded language not only the medium of communication but also that through which world can be expressed. Each language games depict a distinct form of life through which it depicts the world or social reality in turn.

With this view of form of life Wittgenstein has adapted to practical view of the world which was missing in his earlier philosophy. But in later philosophy also Wittgenstein's main aim was to show the relation between world and language. He believes that it is essential because without language world cannot be accessed at all.

However, the 'World' in *Philosophical Investigations* is not metaphysical or logical possible world like that of *Tractatus* . Wittgenstein's idea of forms of life depicts the social reality or the world we are living in. He put forward the view of forms of life to mean the realm of social reality. Language is social in nature and meanings of words are constructed because of the social interactions of the people. By rejecting the notion of private language, Wittgenstein tried to show that language does not belong to the isolated regions in a speaker's mind but it is in fact belongs to a social reality. Meanings are constantly brought into being and are also discarded by the community of speakers. Meanings are not constructed in the mind of the speakers in isolation to everything in the world. They are also not constructed to refer anything which belong to outside of reality because there are many instances where there is no objective reference but still certain words have meaning like 'unicorn' or 'Santa clause'. Thus, for Wittgenstein meaning of the words are in the use of how they are put in different language games practice in social reality or social world.

Language is a social phenomenon. It is used by different people in a society. All aspects of life are learned and taught through language only. Man cannot live in isolation, without belonging to other members of the community or society, and language (including certain non-linguistic activities) is the only medium of his communication with the other members of the community, thus language becomes a bridge which links man to the world. Language is, therefore, essentially embedded in the world. How this relationship

is carried out is explained by Wittgenstein by the idea of language games and forms of life.

Wittgenstein believes that it is essential because without language world cannot be known or accessed at all. He tried to show a different view of language and world with his concept of language games and forms of life integrated together. Wittgenstein came to realize language is not an abstract system but a social practice. Understanding language requires us to focus on how it is used by members of linguistic community. He regarded language and meaning to be primarily public which are embedded in our social practice. Henry Loy Finch, in book, *Wittgenstein: the later philosophy,* stated that, the view of forms of life in Wittgenstein philosophy does not only show the relation between language games and its meaning but it has a wider context of our everyday life and everyday certainties. Wittgenstein has also discussed in details about forms of life and our everyday certainties in his book "Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology", Wittgenstein wrote,

"…the fact that we act such and such ways, e.g., punish certain actions, establish the state of affairs thus and so, give orders, render accounts……….are facts of living" (RPP I, 630)

According to Finch, these facts of living discussed by Wittgenstein can only be followed in a society or in a social setting. This social setting and our forms of living in this setting creates a world. This world is different from the world of *Tractatus* which was thought to be logically possible. This world is our everyday world with all our everyday certainties.

The main theme around which the whole *Tractatus* centers is about language and how it is connected with the world. How language functions with its names and proposition which has equivalents with the world containing objects and states of affairs and things

and situations. In *Philosophical Investigations* also Wittgenstein maintained the same theme but here he has modified his concept of the connection between language and the world. Here, Wittgenstein used the concept of language games which binds language with the world. However, in his early philosophy, he used the concept of picture theory of meaning to show the relation between world and language. This theory is that in which the very essence of *Tractatus* is reflected. Thus, there is a shift from *Tractatus* to *Investigations* of viewing the world as a fixed structured to a fluid structured which is bound up by our everyday practices and forms of life.

In the preface of the *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein says that his new thoughts can be understood only by contrast with the thoughts of the *Tractatus*, and that the *Tractatus* contains many grave mistakes. However, Wittgenstein never discussed in what way his new thoughts should contrasted with his earlier one and he also never told what were the grave mistakes that he made in *Tractatus* .

Many commentators believed that they can be successfully find out the mistakes by the help of the hints given in the *Investigations* and elsewhere in Wittgenstein's later writings. And most of them thought that the picture theory of meaning was the prime mistake Wittgenstein was talking about. Some of them have even contended that Wittgenstein's rejection of the picture theory forms the demarcation line between Wittgenstein's later and early philosophy.

However, there is a debate between different commentators that whether Wittgenstein has completely rejected the picture theory of meaning or whether he carried out his later philosophy on the base of his early philosophy. That Wittgenstein rejected the picture theory was claimed by many philosophers among them is George Pitcher. Pitcher's book,

An Introduction to the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, is one of the important books on Wittgenstein. It is also considered to be a joint treatment of both *Tractatus* and *Investigations*. Pitcher says that as a result of Wittgenstein's later criticisms "the picture theory is dissolved into nothingness. It vanishes without a trace." Peter Hacker and James Bogen and many other philosophers also argued in a similar way like Pitcher on the same view. However, Anthony Kenny had listed a great number of statements which shows that Wittgenstein had not rejected the picture theory of meaning completely. However, it is also true that from Wittgenstein's various remarks in his later writing it suggest that he found the theory to be problematic, but it cannot be said that he considered it to be one of the fundamental error in his book. Erik Stenius in his paper, "A picture theory and Wittgenstein's later attitude to it", argued in this regard. Stenius believed that Wittgenstein has not completely abandoned the picture theory of meaning. In many of the sections in the *Investigations* shows that Wittgenstein still gave importance to Picture theory of meaning, for example in the section 522 of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein states that a comparison of a sentence to a picture has a point. Stenius on the same paper also argued that Wittgenstein later became dissatisfied with the picture theory for giving it too much attention for explaining how language functions. But it does not mean that he has completely rejected the picture theory of meaning.

R.C Pradhan, regarding 'Picture Theory of Meaning', states that, "Wittgenstein was not intended to construct a theory in the strict sense of the term in the *Tractatus*. As Wittgenstein was an analytic philosopher his main emphasis was to analyze language. When language is analyzed one is bound to encounter propositions as the constituents of language. Wittgenstein always believed that language and world are interrelated. Therefore, he believed that these constituents of propositions are representations of the

facts in the world. And as such picture theory was formed. But later Wittgenstein realized his mistakes in the picture theory and tried to rectify it in the *Investigations*. In *Tractatus* Wittgenstein believed that the metaphysics of the essence of the world must be founded on logic that discloses the essence of language."[3] However, in his later period, Wittgenstein realizes that his earlier view demanded that language and world be viewed from a standpoint that has little to do with the actual language we speak and the actual world we live in. He came to realize that his earlier view has limited the nature of language and confined language only to one function that is to uncover its essence. Moreover, he also questions the whole idea inherited from Frege and Russell. He discarded the very idea logical form is concealed in our language and that it needs philosophical penetration to be unearthened. Logical form in this sense is something which logic alone can provide. It is the very idea that regards logic to be something which is devoid of vagueness, which is truly pure and is beyond space and time. This led Wittgenstein to state in *Tractatus* that, "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror image of the world. Logic is transcendental."[4] This kind of thinking has led Wittgenstein in his early philosophy to vest logic with the metaphysical task of providing a mirror image of the world. This makes logic a "transcendental project" of bringing out the logical essence of the world. R.C Pradhan further holds that, "according to Wittgenstein the whole transcendental project was misguided because logic has no competence to discover the logical structure of the world."[5]

Thus, it is difficult to say that whether or not Wittgenstein has completely rejected the picture theory of proposition, however, from various discussion in *Investigations* it is to be certain that Wittgenstein never went back to his early philosophy instead he tried to move forward with a new vision and a new version of the relation between man, language

and world. However, it may also be said that, many trends of the picture theory is found in his later philosophy. It also seems that Wittgenstein did not give up the basic idea of the picture theory in his later writings.

Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* attempts to establish an isomorphic relation between language and the world. There is a denotational theory of meaning involved in *Tractatus*. According to this theory, the meaning of an expression is its referent. However, in *Tractatus* there are two sides of this denotational theory. The first is denotational theory of meaning of a word and the other is the denotational theory of the meaning of a sentence. The first denotational theory states that the meaning of a word is the object it denotes and the other denotational theory states that the meaning of a sentence is the situation which pictures. Thus, we have two denotational theories one is referent theory in regard to meaning of a word and picture theory in regard to the meaning of sentence.

Regarding the first denotational theory that is the meaning of the word is the object it denotes, "object" also occupies an important place in it. Wittgenstein believes that objects stands in combinations with one another in a state of affair. It is objects which forms the substance of reality. Objects are the base of the world, they are changeless but the change in their configuration is the change which is to be found in the world. Wittgenstein's view of object comes very close to Kantian view. Like Kant, Wittgenstein holds that there is a notion of space-time involved in the view of object. The world is regarded to be totality of facts, therefore it is within the configuration of space and time, and hence there cannot be anything outside of it. Therefore objects also are one or many component of it. As objects have extensions therefore they cannot be imagined without space and time. However, Wittgenstein's view also differs from that Kant, in the respect that space and time to be forms of object because for Wittgenstein it is not logically possible to think

otherwise. On the other hand, Kant rejects this view of Wittgenstein, because according to him, intuition is the possibility of all experience and it is which gives the principles knowledge. Therefore, space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition and not just forms of object. Wittgenstein regarded space and time to be forms of object. This view is clear from his quotation, "Time and colour (colouredness) are forms of object."6 However, Wittgenstein has not drawn any distinction between object and properties. Here, he differs from Russell. Russell has drawn such distinction on the epistemological level. But, for Wittgenstein, if we cannot draw any logical and ontological distinction between them therefore an epistemological distinction also cannot be drawn. Wittgenstein also differs from Russell in regards to the simplicity of objects. Wittgenstein regards objects to be logically simple but not in a phenomenological sense. However, according to Russell, objects are those which are designated to language by demonstrative pronoun which according to him are logical proper names. He also holds that demonstrative pronouns like 'this', 'that' are used to refer sense data. Thus, the objects according to Russell are simple in phenomenological or epistemological sense. Wittgenstein regarded objects to be distinguishable not because of its perceptibility or imperceptibility but because of its individuality. Wittgenstein uses the term 'object' in a technical sense. He does not mean by objects to be house, mat, table or desks only, however it also takes into account all of such things. Objects form the substance of the world but they can be known only through the facts in which they occur. If there are two objects then there must be one atomic fact because objects required fact to occur. It is objects internal property. Objects like things-in-themselves are logical. The difference between things-in-themselves and things- as they appear is similar to the difference between objects and atomic facts. Things- in themselves are the substance of the world

186

but they are known only through things as they appear. Thus, Wittgensteinian objects in *Tractatus* are similar to the Kantian things-in-themselves in the Critique of Pure Reason.

According to Wittgenstein, objects correspond to names in propositions, which combine to form language. Name refers to the objects of which they are names in a sentence. Names have no sense but will have sense when present in a sentence. Names cannot be understood like sentence can be understood. To understand the meaning of a name denotation is required. Wittgenstein was influenced by Frege's distinguishing sense from reference. However, there is a debate regarding the meaning of a name. Most commentators believe that, according to Wittgenstein, meaning of a name is the object it denotes. According to them, "name means an object; the object is its meaning."[7] However, some commentators believe that Wittgenstein was wrongly interpreted. The words involved in the quotation are 'mean' and 'meaning'. According to them, these were not understood correctly. What Wittgenstein actually meant was very different. The word which misunderstood by different commentators were, 'bedeutet' and 'bedeutung' which were translated into English as 'means' and 'meaning' respectively. However, if we have a careful look into the words used by Wittgenstein then it can be seen that the meaning of the word bedeutet also mean 'refers', 'signify' or 'stand for'. Again, the meaning of the term 'bedeutung' in German language is also meant as referent, signified etc. however, these commentators also believes that it is not the case of wrong translation because 'mean' and 'meaning' also use as 'refer' and 'referent' in English language, it is just that Wittgenstein had used these words in different sense. Thus, if we look at the quotation 3.203 we find – "A name refers an object, the object is its referent" [8]by this Wittgenstein meant that every name must have a referent and the referent is the object. The object is not meaning of the name it denotes but rather the name stands for an object. A name

cannot be defined, because it is simple and it only stands for an object. However, it is to be noted that the reason for all this confusion is that Wittgenstein has used many of the terms ambiguously in *Tractatus*. He has used a particular term in different sense in different occasion of the book which required clarifications. But Wittgenstein never put effort to give any clarification.

Thus, it may be said that names have meaning by their denoting ability. A name can be meaningful when it denotes something other than itself. However, before knowing the meaning of a name we must know the thing by ostension to which the name denotes. Thus naming and knowing are always taken together in *Tractatus* and it also marks the beginning of the *Investigations*.

On the other hand, in *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein main emphasis was on grammar. Language functions under the strict rules of grammar. Grammar is regarded to be a tool which enables language to function properly. However, it to be noted that grammar in his later philosophy is like what logic was in his early philosophy. In the *Investigations* grammar replaces logic for all practical purposes in to rules of language. But, it does not mean that Wittgenstein in his later philosophy has less concern about logic. It is only that Wittgenstein has adopted a new approach regarding the treatment of logic and language.

Wittgenstein in his later philosophy can be seen to move forward from his early metaphysics into a more practical view. Here, he regards language to be a practice. His notion of grammar is also based on the rules of language which believes that language is a practice. These rules made language an institution with repeatable application. It is based on the view that these rules guide the use of language. Wittgenstein in

Philosophical Investigation has come with theory called the 'use theory'. Language is just a jumble of sounds. It only becomes meaningful when articulated by a speaker to hearer. This interaction between the speaker and the hearer has to be occurred in a life situation. Thus, a sign becomes meaningful only when it is actually used or employed. It is like the pieces in a chess game, the role of pieces determines its function similarly a word can be understood by its function or use. Wittgenstein also compares the words with tools in a tool box. He compared tools with toolbox to show the divergent function of words like different tools in a tool box. He wrote,

"Think of words as instruments characterized by their use…."

""Think of the tools in a tool box, there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue pot, glue, nails & screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.""9

Thus, Wittgenstein compares words in language with the tool in toolbox to show that there is no function common between the tools similarly words also do not have one function instead they have multiplicity of function.

Wittgenstein also put forwarded the view of language game in *Philosophical Investigations.* Words are pieces in language game like the pieces in chess board where the importance of a particular piece is known by the role of the piece in the game. Similarly the meaning of a particular word can be known by its place in the language game. According to Wittgenstein, a word or an expression has its meaning from the modes of behaviour. Malcolm also states the same, "An expression has meaning only in the stream of life."10 here what Malcolm and Wittgenstein meant that there are no

common or general use for word or expression; instead they have a particular use. And their use can only be determined by their place in language game or forms of life.

Language game is also regarded by Wittgenstein to constitute the basic relation between the world and language. In *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein already said about this projective relation between world and language. But Wittgenstein could not properly explain this relation in Tractatus . During the period 1929-35 he was occupied in trying to understand the relation, his paper *Some Remarks on Logical Form* stands as a proof for his pre-occupation during that period. There is other writing which also shows his concern about the relation between world and language in the middle period. Thus, he reached the concept of language game which is regarded to be the link between name-object relations. It is language game which connects words and sentences in the language, to objects and facts of the world. There are certain rule governed human activities which help us to understand the connection between the expressions of our language with that of the world. J. Hintikka and M. Hintikka states that, "The learning of language does not consist, St Augustine and the author of the Tractatus notwithstanding, in a series of acquisitions of sundry names for different entities. It consists in learning those language game that serve to mediate world object relations. The teaching of these games is logically speaking more like training the learner in a new skill than conveying to him definitions of words and expressions, no matter whether or not these definitions are verbal."[11]

 In his later philosophy, he regarded 'language games to be the measure of all things'. In Philosophical Investigations language games plays much important role than rules. It is not only logic of rules but also logic of language games. Language games are regarded to be prior to the role played by rules in Philosophical Investigations. Hintikka and Hintikka hold that "Language games does not replace name-object relation found in *Tractatus* , it

in fact constitute the relation. Although the notion of rules also played an important part in his later philosophy, but language games are given more importance by Wittgenstein. The notion of rules is called the notion of criterion. It is also most widely discussed topic in his later philosophy. Criterion and rule are used by Wittgenstein almost very closely in the writings of his middle period. A criterion for a phenomenon seems to provide the speaker with a rule for the use of a word referring to this phenomenon, and a rule for the use of an expression apparently yields a criterion for its correct use."[12]

It can be said that the words "language games' and "criterion" are co-relative terms. To need for criteria for the use of a word is mean to need for a public language game where the word plays a role. The occurrence of the word "criteria" is found in the discussion of rule-following part in the *Philosophical Investigations*. But it cannot be said that the whole part of rule following is based on criteria because it is the language games which determines whether or not a rule is followed. Thus language games are not learned by learning criteria; in fact they are taught or learned by training and practices in day to day activities.

Thus, language games occupy a supreme place in Wittgenstein later philosophy. Wittgenstein also brought up the concept of family resemblance in *Philosophical Investigations* to explain the similarity between different language games. These language games have various similarities but they do not have any common essence. In *Tractatus ,* Wittgenstein believes that there is a common essence of language which lies underneath the surface and we need needs to decipher it by analysis. But, in *Philosophical Investigations,* there is no common essence of language games because language games are intrinsically connected with human activities and behaviour, our practical affairs, our personal and public activities, our relationship with the world, in other words it may be

said that language games are connected with the diverse forms of life and we form these forms of life by living in it as social beings. Thus, these language games have resemblance among them like the members of a family. Every member of a family is itself independent still has certain similarity in their nature, behaviour or in their looks. Likewise every language game is different still they have certain similarities among them.

Thus, Wittgenstein main emphasis in both his early and later philosophy is on language. According to him, philosophical problem mostly arises because of misuse of language. Wittgenstein states that, "Philosophical problem arises when language goes on a holiday"[13]. According to him, philosophical problem may be solved by looking into the working of our language. Philosophy also helps us recognize those working of our language, despite of an urge to misunderstand them. He asserts that "the problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known"[14]

In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein talked about the self. He tried to reconcile the transcendental nature of self to the world. Wittgenstein also tried to draw a distinction between the empirical self and the transcendental self. His concept of self can be traced back from the *Notebooks* (1914-16) where this distinction can be found. The empirical self-according to Wittgenstein is not a real self. He regarded the empirical self as a psycho-physical self which is present in the world itself. It is the human beings which are not the real self. A real self is that which is beyond the world and also beyond experience. It is the self which cannot be grasped by the facts of the world. Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* regarded the self to be limit of the world. Therefore, the self must transcends the world. It cannot be the object of the world. Wittgenstein wrote, "The 'I' is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the 'I'. So there really is a way in which there can and must be

mention of the 'I' in a non-psychological sense in philosophy. The 'I' makes its appearance in philosophy through the world's being my world." [15]

Wittgenstein tried to tackle the problems of the first person pronoun which give rise to the questions of 'the ego' or 'the self'. He tried to answer these questions which are found in his writings in the *Notebook*. In *Tractatus ,* also we found some of the reflections of the discussions in the section 5.6 of the book. In the *Tractatus ,* Wittgenstein's idea of the self has some familiarity with that of the ideas found in the history of philosophy. However, his concept of self was primarily influenced by Schopenhauer's book, *The World as Will and Representation.* Schopenhauer's philosophy is a version of transcendental idealism which also has some similarities with that of Kant. Like Kant, he also was critical of Descartes view of the "self as the 'knowing subject' as the self-subsistent immaterial substance and 'of the external world' consisting of material substance set over against the subject as the object of possible knowledge."[16] According to Schopenhauer, the knowing self is indeed the presupposition of the possibility of experience and knowledge. However, the knowing self cannot be the object of the world as we experience it –the world as representation. It is transcendental, it transcends the phenomenal world. Its relation to the world is like the eye and the visual field. "The eye sees everything except itself."[17] Similarly, the world as we experience is not independent of the experience of it. It is, like Kant says phenomenally real and transcendentally ideal. The world as representation is there in space and time and which are regarded to be the forms of intuition. The perceiving subject is out there in the world like the object which are said to be the constituents of the world but the subject which is beyond the world, Kant called it noumena or things in itself. However, according to Kant, it is unknown to us but for Schopenhauer it is not unknowable. It helps us to access our inner

193

consciousness through the path which is called 'Will' by him. The Will is said to be the noumenal world which underlies the phenomenal world. The Will is not just one will among many other will, it is The Will as the World Will. Our subjective intentional actions are conducted by the objectified Will.

The early Wittgenstein was influenced by this concept of Will of Schopenhauer. He believed that the world as representation can only represented in language. The World as Will is beyond the phenomenal world. The Will is regarded to be the moral agent who has moral influence upon the world. However, the influence is also limited because it can only influence the meaning of the world but not the facts. Facts always remain what or how they are only the meaning changes according to the will whether the will is good or bad. Wittgenstein wrote,

""If the good or bad exercise of the will alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts of the world what can be expressed by means of language."

"In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and a wane as a whole.""[18]

Thus, the Will or the transcendental self is just a helpless spectator of the world because it can never change the facts of the world. Thus, the world is indifferent to the transcendental self and its will.

Wittgenstein concept of self, in *Tractatus ,* is different from Descartes. Wittgenstein does not regard the self to be the part of the world as Descartes did. The fact that the metaphysical self is the limit of the world points out the anti-substantial notion of the self. Descartes regarded the self to be a substance. However, Wittgenstein also made clear that we cannot think of the world apart from this metaphysical self. The empirical self which

194

is part of the world presupposes the transcendental self. The transcendental self-cast a shadow over the empirical self and also regulates its actions in the world.

Wittgenstein concept self also differs from the Humean concept of self. Hume reduced the self to just a bundle sensations. But for Wittgenstein self is real. The transcendental self is different from the thinking and experiencing subject. Hume does not even accept thinking and experiencing self. Wittgenstein even regarded the self to be the bearer of ethics. It is the bearer of good and evil in his early philosophy.

R.C Pradhan states that, "Wittgenstein's account of self in his early philosophy leaves many question answered. First of all, what is the relation between the self and the world? Secondly what is the role of self in language and world? And lastly, is the self a substance or just a shadow- a vanishing shadow? All these questions tend to throw doubt on the transcendental view of self. Wittgenstein is undeterred by the fact that the self cannot be talked about in language like the not-self or the world. He, therefore, keeps the self at the limit of the world and says a little about it. All this may sounds as if he has a mystic silence on the subject. One may wonder if the self can have any relation with the world at all except being in the limit of the latter. But is the limit a relation at all? It may imply the cancellation of all relations. That is why the transcendental self cannot play the role of a causal agent to the world. That is, it cannot causally influence the states of affairs in the world."[19]

However, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein tried to get rid of the Schopenhauer's transcendentalism concept of the self. He also tried to get rid of the 'I' in philosophical usage. In *Tractatus* also Wittgenstein tried to approach the problems of the logical analysis of the first person propositions through investigations of the believe sentences.

In the sentences 'A believes that p' and 'I believes that p', it appears as if such proposition describes a relation between an object and a proposition. However in the proposition 'I believe that p' 'I' is not a logical proper name signifying an object or an empirical soul or substance. There are indeed psychic facts, some of which constitutes representations of how things are in the world, they have psychic constituents, but there is no soul substance or any object that owns this psychic element. Therefore, in *Investigations,* he holds that, the 'I' can be eliminated from language. He stated that instead of 'I think' we should say 'It thinks'. According to him, the use of the word 'I' is regarded to be one of the most misleading representational techniques in our language for immediate experience. These traditional problems can be solved only when we try to investigate the use of the first person pronoun.

According to P.M.S Hacker, Wittgenstein tried to solve the problems of nature mind as well as the self during the period 1930s. The problems left us with three alternatives-

(i)   "Cartesian doctrine of the mind or soul which is connected to the body, and also which we use referring the word I".(ii) "Humean theories which refer to an inner self".(iii) "Kantian account which indicates a moral self which is transcendental".

(ii)   Wittgenstein also took his own transcendentalism into consideration. However, in the *Notebooks* 1914-16 and his theory of 'no ownership' in *Philosophical Remarks* regarded all these to be the symptoms of grammatical misunderstandings.

Wittgenstein also agreed with Descartes that, the 'I' word does not only refer to the body. We do not always recognize a person by its bodily characteristics but it does not imply

that there is something residing in the body i.e., mind or soul. According to Hacker, what Wittgenstein meant, is that the word 'I' only is one symbol which has a practical use, it does not refer to a body, soul or not even a person. Wittgenstein believes that 'I' does not differ from person –referring expressions (e.g. N.N, he) as a hammer from a mallet but as a hammer from nail. This claim implies to a paradoxical concept of the word 'I'. Hacker tried to make the point clear by stating,

"When I claim that 'I have pain' or 'I think that such and such', or is about to go, I am manifesting my pain, giving opinion, drawing my attention to myself, or expressing my intention. I do so by using the first person pronoun, but in so using it I do not pick out one person from among others. One might object that just as when I assert 'he is in pain' or 'N.N thinks such and such', so here too I know that I am in pain- although that is not because my evidence is slender. I do not know by being in pain that someone else does not have the same pain. 'I know' prefixed to an avowal, unlike 'I know' prefixed to a corresponding third person sentence, does not signify an item of knowledge. Furthermore, a whole battery of epistemic terms- e.g. 'I doubt', 'I wonder', 'I suspect', 'I guess'- either cannot intelligibly be prefixed to first-person present –tense psychological sentences or, if they can, they function quite differently from cases where they are prefixed to third-person sentences. These differences too earmark the distinctive role of the first-person pronoun over this part of its range of use, a role which fundamentally misleading to treat it as being on the same level as person referring expressions." [20]

Wittgenstein thought that teaching differences is one of the methods for dissolving philosophical problems. According to him, these problems arise because of the assimilation of various expressions which resembles one another. But, according to him, these expressions belongs to a family of distinct but overlapping paradigm, therefore, they

cannot be brought under one simple paradigm to determine a certain kind of speech function. The history of the philosophical reflection of 'the self' is one example which shows the misunderstandings which give rise to these problems. Another example is the world 'I' which is thought to refer to something to a mental entity, to a thinking self which is connected with a substance. But according to Wittgenstein there are difference between the word I and proper names, descriptions, other personal pronouns, differences in function, in identification of the bearer, in grammatical combination with other expression, verification etc.

Thus, Wittgenstein has denied that, there is any separate and a private substance called 'mind' or 'thinking self'. Though he does not denied mental predicates but he denied the concept of mind as a substance. According to him, mental predicates do not refer to any entity which is private and cannot be introspected. Mental states are nothing but particular patterns of behaviour. For Wittgenstein it is grammatical mistakes to hold mind is a private entity. It is only the word 'mind' which has its place in the language game which does imply that there is a real substance called mind.

Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, discussed about the different mental concepts. He regarded memory and remembering to be mental concepts. However, he does not regard meaning and understanding to be mental concepts. Wittgenstein states that it is a general disease to believe meaning and understanding to be mental states. According to him, words in themselves are lifeless; therefore, there is a need to add meaning to these words in order to make them understandable. However, many a times a mental activity is thought to be responsible to add meaning to these words. But, Wittgenstein believes that, it is incorrect to assume any such mental activities instead it is the use of the words which makes them meaningful. "Meaning is a flow of life that only can make an expression

significant." Meaning and understanding, according to Wittgenstein, does not determined by what is going on in a speaker's or a hearer's mind. It is only use of the word which makes them lively. Wittgenstein holds that understanding is also closely related with the grammar of the word 'to know'. Understanding is not a state like pain, depression etc. 'To know how to go on' may mean different things in different situations therefore understanding is also not a mental state or process.

Wittgenstein also does not regarded thought to be an inner process. According to him, the concept of inner is a grammatical fiction. The concept of the inner presents a misleading picture of the mind. It arises because of our misuse of grammar concerning the words about mental activities. According to Wittgenstein, statements which express mental activities for example, 'I am in pain' is different from the statement 'I have a hand'. The statements about mental activities are not descriptive statement. They are avowal of mental activities. They are first person present tense which expresses statement about the mind avowals.

Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, also put forward the private language argument. Wittgenstein's discussion of the argument was actually an attack on Cartesian concept of mind. According to him, private language is that where only the speaker can understand it referring to his immediate experience and which cannot be known by anyone else. According to Wittgenstein, such language is not possible. Language is a way of communication which contain within it different activities, rules, systems etc which are necessarily public. These characteristics cannot be held in private language. Language is essentially public; therefore, it has certain rules to follow. Since, private language can only be known by the speaker, therefore there is no means of verifying himself whether or not he is correct while using it. He has also provided many thought experiments like the

'beetle analogy' and the 'diary argument' to prove his point. However, there is huge debate among different philosophers regarding this 'Private Language Argument'. Many commentators on Wittgenstein, like Baker and Hacker, argued that, such a language is possible. But, there are philosophers who also supported Wittgenstein, like Malcolm. According to them, such a language lacks verification and it is far from possible because such a language cannot be a proper language. Language is a social activity. Such a characteristic is missing in private language. Thus Wittgenstein concept of 'Private Language Argument' is a variously discussed topic and it also occupies an important place in Western Philosophy even today.

Thus, from the above discussion, we may conclude that both his early and later philosophy were significant in their own place. Wittgenstein in both the stages always tried to show how language helps us to understand different aspects of life. His main focus was upon the relationship shared between language and world. He tried hard to make us clear about the relation between world and language. Wittgenstein, in both his stages of philosophy, he never tried to solve problems like mind or body or soul. His only aim was clarification. In both in his early and later philosophy, Wittgenstein tried clarify our use of language so that we do not "fall into trap of misleading appearance of the ordinary language". He tried to eliminate conceptual confusions for a better understanding of how our language works. His later view where he gave importance to language games goes against that of logical positivist's view that gave importance to Formal language. Wittgenstein regarded ordinary language to be more real than Formal language. According to him, 'Formal language' creates confusion in everyday life. In his earlier method he tried to analyze the hidden logical structure of language. On the other hand, in his later philosophy, he tried to solve philosophical problems by clarifying the use of the

grammar of language and to show how words are applied to language games which are governed by the grammar. Thus, in *Tractatus ,* Wittgenstein focused on the ontological explanation of language, and in the *Investigations,* Wittgenstein focused on the ordinary language where he regarded language to be a form of life.

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